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THE 
WORKERS  AT  WAR 


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TTbc  Century  flew  TKHorU)  Series 

W.    F.    WlLLOUGHBY,    GENERAL   EDITOR 


THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  SCIENCE 
Edited  by  Robert  M.  Yerkes 

POLITICAL  SYSTEMS  IN  TRAN- 
SITION 

By  Charles  G.  Fenwick 

THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

By  Frank  Julian  Warne 


Other  titles  will  be  published  later 


3be  Gentun;  flew  Motto  Settee 


I 


THE 
WORKERS  AT  WAR 


BY 

FRANK  JULIAN ^WARNE 

MANAGER  INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS,  UNITED   STATES 
HOUSING  CORPORATION 

Author  of  "The  Tide  of  Immigration,"  etc. 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1920 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
THE  CENTUBY  Co. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  SOUTHERN  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


MY  CREED 

I  believe  in  the  United  States  of  America  as  a  gov- 
ernment of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the  people, 
whose  just  powers  are  derived  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed;  a  democracy  in  a  republic;  a  sovereign 
Nation  of  many  sovereign  States;  a  perfect  Union, 
one  and  inseparable,  established  upon  those  principles 
of  freedom,  equality,  justice,  and  humanity  for  which 
American  patriots  sacrificed  their  lives  and  fortunes. 
I  therefore  believe  it  is  my  duty  to  my  country  to  love 
it ;  to  support  its  Constitution ;  to  obey  its  laws ;  to 
respect  its  flag;  and  to  defend  it  against  all  enemies. 
—  WILLIAM  TYLER  PAGE. 


I  further  am  of  the  faith  that  each  and  all  of  these 
can  best  be  realized  through  democracy  in  industry 
which  will  secure  and  assure  to  all  the  people  a  fair 
profit  to  the  producer,  a  fair  wage  to  the  worker,  and 
a  fair  price  to  the  consumer. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  THE  WORLD  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY 3 

II  DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  AMERICAN  WORKINGMAN  .     .  14 

III  INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKERS   ...  26 

IV  THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 35 

V  THE  AMERICAN  WORKINGMAN  AT  WAR     ....  48 

VI  WORKING  FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  ......  59 

VII  THE  GOVERNMENT  AS  THE  EMPLOYER 69 

VIII  THE  WILSON  ADMINISTRATION'S  LABOR  POLICY  .  .  79 

IX  THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  RAILWAY  EMPLOYES  .  .  88 

X  THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  SHIPBUILDING  LABOR  ...  99 

XI  THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  COAL  MINE  WORKERS  .  .  .  in 

XII  THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  .  .119 

XIII  THE  NATIONAL  WAR  LABOR  BOARD 131 

XIV  THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR 140 

XV  THE  GOVERNMENT,  WAGES,  AND  THE  COST  OF  LIVING  152 

XVI  THE  Vicious  CYCLE  AND  THE  LABOR  UNION  .     .      .  162 

XVII  CAUSES  AND  EFFECTS  OF  THE  Vicious  CYCLE  .     .      .  175 

XVIII  THE  Vicious  CYCLE,  STRIKES,  AND  THE  CONSUMER  .  187 

XIX  DEMOCRACY  IN  INDUSTRY 200 

XX  THE  THREE  PARTIES  TO  PRODUCTION     .....  210 

XXI  INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  THE  CONSUMER  .      .     .  219 

XXII  INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  THE  CORPORATION     .     .  230 

XXIII  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONSUMER 240 


THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  WORLD  WAR   AND  DEMOCRACY 

WHEN  the  Imperial  German  Army  in  August,  1914, 
moved  like  an  avalanche  through  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
burg into  northern  France  there  was  no  statesman  sufficiently 
keen  in  discernment  who  would  have  prophesied  America's 
participation  in  the  conflict.  Americans  at  first  were  only 
mildly  interested  in  the  event,  believing  it  to  be  another  of  those 
numerous  quarrels  between  European  nations  with  which  their 
traditions  taught  them  they  had  no  concern.  They  watched 
the  developments  of  the  first  months  of  the  war  as  detailed  in 
the  newspapers  with  little  national  concern ;  only  as  detached 
groups  was  interest  manifested .  in  expressions  favorable  to 
one  side  or  the  other  as  the  fortunes  of  war  shifted. 

There  were  those  in  the  nation  who  sympathized  deeply  with 
violated  Belgium  and  its  people.  There  were  others,  as  had 
always  been  the  case  when  France  was  threatened  ever  since 
the  American  Revolution,  who  felt  deep  concern  for  the  safety 
and  welfare  of  the  French  Republic  and  people.  Still  others 
were  strongly  pro-British  in  their  traditions  and  sympathies. 
Russia  was  then  still  an  Empire  ruled  over  by  the  autocratic 
Czar  and,  because  of  its  traditional  antagonism  to  popular 
government  and  democratic  movements,  did  not  appeal  in  its 
war  aims  to  any  very  large  group  among  the  American  people. 
To  Russia's  war  campaigns,  however,  were  attached  the  feelings 
that  accompanied  the  failure  or  success  of  her  efforts  as  an 
ally  of  Belgium,  France,  and  Great  Britain.  There  was  also 

3 


4  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

in  America  a  large  group  in  sympathy  with  the  war  aims  of 
Germany  and  her  allies.  Most  of  these  were  immigrants 
from  that  country  or  their  descendants  in  whose  hearts  still 
burned  love  of  the  Fatherland. 

While  this  was  true  as  to  large  groups  in  the  United  States 
it  still  also  was  true  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the 
great  majority  of  Americans  were  not  conscious  of  any  funda- 
mental concern  in  the  conflict.  They  saw,  at  that  time,  none 
of  their  vital  principles  of  government  at  stake ;  they  perceived 
no  danger  threatening  their  cherished  institutions  ;  they  were  in- 
terested primarily  only  as  spectators  of  world  events.  For  so 
many  years  of  their  national  existence  had  they  kept  hands  off 
in  quarrels  between  European  states  that  they  had  no  thought  to 
intervene  or  become  a  participant.  On  the  contrary,  they  had 
been  taught,  from  the  very  first  days  of  their  existence  as  a 
nation,  not  to  become  involved  in  foreign  entangling  alliances. 
Washington,  their  first  President,  had  warned  them,  and  his 
successors  had  repeated  the  warning,  that  their  security  as  a 
nation  depended  upon  the  observance  of  this  principle  of  action. 
And  for  more  than  a  century  and  a  quarter  they  had  consist- 
ently followed  this  precept. 

This  attitude  undoubtedly  would  have  continued  to  the  end, 
had  not  events  brought  to  them  realization  that  their  very  in- 
dependence and  liberties  were  involved  in  the  war's  final  out- 
come. Not  alone  through  dynamite  and  bomb  outrages  in  in- 
dustrial plants  in  the  United  States  by  German  sympathizers; 
by  the  insidious  plotting  of  spies;  by  attempts  to  embroil 
Mexico  in  an  attack  upon  the  American  people,  but  also  and 
principally  by  the  inhuman  work  of  German  submarines  in 
sinking  cargo  and  passenger  vessels,  and  even  hospital  ships 
on  the  high  seas,  involving  the  lives  and  property  rights  of 
American  citizens  —  was  the  attitude  of  the  American  people 
gradually  changed  from  that  of  non-interference  to  one  of 
growing  concern  as  to  their  own  safety  as  a  nation  and  finally 
to  that  of  active  participation. 

It  is  doubtful  if  the  American  people  would  have  gone  to 


THE  WORLD  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY  5 

war  even  over  the  sinking  of  American  vessels  by  German 
submarines  as  their  Government  is  usually  tolerant  enough  to 
give  weight  to  the  exigencies  of  war  times.  It  is  equally  doubt- 
ful if  proof  of  a  conspiracy  by  officials  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government,  to  stir  up  the  antagonism  of  a  neighboring  nation 
on  the  south,  would  of  itself  have  caused  America  to  declare 
war  against  the  German  Government.  The  dynamiting  and 
bombing  of  industrial  plants  in  this  country,  which  were  pro- 
ducing war  munitions  for  the  French,  British  and  their  allies, 
certainly  would  not  of  itself  have  driven  America  into  the  war; 
nor  would  the  intrigues  of  German  spies  alone  have  had  this 
effect. 

Not  a  single  one  of  the  specific  causes  of  complaint  against 
Germany  was  of  itself  sufficient  to  cause  the  American  people 
finally  to  take  sides  against  the  Central  Powers.  But  each  of 
these  causes  did  supply  convincing  evidence  that  something 
more  fundamental  than  the  usual  European  quarrel  between 
nations  was  at  stake  in  the  conflict.  And  this  something  more 
fundamental  the  American  people  slowly  began  to  see  was  in 
reality  a  conflict  between  two  great  and  vital  principles  of  gov- 
ernment —  the  principles  of  autocracy  and  of  democracy. 
Without  question  it  was  because  the  American  people  were  led 
finally  to  believe  that  democracy  with  its  representative  govern- 
ment was  at  stake  that  they  entered  the  war. 

This,  in  brief,  is  the  explanation  of  the  causes  of  the  arrival 
of  another  fateful  day  just  two  years  and  eight  months  after 
the  beginning  of  the  Great  War,  when  the  American  people 
directed  their  President  and  Congress  to  take  the  official  action 
which  threw  them  as  an  active  participant  into  the  vortex  of 
the  world  war.  On  Monday,  April  12,  1917,  Congress,  by 
joint  resolution,  declared  "  a  state  of  war  exists  between  the 
Imperial  German  Government  and  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States."  The  President  was  authorized 
and  directed  "  to  employ  the  entire  naval  and  military  forces 
of  the  United  States  and  the  resources  of  the  Government  to 
carry  on  war  against  the  Imperial  German  Government;  and 


6  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

to  bring  the  conflict  to  a  successful  termination  all  the  re- 
sources of  the  country  "  were  pledged. 

Nothing  stirred  the  soul  of  the  nation  with  stronger  appeal 
as  an  effective  war  cry  than  President  Wilson's  paraphrase  of 
the  object  of  the  war — "The  world  must  be  made  safe  for 
democracy."  "  We  are  glad,  now  that  we  see  the  facts  with 
no  veil  of  false  pretense  about  them,"  said  the  President  in  his 
address  to  Congress  advising  the  declaration  of  war,  "  to  fight 
thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the  world  and  for  the  liberation 
of  its  peoples,  the  German  peoples  included,  for  the  rights  of 
nations,  great  and  small,  and  the  privilege  of  men  everywhere 
to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedience.  The  world  must 
be  made  safe  for  democracy.  Its  peace  must  be  planted  upon 
the  tested  foundations  of  political  liberty.  We  have  no  selfish 
ends  to  serve.  We  desire  no  conquest,  no  dominion.  We  seek 
no  indemnities  for  ourselves,  no  material  compensation  for 
the  sacrifices  we  shall  freely  make.  We  are  but  one  of  the 
champions  of  the  rights  of  mankind.  We  shall  be  satisfied 
when  those  rights  have  been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith  and 
the  freedom  of  nations  can  make  them." 

Welcoming  the  Governors  of  the  various  States  and  repre- 
sentatives of  State  Councils  of  National  Defense  at  the  White 
House  on  May  2,  1917,  the  President  said  that  the  great  task 
before  the  American  people  was  to  make  good  what  the  nation 
had  promised  to  do  — "  go  to  the  defense  and  vindication  of  the 
rights  of  people  everywhere  to  live  as  they  have  a  right  to  live 
under  the  very  principles  of  our  Nation." 

In  a  communication  to  the  provisional  Government  of 
Russia,1  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  explain  "  the  objects 
which  the  United  States  has  had  in  mind  in  entering  the  war," 
the  President  said :  "  The  position  of  America  in  this  war  is 
so  clearly  avowed  that  no  man  can  be  excused  for  mistaking 
it.  She  seeks  no  material  profit  or  aggrandizement  of  any  kind. 
She  is  fighting  for  no  advantage  or  selfish  object  of  her  own, 
but  for  the  liberation  of  peoples  everywhere  from  the  aggres- 

1  Published  June  9,  1917. 


THE  WORLD  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY  7 

sions  of  autocratic  force."  Further  on  in  the  communication 
the  President  said :  "  We  are  fighting  for  the  liberty,  the  self- 
government  and  the  undictated  development  of  all  peoples." 
Again  he  said:  "  The  brotherhood  of  mankind  must  no  longer 
be  a  fair  but  empty  phrase;  it  must  be  given  a  structure  of 
force  and  reality.  The  nations  must  realize  their  common  life 
and  effect  a  workable  partnership  to  secure  that  life  against 
the  aggressions  of  autocratic  and  self-pleasing  power." 

"  The  great  fact  that  stands  out  above  all  the  rest,"  said 
President  Wilson  at  the  celebration  of  Flag  Day  on  June  14, 
1917,  "  is  that  this  is  a  people's  war,  a  war  for  freedom  and 
justice  and  self-government  amongst  all  the  nations  of  the 
world,  a  war  to  make  the  world  safe  for  the  peoples  who  live 
upon  it  and  have  made  it  their  own,  the  German  people  them- 
selves included." 

In  virtually  every  address  made  by  President  Wilson  follow- 
ing the  formal  declaration  of  war  he  aimed  to  interpret  some- 
thing of  the  spirit  of  the  American  people  as  to  the  object  of 
their  war  against  the  Imperial  German  Government.  In  a 
Memorial  Day  address  at  the  Arlington  Cemetery  near  Wash- 
ington on  May  30,  1917,  he  said: 

"  Any  Memorial  Day  of  this  sort  is,  of  course,  a  day  touched 
with  sorrowful  memory,  and  yet  I  for  one  do  not  see  how  we 
can  have  any  thought  of  pity  for  the  men  whose  memory  we 
honor  today.  I  do  not  pity  them.  I  envy  them,  rather;  be- 
cause theirs  is  a  great  work  for  liberty  accomplished  and  we 
are  in  the  midst  of  a  work  unfinished,  testing  our  strength 
where  their  strength  has  already  been  tested.  There  is  a  touch 
of  sorrow,  but  there  is  a  touch  of  reassurance  also  in  a  day  like 
this,  because  we  know  how  the  men  of  America  have  responded 
to  the  call  of  the  cause  of  liberty  and  it  fills  our  minds  with  a 
perfect  assurance  that  that  response  will  come  again  in  equal 
measure,  with  equal  majesty,  and  with  a  result  which  will  hold 
the  attention  of  all  mankin'd. 

"  When  you  reflect  upon  it,  these  men  who  died  to  preserve 
the  Union  died  to  preserve  the  instrument  which  we  are  now 
using  to  serve  the  world  —  a  free  Nation  espousing  the  cause 
of  human  liberty.  In  one  sense  the  great  struggle  into  which 


8  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

we  have  now  entered  is  an  American  struggle,  because  it  is  in 
defense  of  American  honor  and  American  rights,  but  it  is 
something  even  greater  than  that ;  it  is  a  world  struggle.  It  is 
the  struggle  of  men  who  love  liberty  everywhere,  and  in  this 
cause  America  will  show  herself  greater  than  ever  because 
she  will  rise  to  a  greater  thing.  \Ve  have  said  in  the  beginning 
that  we  planted  this  great  Government  that  men  who  wished 
freedom  might  have  a  place  of  refuge  and  a  place  where  their 
hope  could  be  realized,  and  now,  having  established  such  a 
Government,  having  vindicated  the  power  of  such  a  Govern- 
ment, we  are  saying  to  all  mankind,  '  We  did  not  set  this  Gov- 
ernment up  in  order  that  we  might  have  a  selfish  and  separate 
liberty,  for  we  are  now  ready  to  come  to  your  assistance  and 
fight  out  upon  the  field  of  the  world  the  cause  of  human  liberty.' 
In  this  thing  America  attains  her  full  dignity  and  the  full  frui- 
tion of  her  great  purpose. 

"  No  man  can  be  glad  that  such  things  have  happened  as 
we  have  witnessed  in  these  last  fateful  years,  but  perhaps  it 
may  be  permitted  to  us  to  be  glad  that  we  have  an  opportunity 
to  show  the  principles  that  we  profess  to  be  living  principles 
that  live  in  our  hearts,  and  to  have  a  chance  by  the  pouring  out 
of  our  blood  and  treasure  to  vindicate  the  thing  which  we  have 
professed.  For,  my  friends,  the  real  fruition  of  life  is  to  do 
the  thing  we  have  said  we  wished  to  do.  There  are  times 
when  words  seem  empty  and  only  action  seems  great.  Such 
a  time  has  come,  and  in  the  providence  of  God  America  will 
once  more  have  an  opportunity  to  show  to  the  world  that  she 
was  born  to  serve  mankind." 

As  the  President  linked  our  object  in  the  war  against  Ger- 
many with  the  purpose  of  the  men  who  fought  to  preserve  the 
Union,  so  he  as  strikingly  identified  that  object  with  the  purpose 
of  the  men  who  fought  to  establish  the  Union.  His  Thanks- 
giving Day  Proclamation  in  November,  1917,  served,  as  did  all 
his  public  utterances,  to  arouse  and  maintain  steadfast  loyalty 
to  the  Government  in  its  prosecution  of  the  war.  In  that 
Proclamation  he  said : 

"  We  have  been  given  this  opportunity  to  serve  mankind  as 
we  once  served  ourselves  in  the  great  day  of  our  Declaration 
of  Independence,  by  taking  up  arms  against  a  tyranny  that 
threatened  to  master  and  debase  men  everywhere  and  joining 


THE  WORLD  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY  9 

with  other  free  peoples  in  demanding  for  all  the  nations  of  the 
world  what  we  then  demanded  and  obtained  for  ourselves. 
In  this  day  of  the  revelation  of  our  duty  not  only  to  defend 
our  own  rights  as  a  nation  but  to  defend  also  the  rights  of  free 
men  throughout  the  world,  there  has  been  vouchsafed  us  in 
full  and  inspiring  measure  the  resolution  and  spirit  of  united 
action."  We  are  "  in  the  midst  of  the  greatest  enterprise  the 
spirits  of  men  have  ever  entered  upon.  ...  A  new  light  shines 
about  us.  The  great  duties  of  a  new  day  awaken  a  new  and 
greater  national  spirit  in  us.  We  shall  never  again  be  divided 
or  wonder  what  stuff  we  are  made  of." 

Speaking  at  the  tomb  of  Washington  at  Mount  Vernon  on 
July  4,  1918,  President  Wilson  said : 

*'  Washington  and  his  associates  were  thinking,  not  of  them- 
selves and  of  the  material  interests  which  centered  in  the  little 
groups  of  landholders  and  merchants  and  men  of  affairs  with 
whom  they  were  accustomed  to  act,  in  Virginia  and  the  colonies 
to  the  north  and  south  of  her,  but  of  a  people  which  wished 
to  be  done  with  classes  and  special  interests  and  the  authority 
of  men  whom  they  had  not  themselves  chosen  to  rule  over 
them.  They  entertained  no  private  purpose,  desired  no  pecu- 
liar privilege.  They  were  consciously  planning  that  men  of 
every  class  should  be  free  and  America  a  place  to  which  men 
out  of  every  nation  might  resort  who  wished  to  share  with 
them  the  rights  and  privileges  of  free  men.  And  we  take  our 
cue  from  them,  do  we  not?  We  intend  what  they  intended. 
We  here  in  America  believe  our  participation  in  this  present 
war  to  be  only  the  fruitage  of  what  they  planted.  Our  case 
differs  from  theirs  only  in  this,  that  it  is  our  inestimable  priv- 
ilege to  concert  with  men  out  of  every  nation  which  shall  make 
not  only  the  liberties  of  America  secure  but  the  liberties  of  every 
other  people  as  well.  We  are  happy  in  the  thought  that  we 
are  permitted  to  do  what  they  would  have  done  had  they  been 
in  our  place.  There  must  now  be  settled  once  for  all  what 
was  settled  for  America  in  the  great  age  upon  whose  inspira- 
tion we  draw  today.  .  .  . 

"  This,  then,  is  our  conception  of  the  great  struggle  in  which 
we  are  engaged.  The  plot  is  written  plain  upon  every  scene 
and  every  act  of  the  supreme  tragedy.  On  the  one  hand, 
stand  the  peoples  of  the  world  —  not  only  the  peoples  actually 
engaged,  but  many  others  also  who  suffer  under  mastery  but 


io  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

cannot  act ;  peoples  of  many  races  and  in  every  part  of  the 
world  —  the  people  of  stricken  Russia  still  among  the  rest 
though  they  are  for  the  moment  unorganized  and  helpless. 
Opposed  to  them,  masters  of  many  armies,  stand  an  isolated, 
friendless  group  of  governments  who  speak  no  common  pur- 
pose, but  only  selfish  ambitions  of  their  own  by  which  none 
can  profit  but  themselves,  and  whose  peoples  are  fuel  in  their 
hands;  governments  which  fear  their  people  and  yet  are  for 
the  time  their  sovereign  lords,  making  every  choice  for  them 
and  disposing  of  their  lives  and  fortunes  as  they  will,  as  well  as 
of  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  every  people  who  fall  under  their 
power — governments  clothed  with  the  strange  trappings  and 
the  primitive  authority  of  an  age  that  is  altogether  alien  and 
hostile  to  our  own.  The  Past  and  the  Present  are  in  deadly 
grapple  and  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  being  done  to  death 
between  them." 

President  Wilson's  ability  to  arouse  the  patriotic  motives 
and  impulses  of  the  American  people  by  linking  the  object  for 
which  they  went  to  war  against  Germany  with  those  of  the 
historic  events  of  their  growth  as  a  nation  is  again  illustrated 
in  his  message  to  the  farmers'  conference  in  session  at  Urbana, 
Illinois,  January  31,  1918.  In  that  address  he  declared  the 
object  of  the  war  in  which  we  were  engaged  to  be  "  the  greatest 
that  free  men  have  ever  undertaken  " ;  "  it  was  necessary  for 
us  as  a  free  people  to  take  part  in  this  war  " ;  America  is  fight- 
ing "  as  truly  for  the  liberty  and  self-government  of  the  United 
States  as  if  the  war  of  our  own  Revolution  had  to  be  fought 
over  again  " ;  "  our  national  life  and  our  whole  economic  de- 
velopment will  pass  under  the  sinister  influence  of  foreign  con- 
trol if  we  do  not  win  " ;  "  America  has  the  greatest  opportunity 
she  has  ever  had  to  make  good  her  own  freedom  and  in  mak- 
ing it  good  to  lend  a  helping  hand  to  men  struggling  for  their 
freedom  everywhere  " ;  "  it  was  farmers  from  whom  came  the 
first  shots  at  Lexington,  that  set  aflame  the  revolution  that 
made  America  free  " ;  and  "  this  great  last  war  for  the  emanci- 
pation of  men  from  the  control  of  arbitrary  government  and 
the  selfishness  of  class  legislation  and  control." 

President  Wilson  lost  no  opportunity  early  in  the  war  to 


THE  WORLD  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY          11 

state  and  re-state  and  reiterate  the  objects  and  purposes  for 
which  the  United  States  entered  the  European  conflict.  In 
concise  and  clear-cut  comparisons  he  identified  our  participation 
in  the  war  as  a  part  of  the  American  struggle  for  independence 
and  democracy  and  he  constantly  drew  analogies  between  our 
purposes  in  the  present  conflict  and  those  of  the  past  by  which 
the  United  States  was  established  and  preserved  as  a  Republic. 
In  the  Presidential  address  at  the  joint  session  of  the  House 
and  Senate  on  December  4,  19^7,  in  which  Congress  was  asked 
to  declare  war  against  Austro-Hungary,  he  said : 

"  For  us  this  is  a  war  of  high  principle,  debased  by  no  selfish 
ambition  of  conquest  or  spoliation;  ...  we  have  been  forced 
into  it  to  save  the  very  institutions  we  live  under  from  corrup- 
tion and  destruction.  The  purposes  of  the  Central  Powers 
strike  straight  at  the  very  heart  of  everything  we  believe  in; 
their  methods  of  warfare  outrage  every  principle  of  humanity 
and  of  knightly  honor;  their  intrigue  has  corrupted  the  very 
thought  and  spirit  of  many  of  our  people;  their  sinister  and 
secret  diplomacy  has  sought  to  take  our  very  territory  away 
from  us  and  disrupt  the  Union  of  the  States.  Our  safety 
would  be  at  an  end,  our  honor  forever  sullied  and  brought  into 
contempt  were  we  to  permit  their  triumph.  They  are  striking 
at  the  very  existence  of  democracy  and  liberty. 

"  It  is  because  it  is  for  us  a  war  of  high,  disinterested  pur- 
pose, in  which  all  the  free  peoples  of  the  world  are  banded 
together  for  the  vindication  of  right,  a  war  for  the  preservation 
of  our  nation  and  of  all  that  it  has  held  dear  of  principle  and 
of  purpose,  that  we  feel  ourselves  doubly  constrained  to  propose 
for  its  outcome  only  that  which  is  righteous  and  of  irreproach- 
able intention,  for  our  foes  as  well  as  for  our  friends.  The 
cause  being  just  and  holy,  the  settlement  must  be  of  like  motive 
and  quality.  For  this  we  can  fight,  but  for  nothing  less  noble 
or  less  worthy  of  our  traditions.  For  this  cause  we  entered  the 
war  and  for  this  cause  will  we  battle  until  the  last  gun  is  fired." 

Again  in  his  address  to  the  joint  session  of  the  House  and 
Senate  on  January  8,  1918,  among  other  things  the  President 
said: 

"We  entered  this  war  because  violations  of  right  had  occurred 
which  touched  us  to  the  quick  and  made  the  life  of  our  own 


12  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

people  impossible  unless  they  were  corrected  and  the  world 
secured  once  for  all  against  their  recurrence.  What  we  de- 
mand in  this  war,  therefore,  is  nothing  peculiar  to  ourselves. 
It  is  that  the  world  be  made  fit  and  safe  to  live  in ;  and  particu- 
larly that  it  be  made  safe  for  every  peace-loving  nation  which, 
like  our  own,  wishes  to  live  its  own  life,  determine  its  own 
institutions,  be  assured  of  justice  and  fair  dealing  by  the  other 
peoples  of  the  world  as  against  force  and  selfish  aggression. 
All  the  peoples  of  the  world  are,  in  effect,  partners  in  this 
interest,  and  for  our  own  part  we  see  very  clearly  that  unless 
justice  be  done  to  others  it  will  not  be  done  to  us.  The  program 
of  the  world's  peace,  therefore,  is  our  program ;  and  that  pro- 
gram, the  only  possible  program,  as  we  see  it  is  this : " 

Here  the  President  presented  his  fourteen  points  or  condi- 
tions for  the  termination  of  the  war,  and  continuing  said : 

"  We  have  spoken  now,  surely,  in  terms  too  concrete  to  admit 
of  any  further  doubt  or  question.  An  evident  principle  runs 
through  the  whole  program  I  have  outlined.  It  is  the  principle 
of  justice  to  all  peoples  and  nationalities,  and  their  right  to  live 
on  equal  terms  of  liberty  and  safety  with  one  another,  whether 
they  be  strong  or  weak.  Unless  this  principle  be  made  its 
foundation  no  part  of  the  structure  of  international  justice  can 
stand.  The  people  of  the  United  States  could  act  upon  no  other 
principle ;  and  to  the  vindication  of  this  principle  they  are  ready 
to  devote  their  lives,  their  honor,  and  everything  that  they 
possess.  The  moral  climax  of  this  the  culminating  and  final 
war  for  human  liberty  has  come,  and  they  are  ready  to  put 
their  own  strength,  their  own  highest  purpose,  their  own  in- 
tegrity and  devotion  to  the  test." 

Not  alone  President  Wilson  but  members  of  his  Cabinet  and 
other  patriots  also  impressed  upon  the  thoughts  of  the  people 
that  the  one  great  outstanding  object  of  the  war  was  in  behalf 
of  threatened  democracy.  "  We  are  fighting  Germany  because 
in  this  war  feudalism  is  making  its  last  stand  against  oncoming 
democracy,"  said  Secretary  Lane  of  the  Interior  in  a  speech  be- 
fore the  Home  Club  of  the  Department  of  the  Interior  in  Wash- 
ington on  June  4, 1917.  "  We  see  it  now.  This  is  a  war  against 
an  old  spirit,  an  ancient,  outworn  spirit.  It  is  a  war  against 
feudalism  —  the  right  of  the  castle  on  the  hill  to  rule  the  village 


THE  WORLD  WAR  AND  DEMOCRACY          13 

below.  It  is  a  war  for  democracy  —  the  right  of  all  to  be  their 
own  masters.  Let  Germany  be  feudal  if  she  will,  but  she  must 
not  spread  her  system  over  a  world  that  has  outgrown  it.  Feu- 
dalism plus  science,  thirteenth  century  plus  twentieth,  this  is 
the  religion  of  the  mistaken  Germany  that  has  linked  itself  with 
the  Turk,  that  has,  too,  adopted  the  method  of  Mahomet  — 
'  The  State  has  no  conscience ' ;  '  The  State  can  do  no 
wrong ! ' ' 


CHAPTER  II 

DEMOCRACY   AND  THE   AMERICAN    WORKINGMAN 

A  CLEAR  conception  of  the  American  workingman  and 
of  his  environmental  conditions  must  be  had  if  we  are  to 
understand  the  effect  upon  him  of  the  appeals  in  which  the  war 
against  the  Imperial  German  Government  was  represented  as 
being  a  continuation  of  America's  traditional  struggle  for 
democracy. 

This  workingman  is  not  a  product  of  nor  is  he  encompassed 
about  by  the  environment  of  the  large  city.  The  typical 
American  workingman  lives  in  the  smaller  cities  —  those  with 
a  population  of  200,000  and  less.  He  has  either  been  born 
there  or  has  moved  into  it  from  his  nearby  birthplace  in  some 
still  smaller  town  or  village  or  probably  from  the  farm.  He 
has  not  traveled  much  nor  far  from  his  place  of  birth.  Census 
statistics  show  that  fifty-seven  out  of  every  one  hundred  of  our 
urban  population  are  born  in  the  State  of  their  residence,  only 
nineteen  out  of  every  one  hundred  in  some  other  State  and 
many  of  these  nearby  in  adjoining  States,  and  twenty-three  in 
some  foreign  country.  It  may  be  that  the  parents  of  this  typi- 
cal workingman  were  born  in  Germany  or  England  or  Ireland 
or  Scotland  or  one  of  the  Scandinavian  countries  but  as  a  rule 
he  himself  is  native  to  the  soil  of  the  State  in  which  he  resides; 
or  if,  as  in  some  instances,  he  himself  is  among  those  born 
abroad  he  immigrated  with  his  parents  at  an  age  too  young 
to  have  retained  impressions  of  his  foreign  place  of  birth  strong 
enough  to  make  him  very  much  different  from  the  native  work- 
ingman alongside  of  whom  he  is  employed. 

Although  of  poor  parentage  and  poor  himself,  economically, 
either  he  has  attended  or  his  children  are  at  present  attending 

14 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKINGMAN        15 

the  public  school.  Neither  he  nor  his  children  progress  so  far 
as  graduation,  leaving  about  the  thirteenth  or  fourteenth  year 
of  age  "  to  go  to  work "  to  assist  the  family  income.  But 
even  with  his  meager  schooling  he  is  usually  able  to  read  and 
write  and,  what  is  of  greater  importance,  the  influence  of  the 
democracy  of  the  public  school  has  brought  his  mind  in  touch 
with  —  has  not  left  him  in  complete  ignorance  of  —  the  out- 
standing events  of  American  history.  It  has  brought  into  the 
family  life  words  and  phrases  from  the  sayings  and  teachings 
of  the  school  histories  as  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
the  Revolutionary  War,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  Lincoln's  Gettysburg  address, 
and  of  speeches  of  other  great  men  with  regard  to  the  preceding 
eras  of  America's  struggles  to  establish  political,  religious, 
educational,  and  social  democracy. 

Of  course  the  American  workingman  does  not  understand 
all  these  in  their  details  and  as  to  every  phase  of  their  signifi- 
cance and  refinement  of  understanding,  but  he  can  grasp  in 
broad  outline  the  meaning  of  the  striving  of  the  American 
people '  for  political  and  civil  liberty  and  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence from  autocratic  government.  He  is  assisted  in  this 
by  the  public  observance  of  Washington's  and  Lincoln's  Birth- 
days, Independence  Day  and  Memorial  or  Decoration  Day,  the 
celebration  of  which  are  nearly  always  accompanied  by  the 
reading  of  some  historical  document  and  the  delivery  of  a 
patriotic  address  by  some  local  celebrity.  That  all  this  has 
substance  and  is  not  mere  words  is  supported  by  the  fact  that 
in  many  a  workingman's  humble  home  will  be  found  hung  on 
the  walls  a  newspaper  supplement  reproduction  of  the  likeness 
of  Washington  or  Lincoln  or  Roosevelt,  and  not  infrequently 
similar  evidence  of  some  great  historical  event,  such  as  the 
Declaration  of  In4ependence,  or  of  Lincoln's  Gettysburg  ad- 
dress, or  the  Stars  and  Stripes  ornamenting  one  of  America's 
patriotic  songs.  The  worker  is  also  brought  into  contact  with 
the  principles  of  political  democracy  by  the  broad  social  en- 
vironment of  his  immediate  neighborhood,  such  as  his  exercise 


i6 

of  the  duties  of  citizenship,  in  his  relation  to  the  political  parties, 
as  a  member  of  some  religious  denomination,  and  through  the 
town  meeting,  public  lectures,  and  the  like. 

This  is  not  the  picture  of  the  American  workingman  found 
portrayed  in  the  minds  of  those  who  are  readers  of  the  accounts 
of  labor  disturbances  as  reported  in  the  large  city  newspaper, 
or  who  conceive  of  this  workingman  as  a  dweller  in  our  larger 
cities  and  concentrated  industrial  centers.  Instead,  these  have 
the  picture  of  an  ignorant  and  a  discontented  worker  led  by  self- 
seeking,  radical  agitators  who  are  striving  for  the  overthrow 
of  orderly  government  and  whose  whole  concern  is  the  stirring 
up  of  trouble  and  antagonisms  between  the  worker  and  his 
employer  —  a  picture  of  a  lawless  participant  in  strikes  and 
lockouts  and  their  accompanying  disorders  and  disturbance  of 
the  peace.  This  particular  city  worker  does  exist,  usually  con- 
centrated near  his  place  of  employment  in  large  numbers  in  the 
poorer  and  unsanitary  "  slum  "  section.  Generally  he  is  of 
foreign  birth  and  has  only  recently  arrived  in  the  United  States 
from  Italy,  Russia  or  Austro-Hungary,  or  possibly  a  few  years 
earlier  from  Ireland,  Germany,  England  or  the  Scandinavian 
countries.  His  environmental  conditions,  both  those  before  he 
immigrated  and  those  he  has  been  forced  to  live  under  since 
his  arrival  in  America,  have  not  been  such  as  to  bring  him  into 
sufficiently  close  contact  with  the  influences  of  democracy  so  as 
to  imbue  him  with  loyalty  to  those  principles  which  punctuate 
America's  historic  struggles  as  a  nation.  But  this  foreign-born 
worker,  in  the  United  States,  although  in  the  aggregate  num- 
bering more  than  ten  million,  is  not  the  typical  American  work- 
ingman. 

The  point  it  is  desired  to  stress  without  going  too  much  into 
detail  in  identifying  this  workingman  is  that  his  surroundings 
have  been  and  are  such  as  to  make  him  receptive  to  expressions 
of  ideas  that  have  to  do  with  rights  and  justice  and  liberty 
and  freedom  and  independence  and  self-government  and  democ- 
racy. This  mental  receptivity  and  these  concepts  had  received 
expression  from  him,  long  before  the  war  against  Germany,  in 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKINGMAN        17 

the  formation  of  the  labor  union  for  securing  and  protecting 
his  industrial  "  rights."  Not  all  American  workingmen,  it  is 
true,  are  members  of  the  trade  or  labor  union  but  millions  of 
them  are.  In  ever-growing  numbers,  accompanying  the  rapid 
development  in  the  United  States  since  the  early  eighties  of  the 
last  century  of  concentrated  and  monopolized  production,  they 
have  been  organizing  to  such  an  extent  that  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  war  there  were  in  existence  about  one  hundred 
and  twenty  national  and  international  unions  (the  latter  usually 
including  also  workers  in  Canada)  and  eight  hundred  and 
eighty-four  federal  unions,  with  their  thousands  of  State,  dis- 
trict, city,  and  local  unions  comprising  a  membership  in  excess 
of  4,500,000.  All  these  unions,  with  the  exception  of  the  four 
railroad  brotherhoods  whose  members  are  engaged  in  the  opera- 
tion of  trains,  had  become  federated  in  the  American  Federation 
of  Labor. 

This  is  a  movement  of  native  workers  primarily,  and  into  these 
organizations  the  mass  of  workingmen  have  instilled  the  very  es- 
sence of  the  principles  of  representative  government  —  the  in- 
strument of  political  democracy.  Their  membership  generally 
includes  without  discrimination  all  workers  engaged  in  a  particu- 
lar craft  or  trade,  although  organization  by  industry  rather  than 
by  occupation  has  shown  the  stronger  tendency  in  recent  years. 
The  officers  are  elected  annually  by  majority  vote  of  members 
in  good  standing,  and  are  retained  in  power  upon  representative 
principles.  In  the  final  analysis  the  determination  of  all  ques- 
tions of  principles  and  policies  is  in  the  hands  of  the  rank  and 
file.  Though  managing  or  directing  authority  is  necessarily 
delegated  to  administrative  officials  and  committees,  it  is  only 
for  a  short  period  of  time.  All  power  rests  with  the  members 
in  their  collective  capacity.  To  them  every  great  issue  affect- 
ing the  objects  and  purposes  for  which  they  are  organized  is 
referred  sooner  or  later  for  final  decision.  Every  union  holds 
a  national  convention,  usually  once  a  year,  but  in  some  cases 
only  every  two  years,  to  which  delegates  are  elected  by  the 
locals  upon  a  proportional  representative  basis,  that  is,  one  dele- 


i8  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

gate  is  elected  for  every  one  hundred  or  two  hundred  and  so 
on  as  the  case  may  be,  of  fully  paid-up  members.  This  na- 
tional convention  is  the  supreme  legislative  authority  of  the 
organization  —  it  can  even  change  or  amend  the  union's  con- 
stitution. On  the  question  of  a  strike  — the  suspension  of 
employment  until  specified  grievances  are  remedied  or  demands 
granted  —  most  unions  provide  for  a  vote  of  the  individual 
membership  by  means  of  a  secret  ballot;  others  vest  the  au- 
thority to  call  a  strike  with  the  executive  committee  or  board. 

Not  all  labor  unions  have  the  same  constitution,  or  the  same 
kind  of  an  organization  in  details,  but  most  of  them  employ 
the  same  methods  for  attaining  their  objects.  While  the  formal 
expression  of  principles  and  the  character  of  organization 
differ,  as  do  those  of  different  churches  in  the  formulation  and 
expression  of  their  religious  belief,  all  labor  unions  are  working 
towards  the  same  identical  end  just  as  all  religions  aim  for  the 
same  goal.  And  this  end  —  the  fundamental  object  of  the 
existence  of  the  labor  union  —  is  to  secure  to  the  American 
workingman  individual  fights  and  economic  justice  in  the  pro- 
duction, distribution,  and  consumption  of  wealth :  in  brief,  the 
end  is  the  establishment  of  industrial  democracy. 

Although  this  purpose  is  expressed  differently  by  different 
unions  it  usually  takes  the  form  of  demands  for  wages  high 
enough  to  enable  the  worker  to  conform  to  the  American  stand- 
ard of  living;  reasonable  hours  of  employment  (usually  the 
eight  hour  day  and  the  forty-four  hour  week)  ;  the  Saturday 
half  holiday;  observance  of  well  recognized  holidays;  greater 
safety  to  life  and  limb  in  hazardous  occupations ;  better  sanitary 
protection  to  health ;  provision  for  disability  and  old  age ;  pro- 
hibition of  child  labor;  reasonable  guarantee  against  unem- 
ployment; regulation  of  apprentices  for  the  protection  of  the 
older  and  more  skilled  workers;  out-of-work,  sickness,  and 
death  benefits;  weekly  payment  of  wages  in  lawful  money 
(directed  against  the  system  of  paying  employes  in  orders  on 
the  "  company  store  "  and  the  use  of  scrip  by  the  employer  as 
money)  ;  recognition  of  the  labor  union  by  employers ;  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKINGMAN         19 

establishing  of  machinery  for  joint  or  collective  bargaining 
between  representatives  of  the  employers  and  the  union  as  to 
terms  and  conditions  of  employment,  and  so  on. 

All  these  and  other  specific  demands  of  the  workers  represent 
a  modern  Magna  Charta  of  industrial  rights  formulated  by 
the  toiler  in  America  for  the  distinct  and  conscious  purpose 
of  establishing  for  himself  and  his  descendants  the  inalienable 
right  to  the  enjoyment  of  at  least  a  comfortable  physical  stand- 
ard of  living  in  return  for  the  service  he  renders  to  society  in 
the  production  of  the  material  necessities  of  life.  It  was  for 
this  principle  —  for  these  specific  things  —  that  the  American 
workingman  was  fighting  in  his  own  country  and  in  a  pro- 
tracted and  desperate  struggle  at  the  very  time  of  the  entrance 
of  the  United  States  as  a  participant  in  the  European  war. 
This  worker  knew  from  hard  personal  experience  all  that  the 
denial  of  these  industrial  rights  meant  to  him  and  his  family. 
He  knew,  too,  and  also  from  personal  experience,  of  the  damag- 
ing effects  upon  his  civil  and  political  rights  of  the  principles 
and  practices  of  industrial  feudalism  and  autocracy  in  his  own 
native  land. 

That  this  fairly  summarizes  the  situation  in  our  industries 
generally  at  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war  is  not  mere 
say-so  or  opinion.  It  is  based  upon  innumerable,  incontro- 
vertible facts  gathered  by  impartial  government  commissions 
of  investigation.  Let  us  take  the  question  of  wages  for  illus- 
tration. Facts  in  abundance  are  presented  in  the  report  of 
the  commission  appointed  by  the  Director  General  of  the 
United  States  Railroad  Administration  immediately  upon  the 
National  Government  taking  over  the  control  and  operation  of 
the  railroads  in  December,  1917.  Demands  for  increases  in 
wages  had  been  presented  to  the  railway  corporations  by  their 
employes,  and  this  commission  made  an  investigation  of  the 
compensation  of  persons  engaged  in  railroad  service,  the  rela- 
tion of  railroad  wages  to  wages  in  other  industries,  the  condi- 
tions respecting  wages  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  the 
special  emergency  respecting  wages  which  existed  at  the  time 


20  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

owing  to  war  conditions  and  the  high  cost  of  living,  as  well  as 
the  relation  between  different  classes  of  railroad  labor.  The 
economic  welfare  of  2,000,000  workers  —  of  10,000,000  people 
—  was  involved.  The  specific  question  the  commission  set 
itself  to  answer  was  this:  "  What  does  fair  dealing  at  this  time 
require  shall  be  done  for  these  people  who  are  rendering  an 
essential  service  to  the  Nation  in  the  practical  conduct  of  this 
industry  ?  " 

And  here  is  the  commission's  answer: 

"  It  has  been  a  somewhat  popular  impression  that  railroad 
employes  were  among  the  most  highly  paid  workers.  But 
figures  gathered  from  the  railroads  dispose  of  this  belief. 
Fifty-one  per  cent,  of  all  employes  during  December,  1917. 
received  $75  per  month  or  less ;  and  80  per  cent,  received 
$100  per  month  or  less.  Even  among  the  locomotive  engineers, 
commonly  spoken  of  as  highly  paid,  a  preponderating  number 
receive  less  than  $170  per  month,  and  this  compensation  they 
have  attained  by  the  most  compact  and  complete  organization, 
handled  with  a  full  appreciation  of  all  strategic  values.  Be- 
tween the  grades  receiving  from  $150  to  $250  per  month,  there 
is  included  less  than  3  per  cent,  of  all  the  employes  (ex- 
cluding officials)  and  these  aggregate  less  than  60,000  men 
out  of  a  grand  total  of  2,000,000. 

"  The  greatest  number  of  employes  on  all  the  roads  fall  into 
the  class  receiving  betveen  $50  and  $65  per  month,  181,693, 
while  within  the  range  of  the  next  ten  dollars  in  monthly  salary 
there  is  a  total  of  312,761  persons.  In  December,  1917,  there 
were  111,477  clerks  receiving  annual  pay  of  $900  or  less.  In 
1917  the  average  pay  of  this  class  was  but  $56.77  per  month. 
There  were  270,855  section  men  whose  average  pay  as  a  class 
was  $50.31  per  month  ;  121,000  other  unskilled  laborers,  whose 
average  pay  was  $58.25  per  month;  130,075  station  service 
employes,  whose  average  pay  was  $58.57  per  month ;  75,325 
road  freight  brakemen  and  flagmen,  whose  average  pay  was 
$100.17  per  month;  and  16,455  road  passenger  brakemen  and 
flagmen,  whose  average  pay  was  $91.10  per  month. 

"  These,  it  is  to  be  noted,  are  not  prewar  figures ;  they  repre- 
sent conditions  after  a  year  of  war  and  two  years  of  rising 
prices.  And  each  dollar  now  represents  in  its  power  to  pur- 
chase a  place  in  which  to  live,  food  to  eat,  and  clothing  to  wear, 
but  71  cents  as  against  the  100  cents  of  January  i,  1916." 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKINGMAN        21 

So  much  for  the  question  of  wages.  How  about  hours  of 
work  and  other  conditions  and  terms  of  employment? 

With  the  American  workingman  a  standard  working  day 
of  reasonably  limited  length  that  will  not  overtax  the  physical 
strength  of  the  worker  is  as  much  a  part  of  industrial  justice 
as  is  his  conception  of  and  insistence  upon  a  wage  that  will 
supply  himself  and  his  family  with  the  necessaries  and  some 
of  the  comforts  of  living.  In  not  a  few  industries  he  has  suc- 
ceeded, only  through  years  of  struggle  and  by  means  of  the 
power  of  organization,  however,  in  establishing  the  eight  hour 
day  as  the  standard,  receiving  overtime  payment  in  emergencies 
requiring  longer  hours.  But  in  many  industries  longer  hours 
than  eight  a  day  is  the  practice. 

To  establish  the  eight  hour  day  among  the  70,000  men  em- 
ployed in  the  lumber  industry  of  the  Pacific  Northwest  a  strike 
was  declared  in  that  industry  just  prior  to  our  entrance  into 
the  European  war.  It  was  virtually  the  only  industry  on  the 
Pacific  coast  in  which  this  standard  of  working  hours  did  not 
prevail.  The  employers  opposed  the  movement  with  all  the 
power  at  their  command,  even  to  the  extent  of  binding  them- 
selves by  an  agreement  to  discriminate  against  all  mills  intro- 
ducing the  eight  hour  day.  The  men  had  gone  out  on  strike 
early  in  the  summer  of  1917  but  were  defeated,  with  ensuing 
unrest  and  dissatisfaction  and  smouldering  hatreds  which  are 
never  conducive  to  personal  efficiency  or  cooperative  plant 
production. 

The  living  and  working  conditions  of  the  men  in  the  lumber 
industry  were  anti-social  and  even  uneconomic  from  the  em- 
ployers' point  of  view,  the  unlivable  conditions  of  many  of  the 
lumber  camps  being  inconceivable  to  any  liberty  loving  Ameri- 
can who  had  not  actually  seen  them.  Abuses  affecting  the 
individual  health  as  well  as  the  personal  well  being  of  the 
workers  were  widespread.  Intermittent  employment  was 
general,  as  reflected  in  the  fact  that  the  turn-over  of  labor  each 
year  in  the  industry  was  as  high  as  600  per  cent.  Largely 
because  of  the  working  conditions  surrounding  their  employ- 


22  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

ment  nine  out  of  every  ten  workers  were  "  womanless,  vote- 
less,  and  jobless."  A  little  imaginative  interpretation  of  this 
quotation  pictures  a  man  wholly  free  from  the  very  essentials 
of  good  citizenship  —  his  conditions  of  employment  do  not  fit 
him  to  take  his  place  in  a  democracy. 

These  employers  bitterly  opposed  any  and  all  efforts  to  or- 
ganize the  men  into  unions  and  this  attitude,  in  the  words  of 
the  President's  Mediation  Commission,  "  has  reaped  for  them 
an  organization  of  destructive  rather  than  constructive  radical- 
ism. The  I.  W.  W.  (Industrial  Workers  of  the  World)  is 
filling  the  vacuum  created  by  the  operators.  The  red  card  is 
carried  by  large  numbers  throughout  the  Pacific  Northwest.  .  .  . 
The  hold  of  the  I.  W.  W.  is  riveted  instead  of  weakened  by 
unimaginative  opposition  on  the  part  of  employers  to  the  cor- 
rection of  real  grievances." 

It  was  the  absence  of  the  practice  of  principles  of  industrial 
democracy  as  well  as  its  counterpart  —  the  presence  of  autoc- 
racy —  that  was  also  largely  responsible  for  unrest  in  the  Chi- 
cago meat  packing  industry.  There  the  very  essence  of 
industrial  democracy  —  machinery  for  joint  bargaining  between 
representatives  of  employes  and  employers  as  to  terms  and 
conditions  of  employment  —  was  lacking.  "  The  chief  source 
of  trouble  comes  from  lack  of  solidarity  and  want  of  power 
on  the  part  of  the  workers  to  secure  redress  of  grievances 
because  of  the  systematic  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  packers 
against  the  organization  of  its  workers,"  says  the  report  of  the 
President's  Mediation  Commission.  "  The  strike  of  1903  de- 
stroyed the  union,  and  for  fourteen  years  the  organization  of 
the  yards  has  been  successfully  resisted.  In  1917  effective  or- 
ganization again  made  itself  felt,  so  that  by  the  end  of  the  year 
a  sizable  minority,  variously  estimated  from  25  to  50  per  cent., 
was  unionized."  In  December  of  1917  a  strike  radiating  out 
from  Chicago  threatened  the  meat-packing  industry  of  the  en- 
tire country.  The  issues  affected  upward  of  100,000  men. 

"  It  is  a  commonplace  of  trade  union  experience  that  an 
organized  compact  minority  can  control  the  labor  situation  in 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKINGMAN        23 

an  industry.  The  union  leaders  felt,  and  rightly  felt,  therefore, 
that  their  demands  had  the  effective  backing  of  a  potential 
strike.  More  important  than  any  of  the  specific  grievances, 
however,  was  the  natural  desire  to  assert  the  power  of  the 
union  by  asking  the  packers  for  union  recognition,  at  least  to 
the  extent  of  a  meeting  between  the  packers  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  union.  This  the  packers  refused  to  do.  They 
refused  to  meet  eye  to  eye  with  the  union  leaders  because  of 
distrust  of  those  leaders."  x 

Aside  from  the  question  of  recognition  of  the  union  the  two 
specific  grievances  involved  were  low  wages  and  long  hours. 
Two  wage  increases  had  been  granted  during  1917,  largely  in 
an  endeavor  to  forestall  union  activity,  but  even  with  these 
increases  the  wage  scales,  particularly  for  the  great  majority 
of  the  unskilled  workers,  were  inadequate  in  contrast  with  the 
increased  cost  of  living.  The  belief  on  the  part  of  the  employes 
that  the  companies  had  been  making  excessive  profits  notwith- 
standing Government  regulation  of  the  prices  of  meats  and 
other  packing  house  products  also  influenced  the  workers  in 
demanding  higher  wages. 

The  Pacific  Coast  telephone  dispute  also  involved  recognition 
by  the  employers  of  the  principal  instrumentality  of  industrial 
democracy  —  the  organization  of  the  employes.  Because  of 
failure  in  this  direction  a  tie-up  of  the  telephone  system  of  the 
entire  Pacific  Coast  was  threatened  for  several  months,  which 
would  have  affected  a  vast  net-work  of  industry  stretching 
over  a  wide  territory  in  California,  Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho, 
and  Nevada.  The  strike  actually  did  become  effective  in 
Washington  and  Oregon  in  November,  1917. 

The  particular  phase  of  union  recognition  involved  in  the 
telephone  strike  was  that  of  girl  employes  of  the  corporation. 
There  was  already  in  existence  a  union  of  the  electrical  me- 
chanics of  the  company  and  with  this  organization  the  com- 
pany's officials  had  entered  into  collective  bargaining  agree- 
ments. With  this  union  of  the  men  the  nine  thousand  girl 

1  Report  of  the  President's  Mediation  Commission. 


24  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

employes,  principally  operators,  desired  to  affiliate.  The  union 
men  employes  supported  this  demand  of  the  girls.  It  was 
the  refusal  by  the  officials  of  the  telephone  company  to  permit 
its  girl  employes  to  affiliate  with  the  men's  union  that  pre- 
cipitated the  issue  and  culminated  in  the  strike  that  partly  tied 
up  the  service.  There  was  also  a  demand  for  an  increase  in 
wages  to  the  men  employes  as  these  wages  had  remained  sta- 
tionary since  1913  while  the  cost  of  living  had  greatly  increased. 
A  demand  for  a  closed  shop,  by  which  only  members  of  the 
union  would  be  employed  by  the  company,  was  later  modified 
into  the  expression  of  a  desire  for  a  preferential  shop. 

In  the  California  oil  fields  the  specific  demands  of  unionized 
employes  in  1917  were  for  an  eight-hour  day  and  a  minimum 
daily  wage  of  four  dollars,  while  at  the  same  time  complaint 
was  made  against  discrimination  in  employment  by  employers 
because  of  union  membership.  About  18,000  men,  English- 
speaking  and  nearly  all  Americans,  a  large  proportion  highly 
skilled,  were  affected.  The  union  had  about  10,000  members. 
These  men  produced  from  the  oil  fields  of  southern  California 
about  8,000,000  barrels  of  oil  a  month  —  one-third  of  the  total 
oil  production  of  the  country.  Ownership  of  almost  the  entire 
output  is  concentrated  in  the  monopoly  control  of  eleven  cor- 
porations. 

These  illustrations  from  the  railway,  lumber,  meat  packing, 
telephone,  and  oil  producing  industries  call  attention  to  specific 
issues  of  industrial  democracy  involved  in  labor  controversies 
which  the  American  workingman  through  his  union  was  fight- 
ing to  secure.  But  just  as  the  war  "  to  make  the  world  safe  for 
democracy "  had  to  be  fought  against  specific  practices  of 
political  autocracy  as  represented  in  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment that  should  be  utterly  annihilated  from  the  face  of  the 
earth,  so  the  American  workingman  in  order  to  secure  industrial 
democracy  at  home  found  himself  fighting  against  the  practices 
of  industrial  autocracy  of  employers  in  his  own  country.  Not 
only  was  he  fighting  for  something  that  was  worth  while  but 
he  was  also  fighting  against  something  that  had  first  to  be 


DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKINGMAN        25 

destroyed  or  made  ineffective  before  his  rights  could  be  secured 
and  made  secure.  He  was  being  denied  the  enjoyment  of  the 
very  things  that  gave  to  democracy  its  real  meaning.  The 
American  workingman  had  'been  experiencing  for  years  not 
only  the  injurious  effects  of  the  refusal  of  autocracy  in  industry 
to  grant  to  him  his  industrial  rights  but  he  was  also  the  victim 
of  innumerable  acts  on  the  part  of  representatives  of  this  autoc- 
racy that  resulted  in  actually  depriving  him  of  his  guaranteed 
civil  and  political  rights.  Two  instances  of  these  overt  acts 
occurred  early  in  the  beginning  of  the  European  war.  One  is 
known  as  the  "  Mooney  Case  "  and  the  other  as  the  "  Bisbee 
Deportations." 


CHAPTER  III 

INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  THE  WORKERS 

WHILE  a  preparedness  parade  was  in  early  progress  in 
San  Francisco  on  July  22,  1916,  an  explosion  occurred 
in  one  of  the  city's  side  streets  rilled  with  the  paraders  and  the 
public  which  resulted  in  six  people  being  killed  outright  and 
some  forty  injured,  of  which  latter  four  subsequently  died. 
'*  Without  question  the  explosion  was  murder  designed  on  a 
large  scale,"  says  the  report  of  President  Wilson's  Mediation 
Commission  which  was  directed  some  months  later  *  to  make 
an  investigation  of  the  facts,  "  and  indisputably  a  most  heinous 
crime  had  been  committed."  Subsequent  developments  lead- 
ing to  identification  of  the  perpetrators  resulted  in  the  arrest  of 
four  men  and  one  woman,  and  later  in  the  conviction  of  a  youth 
named  Billings  and  Thomas  J.  Mooney,  the  latter  on  the  charge 
of  murder  in  the  first  degree.  Billings  was  sentenced  to  the 
penitentiary  for  life  and  Mooney  to  be  hanged. 

The  significance  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  Mooney  was  a 
prominent  labor  leader  of  the  more  radical  workers  on  the 
Pacific  Coast.  His  reputation  was  that  of  an  associate  of  pro- 
fessed anarchists,  a  believer  in  "  direct  action  "  as  the  remedy 
of  the  workers'  grievances,  and  he  had  once  before  been  in- 
dicted, although  acquitted  after  three  trials,  on  the  charge  of 
attempting  to  dynamite  the  property  of  a  public  utility  corpora- 
tion of  San  Francisco.  He  had  led  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
in  1916  to  organize  the  employes  of  the  United  Railroads 
of  that  city.  In  these  and  other  ways  Mooney  had  secured 
the  bitter  and  determined  antagonism  of  the  employers  in  San 

1  The  Commission  reported  to  the  President  under  date  of  January 
16,  1918. 

26 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  WORKERS     27 

Francisco  and  it  was  through  the  efforts  of  detectives  of  these 
employers  that  Mooney  was  arrested  and  charged  with  the 
dynamiting  crime.  It  was  on  evidence  submitted  by  these 
detectives,  which  later  was  brought  into  serious  doubt  as  to  its 
reliability,  that  Mooney  was  convicted. 

Instead  of  a  case  of  simple  justice  before  the  court  for  the 
sifting  of  evidence  and  the  ascertainment  beyond  a  question  of 
a  doubt  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused,  the  Mooney 
case  became  a  cause  of  increasing  widespread  unrest  and  agita- 
tion among  the  workers  and  of  growing  hostility  between 
employes  and  employers,  not  only  on  the  Pacific  Coast  but  also 
throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  country.  Mass  meetings 
and  public  parades  of  protest  over  his  conviction  were  held  by 
the  workers  and  their  sympathizers  and  petitions  and  demands 
for  a  new  trial  poured  into  the  courts,  the  legislature,  and  the 
governor  of  California  and  even  into  Congress  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  "  Just  as  Mooney  symbolized  labor 
for  all  the  bitter  opponents  of  organized  labor,"  says  the  Com- 
mission's report,  "  so  he  came  to  symbolize  labor,  irrespective 
of  his  persona!  merits,  in  the  minds  of  workers  and  of  their 
sympathizers.  The  'Mooney  case'  soon  resolved  itself  into  a 
new  aspect  of  an  old  industrial  feud."  It  even  grew  into  a 
question  of  international  importance  through  meetings  of  work- 
ers in  Russia  declaring  in  resolutions  that  the  professions  of 
the  United  States  in  behalf  of  world  democracy  would  have 
more  influence  with  the  Russians  if  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  insisted  upon  democracy  at  home.  The  public 
generally  v  came  to  believe  that  because  of  the  circumstances 
surrounding  Mooney's  prosecution  and  conviction,  and  espe- 
cially because  of  his  prominence  as  a  labor  leader,  "  the  terrible 
and  sacred  instruments  of  criminal  justice  were  consciously  or 
unconsciously  made  use  of  against  labor  by  its  enemies  in  an 
industrial  conflict."  The  Commission  further  said :  "  The  feel- 
ing of  disquietude  aroused  by  the  case  must  be  heeded,  for  if 
unchecked,  it  impairs  the  faith  that  our  democracy  protects  the 
lowliest  and  even  the  unworthy  against  false  accusations.  War 


28      .  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

is  fought  with  moral  as  well  as  material  resources.  We  are 
in  this  war  to  vindicate  the  moral  claims  of  unstained  processes 
of  law,  however  slow  at  times,  such  processes  may  be.  These 
claims  must  be  tempered  by  the  fire  of  our  own  devotion  to 
them  at  home." 

The  "  Bisbee  Deportation,"  also  reported  upon  by  the  Presi- 
dent's Mediation  Commission,  is  another  illustration  of  the 
practices  of  industrial  autocracy  in  America.  It  was  a  conse- 
quence of  a  strike  in  June,  1917,  in  the  copper  mining  districts 
of  Arizona,  which  produce  about  one-fourth  of  the  entire  cop- 
per output  of  the  United  States.  The  principal  demands  of  the 
employes  are  stated  as  follows  in  the  report  of  the  Commission : 

"  While  not  expressed  in  so  many  words,  the  dominant  feel- 
ing of  protest  was  that  the  industry  was  conducted  upon  an 
autocratic  basis.  The  workers  did  not  have  representation  in 
determining  those  conditions  of  their  employment  which  vitally 
affected  their  lives  as  well  as  the  company's  output.  Many 
complaints  were,  in  fact,  found  by  the  commission  to  be  un- 
founded, but  there  was  no  safeguard  against  injustice  except 
the  say-so  of  one  side  to  the  controversy.  In  none  of  the 
mines  was  there  direct  dealing  between  companies  and  unions. 
In  some  mines  grievance  committees  had  been  recently  estab- 
lished, but  they  were  distrusted  by  the  workers  as  subject  to 
company  control,  and,  in  any  event,  were  not  effective,  because 
the  final  determination  of  every  issue  was  left  with  the  com- 
pany. In  place  of  orderly  processes  of  adjustment  workers 
were  given  the  alternative  of  submission  or  strike. 

"  The  men  sought  the  power  to  secure  industrial  justice  in 
matters  of  vital  concern  to  them.  The  power  they  sought 
would  in  no  way  impinge  on  the  correlative  power  which  must 
reside  in  management.  Only  by  a  proper  balance  of  adequate 
power  on  each  side  can  just  equilibrjum  in  industry  be  attained. 
In  the  minds  of  the  workers  only  the  right  to  organize  secured 
them  an  equality  of  bargaining  power  and  protection  against 
abuses.  There  was  no  demand  for  a  closed  shop.  There  was 
a  demand  for  security  against  discrimination  directed  at  union 
membership.  The  companies  denied  discrimination,  but  re- 
fused to  put  the  denial  to  the  reasonable  test  of  disinterested 
adjustment. 

"The  men  demanded  the  removal  of  certain  existing  griev- 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  WORKERS     29 

ances  as  to  wages,  hours,  and  working  conditions,  but  the  spe- 
cific grievances  were,  on  the  whole,  of  relatively  minor  impor- 
tance. The  crux  of  the  conflict  was  the  insistence  of  the  men 
that  the  right  and  the  power  to  obtain  just  treatment  were  in 
themselves  basic  conditions  of  employment,  and  that  they  should 
not  be  compelled  to  depend  for  just  treatment  on  the  benevo- 
lence or  uncontrolled  will  of  the  employers." 

On  July  12,  1917,  within  less  than  three  weeks  from  the  call- 
ing of  the  strike,  occurred  the  forcible  deportation  of  striking 
employes  from  the  Warren  district  to  a  point  outside  the  State 
of  Arizona  which  startled  into  indignation  the  feeling  of  justice 
and  of  liberty  of  the  American  people.  Briefly  the  facts  are 
these:  The  sheriff  of  Cochise  county,  in  which  is  located  the 
mining  town  of  Bisbee,  had  requested,  through  the  Governor  of 
the  State,  the  despatching  of  federal  troops  to  preserve  order, 
the  State  militia  having  previously  been  drafted  into  federal 
service.  But  upon  separate  investigations  on  two  different 
occasions  by  a  representative  of  the  War  Department  the  situa- 
tion was  found  so  peaceful  as  not  to  justify  the  presence  of 
troops.  Says  the  report  of  the  President's  Mediation  Com- 
mission : 

"  Early  in  the  morning  of  July  12,  the  sheriff  and  a  large 
armed  force  presuming  to  act  as  deputies  under  the  sheriff's 
authority,  comprising  about  2,000  men,  rounded  up  1,186  men 
in  the  Warren  district,  put  them  aboard  a  train,  and  carried 
them  to  Columbus,  New  Mexico.  The  authorities  at  Colum- 
bus refused  to  permit  those  in  charge  of  the  deportation  to  leave 
the  men  there,  and  the  train  carried  them  back  to  the  desert 
town  of  Hermanas,  New  Mexico,  a  nearby  station.  The  de- 
portees were  wholly  without  adequate  supply  of  food  and  water 
and  shelter  for  two  days.  At  Hermanas  the  deported  men  were 
abandoned  by  the  guards  who  had  brought  them  and  they  were 
left  to  shift  for  themselves.  The  situation  was  brought  to  the 
attention  of  the  War  Department,  and  on  July  14  the  deportees 
were  escorted  by  troops  to  Columbus,  New  Mexico,  where  they 
were  maintained  by  the  Government  until  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember. 

"  According  to  an  Army  census,  of  the  deported  men  199 
were  native-born  Americans,  468  were  citizens,  472  were  regis- 


30  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

tered  under  the  selective-draft  law,  and  433  were  married.  Of 
the  foreign-born,  over  twenty  nationalities  were  represented, 
including  141  British,  82  Serbians,  and  179  Slavs.  Germans 
and  Austro-Hungarians  (other  than  Slavs)  were  comparatively 
few. 

"The  deportation  was  carried  out  under  the  sheriff  of  Cochise 
county.  It  was  formally  decided  upon  at  a  meeting  of  citizens 
on  the  night  of  July  II,  participated  in  by  the  managers  and 
other  officials  of  the  Copper  Queen  Consolidated  Mining  Com- 
pany ( Phelps-Dodge  Corporation,  Copper  Queen  division)  and 
the  Calumet  and  Arizona  Mining  Company.  Those  who 
planned  and  directed  the  deportation  purposely  abstained  from 
consulting  about  their  plans  either  with  the  United  States  attor- 
ney in  Arizona,  or  the  law  officers  of  the  State  or  county  or 
their  own  legal  advisers. 

"  In  order  to  carry  out  the  plans  for  the  deportation  into 
successful  execution,  the  leaders  in  the  enterprise  utilized  the 
local  offices  of  the  Bell  Telephone  Company,  and  exercised  or 
attempted  to  exercise  a  censorship  over  parts  of  interstate  con- 
nections of  both  the  telephone  and  telegraph  lines  in  order  to 
prevent  any  knowledge  of  the  deportation  reaching  the  outside 
world. 

"  The  deportation  was  wholly  illegal  and  without  authority 
in  law  either  State  or  Federal. 

"  Following  the  deportation  of  the  twelfth,  in  the  language  of 
Governor  Campbell  of  Arizona,  'the  constitutional  rights  of 
citizens  and  others  have  been  ignored  by  processes  not  provided 
by  law,  viz. :  by  deputy  sheriffs  who  refused  persons  admittance 
into  the  district  and  the  passing  of  judgment  by  a  tribunal 
without  legal  jurisdiction  resulting  in  further  deportations.' 

"  Immediately  after  the  first  deportation,  and  until  late  in 
August,  the  function  of  the  local  judiciary  was  usurped  by  a 
body  which  to  all  intents  and  purposes  was  a  vigilance  commit- 
tee, having  no  authority  whatever  in  law.  It  caused  the  de- 
portation of  large  numbers  of  others.  So  far  as  this  committee 
is  concerned,  its  activities  were  abandoned  at  the  request  of  the 
Governor  of  Arizona  late  in  August. 

"  Among  those  who  were  deported  from  the  district  and 
who  thereafter  were  arrested  in  seeking  entrance  into  it  were 
several  who  were  registered  under  the  selective-draft  law  and 
sought  to  return  or  remain  in  the  district  in  order  to  discharge 
their  legal  duty  of  reporting  for  physical  examination  under  the 
draft." 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  WORKERS     31 

The  American  workingman  had  reason  to  know  that  Prus- 
sianism  was  not  operating  in  the  German  Empire  alone  or, 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  in  Belgium  and  France  alone. 
He  saw  it  entrenched  in  almost  impregnable  strongholds  in 
many  industries  in  the  United  States.  He  recognized  it  even 
in  its  many  disguises.  The  autocracy  of  the  "  Bisbee  Deporta- 
tions "  served  to  add  fuel  to  the  flames  raging  over  the  con- 
troversy in  the  "  Mooney  Case,"  which  was  then  at  its  height, 
and  together  these  aroused  in  the  labor  world  such  a  storm  of 
protest  as  was  probably  never  before  experienced  in  the  history 
of  this  country.  No  German  Kaiser  or  Russian  Czar,  even  at 
the  summit  of  his  exercise  of  autocratic  power,  ever  attempted 
a  greater  usurpation  of  the  exercise  of  sovereignty. 

The  personal  experience  of  the  American  workingman  en- 
gaged in  industrial  pursuits  in  mine  and  mill  and  factory  and 
plant  over  a  period  of  years  preceding  the  beginning  of  the 
European  war,  and  especially  after  the  development  of  control 
of  industry  by  the  corporation  since  the  eighties,  has  been 
such  as  to  make  him  acquainted  in  a  very  intimate  way  with 
the  effects  of  the  exercise  of  autocratic  power.  He  had  for 
years  been  denied  the  right  to  have  anything  to  say  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  money  wages  he  was  to  receive  for  the  work  he 
performed,  or  even  as  to  the  form  in  which  he  received  these 
wages,  not  infrequently  being  paid  in  "  orders "  on  the 
"  company  "  store.  He  had  been  denied  participation  in  deter- 
mining how  many  hours  a  day  he  must  work  for  those  wages. 
In  brief,  all  the  conditions  of  employment  under  which  he 
labored  for  a  livelihood  had  been  determined  arbitrarily  and 
autocratically  by  the  employer.  And  when  the  exactions  of 
the  employing  class  became  unbearable  and  the  workingman 
attempted  to  organize  with  other  workmen  in  a  union  for 
their  mutual  protection,  he  was  denied  even  this  right  of  asso- 
ciation. 

The  American  workingman,  then,  knew  autocracy,  and  he 
could  recognize  its  acts  when  he  saw  them  committed,  whether 
these  commissions  were  by  the  German  Government  in  sinking 


32  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

American  vessels  on  the  high  seas  or  by  the  industrial  corpora- 
tion engaged  in  the  forcible  deportation  of  American  citizens 
who  had  gone  on  strike  for  their  industrial  rights.  And  it 
so  happened  that  the  American  workingman  was  engaged  in  a 
struggle  against  the  exercise  of  its  autocratic  powers  by  the 
corporation  within  the  United  States  at  the  very  time  he  was 
being  called  upon  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
fight  autocracy  in  Europe  as  represented  by  the  acts  of  the 
German  Government. 

This  is  why  it  is  that  the  appeals  of  President  Wilson,  in 
which  he  personified  the  war  against  the  Imperial  German 
Government  merely  as  another  phase  of  the  age-long  warfare 
in  behalf  of  democracy,  struck  a  responsive  chord  in  the  mind 
and  heart  of  the  American  workingman.  The  President's 
terms  were  familiar  terms,  whether  they  were  those  denouncing 
autocratic  acts  and  usurpations  or  those  that  belonged  to  the 
vocabulary  of  democracy ;  and  the  American  workingman  could 
understand  their  meaning.  They  sank  deep  into  his  inner 
consciousness  and  moved  the  springs  of  his  action.  They 
enlisted  him  whole-heartedly  in  America's  cause  and  they 
bound  him  irrevocably  to  the  successful  prosecution  of  the 
war.  And  in  this  one  thing  —  in  welding  to  the  prosecution  of 
the  war  the  enthusiastic  support  of  the  workingmen  of  America 
—  more  than  by  any  other  single  line  of  conduct  President 
Wilson  assured  the  winning  of  the  war.  For  without  this 
whole-hearted  support  of  the  American  workingman  the  war 
could  not  have  been  won  for  democracy. 

President  Wilson  did  more,  however,  than  merely  point  out 
the  close  relation  between  the  objects  of  democracy  and  the 
purpose  of  the  American  people  in  the  war.  He  linked  with 
the  latter  the  struggle  the  American  workingman  himself  was 
making  in  his  own  country  against  anti-democratic  tendencies 
in  his  own  sphere  of  daily  existence.  Not  only  did  the  Presi- 
dent link  these  separate  struggles  as  one  directed  towards  iden- 
tical ends  but  he  also  signified  his  support  of  the  one  as  of  the 
other.  Addressing  the  Labor  Committee  of  the  Council  of 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  WORKERS     33 

National  Defense  at  the  White  House  on  May  15,  1917,  the 
President  said: 

"  I  have  been  very  much  alarmed  at  one  or  two  things  that 
have  happened,  at  the  apparent  inclination  of  the  legislatures  of 
one  or  two  of  our  States  to  set  aside  even  temporarily  the  laws 
which  have  safeguarded  the  standards  of  labor  and  of  life.  I 
think  nothing  would  be  more  deplorable  than  that.  We  are 
trying  to  fight  in  a  cause  which  means  the  lifting  of  the  stand- 
ards of  life,  and  we  can  fight  in  that  cause  best  by  voluntary 
cooperation.  I  do  not  doubt  that  any  body  of  men  representing 
labor  in  this  country,  speaking  for  their  fellows,  will  be  willing 
to  make  any  sacrifice  that  is  necessary  in  order  to  carry  this 
contest  to  a  successful  issue,  and  in  that  confidence  I  feel  that 
it  would  be  inexcusable  if  we  deprived  men  and  women  of  such 
a  spirit  of  any  of  the  existing  safeguards  of  law.  Therefore,  I 
shall  exercise  my  influence  as  far  as  it  goes  to  see  that  that 
does  not  happen  and  that  the  sacrifices  we  make  shall  be  made 
voluntarily  and  not  under  the  compulsion  which  mistakenly  is 
interpreted  to  mean  a  lowering  of  the  standards  which  we  have 
sought  through  so  many  generations  to  bring  to  their  present 
level." 

In  reply  to  an  invitation  from  Chairman  Samuel  Gompers 
of  the  American  Alliance  for  Labor  and  Democracy  to  attend 
a  conference  of  that  organization  at  Minneapolis,  President 
Wilson  under  date  of  August  31,  1917,  among  other  things, 
said: 

"  I  myself  have  had  sympathy  with  the  fears  of  the  workers 
of  the  United  States,  for  the  tendency  of  war  is  toward  re- 
action, and  too  often  military  necessities  have  been  made  an 
excuse  for  the  destruction  of  laboriously  erected  industrial 
and  social  standards.  These  fears,  happily,  have  proved  to  be 
baseless.  With  quickened  sympathies  and  appreciation,  with  a 
new  sense  of  the  invasive  and  insidious  dangers  of  oppression, 
our  people  have  not  only  held  every  inch  of  ground  that  has 
been  won  by  years  of  struggle,  but  have  added  to  the  gains  of 
the  twentieth  century  along  every  line  of  human  betterment. 
Questions  of  wages  and  hours  of  labor  and  industrial  readjust- 
ments have  found  a  solution  which  gives  to  the  toiler  a  new 
dignity  and  a  new  sense  of  social  and  economic  security.  I 


34  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

beg  you  to  feel  that  my  support  has  not  been  lacking  and  that 
the  Government  has  not  failed  at  any  .point  in  granting  every 
just  request  advanced  by  you  and  your  associates  in  the  name 
of  the  American  worker. 

"  No  one  who  is  not  blind  can  fail  to  see  that  the  battle  line 
of  democracy  for  America  stretches  today  from  the  fields  of 
Flanders  to  every  house  and  workshop  where  toiling,  upward- 
striving  men  and  women  are  counting  the  treasures  of  right 
and  justice  and  liberty  which  are  being  threatened  by  our  pres- 
ent enemies." 

Finally  in  an  address  before  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor  in  its  annual  convention  at  Buffalo  on  November  12, 
1917,  the  President,  among  other  things,  said: 

"  While  we  are  fighting  for  freedom  we  must  see,  among 
other  things,  that  labor  is  free,  and  that  means  a  number  of 
interesting  things.  It  means  not  only  that  we  must  do  what 
we  have  declared  our  purpose  to  do,  see  that  the  conditions 
of  labor  are  not  rendered  more  onerous  by  the  war,  but  also 
that  we  shall  see  to  it  that  the  instrumentalities  by  which  the 
conditions  of  labor  are  improved,  are  not  blocked  or  checked. 
That  we  must  do." 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   WORKERS   AND  THE   WORLD   WAR 

V 

ALL  the  public  professions  of  faith  in  the  principles  of 
democracy  by  the  Wilson  Administration  were  put  to  the 
acid  test  in  the  formulation  of  the  principles  to  govern  the 
selection  of  the  men  from  among  the  body  of  citizens  who 
were  to  serve  in ,  the  military  forces.  And  it  met  this  test 
admirably.  Probably  no  other  single  official  act  was  more 
responsible  in  solidifying  labor  in  support  of  the  war.  The 
Selective  Service  Act  had  this  effect  to  an  incalculable  degree. 
It  breathed  the  principles  of  democracy  in  every  line  and  in 
every  section  of  its  provisions. 

Approved  by  the  President  on  May  16,  1917,  this  Act  pro- 
vided that  all  male  persons  between  the  ages  of  twenty-one  and 
thirty,  both  inclusive,  were  subject  to  registration.  The  day 
of  registration  was  set  by  Presidential  proclamation  for  June  5. 
From  the  ten  million  names  so  registered  were  selected,  by  the 
drawing  of  numbers  as  in  a  lottery,  the  men  who  made  up  the  first 
draft  of  the  National  Army.  The  official  drawing  of  numbers 
took  place  on  Friday,  July  20,  1917,  in  the  Office  Building  of 
the  United  States  Senate  in  the  National  Capital.  Distin- 
guished citizens  were  present,  including  the  Secretary  of  War, 
officers  of  high  rank  in  the  Army,  Senators,  and  Representa- 
tives. The  numbers,  encased  in  capsules,  were  drawn  by  two 
blindfolded  men.  Prior  to  the  drawing  of  the  first  number 
Secretary  of  War  Baker  said :  "  We  are  met  to  conduct  a 
lottery  or  draft  by  which  the  National  Army  and  such  additions 
as  may  be  necessary  to  bring  the  Regular  Army  and  National 
Guard  to  war  strength  are  to  be  selected.  This  is  an  occasion 
of  very  great  dignity  and  some  solemnity.  It  represents  the 
first  application  of  the  principles  believed  by  many  of  us  to  be 

35 


36 

fairly  democratic,  equal,  and  fair  in  selecting  soldiers  to  defend 
the  national  honor  abroad  and  at  home."  The  first  number 
drawn  was  258.  The  drawing  proceeded  without  interruption 
at  the  rate  of  600  an  hour,  and  a  total  of  twenty-two  hours 
was  consumed  in  the  task.  After  the  numbers  were  drawn  and 
assigned  to  the  individuals,  those  thus  selected  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  present  claims  for  exemption,  exclusion,  or  discharge 
from  the  draft  and  to  support  such  claims  by  evidence.  Thus 
all  unfairness  and  injustice  was  removed  as  between  the  rich 
and  the  poor  man  in  the  registration  and  the  final  selection  for 
war  service. 

Of  particular  significance  in  this  connection  is  Section  3  of 
the  Act.  It  provided  that :  "  No  bounty  shall  be  paid  to  induce 
any  person  to  enlist  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States ; 
and  no  person  liable  to  military  service  shall  hereafter  be  per- 
mitted or  allowed  to  furnish  a  substitute  for  such  service;  nor 
shall  any  substitute  be  received,  enlisted,  or  enrolled  in  the 
military  service  of  the  United  States ;  and  no  such  person  shall 
be  permitted  to  escape  such  service  or  to  be  discharged  there- 
from prior  to  the  expiration  of  his  term  of  service  by  the  pay- 
ment of  money  or  any  other  valuable  thing  whatsoever  as  con- 
sideration for  his  release  from  military  service  or  liability 
thereto."  For  the  purpose  of  determining  exemption  from 
military  service,1  the  act  provided  for  the  establishment  of 

1  The  Selective  Service  Act  provided  for  exemption  as  follows : 
"  That  the  Vice  President  of  the  United  States,  the  officers,  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial,  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several  States, 
Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia,  regular  or  duly  ordained 
ministers  of  religion,  students  who  at  the  time  of  the  approval  of  this 
act  are  preparing  for  the  ministry  in  recognized  theological  or  divinity 
schools,  and  all  persons  in  the  military  and  naval  service  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  exempt  from  the  selective  draft  herein  prescribed;  and 
nothing  in  this  act  contained  shall  be  construed  to  require  or  compel 
any  person  to  serve  in  any  of  the  forces  herein  provided  for  who  is 
found  to  be  a  member  of  any  well-recognized  religious  sect  or  organ- 
ization at  present  organized  and  existing  and  whose  existing  creed  or 
principles  forbid  its  members  to  participate  in  war  in  any  form  and 
whose  religious  convictions  are  against  war  or  participation  therein 


THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR       37 

Local  Boards  and  District  Boards  of  Appeal.  Appeals  from 
the  District  Boards  were  to  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
Another  feature  of  the  activities  of  the  National  Adminis- 
tration which  appealed  in  the  direction  of  securing  the  support 
of  the  American  workingman  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  was  the 
broad  and  liberal  measures  taken  to  facilitate  and  clear  the 
channels  of  distribution  of  commodities,  to  prevent  hoarding, 
to  assure  fair  prices,  to  restrain  speculation  injurious  to  the 
public,  to  prohibit  evil  practices  on  exchanges,  to  protect  the 
people  against  "  corners  "  in  crops,  and  to  prevent  extortions  of 
various  kinds.  Such  action  was  provided  for  in  statutes  en- 
acted by  Congress  dealing  with  necessaries  of  life,  such  as 
foods,  feeds,  shoes,  clothing,  fuel,  and  articles  required  for  their 
production,  all  these  being  placed  under  Government  control 
for  the  period  of  the  war  simply  by  declaring  that  every  busi- 

in  accordance  with  the  creed  or  principles  of  said  religious  organiza- 
tions, but  no  person  so  exempted  shall  be  exempted  from  service  in 
any  capacity  that  the  President  shall  declare  to  be  noncombatant ; 
and  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  exclude  or  discharge  from 
said  selective  draft  and  from  the  draft  under  the  second  paragraph  of 
section  one  hereof,  or  to  draft  for  partial  military  service  only  from 
those  liable  to  draft  as  in  this  act  provided,  persons  of  the  following 
classes:  County  and  municipal  officials;  custom-house  clerks;  persons 
employed  by  the  United  States  in  the  transmission  of  the  mail;  artificers 
and  workmen  employed  in  the  armories,  arsenals,  and  navy-yards  of  the 
United  States,  and  such  other  persons  employed  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States  as  the  President  may  designate;  pilots;  mariners  actu- 
ally employed  in  the  sea  service  of  any  citizen  or  merchant  within 
the  United  States;  persons  engaged  in  industries,  including  agricul- 
ture, found  to  be  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Military  Estab- 
lishment or  the  effective  operation  of  the  military  forces  or  the  main- 
tenance of  national  interest  during  the  emergency ;  those  in  a  status 
with  respect  to  persons  dependent  upon  them  for  support  which  renders 
their  exclusion  or  discharge  advisable;  and  those  found  to  be  physically 
or  morally  deficient :  No  exemption  or  exclusion  shall  continue  when 
a  cause  therefor  no  longer  exists:  Provided.  That  notwithstanding  the 
exemptions  enumerated  herein,  each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District 
of  Columbia,  shall  be  required  to  supply  its  quota  in  the  proportion 
that  its  population  bears  to  the  total  population  of  the  United  States." 


38  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

ness  dealing  with  them  was  affected  with  the  public  interest. 
Standards  for  grades  of  foods,  feeds,  and  seeds  were  estab- 
lished and  the  labeling  of  such  commodities  regulated.  The 
manufacture,  storage,  and  distribution  of  foods,  food  mate- 
rials and  feeds  were  licensed  and,  wherever  found  necessary, 
were  subjected  to  Government  control.  Provision  was  also 
made  for  the  regulation  of  prices,  and  when  these  were  fixed 
it  was  made  unlawful  for  anybody  to  charge  a  higher  price. 

In  these  and  other  ways  the  Wilson  Administration  dis- 
played statesmanship  of  a  high  order  in  accurately  sensing  the 
kind  of  appeal  that  would  secure  the  unquestioned  loyalty  of 
the  American  workingman  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Not 
only  through  their  local,  state,  national  and  international  unions 
and  their  federated  organization  —  the  American  Federation 
of  Labor  —  did  the  organized  workers  of  the  United  States 
support  the  Government  but  they  called  into  existence  a  sepa- 
rate organization  in  order  to  make  their  influence  even  more 
widely  felt,  particularly  among  the  unorganized  workers. 
This  new  organization  was  the  American  Alliance  for  Labor 
and  Democracy.  Its  purpose  is  well  expressed  in  its  name ; 
also  in  resolutions  adopted  at  a  mass  meeting  held  under  its 
auspices  in  New  York  City  on  Washington's  Birthday  in  1918. 
These  resolutions  were  in  part  as  follows : 

"  Whereas  the  united  free  peoples  of  the  world  are  engaged 
in  a  great  final  struggle  against  autocracy  to  the  end  that  the 
boundless  opportunities  of  democracy  and  freedom  may  be 
opened  to  all  humanity ;  and 

"  Whereas  the  great  struggle  of  which  this  world  war  is  the 
climax,  had  its  beginning  on  the  American  Continent  under  the 
leadership  of  the  immortal  George  Washington,  to  whose 
memory  we  pay  tribute  in  this  mass  meeting  on  the  anniversary 
of  his  birth ;  and 

"  Whereas  the  American  labor  movement  has  stood  stead- 
fastly for  the  cause  of  democracy  and  freedom  from  the  begin- 
ning of  its  history,  battling  against  autocracy  in  every  form, 
against  imperialism  and  militarism  and  greed,  striving  always 
to  open  the  way  to  greater  freedom  and  new  opportunities  in 
enlarged  democracy:  Be  it  therefore 


THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR       39 

"  Resolved  by  this  meeting  of  trade-unionists  and  their 
friends,  held  under  the  auspices  of  the  American  Alliance  for 
Labor  and  Democracy,  that  we  once  more  declare  our  steadfast 
loyalty  to  America's  enlightened  cause;  that  we  recognize  in 
this  great  struggle  at  arms  a  war  that  is  essentially  labor's  war 
—  a  war  of  the  useful  people  of  the  world  against  the  agents 
and  institutions  of  tyranny  and  oppression  —  and  that  we  are 
resolved  to  remain  with  this  struggle  to  its  victorious  conclu- 
sion ;  and  be  it  further 

"  Resolved,  That  we  commend  the  determination  of  the 
American  labor  movement  to  have  no  contact  or  dealings  with 
enemy  nations  so  long  as  those  nations  remain  autocratic,  and 
that  we  send  again  to  the  people  of  those  nations  the  word  that 
the  American  working  people  caa  discuss  no  international  or 
other  questions  with  them  so  long  as  they  consent  to  autocratic 
domination  and  fight  the  battles  of  autocracy ;  and  be  it  further 

"  Resolved,  That  we  are  one  with  the  whole  people  of 
America  in  our  resolve  to  exert  every  effort  for  a  triumphant 
military  effort  on  the  battlefields  of  Europe  to  bring  about  the 
final  overthrow  of  autocracy,  meanwhile  guarding  jealously 
our  democratic  institutions  at  home  as  the  foundations  of  a 
wider  and  fuller  democracy  to  come:  and  be  it  further 

"  Resolved,  That  we  here  again  express  our  appreciation  of 
the  far-sighted  wisdom  and  singleness  of  purpose  of  President 
Wilson  as  manifested  in  his  first  statement  of  the  aims  of  our 
Nation  in  this  war,  which  statement  has  furnished  a  rallying 
point  for  the  advancing  democratic  thought  of  the  world ;  and 
be  it  further 

"  Resolved,  That  we  forward  this  declaration  of  fidelity  and 
loyalty  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  as  our  renewed 
pledge  of  fealty  and  true  understanding  at  this  most  fitting  time, 
the  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  our  first  Great  Liberator." 

The  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  Lincoln  was  also  made  the 
occasion  of  nation-wide  demonstrations  of  patriotic  duty  by  the 
workers.  The  week  of  Lincoln's  birthday  was. observed  as 
Loyalty  Week  by  organized  labor  in  order  "  the  more  thor- 
oughly and  effectively  to  demonstrate  our  solidarity  and  our 
unity  in  behalf  of  our  Republic."  *  All  local  branches  of  the 

1  Extract  from  a  circular  letter  issued  by  the  executive  council  of 
the  American  Alliance  for  Labor  and  Democracy  under  date  of  Jan- 
uary 4,  1918. 


40  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Alliance,  in  cooperation  with  the  local  bodies  of  organized 
labor,  held  mass  meetings  and  demonstrations  and  distributed 
patriotic  literature  among  their  fellow  workers  and  citizens 
setting  forth  America's  aims  and  ideals  with  the  view  of  com- 
bating the  insidious  forces  of  pro-German  and  anti-American 
propaganda. 

As  to  the  work  of  this  organization  President  Wilson  said 
in  a  telegram  to  its  convention  held  at  St.  Paul,  Minnesota, 
in  June,  1918: 

"  Called  into  being  to  combat  ignorance  and  misunderstand- 
ing, skillfully  played  upon  by  disloyal  influences,  the  American 
Alliance  for  Labor  and  Democracy  has  done  a  great  and  neces- 
sary work.  It  has  aided  materially  in  promoting  the  unity  that 
proceeds  from  exact  understanding,  and  is  today  a  valid  and 
important  part  of  the  great  machinery  that  coordinates  the 
energies  of  America  in  the  prosecution  of  a  just  and  righteous 
war." 

Nor  did  the  President  withhold  expressions  of  recognition  of 
the  part  the  labor  unions  were  playing  in  the  war.  To  Presi- 
dent Gompers  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  at  its 
convention  in  St.  Paul  in  June,  1918,  the  President  sent  this 
telegram : 

"  Please  convey  to  the  thirty-eighth  annual  convention  of  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor  my  congratulations  upon  the 
patriotic  support  which  the  members  of  your  organization  have 
given  to  the  war  program  of  the  Nation  in  the  past  year  not  only 
in  the  trenches  and  on  the  battlefield,  where  so  many  of  our 
younger  men  are  now  in  uniform,  but  equally  in  the  factories 
and  shipyards  and  workshops  of  the  country,  where  the  Army 
is  supported  and  supplied  by  the  loyal  industry  of  your  skilled 
craftsmen.  We  are  facing  the  hardships  of  the  crucial  months 
of  the  struggle.  The  Nation  can  face  them  confidently,  as- 
sured now  that  no  intrigues  of  the  enemy  can  ever  divide  our 
unity  by  means  of  those  industrial  quarrels  and  class  dissen- 
sions which  he  has  tried  so  diligently  to  foment.  In  these  days 
of  trial  and  self-sacrifice  the  American  workingman  is  bearing 
his  share  of  the  national  burden  nobly.  In  the  new  world  of 
peace  and  freedom  which  America  is  fighting  to  establish  his 
place  will  be  as  honored  and  his  service  as  gratefully  esteemed." 


THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR   41 

The  service  "  in  the  factories  and  shipyards  and  workshops  " 
which  American  labor  was  called  upon  to  render  at  the  en- 
trance of  the  United  States  as  a  participant  in  the  war  involved 
the  most  radical  readjustment  in  its  history.  While  it  is  true 
a  partial  readjustment  from  the  pursuits  of  peacetime  condi- 
tions to  war  time  requirements  had  been  brought  about  prior 
to  our  participation  through  the  demands  of  the  Allies  upon 
the  industries  of  the  United  States  for  war  material,  at  the 
same  time  this  was  only  to  a  very  limited  extent  compared  with 
the  almost  complete  revolution  following  upon  the  demands  of 
the  American  Government  for  men  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  army 
and  navy  as  well  as  for  industrial  war  service  of  all  kinds. 
This  readjustment  could  never  have  been  accomplished  half  so 
quickly  and  so  expeditiously  had  not  the  labor  movement  of 
the  preceding  decades  supplied  at  hand  the  necessary  machinery 
of  organization.  Nor  could  it  have  been  brought  about  with- 
out centralized  control  of  economic  forces  by  the  National 
Government.  That  it  was  accomplished  in  such  a  short  time 
and  with  so  little  disturbance  to  the  orderly  processes  of  pro- 
duction is  one  of  the  marvels  of  our  varied  war  activities. 

Industries  over-night  were  turned  from  peace  time  to  war 
time  production.  A  swamp  yesterday  was  today  a  thriving, 
hustling  town  surrounding  an  entirely  new  industry.  Barren 
fields  one  day  were  populated  camps  or  cantonments  or  training 
stations  the  next  day.  This  sounds  quite  easy  and  simple  when 
stated  in  mere  words  but  the  details  of  the  actual  thing  fills 
one  with  wonder  and  astonishment  at  the  ease  and  quickness  of 
adaptability  in  a  great  emergency  not  only  of  the  American 
workingman  but  also  of  the  American  employer.  Our  indi- 
vidualistic system  of  production  had  developed  this  adaptability 
unconsciously  almost,  at  least  these  workers  and  employers  had 
never  before  been  called  upon  to  such  an  extraordinary  extent 
as  so  clearly  to  demonstrate  the  possession  of  this  quality  as  a 
national  characteristic.  Nothing  else  offers  so  satisfactory  an 
explanation  of  the  remarkable  transformation. 

The  nature  of  the  employment  of  labor  being  primarily  deter- 


42  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

mined  by  the  characteristics  of  the  employment  of  capital,  it 
was  first  necessary  that  the  Government  exercise  in  innumer- 
able directions  arbitrary  control  over  capital.  And  the  spirit  of 
acquiescence  with  which  this  ordinarily  repellent  interference 
was  met  is  only  to  be  explained  on  the  ground  of  patriotism. 
Employers  who  would  have  offered  the  most  determined  opposi- 
tion under  ordinary  circumstances  to  any  interruption  of  their 
normal  production  activities,  without  a  word  of  protest  consented 
to  the  complete  and  sudden  shut  down  of  the  usual  output  of 
their  plant  and  adjusted  their  entire  resources  to  the  production 
of  whatever  war  material  they  were  told  the  Government  was 
most  in  need.  And  the  employes  of  the  plants  as  willingly 
acquiesced  in  almost  as  complete  a  dislocation  from  their  normal 
pursuits. 

One  plant  that  was  engaged  before  the  war  in  manufacturing 
steel  passenger  cars,  another  in  making  safes,  and  a  third  in 
producing  hoisting  and  mining  machinery  were  assigned  to 
turning  out  carriages  for  155-millimeter  guns.  The  recoil 
machinery  for  this  gun,  the  manufacture  of  which  presents 
peculiarly  difficult  problems,  was  made  by  an  elevator  company 
and  an  automobile  corporation.  Another  automobile  factory, 
an  air-brake  plant,  and  a  Government  arsenal  were  put  to  work 
making  carriages  for  the  75-millimeter  guns.  A  sewing  ma- 
chine company  and  a  Government  arsenal  manufactured  the 
recoil  mechanism. 

Nothing  illustrates  this  adjustment  to  war  time  requirements 
more  concretely  than  the  situation  with  regard  to  the  automobile 
industry.  At  a  meeting  in  Detroit  early  in  August,  1918,  the 
automobile  manufacturers  of  the  United  States  had  adopted  a 
resolution  voluntarily  agreeing  to  the  curtailment  of  50  per  cent. 
of  their  production  of  passenger  cars.  To  this  the  War  In- 
dustries Board  replied  that  while  the  action  was  clearly  a  step 
in  the  right  direction  and  furnished  a  basis  for  each  and  all 
the  manufacturers,  without  further  delay,  to  make  appropriate 
reductions  in  selling,  general,  and  overhead  expenses,  "  still  it 
is  only  a  step,  and  a  further  curtailment  is  inevitable."  The 


THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR       43 

Board  advised  the  automobile  manufacturers  that  there  would 
be  "  little,  if  any,  of  the  principal  materials  required  in  the 
construction  of  passenger  cars  available  for  non-war  industries 
after  the  war  requirements  shall  have  been  provided  for,"  and 
that  it  could  not  "  make  any  promise  whatsoever  regarding  the 
supply  to  your  industry  of  steel,  rubber,  or  other  materials  for 
any  definite  period  in  advance.  We  strongly  believe  that  it  is 
to  the  best  interest  of  your  members  and  all  other  manufacturers 
of  passenger  automobiles  to  undertake  to  get  on  100  per  cent, 
war  work  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  not  later  than  January  i, 
1919,  for  in  no  other  way  can  you  be  sure  of  the  continuance 
of  your  industry  and  the  preservation  of  your  organization." 

Into  the  hands  of  this  War  Industries  Board  had  been  given 
virtually  absolute  power  over  all  raw  materials.  These  were 
controlled  by  it  primarily  for  meeting  the  war  needs  of  the 
Government.  The  functions  of  this  'board  are  briefly  sum- 
marized as  follows  from  the  statement  of  President  Wilson  of 
March  4,  1918:  To  create  new  facilities;  to  disclose  and  if 
necessary  to  open  up  new  or  additional  sources  of  supply ;  to 
convert  existing  facilities,  where  necessary,  to  new  uses;  to 
study  the  conservation  of  resources  and  facilities  by  scientific, 
commercial,  and  industrial  economies;  to  advise  purchasing 
agencies  of  the  Government  with  regard  to  prices  to  be  paid ;  to 
determine,  wherever  necessary,  priorities  of  production  and  of 
delivery ;  to  determine  the  proportions  of  any  given  article  to  be 
made  immediately  accessible  to  the  several  purchasing  agencies 
when  the  supply  of  that  article  is  insufficient,  either  temporarily 
or  permanently ;  and  to  make  purchases  for  the  Allies. 

The  exercise  of  these  functions  concentrated  in  this  board 
control  over  virtually  the  entire  production  processes  of  the 
nation.  The  effect  of  this  upon  the  adjustment  of  labor  to  war 
conditions  is  apparent.  No  industry  could  continue  in  peace 
time  operation  if  the  board  decreed  otherwise.  These  decisions 
of  the  board  in  consequence  determined  the  disposition  of  the 
labor  force  as  between  industries.  Take,  for  illustration,  the 
resolution  of  the  board  made  public  March  27,  1918,  in  which 


44  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

was  announced  its  policy  towards  new  corporations  organized 
for  the  erection  of  industrial  plants  which  could  not  be  utilized 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  and  also  towards  the  plans  of 
certain  of  the  states,  counties,  cities,  and  towns  for  the  con- 
struction of  public  buildings  and  other  improvements  which 
would  not  contribute  directly  toward  the  winning  of  the  war. 
As  the  carrying  forward  of  these  activities  would  involve  the 
utilization  of  labor,  material,  and  capital  urgently  required  for 
war  purposes,  the  board  stated  that  "  in  the  public  interest  all 
new  undertakings  not  essential  to  and  not  contributing,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  toward  winning  the  war  .  .  .  will  be  dis- 
couraged, notwithstanding  they  may  be  of  local  importance  and 
of  a  character  which  should  in  normal  times  meet  with  every 
encouragement."  It  gave  notice  that  it  would  withhold  from 
such  projects  priority  assistance,  without  which  new  construc- 
tion of  the  character  mentioned  would  frequently  be  found  im- 
practicable, and  that  parties  embarking  on  such  undertakings 
did  so  at  their  peril. 

Along  the  line  of  controlling  the  disposition  of  capital  and 
through  this  means  eliminating  non-essential  production  during 
the  war  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  passed  upon  proposals  as 
to  capital  expenditures.  The  avoidance  of  unnecessary  expen- 
ditures in  both  private  and  public  enterprises  was  insisted  upon. 
Before  making  contracts  involving  the  use  of  labor  and  mate- 
rial, or  placing  new  issues  of  securities,  or  agreeing  to  purchase 
new  issues,  bankers  and  corporations  were  required  to  confer 
with  the  board  in  order  that  it  determine  whether  the  under- 
taking covered  by  the  proposals  was  necessary  for  the  public 
health  and  welfare  or  contributed  directly  toward  winning  the 
war.  Public  improvements  and  new  private  enterprises  which 
in  time  of  peace  were  entirely  proper  were  now  considered  in 
connection  with  the  great  governmental  problems  arising  out 
of  military  necessities.  In  consequence  of  the  work  of  the 
Capital  Issues  Committee  many  proposed  ventures  were  sup- 
pressed at  the  source,  either  because  the  applicants  realized 
that  the  purposes  for  which  they  desired  to  issue  securities  were 


THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR   45 

not  compatible  with  the  national  interests,  or  because  the  local 
committees  were  able  to  impress  upon  them  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Government  before  they  reached  the  central  committee 
at  Washington.  Notwithstanding,  this  central  committee 
passed  upon  numerous  applications,  in  one  week  alone  these 
numbering  ninety-six  and  aggregating  $232,868,918,  being 
largely  renewal  and  refunding  operations. 

The  manufacture  of  passenger  automobiles  for  pleasure  and 
the  construction  of  buildings  other  than  for  immediate  use  for 
war  purposes  are  taken  merely  to  illustrate  that  upon  America's 
entrance  into  the  war  all  industrial  activities  of  the  people  be- 
came at  once  of  relative  importance,  and  this  relativity  was 
measured  solely  by  the  industry's  ability  to  contribute  to  the 
prosecution  of  the  war.  Some  were  absolutely  vital  to  this 
end,  but  many  more  could  be  temporarily  dispensed  with.  Tre- 
mendous as  were  the  country's  resources  there  was  not  suffi- 
cient capital,  materials,  machinery,  and  labor  both  for  fighting 
the  war  to  a  successful  conclusion  and  continuing  at  the  same 
time  normal  business  enterprises.  The  country's  industrial 
equipment  was  limited  in  face  of  the  enormous  demand  upon 
it.  The  war  had  to  be  prosecuted  —  there  was  no  other 
thought  conceivable  —  and  in  consequence  normal  lines  of  pro- 
duction had  to  cease  in  order  to  provide  the  necessary  war 
equipment. 

Under  these  conditions  it  should  be  expected  that  the  dec- 
laration of  war  would  be  followed  almost  immediately  by  wide- 
spread dislocation  of  industry.  The  conduct  of  industry  and 
of  business  enterprises  generally  had  been  proceeding  through 
many  years  of  peace  along  certain  definite  lines  of  production 
not  at  all  related  to  the  conduct  and  operation  of  a  foreign 
war,  and  certainly  not  of  a  war  of  the  magnitude  that  the 
European  conflict  had  assumed.  War  meant  not  only  a  de- 
crease in  the  production  of  so-called  non-essentials  and  a  com- 
plete change  in  the  production  of  many  commodities  but  also 
an  enormous  increase  in  the  manufacture  of  other  commodities. 
Radical  readjustments  in  industry  alone  would  enable  the  Gov- 


46  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

ernment  to  secure  the  necessary  war  supplies.  And  among 
these  readjustments  was  the  taking  of  labor  from  its  normal 
occupations  and  transferring  it  to  war  time  employments,  not 
alone  for  the  Army  and  Navy  and  other  branches  of  the  mili- 
tary service  but  for  the  industrial  production  of  all  forms  of 
munitions  and  supplies  necessary  to  the  successful  work  of 
the  soldier. 

In  the  most  literal  sense  the  war  became  an  industrial  war 
between  peoples  and  was  fought  by  employments  of  production 
as  well  as  by  rifles  and  cannons.  It  was  a  war  of  industrial 
resources  no  less  than  of  armies.  Not  only  did  the  places  of 
soldiers  withdrawn  from  industries  have  to  be  filled  but  en- 
tirely new  occupations  had  also  to  be  provided  for  and  the  men 
secured  to  fill  them.  There  was  imperative  need  for  the  con- 
struction of  cantonments,  of  training  stations,  of  hospitals,  of 
aircraft  plants,  of  shipyards,  of  arsenals,  and  of  hundreds  and 
hundreds  of  plants  and  factories  for  the  making  of  war  mate- 
rials of  every  possible  description. 

All  this  also  assisted  in  the  radical  dislocation  of  labor.  Pro- 
duction was  largely  centered  in  the  cities  and  towns  on  the 
Atlantic  seacoast ;  and  towards  these  industrial  centers  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  workmen  were  drawn  by  the  trainloads 
from  all  parts  of  the  Middle  West  and  Rocky  Mountain  sec- 
tions and  from  as  far  south  as  Texas.  With  the  working  popu- 
lation of  those  centers,  these  recruits  made  rifles  and  cannons 
and  flying  machines  and  motor  trucks  and  cartridges  and  cloth- 
ing and  built  ships  and  the  thousand  and  one  other  things  neces- 
sary for  the  equipment  and  transportation  of  an  army  of 
millions  of  men.  Not  the  least  of  these  efforts  was  the  con- 
struction of  houses  for  the  workers  themselves,  as  this  trans- 
plantation of  male  population  swamped  all  the  industrial  cen- 
ters, and  houses  for  the  men  to  live  in  became  vital  to  continu- 
ous production. 

With  so  many  economic  forces  at  play  it  is  not  possible  to 
decide  which  contributed  most  to  winning  the  war.  One 
should  be  satisfied  with  the  result  without  undertaking  the 


THE  WORKERS  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR   47 

thankless  task  of  apportioning  the  credit.  But  this  willingness 
and  adaptability  of  the  American  workingman  in  meeting  almost 
every  emergency  he  was  called  upon  to  meet  should  not  be 
permitted  to  escape  having  attached  to  it  the  significance  which 
its  importance  deserves  as  a  factor  of  vital  influence  in  de- 
termining the  outcome  of  the  war.  In  so  far  as  the  participa- 
tion of  the  United  States  is  considered,  the  war  was  won  be- 
cause of  uninterrupted  production  of  the  things  absolutely 
essential  in  getting  the  army  trained,  equipped  and  on  the  battle- 
fields of  France.  If  our  production  machinery,  which  accom- 
plished this  tremendous  task,  had  failed  at  any  vital  point  in 
supplying  essential  materials,  the  war  could  not  have  been  suc- 
cessfully terminated  in  favor  of  the  Allies.  And  in  the  per- 
formance of  this  task  the  American  workingman  can  justly 
claim  no  small  part. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  AMERICAN    WORKINGMAN   AT   WAR 

THE  American  workingman  is  blood-brother  to  the  Ameri- 
can soldier  who  fired  at  Chateau-Thierry  the  gun  that 
stopped  the  German  that  caused  the  retreat  that  forced  the 
armistice  that  won  the  war.  Back  of  this  American  soldier 
who  carried  the  gun  was  the  worker  who  dug  the  ore,  who 
forged  the  steel,  who  shaped  the  shell,  who  made  the  powder, 
who  assembled  the  parts,  who  perfected  the  gun ;  the  worker 
who  stoked  the  furnace  that  supplied  the  steam  that  operated 
the  engine  that  moved  the  ship  that  transported  the  soldier 
and  the  gun.  Back  of  him  also  was  the  worker  who  ran  the 
locomotive  that  hauled  the  train  that  carried  the  coal  that 
operated  the  machinery  that  moved  the  lathe  that  fashioned 
the  gun  —  the  worker  who  mined  the  coal  that  fueled  the  boiler 
that  started  the  engine  that  pulled  the  cars  that  carried  the 
lumber  that  formed  the  barracks  that  housed  the  soldier  —  the 
worker  who  tended  the  loom  that  transformed  the  wool  that 
made  the  uniform  that  clothed  the  soldier  —  the  worker  who 
grew  the  food  that  nourished  the  soldier  that  pulled  the  trigger 
that  fired  the  gun  that  sped  the  bullet  that  won  the  war.  This 
worker  is  the  American  workingman  whose  blood-brother,  we 
repeat,  carried  the  gun  that  stopped  the  German  at  Chateau- 
Thierry. 

Back  of  this  soldier  —  of  his  living,  his  training,  his  equip- 
ment, and  his  transportation  across  the  seas  —  back  all  along 
the  line  were  millions  of  toiling,  sweating,  labor-giving  men 
whose  work  was  necessary  before  the  soldier  could  have  fired  at 
Chateau-Thierry  the  shot  that  won  the  war. 

The  mere  details  of  this  twentieth  century  miracle  are  prosaic. 

48 


THE  AMERICAN  WORKINGMAN  AT  WAR      49 

They  simply  record  the  excavating  of  dirt,  the  mixing  of  rnor- 
tar,  the  laying  of  brick,  the  felling  of  trees,  the  sawing  of 
lumber,  the  nailing  of  boards,  the  mining  of  coal,  the  operating 
of  machines,  the  fashioning  of  metals,  the  sewing  of  cloth,  the 
growing  of  food,  the  running  of  trains,  the  manning  of  ships  — 
the  doing  of  the  thousand  and  one  acts  of  labor  that  go  to  make 
up  the  everyday  humdrum  life  of. the  American  toiler. 

On  the  day  the  United  States  officially  entered  the  war,  April 
2,  1917,  its  entire  military  force  in  service  was  212,034  officers 
and  enlisted  men  distributed  in  the  regular  army,  in  the  national 
guard  of  the  separate  states  in  Federal  service,  and  in  the 
Reserve.  One  year  later,  on  April  i,  1918,  the  total  number  of 
men  under  arms  in  the  military  service  was  1,652,725.  These 
comprised  10,698  officers  and  503,142  enlisted  men  in  the  regu- 
lar army,  16,893  officers  and  431,583  enlisted  men  in  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  516,839  enlisted  men  in  the  national  army,  and 
96,210  officers  and  77,360  enlisted  men  in  the  Reserve.  Within 
twelve  months  the  number  of  men  under  arms  had  been  in- 
creased eightfold. 

Another  army,  but  of  civilian  workers  from  all  the  building 
crafts,  and  exceeding  in  number  one  hundred  thousand,  was 
recruited  out  of  the  labor  force  of  the  country  not  included  in 
the  draft  ages  and  put  to  work  to  house  in  training  camps  this 
fighting  army  of  soldiers  —  an  unprecedented  army  for  an  un- 
warlike  people.  These  workers  built  almost  over-night,  sixteen 
cantonments  and  an  equal  number  of  other  camps  —  virtually 
thirty-two  small-sized  cities  each  accommodating  a  minimum  of 
twenty-two  thousand  men  and  some  as  many  as  forty  thousand 
men.  These  military  towns  which  the  Government  constructed 
through  the  War  Department  were  located  in  different  sections 
of  the  country  at  the  various  mobilization  centers.  From  three 
thousand  to  ten  thousand  workers  were  required  in  the  erection 
of  each  camp,  the  number  of  men  employed  depending  upon 
its  size. 

This  is  equivalent  in  each  case  to  the  construction  of  approxi- 
mately one  thousand  separate  buildings  covering  more  than  a 


50  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

square  mile  of  ground,  exclusive  of  the  area  required  for  drill 
purposes,  such  buildings  comprising  barracks  for  the  men  and 
quarters  for  the  officers,  kitchens,  mess  halls,  bath  houses, 
stores,  warehouses,  refuse  disposal  plants,  laundries,  hospitals, 
garages,  theatres,  rifle  ranges,  railway  stations,  post  offices  and 
the  score  and  more  other  separate  structures  necessary  to  pro- 
vide housing  for  the  troops  and  for  the  varied  activities  of  a 
big  camp.  In  all  the  sixteen  cantonments  there  were  erected 
as  many  as  twenty-two  thousand  individual  buildings  of  many 
types.  Roadways  and  asphalted  and  paved  streets,  electric 
lighting  and  steam  heating  plants,  water  works,  sewers,  tele- 
phone lines,  fire  protection  service,  railway  facilities,  and  like 
modern  needs  all  depended  upon  manual  labor  to  create  them. 

Then,  too,  there  were  the  workers  back  in  the  forests  of 
mountain  recesses  felling  the  trees  and  hauling  them  to  the  mills, 
and  men  in  the  mills  sawing  the  logs  into  lumber  for  these  build- 
ings. Within  sixty  days  one  hundred  and  ninety  mills  in  all 
parts  of  the  country  shipped  to  the  cantonment  sites  more  than 
500,000,000  feet  of  lumber  requiring  twenty-four  thousand 
freight  cars  to  transport  it. 

Workers  were  engaged  also  in  the  production  of  the  4,000 
street  lamps,  the  carload  of  roofing  tacks,  the  5,000  water  casks, 
the  8,000  fire  extinguishers,  the  22,000  cubic  yards  of  sand,  the 
40,000  cubic  yards  of  brpken  stone  and  screened  gravel,  the 
75,000  barrels  of  cement,  the  93,000  kegs  of  nails,  the  140,000 
doors,  the  140,000  rolls  of  sheathing  paper,  the  250,000  fire 
pails,  the  265,000  feet  of  lamp  cord,  the  320,000  inside  lamps, 
the  380,000  feet  of  fire  hose,  the  686,000  sashes,  the  3,000,000 
square  feet  of  screens,  the  6,000,000  square  feet  of  roofing 
paper,  the  20,000,000  feet  of  insulated  wire,  the  30,000,000 
square  feet  of  wall  boarding  and  the  innumerable  other  com- 
modities necessary  to  the  construction  of  these  cantonments. 
In  brief,  each  cantonment  required  five  thousand  carloads  of 
material,  not  including  supplies  for  the  workmen  while  en- 
gaged in  construction  —  a  total  for  the  sixteen  cantonments 
of  eighty  thousand  carloads. 


THE  AMERICAN  WORKINGMAN  AT  WAR      51 

Recall  to  mind  also  those  other  millions  of  workers  in  the 
civilian  army  who  were  toiling  in  the  second  line  of  defense 
in  the  production  of  the  materials  for  clothing  and  equipping 
the  soldier  army  —  those  workers  who  made  the  6,500,000 
overcoats,  the  8,000,000  hats,  the  8,000,000  barrack  bags,  the 
8,000,000  bed  sacks,  the  11,000,000  woolen  coats,  the  14,000,000 
pairs  of  woolen  breeches,  the  20,000,000  blankets,  the  21,000,- 
ooo  pairs  of  shoes,  the  22,000,000  yards  of  overcoating,  the 
26,000,000  undershirts,  the  31,000,000  pairs  of  drawers,  the 
31,000,000  yards  of  cloth  for  uniforms,  the  35,000,000  yards 
of  flannel  suiting,  the  50,000,000  pairs  of  heavy  stockings,  and 
the  250,000,000  yards  of  cotton  cloths  contracted  for  at  one 
time. 

In  the  manufacture  of  woolen  goods  alone  for  the  Army  the 
co-operation  of  employes  in  more  than  three  hundred  mills  was 
necessary.  By  May  I,  1917,  the  government  had  contracted 
for  fifty  million  yards  of  duck  for  tents,  motor  truck  coverings, 
leggings,  haversacks,  and  other  equipment.  Investigation  dis- 
closed that  all  the  duck  mills  of  the  entire  country  were  un- 
able to  produce  more  than  twenty  million  yards  before  January 
i,  1918.  To  secure  the  additional  thirty  million  yards  manu- 
facturers of  carpets  and  other  cotton  textiles  turned  their  em- 
ployes and  plants  to  making  duck.  Hundreds  of  looms  were 
changed  and  builders'  stocks  altered  so  extensively  that  many 
mills  without  facilities  for  making  yarns  encountered  a  serious 
shortage  of  this  material.  Then  the  forces  of  the  yarn  makers 
were  mobilized  behind  the  mills  in  order  to  secure  the  sixteen 
million  pounds  of  cotton  yarn  needed. 

Think,  too,  of  the  myriad  of  other  workers  engaged  in  the 
production  of  the  twenty-nine  regular  articles  of  clothing  of 
the  soldier  and  the  ninety  articles  of  his  equipment  —  buttons, 
belts,  shoe  laces,  leggings,  service  hats,  slickers,  bugles,  axes, 
and  so  on. 

By  June,  1918,  factory  workers  had  produced  for  the  United 
States  Army  1,568,000  rifles,  excluding  200,000  separate 
parts,  a  rate  of  production  of  45,000  a  week.  The  workers  in 


52  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

i 

eight  plants  had  made  this  output  with  the  employes  in  only 
five  of  the  eight  busy  all  the  time,  production  in  three  having 
been  slowed  down  on  rifles  in  order  to  turn  out  machine  guns 
and  automatic  pistols.  This  industry  alone  was  employing 
ninety  thousand  men,  women  and  children. 

Many  other  thousands  were  producing  1,000,000,000  rounds 
of  ammunition  for  the  troops  in  the  training  cantonments  alone, 
427,246,000  pounds  of  explosives,  60,000,000  hand  and  rifle 
grenades  and  an  equal  number  of  projectiles  for  all  calibres 
of  heavy  artillery,  175,000,000  clips  for  small-arms  cartridges 
and  22,000,000  bandoleers  for  carrying  cartridges,  725,000  auto- 
matic pistols,  and  250,000  revolvers. 

Other  workmen  were  turning  out  complete  machine  guns  at 
the  rate  of  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  a  year,  3*4 
inch  to  9  inch  calibre  guns  at  the  rate  of  fifteen  thousand  a  year, 
and  cartridges  for  rifles  and  pistols  at  the  rate  of  twenty  mil- 
lion a  day.  Since  this  country  had  entered  the  war  and  up 
to  and  including  July  19,  1918,  the  total  output  of  cartridges 
for  rifles,  pistols,  revolvers,  and  machine  guns,  inspected  and 
accepted,  was  2,014,815,584.  This  made  the  daily  average 
output  approximately  15,000,000  but  included  in  the  time  cal- 
culated were  months  that  had  been  necessary  for  preparation 
during  the  earlier  days  and  the  output  had  naturally  increased 
as  this  preparatory  period  was  left  behind.  The  maximum 
number  inspected  and  accepted  in  a  single  day  up  to  August 
3,  1918,  was  29,466,000  on  July  5  of  that  year.  The  number 
of  small  arms  such  as  rifles,  pistols,  revolvers,  and  machine 
guns  inspected  and  accepted  up  to  July  14  totaled  1,886,769 
complete  rifles  of  all  types,  217,000  pistols,  169,367  revolvers, 
and  82,540  machine  guns. 

Still  other  workers  were  making  thirty-five  thousand  motor 
trucks  and  tractors  for  hauling  heavy  guns  and  ammunition. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  were  only  three  thousand 
motor  trucks,  four  hundred  and  fifty  automobiles,  and  six  hun- 
dred and  seventy  motorcycles  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps  of 
the  Regular  Army.  From  April  8,  1917,  to  July  I,  1918,  there 


THE  AMERICAN  WORKINGMAN  AT  WAR      53 

had  been  produced  for  the  motor  transport  service  27,005  mo- 
torcycles and  25,874  side  cars  for  motorcycles,  and  8,809  motor 
ambulances.  By  July  i  there  were  overseas  alone  18,000  motor 
trucks  and  3,420  passenger  cars.  American  mechanics  were 
at  that  time  turning  out  trucks  complete  and  ready  for  im- 
mediate use  at  the  rate  of  forty-five  hundred  a  month.  A 
standardized  truck  of  interchangeable  parts  specially  devised 
for  heavy  military  duty  was  designed,  and  in  October  an  order 
placed  for  ten  thousand,  actual  production  beginning  in  Janu- 
ary, only  five  months  from  the  starting  of  the  work.  Standard- 
ization was  also  applied  to  the  trailers,  motorcycles,  bicycles, 
machine-shop  trucks,  tank  trucks,  and  other  automotive  equip- 
ment. Workmen  were  necessary  in  repair  shops  to  maintain 
this  equipment  and  also  in  the  standardized  base  shops,  each 
of  the  latter  covering  four  acres  of  ground  and  requiring  a 
force  of  twelve  hundred  mechanics  to  operate,  these  shops 
serving  also  as  depots  and  training  centers  for  the  selection 
and  organization  of  skilled  personnel  to  be  sent  overseas. 

All  these  men  —  the  soldiers,  the  workers  constructing  and 
those  operating  the  training  camps  and  those  making  the 
thousand  and  one  articles  necessary  to  their  operation  —  these 
millions  had  to  be  fed,  and  in  the  performance  of  this  task,  by 
no  means  a  small  one,  other  divisions  of  the  army  of  toilers 
back  on  the  farms  and  in  the  factories  and  food  depots  were 
called  upon.  What  this  task  was  is  illustrated  in  the  estimated 
annual  supplies  for  the  one  million  men  in  the  Army  in  the 
United  States  exclusive  of  the  soldiers  in  France.  These  sup- 
plies amounted  to  398,000,000  pounds  of  fresh  beef  and  8,000,- 
ooo  pounds  of  canned  beef,  the  latter  not  including  canned 
corned  beef  hash ;  480,700,000  pounds  of  potatoes ;  300,000,000 
pounds  of  flour;  55,000,000  pounds  of  onions;  50,000,000 
pounds  of  granulated  sugar;  29,600,000  pounds  of  coffee;  8,- 
200,000  pounds  of  lard ;  7,300,000  pounds  of  butter,  excluding 
oleomargarine ;  3,800,000  cans  of  black  pepper,  cinnamon, 
cloves,  ginger,  and  nutmeg;  1,000,000  gallons  of  cane  syrup; 
850,000  gallons  of  cucumber  pickles.  In  addtition  there  were 


54  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

the  supplies  for  the  remainder  of  the  soldiers'  forty-nine  items 
of  regular  rations,  such  as  bacon,  baked  beans,  corn,  peas, 
tomatoes,  flavoring  extracts,  other  canned  vegetables  and 
fruits,  evaporated  apples  and  peaches,  canned  and  dried  fish, 
candy,  chewing  gum,  as  well  as  the  additional  165  items  sup- 
plied for  sale  to  the  soldier  at  cost,  such  as  various  kinds  of 
foodstuffs  and  also  shaving  mugs,  razors,  toilet  articles,  pencils, 
thread,  pins,  pens,  shoe  polish,  letter  paper,  pipes,  and  so  on. 

While  these  fragmentary  details  of  the  work  of  the  toilers 
in  the  second  line  of  defense  enable  one  to  form  some  idea  of 
the  task  the  American  workingman  was  called  upon  to  per- 
form, that  task  was  of  a  magnitude  so  great  it  is  be- 
yond the  power  of  mere  word  description  to  convey  a 
comprehensive  conception  of  it.  No  complete  picture  of  this 
could  be  given  even  if  ten  times  the  space  were  available.  It 
can  only  be  vaguely  indicated  by  selected  instances,  and  even 
then  the  imagination  has  to  be  called  upon  for  assistance. 

Conceive,  for  illustration,  of  the  workers  all  along  the  line 
of  production  that  were  necessary  to  carry  to  completion  the 
297  separate  projects  for  emergency  work  to  house  and  meet 
the  needs  of  soldiers  in  this  country  and  to  provide  buildings 
for  the  manufacture  and 'storage  of  supplies  for  the  Army, 
both  here  and  abroad,  which  had  been  undertaken  by  the  con- 
struction division  of  the  War  Department  and  which  had  been 
executed  or  were  under  way  and  in  prospect  on  June  I,  1918. 
In  addition  plans  had  been  laid  for  117  new  operations.  The 
estimated  cost  of  the  297  projects  was  $1,170,619,000,  not  in- 
cluding three  operations  costing  $106,000,000  which  were  be- 
ing conducted  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment. The  cost  of  the  117  new  projects  was  estimated  to 
be  $700,000,000. 

In  caring  for  the  health  of  the  soldiers  alone  thirty-two  hos- 
pitals were  constructed  and  more  than  forty  others  enlarged. 
Each  cantonment  hospital  comprised  about  seventy  different 
buildings  covering  sixty  acres  of  ground,  the  hospital  proper 
providing  for  a  minimum  of  one  thousand  beds. 


THE  AMERICAN  WORKINGMAN  AT  WAR      55 

For  the  production  of  nitrates  two  entirely  new  plants  were 
constructed  and  equipped  with  machinery  and  materials,  each 
involving  an  appropriation  of  forty-five  million  dollars.  One 
of  these  had  a  capacity  of  sixty  thousand  pounds  of  ammonia 
each  twenty-four  hours.  For  the  purpose  of  increasing  the 
production  of  ammonia  and  toluol,  by-product  coke  ovens  and 
water-power  plants  were  installed. 

By  August,  1918,  workmen  had  completed  for  the  Ordnance 
Department  twenty-six  out  of  thirty-three  plants  for  the  pro- 
duction of  gun  carriages  and  recoil  mechanisms  at  a  cost  of 
twenty-five  million  dollars.  In  the  preceding  month  there  had 
been  made  ready  for  use  fifteen  out  of  sixteen  gun  plants  for 
the  forging  and  machining  of  cannon,  with  a  total  expended 
or  obligated  of  nearly  seventy-five  million  dollars,  including  a 
new  plant  for  the  manufacture  of  big  guns  at  Neville  Island, 
Pittsburgh.  Altogether  the  amount  expended  or  obligated  up 
to  that  time  to  provide  facilities  for  the  production  of  guns, 
carriages,  and  recoil  mechanisms  totalled  $99,606,633,  exclud- 
ing provision  for  the  manufacture  of  artillery  limbers,  caissons, 
and  ammunition  wagons. 

An  entirely  new  industry  had  to  be  created  for  the  produc- 
tion of  gun  carriages  and  for  the  forging  and  machining  of 
cannon.  This  simple  statement  means  that  for  the  carriage 
of  the  240  millimeter  howitzer,  the  most  complex  of  carriages, 
as  many  as  six  thousand  separate  pieces,  exclusive  of  rivets, 
had  to  be  made.  For  the  production  of  the  French  model  gun 
carriage  alone  plants  had  to  be  selected  to  manufacture  the  car- 
riages, new  shops  built,  special  machinery  manufactured  and 
installed,  and  even  the  machine  tools  with  which  to  make  the 
machine-tool  equipment  of  the  carriage  plants  had  to  be  made. 
Standardization  of  manufacture  had  to  be  accomplished  to  such 
a  degree  that  any  part  produced  in  any  plant  would  be  inter- 
changeable with  any  similar  part  produced  in  any  other  plant, 
and  all  parts  produced  in  American  plants  interchangeable  with 
similar  parts  produced  in  French  plants. 

In  as  many  as   fourteen  hundred  different  manufacturing 


56  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

establishments  and  in  eleven  Government  arsenals  workers  by 
the  thousands  were  turning  out  articles  of  war  for  the  Ord- 
nance Department  of  the  Army  alone.  To  take  care  of  these 
products  in  the  course  of  their  distribution  more  than  23,000,- 
ooo  square  feet  of  storage  space  had  to  be  provided.  These 
Ordnance  storage  properties  embraced  separate  warehouse 
buildings  and  miles  of  railroad  sidings  within  the  depot  prem- 
ises. One  of  these  newly  constructed  depots  for  the  storage 
of  war  materials  included  one  hundred  separate  buildings  and 
fifty  miles  of  specially  built  railroad  track  enclosed  in  electric- 
ally charged  wire  barriers.  The  supply  division  of  this  de- 
partment handled  material  amounting  approximately  to  ten 
thousand  carloads  a  month. 

Some  idea  as  to  the  number  of  men  required  to  carry  on  this 
highly  organized  mechanism  of  manufacture,  storage,  and 
distribution  is  suggested  in  the  fact  that  as  many  as  one  hun- 
dred thousand  different  articles,  ranging  all  the  way  from  the 
small  striker  or  firing  pin  of  a  rifle  to  a  complete  sixteen-inch 
gun  and  emplacement,  had  to  be  created  out  of  their  raw  ma- 
terials and  supplied  to  the  troops.  As  an  illustration,  a  single 
gun  with  its  disappearing  carriage  has  7,990  parts  exclusive 
of  sights  and  accessories.  Even  the  three-inch  gun  battery  re- 
quires 3,876  tools,  accessories,  and  supplies  as  essential  parts 
of  its  outfit.  Reserves  in  all  these  spare  parts  had  to  be  main- 
tained and  their  distribution  carried  out  with  efficiency  and 
under  difficult  circumstances.  Not  only  did  these  intricate  and 
complex  weapons  of  modern  warfare  have  to  be  designed  and 
manufactured  by  the  American  workingman  but  he  was  called 
upon  to  produce  also  the  incalculable  number  of  tools,  gauges, 
and  jigs  required  in  this  manufacturing  process. 

So  it  was  with  the  Aviation  Service  of  the  Signal  Corps  of 
the  Army.  It  was  called  upon  to  organize  a  highly  trained 
personnel  and  to  build  the  most  intricate  kind  of  equipment 
with  practically  no  foundation  upon  which  to  start  —  in  fact, 
the  foundation  itself  had  to  be  laid.  Three  appropriations  to- 
taling $691,000,000  measure  in  dollars  its  first  year's  program. 


The  air  service  started  with  65  officers  and  1,120  men,  three 
small  flying  fields,  less  than  three  hundred  second-rate  planes, 
virtually  no  aviation  industry,  and  with  only  the  most  meager 
knowledge  of  the  kaleidoscopic  development  in  air  war  service 
abroad.  Schools  of  eleven  different  kinds  were  instituted, 
courses  of  instruction  laid  out,  and  instructors  secured,  the 
latter  including  foreign  experts  in  a  score  of  lines.  Flying 
fields  were  built,  some  of  them  with  site  selected,  ground 
cleared  and  leveled,  hangars  and  quarters  erected,  and  tele- 
phone, transportation,  drainage,  and  the  like  installed  within 
five  weeks'  time  —  a  strategic  net  work  of  fields  distributed 
over  the  country  along  the  main  proposed  aviation  routes. 
From  the  employes  of  a  single  company  in  the  United  States 
capable  of  anywhere  near  quantity  production  of  training 
planes  (as  for  battle  planes  their  production  in  America  had 
not  even  been  thought  of)  there  were  in  a  comparatively  short 
time  thousands  of  skilled  workers  of  a  score  of  large  companies 
producing  planes,  of  fifteen  turning  out  engines  and  of  more 
than  four  hundred  other  companies  providing  the  necessary 
spare  parts,  accessories,  and  other  essential  supplies. 

This  marks,  in  brief,  the  demajjji,  in  part,  for  such  workers 
as  machinists,  auto-mecha/lics,  engine  repairmen,  gun  ma- 
chinists, chauffeurs,  carpenters,  blacksrriiths,  tinsmiths,  cabinet 
makers,  electricians,  cotfoersmiths,  sheet  \metal  workers,  pro- 
peller makers,  wireless  fperators  and  constructors,  tent  makers, 
sail  makers,  truck  mas^bfS,  vulcanizers,  Wefyers,  and  repairers 
and  installers  of  magnfcto-ignitibn  systems,  Cameras,  watches, 
clocks,  and  other  instruments.  Virtually  ~ni|iety-eight  out  of 
every  one  hundred  men  in  the  air^service  <Ha$  to  be  skilled  in 
some  branch  of  work.  .  '  % 

Aeroplane  production  \vas  wholfy4newv»d  unfamiliar  to 
American  mechanics  and  yet 'Wiose,  taken  froin  other  trades  and 
converted  hastily  into  workers  on^h^njpst-' intricate  and  delicate 
kinds  of  aircraft  machinery  soon  adapted  themselves  to  the  de- 
mands made  upon  their  skill.  Tens  of  thousands  of  skilled  me- 
chanics, engine  men,  motor  repair  men,  and  wood  and  metal 


58  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

workers  were  needed  to  keep  the  planes  always  in  perfect  con- 
dition, this  requiring  a  huge  engineering  and  mechanical  force 
at  the  air  dromes,  flying  fields,  and  repair  depots  both  in  the 
United  States  and  behind  the  lines  in  France.  Without  this 
force  of  American  workmen  the  planes  turned  out  by  Ameri- 
can workmen  would  of  course  have  been  useless  and  the 
American  fliers  helpless. 

The  land  division  of  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army  also  fe- 
quired  skilled  workmen  in  order  to  enable  it  to  operate,  such 
as  chauffeurs,  motorcycle  drivers,  and  gas-engine  repairmen 
for  duty  in  field  and  telegraph  battalions;  telegraphers,  both 
wire  and  radio;  telephone  men,  including  switchboard  oper- 
ators, telephone  repairmen,  and  men  skilled  in  testing  and  re- 
pairing telephones  in  line;  linemen,  both  telegraph  and  tele- 
phone ;  photographers,  both  still  and  moving ;  homing  pigeon 
men,  radio  men  familiar  with  installing  apparatus,  black- 
smiths, cobblers,  clerks,  cable  men,  cooks,  and  so  on  down  a 
long  line  of  skilled  trades. 

In  the  manufacture  of  gas  masks  and  like  appliances  the 
Medical  Department  of  the  Army  also  needed  the  labor  of 
mechanics,  glass  blowers,  pipefitters,  electricians,  carpenters, 
blacksmiths,  chemists,  laborers,  and  the  like.  The  gas  de- 
fense service  of  the  War  Department  was  conducting,  within 
three  weeks  after  America's  entrance  into  the  war,  a  com- 
pletely equipped  factory  for  the  manufacture  of  gas  masks  for 
horses  with  an  output  of  five  thousand  masks  a  day.  This 
rate  of  production  was  partly  due  to  the  introduction  of  rivet- 
ing machinery  which  did  away  with  the  heavy  hand  sewing  of 
the  frame  which  supports  the  mask  on  the  face  of  the  horse. 

And  so  it  was  in  these  humble  and  inconspicuous  ways  that 
the  American  workingman  in  mine  and  mill  and  factory  and 
plant  did  his  part  in  laying  low  the  Political  Autocracy  of  the 
German  Government  as  it  swaggered  and  strutted  through 
Belgium  and  into  France. 


CHAPTER  VI 

WORKING   FOR   THE   GOVERNMENT 

THE  labor  of  the  American  workingman  in  providing 
training  accommodations  and  in  producing  supplies  and 
equipment,  including  the  largest  battleships  the  world  had  ever 
seen,  was  as  essential  to  the  Navy  as  we  have  seen  it  to  have 
been  to  the  Army.  From  a  force  of  68,000  enlisted  men  and 
4,500  officers  in  January,  1917,  the  Navy  had  expanded  by  De- 
cember i  of  that  year  to  254,000  enlisted  men  and  15,000  of- 
ficers 1— from  less  than  75,000  to  nearly  270,000  —  including 
regulars,  reserves,  and  national  naval  volunteers.  It  had  130 
stations  of  all  kinds  on  January  i ;  it  had  a  total  of  363  eleven 
months  later.  The  number  of  employes  at  regular  navy  yards 
in  the  United  States  had  increased  from  35,000  to  more  than 
60,000.  On  shore  and  afloat,  including  civilians  and  sailors, 
the  Naval  Establishment  embraced  more  than  300,000.  The 
expenditures  for  all  naval  purposes  at  the  beginning  of  the  fis- 
cal year  1917  were  about  $8,000,000  a  month;  in  December 
of  that  year  they  were  $60,000,000  a  month.  On  January  i 
there  were  300  naval  vessels  of  all  kinds  in  commission ;  in 
December  more  than  1,000. 

Thus  succinctly  is  indicated  the  task  the  Navy  was  called 
upon  to  accomplish  in  the  way  of  meeting  the  great  expansion 
that  was  found  necessary.  The  large  and  sudden  influx  of 

1  From  the  annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  December, 
1917.  In  June,  1918,  the  strength  of  the  Navy  had  increased  to 
423,800  enlisted  men  and  26,285  officers.  These  were  divided  as  fol- 
lows:  Regular  Navy,  205,798  men,  9,204  officers;  Naval  Reserves, 
148,505  men,  14,704  officers;  Marine  Corps,  48,505  men,  1,364  officers; 
National  Naval  'Volunteers,  15,000  men,  785  officers;  Coast  Guard, 
6,000  men,  228  officers. 

59 


60  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

enlisted  men  and  officers  overtaxed  the  peace  time  training  sta- 
tions before  increased  facilities  could  be  provided.  An  illus- 
tration of  the  immensity  of  the  work  American  labor  per- 
formed in  meeting  this  situation  is  the  new  Naval  Training 
Camp  and  other  improvements  at  Hampton  Roads  in  Vir- 
ginia. This  camp  covers  four  hundred  acres  and  embraces 
more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  buildings.  On  July  15  the 
camp  site,  formerly  the  grounds  of  the  Jamestown  Exposition 
of  1907,  was  largely  covered  with  brambles  and  scrub  pine. 
Within  a  few  weeks  four  thousand  workmen  had  drained  the 
marshes,  laid  out  the  roads,  and  erected  ninety  buildings, 
including  barracks  and  mess  halls.  These  accommodated 
eight  regimental  units  and  a  detention  and  hospital  division, 
each  unit  having  its  own  mess  hall,  barracks,  and  officers'  quar- 
ters. A  temporary  storehouse  was  over  one-eighth  of  a  mile 
long  and  two  hundred  and  sixty  feet  wide ;  there  was  also  a  per- 
manent storehouse  of  reinforced  concrete,  five  stories  high  and 
416  by  119  feet.  The  camp  included  a  bakery,  laundry,  and 
sterilizing  plant.  The  Great  Lakes  Naval  Training  Station 
near  Chicago,  Accommodating  seventeen  thousand  men,  the 
largest  of  the  naval  cantonments,  consisted  of  six  camps  built 
around  a  central  permanent  establishment. 

To  clothe  the  tens  of  thousands  of  recruits  in  the  different 
service  branches  of  the  Navy  the  meager  supply  of  eleven 
thousand  sets  of  uniforms  on  hand  at  the  naval  supply  depots 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  were  of  course  wholly  inadequate. 
Nor  were  the  manufacturers  able  at  first  to  produce  the  quan- 
tities of  uniform  cloth  required.  This  meant  the  securing  of 
the  labor  necessary  to  produce  the  raw  material  for  the  uni- 
forms and  then  other  labor  to  manufacture  it  into  suits.  By 
August,  1917,  the  Navy  had  let  contracts  for  4,500,000  yards 
of  woolen  uniform  cloth  at  an  aggregate  cost  exceeding  $16,- 
000,000.  The  amount  of  wool  in  the  grease  required  for  the 
manufacture  of  the  cloth  was  upward  of  15,000,000  pounds. 
If  delivered  at  one  time  this  cloth  would  require  storage  space 
of  about  300,000  cubic  feet  and  would  weigh  nearly  4,500,000 


WORKING  FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  61 

pounds;  it  would  make  1,000,000  shirts  or  jumpers,  800,000 
pairs  of  trousers,  and  350,000  overcoats;  it  required  all  the 
facilities  of  thirty-five  separate  mills  in  its  manufacture.  By 
the  time  this  single  order  was  placed  correlation  and  coopera- 
tion between  the  workers  engaged  in  the  various  processes 
had  reached  the  point  where  uniforms  were  being  turned  out 
complete  at  the  rate  of  seventy  thousand  a  month. 

The  Navy  Department's  building  program  comprised  the 
improvement  and  extension  of  training  stations,  aviation  sta- 
tions, submarine  bases,  and  navy  yards,  and  the  erection  of  im- 
mense storage  warehouses  for  supplies  and  munitions,  of  dry 
docks  capable  of  accommodating  the  largest  vessels,  gun  shops, 
including  at  the  naval  gun  factory  the  largest  gun  shop  of  the 
kind  in  the  world,  and  hundreds  of  other  buildings  for  the 
various  branches  of  the  service.  This  improvement  program 
amounted  to  the  virtual  rebuilding  of  some  of  the  navy  yards 
and  stations,  comprising  ways,  shops,  tools,  cranes,  and  all  the 
requisite  appurtenances  and  auxiliaries.  The  warship  build- 
ing facilities  of  the  large  private  plants  had  also  to  be  increased 
by  an  enlargement  of  shops,  as  well  as  an  increase  in  the  facili- 
ties at  some  of  the  large  electric,  steel,  and  ordnance  plants  of 
the  country.  There  was  a  remodeling  and  enlargement  of  all 
the  power  plants  at  the  stations  and  the  perfection  of  plans 
for  carrying  out  an  arrangement  to  "  tie  in  "  these  various  im- 
portant government  plants  with  industrial  sources  of  power  in 
their  vicinity. 

The  Navy's  shipbuilding  program  provided  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  largest  warships  ever  built,  involving  the  supplying 
of  structural  shops,  machine  shops,  and  foundries  of  the  most 
modern  type,  some  of  them  of  unprecedented  size,  as  was  also 
the  machinery  for  these  buildings  necessitating,  for  illustration, 
traveling  cranes  having  a  capacity  as  high  as  three  hundred 
tons  and  fitting-out  cranes  with  a  capacity  of  nearly  four  hun- 
dred tons.  America's  mercantile  marine  had  never  been  of 
a  size  sufficient  to  have  created  for  its  own  purposes  these 
enormous  shipbuilding  facilities.  In  fact,  such  facilities  as 


62  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

were  available  in  this  country  were  so  small  as  to  make  the 
carrying  out  of  the  naval  program  of  the  war  impossible  with- 
out large  additions  to  the  private  yards  as  well  as  to  the  govern- 
ment navy  yards.  This  ship  construction  program  by  Oc- 
tober, 1917,  provided  for  787  vessels  of  all  types,  from  sub- 
marine cliasers  to  superdreadnaughts,  at  a  total  cost  exceeding 
$1,150,000,000. 

This  lack  of  facilities  was  particularly  striking  in  the  case 
of  the  construction  of  destroyers.  A  large  number  of  vessels 
of  this  type  had  been  made  necessary  by  the  requirements  of 
modern  naval  warfare,  and  especially  by  the  depredations  of 
the  German  submarine,  and  yet  there  was  not  in  the  entire  coun- 
try a  single  vacant  ways  to  hold  them.  Not  only  were  there 
no  ways  for  these  most  essential  vessels,  and  in  many  cases 
not  even  ground  enough  in  the  shipyards  on  which  to  build 
such  ways,  but  there  also  were  not  in  the  entire  United  States 
enough  skilled  mechanics  in  the  forge  plants,  to  take  a  single 
illustration,  to  forge  the  shafts  and  propelling  machinery  with- 
out suspending  operations  essential  to  the  arming  of  the  troops. 
In  building  the  destroyers  keels  were  laid  on  ground  that  a 
few  months  before  was  swamp  land,  extensions  were  made 
to  forge  plants  which  in  some  cases  were  as  large  and  even 
larger  than  the  original  plants  themselves,  and  every  manufac- 
turer and  every  available  worker  sufficiently  trained  to  make 
anything  needed  for  a  destroyer  was  set  at  this  task. 

A  somewhat  similar  situation  confronted  the  Navy  in  sup- 
plying those  two  potent  weapons  of  modern  warfare,  the  aero- 
plane and  the  submarine;  weapons  that  were  not  even  men- 
tioned in  the  military  textbooks  of  a  dozen  years  before.  The 
facilities  for  their  construction  in  any*  considerable  numbers 
had  to  be  created  over-night ;  skilled  mechanics  had  to  be  se- 
cured somewhere  and  somehow.  So  with  the  construction  of 
those  vessels  primarily  engaged  in  opposing  submarines,  whose 
life-saving  appliances  and  methods  suited  to  recognized  condi- 
tions of  naval  warfare  had  to  be  materially  modified.  Then, 
again,  the  Navy  had  only  a  moderate  supply  of  guns  and  am- 


WORKING  FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  63 

munition  for  arming  naval  auxiliaries  that  were  taken  into 
the  service.  As  for  defensive  weapons  to  protect  merchant 
vessels  when  Germany  undertook  their  indiscriminate  sinking, 
not  only  necessary  guns  but  also  skilled  gun  crews  had  to  be 
provided. 

All  this  preparation  was  accompanied  by  an  incessant  cry 
from  the  Navy  as  from  the  Army  for  skilled  men,  and  then 
more*skilled  men,  as  the  requirements  of  modern  warfare  came 
more  and  more  to  depend  for  their  success  upon  these  engine- 
men,  mechanics,  machinists,  boilermakers,  shipwrights,  ship- 
fitters,  carpenters,  riveters,  caulkers,  blacksmiths,  coppersmiths, 
sheet  metal  workers,  pattern  makers,  molders,  water  tenders, 
bricklayers,  masons,  and  so  on.  The  modern  battleship,  for 
instance,  requires  thirty-eight  machinists'  mates  to  operate  the 
machinery  and  keep  it  in  repair,  and  these  men  must  be  skilled 
artificers.  Their  supply  in  the  labor  market  was  early  in  the 
war  completely  exhausted  and  then  recourse  was  had  to  work- 
ers not  so  skilled  but  machinists  who  were  trained  in  a  rea- 
sonably short  time  to  operate  the  engines,  thus  permitting  a  less 
number  of  machinists'  mates.  The  pattern  maker  and  the 
molder  filled  an  equally  urgent  need  on  repair  ships  inasmuch 
as  under  war  conditions  ships  had  to  be  kept  at  all  times  fully 
prepared  for  immediate  active  duty  and  thus  could  not  return 
to  the  navy  yard  while  it  was  at  all  possible  for  repairs  beyond 
the  capacity  of  the  force  on  board  to  be  made  by  the  personnel 
on  the  repair  ships. 

Thus  is  indicated  the  important  fact  that  thousands  of 
workers  were  enlisted  in  the  Navy  in  occupations  and  positions 
other  than  that  of  those  who  actually  did  the  fighting.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  Army. 

The  Signal  Corps,  for  illustration,  enlisted  bricklayers  to 
build  airdromes  in  France  in  which  to  house  Amerca's  flying 
army  overseas.  These  mechanics  were  so  urgently  needed  in 
large  numbers  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  that  recruiting 
officers  were  given  special  instructions  to  enlist  every  man 
possible  for  this  service.  These  men  upon  enlistment  were 


64  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

sent  to  concentration  training  camps  in  the  South  and  there 
organized  into  squadrons  for  immediate  transportation  to 
France.  Provision  was  made  for  them  to  become  non-com- 
missioned officers.  Their  salary  ranged  from  thirty  dollars 
to  fifty-one  dollars  a  month  with  a  20  per  cent,  bonus  for 
foreign  service,  and  in  addition  food,  lodging,  and  uniform. 

Industrial  employment  of  workers  enlisted  as  soldiers  is  also 
indicated  in  the  formation  of  forest  regiments.  Each  regi- 
ment of  woodsmen  numbered  about  twelve  hundred  men,  com- 
prising ten  battalions,  and  their  task  was  to  supply  from  the 
forests  of  France  lumber  material  for  the  use  of  the  American 
Army,  such  as  cross-ties ;  bridge,  trench,  and  construction  tim- 
ber ;  mine  props ;  and  lumber  and  other  forms  of  wood  essential 
to  military  operations.  These  regiments  required  skilled  lum- 
ber-jacks, sawers,  axmen,  portable  saw-mill  operatives,  tie  cut- 
ters, loggers,  logging  teamsters,  millwrights,  filers,  stationary 
engineers,  charcoal  burners,  boiler  makers,  truck  and  tractor 
operatives,  and  so  on.  Nine  so-called  service  battalions  made 
up  of  laborers  employed  in  connection  with  the  forest  regiment 
had  also  been  authorized  by  September,  1917.  The  officers 
were  trained  in  established  camps. 

In  January,  1918,  recruiting  for  the  Twentieth  Engineers' 
Regiment  of  six  thousand  additional  men  for  forest  and  rail- 
road work  was  being  completed.  This  second  forest  regiment 
had  the  distinction  of  being  the  largest  regiment  in  the  world. 
Three  thousand  of  the  men  were  skilled  in  all  kinds  of  work 
having  to  do  with  the  operation  of  saw-mills  and  with  the 
building  and  operation  of  logging  railroads.  The  remaining 
three  thousand  made  up  three  road  and  bridge-building  bat- 
talions to  serve  as  auxiliary  to  the  logging  and  saw-mill  units. 
These  road  building  battalions  were  composed  of  men  who 
were  familiar  with  rock  crushers,  road  rollers,  scrapers,  grad- 
ers, motor-truck  driving,  and  the  work  of  common  laborers. 
There  were  also  such  workers  as  tracklayers,  track  bosses,  lo- 
comotive engineers  and  firemen,  brakemen,  machinists,  and  so 
on. 


WORKING  FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  65 

By  June,  1918,  there  had  been  organized  five  new  regiments 
and  nineteen  battalions  of  railway  engineers  in  addition  to  sim- 
ilar regiments  already  abroad.  This  meant  that  approximately 
fifty  thousand  American  workingmen  were  engaged  in  the 
work  of  railroad  construction  and  operation  in  France.  The 
organization  of  the  first  railway  regiment  was  early  in  1917 
when  six  railroads  having  headquarters  in  Chicago  recruited 
one  company  each.  In  May,  1917,  steps  were  taken  to  or- 
ganize eight  other  similar  regiments.  One  of  the  very  first 
requests  transmitted  to  the  United  States  Government  by 
France  after  America  had  entered  the  war  was  for  assistance 
in  strengthening  the  French  railway  system  to  meet  the  in- 
creasing war  strain.  Among  the  railway  supplies  sent  from 
this  country  were  1727  engines,  22,630  freight  cars  and  359,- 
ooo  tons  of  steel  rails.  In  addition  there  were  vast  quantities 
of  rail  fastenings,  turn-outs,  ties,  and  other  track  material, 
as  well  as  the  supplies  required  in  building  terminals.  Much 
of  the  task  performed  by  these  workers  had  to  do  with  the  con- 
struction of  terminals  and  terminal  facilities,  including  wharfs, 
docks,  and  lighterage  at  the  water  front,  switching  facilities 
at  inland  points,  round  houses,  and  so  on. 

Similarly  other  workers  enlisted  as  soldiers  actually  engaged 
in  industrial  pursuits,  in  this  country  as  well  as  in  the  war  ter- 
ritory in  France,  indicating  still  further  the  extraordinary  ex- 
tent of  the  demand  for  skilled  workers  for  military  service 
other  than  that  of  the  strictly  fighting  branches  of  the  Army 
and  Navy. 

The  exigencies  of  the  war  also  brought  wholly  unexpected 
demands  for  workers  in  entirely  new  fields  of  endeavor.  For 
illustration,  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army  needed  men  trained 
in  photographic  work.  To  secure  them  a  school  for  aerial  pho- 
tography with  a  course  of  training  covering  four  weeks  was 
established  at  Rochester,  New  York.  These  workers  included 
laboratory  and  dark  room  experts  and  especially  fast  news 
photographers  familiar  with  developing,  printing,  enlarging, 
retouching,  finishing,  and  panchromatic  photography  —  men 


66  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

who  could  take  a  plate  from  the  airmen  and  produce  from  it 
ten  minutes  later  a  finished  enlargement.  Others  of  these 
workers  were  camera  and  optical  construction  and  repairmen, 
lens  experts,  cabinet  makers,  instrument  makers,  and  so  on  — 
skilled  mechanics  who  could  keep  the  whole  delicate  equipment 
in  good  condition.  Still  others  were  experts  familiar  with 
map  compilation,  map  reading  and  interpretation,  topographical 
science,  and  drafting,  and  possessing  trained  analytical  powers 
—  men  who  could  fit  the  finished  prints  into  their  proper  places 
in  the  photographic  reproduction  of  the  German  front,  work 
out  the  information  disclosed,  and  keep  the  whole  map  a 
living  hour-to-hour  story  of  the  things  the  Germans  were  do- 
ing about  which  American  commanders  should  know. 

Then,  there  were  the  workers  in  -camouflage,  the  latest  of  the 
arts  of  military  concealment.  Special  camouflage  companies 
were  organized  comprising  iron  workers,  sheet  metal  workers, 
carpenters,  cabinet  makers,  stage  carpenters,  property  men, 
plaster  molders,  photographers,  scene  painters,  sign  painters, 
and  the  like.  The  task  of  these  workers  was  to  set  up  dummy 
cannon  for  the  eyes  of  the  hostile  aeroplanes ;  to  make  old  boots 
and  broken  stakes  from  destroyed  barbed-wire  entanglements 
conceal  periscopes ;  to  produce  a  papier-mache  steel-lined  coun- 
terfeit of  a  dead  horse  or  a  shell-blasted  tree  trunk;  to  trans- 
form the  roofs  of  aeroplane  sheds  so  that  from  above  they 
appeared  to  be  wheat  fields  and  the  tops  of  railroad  trains. so 
that  to  the  occupants  of  hostile  aeroplanes  they  looked  like 
workingmen's  cottages.  Even  the*  painting  of  canvas  above 
a  bridge  while  it  was  being  constructed,  so  as  to  make  the 
canvas  appear  as  a  river  and  concealing  the  bridge  beneath, 
was  Jiot  beyond  the  requirements  demanded  of  camouflage 
workers. 

These  workers  of  America  —  these  toilers  in  mines  and  mills 
and  shops  and  yards  and  offices  and  plants  and  factories  and 
storage  depots  and  lumber  camps,  and  on  the  farms  and  rail- 
roads, and  at  the  piers  and  wharfs  and  docks  of  the  ports  of 
debarkation,  and  in  the  hulls  of  ships,  and  wherever  in  fact 


WORKING  FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  67 

the  wheels  of  industry  and  of  production  had  to  be  kept  mov- 
ing—  these  men  and  women  "in  the  second  line  of  trenches" 
were  fighting  the  Imperial  German  Government  just  as  effec- 
tively as  their  blood-brother  soldiers  and  marines  in  the  first 
line  of  battle.  Their  activities  were  controlled  and  guided 
and  they  were  moved  to  intensity  of  action  by  the  same  mo- 
tives and  impulses  that  operated  upon  the  men  in  olive  drab 
and  navy  blue.  They,  too,  were  serving  their  country  in  its 
hour  of  need  —  they,  too,  were  working  for  their  Government. 

This  is  true  literally  as  well  as  figuratively.  The  United 
States  Government  actually  became  the  immediate  employer 
of  millions  of  men  and  women  and  indirectly  of  many  other 
millions.  It  took  over  direct  control  and  operation  of  the  rail- 
roads of  the  country  with  their  2,000,000  employes,  and  of 
the  telegraph  and  telephone  lines;  it  built  ships  direct  through 
its  United  States  Shipping  Board  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation 
and  the  Navy  Department;  it  constructed  dwellings  through 
its  United  States  Housing  Corporation  and  other  buildings 
through  the  War  and  Navy  Departments ;  it  controlled  the  pro- 
duction of  coal  through  the  United  States  Fuel  Administration, 
and  in  most  of  the  cases  where  production  was  continued  by 
privately  owned  industries,  even  these  were  operated  under 
contract  with  the  Government. 

A  vast  nation-wide  industry  operating  on  a  scale  of  hereto- 
fore inconceivable  magnitude  under  direct  Government  super- 
vision, had  to  be  created,  organized,  correlated,  and  made  to 
function  in  the  production  and  distribution  of  an  adequate 
supply  of  food,  of  clothes,  of  equipment,  of  munitions,  and  of 
transportation  to  the  firing  line.  This  meant  that  virtually 
every  industry  in  the  entire  country  —  every  mine  and  mill  and 
plant  and  factory  —  from  the  smallest  to  the  largest  had  to  be 
made  to  fit  in  with  the  needs  of  the  fighting  forces.  At  the 
same  time  there  were  the  needs  of  the  civilian  population  that 
could  not  be  ignored  or  neglected.  Not  only  America's  actual 
industrial  power  but  America's  potential  productivity  in  prac- 
tically all  lines  of  human  endeavor  in  the  transformation  of 


68 

raw  material  into  the  finished  product  had  almost  immediately 
to  be  stretched  even  beyond  that  conceivable  potentiality.  It 
was  an  urgent  necessity  that  peace  time  production  in  many 
Jines  be  multiplied  a  hundred  and  even  a  thousand  fold  and 
translated  almost  instantly  into  terms  and  instrumentalities  of 
military  effectiveness.  Organization  to  this  end  had  to  be 
made  to  come  out  of  America's  unorganized  mass  of  available, 
resources.  The  emergency  was  so  great  as  not  to  permit  of  an 
alternative.  It  was  such  as  to  demand  that  the  National  Gov- 
ernment itself  take  complete  control  of  production  and  dis- 
tribution. And  this  it  did. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   GOVERNMENT   AS   THE  EMPLOYER 

WITH  the  Government  the  national  employer,  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  of  virtually  the  greater  number  of 
all  the  workers,  and  with  all  male  citizens  of  military  age  sub- 
ject to  its  orders,  it  was  in  a  position,  as  it  was  under  the  neces- 
sity, of  organizing  them  into  what  was  practically  a  nation- 
wide workshop  under  one  centralized  authority  and  with  but 
one  purpose,  that  purpose  being  victory  over  the  Imperial 
German  Government.  Its  primary  task  was  to  select  out  the 
soldiers  from  among  the  male  citizens,  and  in  the  direction  of 
accomplishing  this  Congress  enacted  the  Selective  Service  Act 
of  May  18,  1917,  which  affected  all  male  citizens  between  the 
nges  of  twenty-one  and  thirty. 

The  purpose  of  this  legislation  in  its  broader  aspects  was 
succinctly  stated  by  President  Wilson  in  his  Proclamation  fix- 
ing June  5  as  the  date  for  registration : 

"  In  the  sense  in  which  we  have  been  wont  to  think  of 
armies,"  said  the  President,  "  there  are  no  armies  in  this  strug- 
gle. There  are  entire  nations  armed.  Thus  the  men  who 
remain  to  till  the  soil  and  man  the  factories  are  no  less  a  part 
of  the  army  that  is  in  France  than  the  men  beneath  the  battle 
flags.  It  must  be  so  with  us.  It  is  not  an  army  that  we  must 
shape  and  train  for  war ;  it  is  a  nation.  To  this  end  our  people 
must  draw  close  in  one  compact  front  against  a  common  foe. 
But  this  cannot  be  if  each  man  pursues  a  private  purpose.  All 
must  pursue  one  purpose.  The  Nation  needs  all  men ;  but  it 
needs  each  man,  not  in  the  field  that  will  most  pleasure  him, 
but  in  the  endeavor  that  will  best  serve  the  common  good. 
Thus,  though  a  sharpshooter  pleases  to  operate  a  triphammer 
for  the  forging  of  great  guns,  and  an  expert  machinist  desires 
to  march  with  the  flag,  the  Nation  is  being  served  only  when  the 

69 


70  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

sharpshooter  marches  and  the  machinist  remains  at  his  levers. 
The  whole  Nation  must  be  a  team  in  which  each  man  shall 
play  the  part  for  which  he  is  best  fitted.  To  this  end,  Congress 
has  provided  that  the  Nation  shall  be  organized  for  war  by 
selection  and  that  each  man  shall  be  classified  for  service  in  the 
place  to  which  it  shall  best  serve  the  general  good  to  call  him. 

"  The  significance  of  this  can  not  be  overstated.  It  is  a  new 
thing  in  our  history  and  a  landmark  in  our  progress.  It  is  a 
new  manner  of  accepting  and  vitalizing  our  duty  to  give  our- 
selves with  thoughtful  devotion  to  the  common  purpose  of  us 
all.  It  is  in  no  sense  a  conscription  of  the  unwilling,  it  is 
rather  selection  from  a  nation  which  has  volunteered  in  mass. 
It  is  no  more  a  choosing  of  those  who  shall  march  with  the 
colors  than  it  is  a  selection  of  those  who  shall  serve  an  equally 
necessary  and  devoted  purpose  in  the  industries  that  lie  behind 
the  battle  line.  The  day  here  named  is  the  time  upon  which  all 
shall  present  themselves  for  assignment  to  their  tasks." 

The  act  of  May  18  authorizing  the  President  to  increase  the 
Military  Establishment  of  the  United  States  looked  to  three 
sources  for  the  Army  which  it  'created.  First,  it  provided  for 
an  increase  in  the  Regular  Army  from  250,157  men  and  officers 
on  June  30,  1917,  to  488,218,  this  increase  being  effected  by  the 
immediate  call  of  the  increments  provided  in  the  National 
Defense  Act  of  1916  and  the  raising  of  all  branches  of  the 
service  to  war  strength.  Second,  the  National  Guard,  reor- 
ganized under  the  National  Defense  Act  and  containing  1 11,123 
officers  and  enlisted  men  on  June  30,  1917,  was  to  be  recruited 
to  full  war  strength  of  470,177  officers  and  enlisted  men. 
Third,  a  new  National  Army  was  to  be  created  through  the 
process  of  selective  conscription  or  draft,  the  President  being 
empowered  to  summon  two  units  of  500,000  men  each  at  such 
time  as  he  should  determine. 

Next  in  importance  only  to  this  paramount  military  necessity 
were  the  economic  needs  of  the  nation  for  man  power.  This 
meant  that  men  whose  removal  to  the  army  would  interfere 
seriously  with  industrial  and  agricultural  pursuits  should  be 
taken  in  the  order  in  which  they  could  best  be  spared.  As  the 
military  needs  required  that  there  be  provided  in  every  com- 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AS  THE  EMPLOYER   71 

raunity  a  list  of  names  of  men  who  would  be  ready  at  any  time 
to  be  called  into  service,  so  the  industrial  demands  made  it 
most  essential  that  there  should  also  be  accessible  the  names 
and  industrial  qualifications  of  all  men.  Thus  the  man  power 
of  the  country  needed  to  be  classified  for  two  distinct  pur- 
poses, each  of  vital  importance  to  the  winning  of  the  war. 

The  experience  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  particularly 
that  of  England,  had  proven  how  vitally  important  it  was  to 
prevent  those  men  being  drafted  into  military  service  who  were 
indispensable  to  the- steady  flow  of  munitions  of  war  and  of 
commodities  necessary  to  maintain  the  working  and  civilian 
population.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  Great  Britain  had 
rushed  men  to  the  front  regardless  of  whether  they  were  neces- 
sary in  munitions  and  other  production,  with  the  result  that 
when  the  Army  was-  in  the  trenches  needless  loss  of  life  resulted 
because  the  men  were  not  sufficiently  supplied  with  arms.  This 
brought  England  to  a  tardy  recognition  of  the  fact  that  men 
in  munitions  plants  were  just  as  essential  as  men  on  the  firing 
line.  Then  began  the  intricate  and  tedious  process  of  filter- 
ing out  from  among  the  fighting  forces  the  skilled  mechanic 
to  do  the  munitions  work.  America  fortunately  learned  a 
valuable  lesson  from  England's  experience. 

With  this  in  mind  the  selective  draft  law  made  provision 
for  classifying  the  names  of  all  men  liable  to  service.  These 
were  next  arranged  in  five  groups  in  the  inverse  order  of  their 
importance  to  the  economic  requirements,  these  latter  including 
the  maintenance  of  essential  industries  and  agriculture  and  the 
support  of  dependents.  All  this  was  provided. for  in  the  en- 
forcement of  the  registration  and  draft  acts.  The  order  of 
liability  to  military  service  was  determined  by  the  national  lot- 
tery drawing  at  Washington  to  which  reference  has  already 
been  made.1  This  assigned  by  number  to  every  registrant  in 
every  community  an  order  of  availability  for  such  service  rela- 
tive to  all  other  men  not  permanently  or  temporarily  exempted 
or  discharged.  The  effect  of  classification  in  Class  I,  for  il- 
1  Chapter  IV,  page  35. 


72  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

lustration,  was  to  render  every  man  so  classified  almost  im- 
mediately liable  to  military  service,  but  in  the  order  determined 
by  the  national  drawings.  The  effect  of  classification  in  Class 
II  was  to  grant  a  temporary  discharge  from  the  draft  effective, 
however,  only  until  Class  I  was  exhausted ;  so  with  those  mak- 
ing up  Classes  III  and  IV.  The  effect  of  classification  in  Class 
V  was  to  grant  exemption  or  discharge  from  the  draft 

Thus  in  the  administration  of  the  Selective  Service  Law  for 
filling  the  ranks  of  the  armies  an  effort  was  made  to  strike  a 
balance  between  the  military  necessity  and  the  industrial  and 
agricultural  or  economic  needs  of  the  Nation  by  which  men 
would  be  placed  in  the  service  or  occupation  that  best  served 
the  common  good.  The  need  for  men  was  in  relative  impor- 
tance as  follows:  I,  military  service;  2,  manufacture  of  arms, 
munitions,  and  like  means  of  warfare;  3,  production  of  food 
and  fuel  supplies  for  ourselves  and  our  allies ;  4,  operation  of 
the  railroads  and  the  construction  and  operation  of  ships. 

The  Priorities  Board  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  in  formu- 
lating a  list  of  preferred  industries,  established  thirty-two 
classes  as  comprising  a  preference  list  that  supplied  the  key  to 
the  relative  importance  of  all  the  country's  manifold  industrial 
enterprises.  The  values  were  established  by  surveys  as  to  the 
nation's  needs  and,  once  established,  the  list  was  maintained 
by  a  system  of  priority  in  determining  the  use  of  the  six  basal 
elements  of  industry.  These  elements  the  board  stated  as  be- 
ing material,  facilities,  fuel,  transportation,  labor,  and  capital. 

The  problem  of  the  Government  as  the  employer  was  a 
shortage  of  workers.  Not  so  much  a  shortage  in  numbers 
but  because  the  peace-time  workers  were  not  in  the  positions 
demanded  by  war-time  production.  Putting  the  situation  an- 
other way  —  the  Government  was  called  upon  to  accomplish 
immediately  a  greater  amount  of  work  absolutely  essential  to 
the  winning  of  the  war  than  there  were  men  and  women  in 
the  positions  it  was  necessary  for  them  to  be  in  to  perform  that 
work.  Its  primary  task,  therefore,  was  to  get  them  in  these 
positions  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AS  THE  EMPLOYER   73 

At  the  beginning  of  America's  participation  in  the  war  the 
manufacturing  plants  of  the  country  had  no  large  resources, 
owing  to  domestic  consumption  and  unusual  foreign  orders. 
In  the  equipment  of  its  armies  the  United  States  had  to  depend 
almost  entirely  upon  its  own  resources,  and  to  have  expected 
its  peace-time  industries  to  house,  clothe,  feed,  equip,  and 
transport  these  millions  of  men  would  have  been  to  expect  the 
impossible.  Many  industries,  some  of  them  entirely  new  to 
American  workers,  had  to  be  quickly  organized  and  in  hun- 
dreds of  instances  additional  factory  and  plant  facilities  had 
to  be  provided  for  peace-time  industries.  Along  with  the 
process  of  mobilization  in  manufacturing  had  to  go  a  radical 
readjustment  of  all  trade  channels  of  demand  and  supply. 

The  Provost  Marshal  General  in  his  report  January,  1918, 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  operation  of  the  Selective 
Service  Act  stated  that  the  needs  of  the  war  had  resulted  in  an 
unprecedented  demand  for  labor  in  the  vital  fields  of  (i)  ship- 
building and  operation,  (2)  munitions  manufacture,  and  (3) 
agriculture. 

"  The  guiding  principle  of  this  office,"  he  stated,  "  must  be 
'  military  effectiveness  first,'  but  when  military  effectiveness 
is  enmeshed  with  marine  effectiveness,  as  it  must  be  in  a  foreign 
war  on  a  battlefield  three  thousand  miles  from  our  coast  line, 
there  is  no  room  for  hesitation.  If  our  soldiers  are  to  be 
effective,  if  the  munitions  we  produce  are  to  be  effective,  if  our 
agricultural  productiveness  is  to  be  effective,  we  must  produce 
the  bottoms  to  carry  all  abroad.  .  .  .  Since  we  are  in  war 
military  effectiveness  comes  first,  but  there  never  was  a  more 
fortunate  corollary  for  the  Nation  than  that  marine  effective- 
ness comes  next.  However,  soldiers  are  helpless  without 
weapons,  and  what  has  been  said  can  never  be  taken  to  mean 
that  the  manufacture  of  munitions  is  to  be  hampered  by  the 
building  of  ships  or  the  disproportionate  raising  of  armies. 

"  All  of  these  things  are  to  be  carried  synchronously  forward, 
and  the  problem  is  simply  one  of  relative  adjustment  from 
month  to  month  and  year  to  year,  with  no  thought  of  carrying 
one  to  a  disproportionate  prejudice  of  the  other.  The  same 
is  true  of  agricultural  productiveness.  The  problem  i^  to 
carry  each  evenly  forward,  avoiding  the  destruction  of  any. 


74  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  the  problem  does  not 
stop  here.  The  entire  effectiveness  of  the  Nation  has  not  been 
envisioned  when  we  have  mentioned  the  manufacture  of  the  in- 
struments of  war,  the  instrumentalities  for  the  overseas  trans- 
portation of  them,  and  the  men  who  are  to  manipulate  them. 
The  Nation  must  be  an  economic  integer  and  a  very  effective 
one,  and  all  is  by  no  means  said  when  these  essentials  are  men- 
tioned." 

Towards  the  accomplishment  of  this  the  Selective  Service 
Act  was  an  instrument  of  compelling  force  in  controlling  the 
labor  supply  throughout  the  United  States  and  in  distributing 
it  ill  the  strategic  industries.  By  means  of  this  act  the  entire 
industrial  field  was  explored,  provision  of  facile  and  effective 
methods  perfected,  and  supple  control  exercised  in  coordinat- 
ing the  man  power  of  the  Nation  and  fostering  the  industries 
in  an  impartial  balance  that  would  carry  forward  all  the  varied 
endeavors  to  a  successful  fruition.  An  illustration  of  this  is 
the  granting  of  immunity  from  the  draft  to  workers  employed 
in  the  construction  and  fitting  out  of  ships  under  the  control 
of  the  Navy  Department  and  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation 
of  the  United  States  Shipping  Board  whe,n  it  became  evident 
beyond  dispute  that  there  were  not  enough  men  in  the  ship- 
yards to  carry  forward  the  projects.  The  immediate  effects 
were  such  as  to  remove  the  serious  shortage  of  labor  that  had 
prevailed  in  shipbuilding. 

Under  the  operation  of  the  Selective  Service  regulations  the 
Government  was  able  to  secure  a  complete  inventory  of  the 
man  power  of  the  country,  including  information  as  to  the 
qualifications  and  industrial  and  domestic  circumstances  of 
each  registrant.  There  was  also  secured  a  definite  classifica- 
tion of  all  registrants  into  the  five  classes  provided  for  accord- 
ing to  their  relative  availability  for  military  service  with  re- 
gard to  their  industrial,  agricultural,  and  domestic  importance 
to  the  Nation.  This  permitted  the  deferment  of  skilled,  key, 
and  pivotal  men  essential  to  the  industries.  It  also  enabled 
as  many  as  240,000  transfers  of  men  from  one  unit  to  another 
to  take  place  in  Army  camps  up  to  June,  1918.  At  that  time 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AS  THE  EMPLOYER      75 

these  transfers  were  averaging  forty  thousand  a  week.  An 
organization  existed  in  each  Army  camp  by  which  enlisted  men 
and  commissioned  officers  were  classified  according  to  occu^ 
pational  qualifications.  The  central  personnel  bureau  at 
Washington  received  reports  soon  after  the  arrival  at  camp  of 
each  draft  increment,  showing  the  number  of  skilled  and  semi- 
skilled men  in  different  occupations,  thus  enabling  quick  trans- 
fers to  the  Signal  Corps,  Ordnance,  Quartermaster,  and  other 
corps  of  the  Army  and  the  supporting  industries  which  were 
constantly  calling  for  specially  skilled  men.  Among  these 
transfers  were  mechanics  of  all  kinds,  chauffeurs,  chemists  for 
gas  defense  work,  physicists  and  meteorologists  for  aviation 
purposes,  surgical  instrument  repairers,  bacteriologists,  map 
draftsmen,  refrigeration  experts,  crane  operators,  foresters, 
railroad  builders,  railway  shop  workmen,  accountants,  gun- 
smiths, and  ordnance  specialists  and  workmen  -for  engineer 
regiments,  and  so  on. 

There  was  also  created  by  the  Selective  Service  regulations 
a  committee  on  education  and  special  training  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Chief  of  Staff.  This  committee's  task  was  to  study 
the  Army's  needs  for  skilled  men  and  technicians,  to  determine 
how  such  needs  could  best  be  met,  to  secure  the  cooperation  of 
the  educational  institutions  of  the  country,  to  represent  the 
War  Department  in  its  relations  with  such  institutions,  and 
to  administer  a  plan  of  special  training  in  schools  and  colleges. 
It  also  encouraged  and  arranged  for  the  technical  education  of 
needed  men.  Associated  with  the  committee  was  an  advisory 
civilian  board  of  educators. 

The  Federal  Board  for  Vocational  Education  was  organized 
in  July,  1917,  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  vocational  educa- 
tion work  in  the  forty-eight  States  and  in  other  ways  assist 
the  war-making  branches  in  training  men  for  special  duties. 
Classes  for  conscripted  men  were  instituted  in  the  public 
schools;  emergency  training  courses  for  Army  occupations 
were  prepared  for  use  under  direct  supervision  of  the  board, 
in  classes  organized  by  the  War  Department  among  enlisted 


76  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

men,  and  for  classes  conducted  on  a  commercial  basis  under 
private  civilian  control.  These  courses  were  for  men  in  me- 
chanical and  technical  occupations  in  the  air  service  of  the 
Signal  Corps,  shipyard  workers,  motor-truck  drivers,  chauf- 
feurs, machine  shop  operatives,  blacksmiths,  sheet  metal  work- 
ers, pipe  fitters,  electricians,  telephone  repairmen,  linemen, 
cable  splicers,  gas  enginemen,  motor  car  and  motorcycle  repair- 
men, oxyacetylene  welders,  airplane  mechanics,  engine  repair- 
men, wood  workers,  riggers,  and  so  on.  By  June,  1917, 
twelve  thousand  men  had  been  trained  for  vocational  educa- 
tion and  turned  over  to  various  war  service  departments,  these 
men  comprising  six  thousand  in  mechanical  lines,  five  thousand 
in  radio  work  for  the  Army,  Navy,  and  mercantile  marine, 
and  one  thousand  in  clerical  occupations  for  the  Quartermaster 
Corps. 

All  this  registering,  classifying,  sorting,  transferring,  and 
training  by  the  Government  was  necessary  in  order  to  place 
the  men  and  women  workers  in  the  positions  in  the  military 
branches  and  in  the  industrial  pursuits  where  they  could  best 
serve  the  Nation.  It  was  an  unprecedented  task  and  was  per- 
formed unprecedentedly  well.  But  it  was  only  a  small  part 
of  the  complete  task  set  for  the  Government. 

After  the  worker  was  placed,  what  was  to  be  his  or  her  re- 
lation and  that  of  the  Government  towards  all  those  disputed 
and  vexatious  and  troublesome  questions  of  employment  which 
for  years  had  been  in  controversy  between  employer  and  em- 
ploye and  which  are  concretely  summarized  as  the  labor  prob- 
lem? As  to  the  workers  in  the  strictly  military  branches,  this 
relation  was  determined  by  statute.  But  with  regard  to  the 
millions  in  industrial  pursuits  employed  directly  by  some  de- 
partment or  bureau  of  the  Government  or  by  some  corporation 
of  contractor  working  directly  for  the  Government,  there  was 
no  provision  by  statute  for  determining  this  relation.  Sud- 
denly and  unexpectedly  the  National  Government  had  been 
forced  into  the  position  of  the  employer.  What  kind  of  an 
employer  was  it  to  be  ? 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AS  THE  EMPLOYER      77 

If  all  at  once  you  were  compelled  to  become  the  principal 
employer  of  the  workingmen  in  the  United  States  what  policy 
would  you  make  effective  as  to  the  wages  you  paid  and  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  employment  you  imposed  upon  or  ex- 
acted from  your  workers?  This  is  the  question  the  United 
States  Government  was  called  upon  to  decide  almost  immedi- 
ately upon  the  declaration  of  war  against  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  in  April,  1917. 

Would  you,  in  conference  with  your  employes,  provide  for 
them  a  properly  constituted  tribunal  where  all  disputed  ques- 
tions affecting  their  employment  were  decided  fairly  and  im- 
partially? Or  would  you  dogmatically  assume  to  decide  such 
questions  yourself  and  tell  your  workers  that  if  they  did  not 
like  your  decision  they  could  get  employment  elsewhere? 

Would  you  demand  of  your  employes  that  they  work  four- 
teen or  twelve  or  even  ten  hours  each  day?  Or  would  you  fix 
the  length  of  the  work-day  in  consultation  with  your  workers 
at  eight  hours  ?  Would  you  require  them  to  work  on  Sundays 
and  holidays?  And  if  you  did,  or  if  you  required  them  to 
work  more  than  eight  hours  each  day,  would  you  pay  them 
time  and  one-half  or  double  time  wages  for  all  extra  hours 
they  worked  ? 

Would  you  increase  their  wages?  If  so  what  standard  of 
measurement  would  you  make  use  of  to  determine  the  amount 
of  increase?  Would  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  to  your 
employes  be  a  matter  of  concern  to  you  ?  \Vhat  relation  would 
you  make  this  increase  bear  to  their  wages? 

Would  you  "  recognize  the  union,"  that  is,  would  you  discuss 
with  representatives  of  the  organization  of  your  employes 
through  joint  or  collective  bargaining  machinery  the  multi- 
tudinous questions  of  employment  that  come  up  between  em- 
ployers and  employes?  Perhaps  you  would  refuse  to  permit 
your  employes  even  to  organize  a  union!  It  may  be  that  you 
would  declare  for  the  "  open  shop  "  so-called ! 

As  the  employer,  would  you  concern  yourself  with  measures 
for  the  prevention  of  accidents  to  your  employes  while  at  work? 


78  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

With  the  conservation  of  their  health?  Writh  the  securing  of 
sanitary  conditions  in  their  work  places  ?  With  the  protection, 
through  old  age  pensions  and  the  like,  of  faithful  employes 
who  were  no  longer  able  to  work  for  you?  With  the  safe- 
guarding of  your  employes  against  the  terrible  effects  of  un- 
employment? \Vith  the  unusual  problems  arising  from  the 
industrial  employment  of  women  and  children? 

Would  your  employes  participate  in  the  management  of  that 
particular  part  of  your  business  which  bears  directly  upon 
matters  concerning  their  employment?  Would  they  partici- 
pate in  your  surplus  profits?  Would  you  have  shop  commit- 
tees? 

In  brief,  What  kind  of  an  employer  would  you  be?  A  be- 
liever of  autocracy  or  of  democracy  in  industry  ? 

It  was  the  answer  the  Wilson  Administration  gave  to  these 
questions  that  was  responsible,  in  large  part,  for  the  successful 
performance  by  the  American  workingman  of  the  stupendous 
task  he  was  called  upon  to  accomplish  in  the  winning  of  the 
war. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  WILSON  ADMINISTRATION'S  LABOR  POLICY 

ATHWART  the  channels  of  strikes  and  lockouts  and  like 
interruptions  to  and  limitations  upon  the  continuous  pro- 
duction of  commodities  and  services,  which  the  course  of  the 
labor  movement  the  past  several  decades  preceding  the  Euro- 
pean war  had  cut  deep  into  the  processes  of  industry,  the  Gov- 
ernment as  the  national  employer  was  now  called  upon  to  pro- 
vide a  means  of  passage.  It  requires  an  unusually  high  de- 
gree of  statesmanship  to  perceive  clearly,  through  the  murk 
of  internal  differences  and  disputes  between  classes  or  groups, 
the  one  thing  necessary  in  order  to  accomplish  a  desired  end 
and  to  apply  successfully  that  particular  remedy.  The  Wil- 
sonian  statesmanship  as  applied  to  the  disturbed  labor  situa- 
tion was  of  this  character. 

Among  the  more  important  industrial  controversies  in  prog- 
ress in  this  country  when  the  United  States  declared  war,  were 
the  acute  labor  disputes  in  the  coal  mines  of  Pennsylvania,  af- 
fecting 80,000  mine  workers,  and  of  Alabama,  involving  25,000 
other  mine  employes ;  in  the  shops  of  the  Southwestern  group 
of  railroads  affecting  42,000  mechanics;  in  the  shipyards  of  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  Coast  States  involving  nearly  300,000 
men ;  in  the  meat  packing  industry  of  Chicago  but  affecting  this 
food  supply  of  the  entire  country ;  in  the  copper  mines  of  Ari- 
zona;  in  the  oil  fields  of  southern  California:  in  the  telephone 
industry  of  Washington,  Oregon,  California,  Idaho,  and  Ne- 
vada ;  in  the  lumber  industry  of  the  Pacific  Northwest ;  among 
virtually  all  classes  of  employes  of  the  railroads ;  and  numer- 
ous other  less  important  disturbances  in  different  industries 
in  all  parts  of  the  country. 

79 


8o  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

"  The  war  can  be  lost  in  America  as  well  as  on  the  fields  of 
France,"  the  President  saw  distinctly,1  and  he  also  perceived  as 
clearly  that  "  ill-considered  or  unjustified  interruptions  of  the 
essential  labor  of  the  country  "  would  bring  this  dire  result. 
The  duty  "  to  avoid  such  interruptions  to  industry  wherever 
they  can  be  avoided  without  the  actual  sacrifice  of  essential 
rights  rests  upon  the  employer  as  imperatively  as  upon  the 
workman,"  he  said.  "  No  man  can  afford  to  do  injustice  at 
any  time  but  at  this  time  justice  is  of  the  essence  of  national 
defense,  and  contests  for  any  sort  of  advantage  that  at  other 
times  would  be  justified  may  now  jeopardize  the  very  life  of 
the  Nation."  Therefore,  "  no  controversy  between  capital  and 
labor  should  be  suffered  to  interrupt  "  the  essential  labor  of  the 
country  "  until  every  instrumentality  set  up  by  the  Government 
for  its  amicable  settlement  has  been  employed  and  its  inter- 
mediation heeded  to  the  utmost;  and  the  Government  has  set 
up  instrumentalities  wholly  fair  and  adequate." 

"  To  stand  together,"  said  the  President  in  an  address  before 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor  convention  at  Buffalo  No- 
vember 12,  1917,  "  means  that  nobody  must  interrupt  the  proc- 
esses of  our  energy  if  the  interruption  can  possibly  be  avoided 
without  the  absolute  invasion  of  freedom.  To  put  it  con- 
cretely, that  means  this :  Nobody  has  a  right  to  stop  the  proc- 
esses of  labor  until  all  the  methods  of  conciliation  and  settle- 
ment have  been  exhausted.  And  I  might  as  well  say  right  here 
that  I  am  not  talking  to  you  alone.  You  sometimes  stop  the 
courses  of  labor,  but  there  are  others  who  do  the  same,  and  I 
believe  that  I  am  speaking  from  my  own  experience  not  only, 
but  from  the  experience  of  others  when  I  say  that  you  are 
reasonable  in  a  larger  number  of  cases  than  the  capitalists, 
am  not  saying  these  things  to  them  personally  yet,  because  I 
have  not  had  a  chance,  but  they  have  to  be  said,  not  in  any 
spirit  of  criticism,  but  in  order  to  clear  the  atmosphere  and 
come  down  to  business.  Everybody  on  both  sides  has  now 
got  to  transact  business,  and  a  settlement  is  never  impossible 
when  both  sides  want  to  do  the  square  and  right  thing. 

*  Telegram  to  the  St.  Paul  convention  of  the  American  Alliance  for 
Labor  and  Democracy,  June  n,  1918. 


WILSON  ADMINISTRATION'S  LABOR  POLICY     81 

"  Moreover,  a  settlement  is  always  hard  to  avoid  when  the 
parties  can  be  brought  face  to  face.  I  can  differ  from  a  man 
much  more  radically  when  he  is  not  in  the  room  than  I  can 
when  he  is  in  the  room,  because  then  the  awkward  thing  is  he 
can  come  back  at  me  and  answer  what  I  say.  It  is  always 
dangerous  for  a  man  to  have  the  floor  entirely  to  himself. 
Therefore,  we  must  insist  in  every  instance  that  the  parties 
come  into  each  other's  presence  and  there  discuss  the  issues 
between  them  and  not  separately  in  places  which  have  no  com- 
munication with  each  other.  .  .  . 

"  We  are  all  of  the  same  clay  and  spirit,  and  we  can  get 
together  if  we  desire  to  get  together.  Therefore,  my  counsel  lo 
you  is  this :  Let  us  show  ourselves  Americans  by  showing  that 
we  do  not  want  to  go  off  in  separate  camps  or  groups  by  our- 
selves, but  that  we  want  to  cooperate  with  all  other  classes  and 
all  other  groups  in  the  common  enterprise  which  is  to  release 
the  spirits  of  the  world  from  bondage.  I  would  be  willing  to 
set  that  up  as  the  final  test  of  an  American.  That  is  the  mean- 
ing of  democracy.  The  fundamental  lesson  of  the  whole  situa- 
tion is  that  we  must  not  only  take  common  counsel,  but  that  we 
must  yield  to  and  obey  common  counsel." 

As  production  of  vitally  essential  commodities  for  the  suc- 
cessful prosecution  of  the  war  was  being  seriously  interfered 
with  by  the  disturbed  labor  conditions,  there  were  two  funda- 
mentally important  acts  the  Government  was  clearly  called 
upon  to  perform  by  the  facts  and  the  logic  of  the  industrial 
situation  which  confronted  the  people  at  the  outset  of  their 
participation  in  the  war.  The  first  of  these  acts  was  to  find 
out  by  investigation  what  were  the  direct  operating  causes  of 
this  interruption,  and  the  second  was  to  apply  a  remedy. 

In  carrying  out  the  determination  of  the  Government  to  omit 
nothing  which  might  aid  in  the  immediate  adjustment  of  all 
disturbances  of  every  character  in  progress  throughout  the 
country,  the  President  appointed  a  commission  early  in  the 
war.1  "  I  have  listened  with  attention  and  concern  to  the 

1  The  members  of  the  commission  were  William  B.  Wilson,  Secre- 
tary of  Labor;  J.  L.  Spangler  of  Pennsylvania,  Verner  Z.  Reed  of 
Colorado,  John  H.  Walker  of  Illinois,  and  E.  P.  Marsh  of  Washington. 


82  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

numerous  charges  of  misconduct  and  injustice  that  representa- 
tives both  of  employers  and  of  employes  have  made  against 
each  other,"  says  the  President's  official  memorandum.1  "  I 
am  not  so  much  concerned,  however,  with  the  manner  in  which 
they  have  treated  each  other  in  the  past  as  I  am  desirous  of 
seeing  some  kind  of  a  working  arrangement  arrived  at  for  the 
future,  particularly  during  the  period  of  the  war,  on  a  basis 
that  will  be  fair  to  all  parties  concerned." 

It  was  the  task  of  the  commission  to  visit,  in  each  instance, 
the  governor  of  the  State  and  advise  him  that  they  were  there 
as  the  personal  representative  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  with  a  view  to  lending  sympathetic  counsel  and  aid  to 
the  State  government  in  the  development  of  a  better  under- 
standing between  employes  and  employers.  The  commission 
was  also  to  deal  with  employers  and  employes  in  a  conciliatory 
spirit,  seek  to  compose  differences  and  allay  misunderstanding, 
and  in  any  way  that  might  be  open  to  them  to  show  the  active 
interest  of  the  National  Government  in  furthering  arrange- 
ments just  to  both  sides.  Wherever  it  was  deemed  advisable 
conferences  of  employers  and  employes  were  to  be  called  with 
the  purpose  of  working  out  a  mutual  understanding  between 
them  which  would  insure  the  continued  operation  of  the  indus- 
try on  conditions  acceptable  to  both  sides.  The  commission  was 
also  to  learn  the  real  causes  for  any  discontent  which  existed  on 
either  side,  not  so  much  by  the  formal  process  of  public  hear- 
ings but  by  getting  into  touch  with  workmen  and  employers 
by  the  more  informal  process  of  personal  conversation. 

This  commission  had  particularly  to  do  with  industrial  con- 
troversies already  in  progress  or  about  to  be  precipitated,  and 
especially  concerning  such  labor  conditions  in  the  mountain 
region  of  the  Northwest  and  on  the  Pacific  Coast.  It  reported 
at  some  length  in  January,  1918,  the  results  in  specific  labor 
adjustments  which  it  had  undertaken,  an  analysis  of  the  diffi- 
culties and  tendencies  making  for  industrial  instability,  and 
recommended  a  policy  as  to  the  direction  that  should  be  taken 
1  Published  September  20,  1917, 


WILSON  ADMINISTRATION'S  LABOR  POLICY     83 

in  labor  matters  during  the  period  of  the  war.  The  specific 
labor  disputes  referred  to  were  the  strikes  in  the  copper  mines 
of  Arizona,  the  unrest  in  the  lumber  industry  of  the  Pacific 
Northwest,  the  threatened  strike  in  the  oil  fields  of  southern 
California,  on  the  telephone  lines  of  the  Pacific  States,  and  in 
the  packing  industry  centering  in  Chicago,  and  the  general 
labor  unrest  in  the  shipbuilding  and  aircraft  production  indus- 
tries. As  to  each  of  these  situations  the  report  set  forth  the 
existing  relation  of  employers  and  employes,  the  causes  of  the 
unrest,  the  steps  necessary  for  the  removal  of  such  causes,  a 
history  of  the  strikes,  the  nature  of  the  settlement  where  adjust- 
ment was  made  by  the  commission,  and  how  this  settlement 
was  working. 

Into  each  situation,  backed  by  the  authority  of  the  National 
Government,  and  supported  by  the  patriotism  of  both  employ- 
ers and  employes,  the  commission  simply  injected  the  instru- 
mentality of  industrial  democracy  which  the  preceding  forty 
and  more  years  of  the  labor  movement  had  built  up.  This 
was  the  institutional  machinery  for  joint  bargaining.  It  pre- 
supposes not  only  the  existence  of  an  organization  of  the  work- 
ers, for  without  such  organization  joint  or  collective  bargain- 
ing between  employer  and  employe  is  an  impossibility,  but  also 
the  "  recognition  "  of  this  organization  and  its  representatives 
on  the  part  of  the  employer.  Such  machinery,  under  the  su- 
pervision of  an  impartial  federal  administrator,  was  established 
in  the  telephone  industry  of  the  Pacific  Coast  States,  in  the 
southern  California  oil  fields,  in  the  Chicago  meat  packing  in- 
dustry, and  in  the  copper  mines  of  Arizona.  A  brief  summary 
of  the  settlement  of  the  labor  controversy  in  the  copper  indus- 
try can  be  taken  as  an  illustration. 

There  was  established  for  each  mine  a  worker's  grievance 
committee  entirely  free  from  all  direct  or  indirect  influence  of 
the  company.  This  committee  was  composed  exclusively  of 
men  working  at  each  mine,  with  the  right  of  members  of  the 
union  to  have  a  union  representative  in  the  presentation  of 
grievances.  There  was  to  be  no  discrimination  against  an 


84  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

employe  because  he  belonged  to  the  union.  Appeal  to  a  United 
States  Government  administrator  was  provided  for  whose  de- 
cision was  binding  on  both  parties  on  all  disputed  questions 
of  fact  as  to  which  the  management  and  employes  could  not 
agree.  Old  and  new  grievances  were  promptly  heard,  in  one 
district  as  many  as  two  hundred  and  fifty  being  disposed  of  in 
five  weeks.  Not  a  few  of  these  were  naturally  found  to  be  triv- 
ial or  groundless  —  they  were  an  inheritance  of  the  preceding 
condition  of  autocratic  domination  by  the  corporation. 

Re-employment  was  effected  of  those  employes  who  went  out 
on  strike,  except  those  guilty  of  seditious  utterances  against  the 
United  States  or  those  having  membership  in  an  organization 
which  did  not  recognize  the  obligation  of  a  contract.  In  pro- 
viding for  re-employment  the  district  instead  of  the  individual 
mine  was  treated  as  an  industrial  unit,  re-employment  being 
secured  through  a  central  employment  committee  for  the  dis- 
trict. The  question  of  a  wage  increase  was  left  to  the  Gov- 
ernment administrator  after  an  investigation  of  the  facts.  The 
machinery  thus  provided  was  designed  to  prevent  strikes  and 
lockouts,  and  was  to  be  in  effect  during  the  period  of  the  war. 

For  the  purpose  of  formulating  a  national  labor  policy  and 
for  devising  and  proyiding  a  method  of  labor  adjustment  which 
would  be  acceptable  to  employers  and  employes  at  least  for 
the  war  emergency  period,  the  Wilson  administration  created 
on  January  28,  1918,  the  War  Labor  Conference  Board  con- 
sisting of  five  representatives  of  employers,  five  representa- 
tives of  employes,  and  two  of  the  general  public.  Among  the 
five  representatives  of  employers  were  four  who  had  never 
dealt  with  organized  labor  in  the  conduct  of  their  industries. 
The  five  representatives  of  the  employes  were  officials  of  na- 
tional and  international  labor  unions  whose  members  were  al- 
most entirely  engaged  in  war  production.  The  members  of  the 
board  were  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  Labor  upon  nomina- 
tion by  the  president  of  the  National  Industrial  Conference 
Board,  an  organization  of  employers,  and  the  president  of 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  the  latter  representing  all 


WILSON  ADMINISTRATION'S  LABOR  POLICY     85 

the  more  important  labor  unions  of  the  country  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  four  railway  brotherhoods  whose  members  were 
engaged  in  the  operation  of  trains.  Each  of  the  two  groups 
thus  selected  chose  one  of  the  two  representatives  of  the 
public.1 

This  board  presented  a  formulation  of  industrial  principles 
which  represented  the  Administration's  labor  policy  and  which 
were  to  govern  the  relations  between  workers  and  employers  in 
war  industries  for  the  duration  of  the  war.  These  principles 
are  as  follows: 

There  should  be  no  strikes  or  lockouts  during  the  war. 

The  right  of  workers  to  organize  in  trade  unions  and  to 
bargain  collectively  through  chosen  representatives  is  recog- 
nized and  affirmed.  This  right  shall  not  be  denied,  abridged, 
or  interfered  with  by  the  employers  in  any  manner  whatsoever. 

The  right  of  employers  to  organize  in  associations  of  groups 
and  to  bargain  collectively  through  chosen  representatives  is 
recognized  and  affirmed.  This  right  shall  not  be  denied, 
abridged,  or  interfered  with  by  the  workers  in  any  manner 
whatsoever. 

Employers  should  not  discharge  workers  for  membership  in 
trade  unions,  nor  for  legitimate  trade  union  activities. 

The  workers,  in  the  exercise  of  their  right  to  organize,  shall 

1  The  members  of  the  board  were  Mr.  L.  F.  Loree,  president  of  the 
Delaware  and  Hudson  Railroad  Company;  Mr.  Loyall  A.  Osborne, 
vice-president  of  the  Westinghouse  Electric  and  Manufacturing  Com- 
pany; Mr.  C.  Edwin  Michael,  president  of  the  Virginia  Bridge  and 
Iron  Company;  Mr.  W.  H.  Van  Dervoort,  president  of  Root  and  Van 
Dervoort  Engineering  Company;  and  Mr.  B.  L.  Worden,  vice-president 
of  the  Submarine  Boat  Corporation,  representing  employers;  Mr. 
Frank  J.  Hayes,  president  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America; 
Mr.  William  H.  Johnston,  president  of  the  International  Association 
of  Machinists;  Mr.  T.  A.  Rickert,  president  of  the  Unked  Garment 
Workers  of  America;  Mr.  W.  L.  Hutcheson,  president  of  the  United 
Brotherhood  of  Carpenters  and  Joiners  of  America;  and  Mr.  Victor 
A.  Olander,  representative  of  the  International  Seamen's  Union  of 
America,  representing  employes.  The  representatives  of  the  public 
were  ex-President  William  Howard  Taft  and  Mr.  Frank  P.  Walsh. 


86  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

not  use  coercive  measures  of  any  kind  to  induce  persons  to 
join  their  organizations,  nor  to  induce  employers  to  bargain  or 
deal  therewith. 

In  establishments  where  the  union  shop  exists  the  same  shall 
continue  and  the  union  standards  as  to  wages,  hours  of  labor, 
and  other  conditions  of  employment  shall  be  maintained. 

In  establishments  where  union  and  non-union  men  and 
women  now  work  together,  and  the  employer  meets  only  with 
the  employes  or  representatives  engaged  in  said  establishments, 
the  continuance  of  such  condition  shall  not  be  deemed  a  griev- 
ance. This  declaration,  however,  is  not  intended  in  any  man- 
ner to  deny  the  right  or  discourage  the  practice  of  the  forma- 
tion of  labor  unions,  or  the  joining  of  the  same  by  the  workers 
in  said  establishments,  as  guaranteed  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph, nor  to  prevent  the  War  Labor  Board  '  from  urging,  or 
any  umpire  from  granting,  under  the  machinery  herein  pro- 
vided, improvement  of  their  situation  in  the  matter  of  wages, 
hours  of  labor,  or  other  conditions,  as  shall  be  found  desirable 
from  time  to  time. 

Established  safeguards  and  regulations  for  the  protection  of 
the  health  and  safety  of  workers  shall  not  be  relaxed. 

If  it  shall  become  necessary  to  employ  women  on  work  or- 
dinarily performed  by  men,  they  must  be  allowed  equal  pay 
for  equal  work  and  must  not  be  allotted  tasks  disproportionate 
to  their  strength. 

The  basic  eight  hour  day  is  recognized  as  applying  in  all 
cases  in  which  existing  law  requires  it.  In  all  other  cases  the 
question  of  hours  of  labor  shall  be  settled  with  due  regard  to 
governmental  necessities  and  the  welfare,  health,  and  proper 
comfort  of  the  workers. 

The  maximum  production  of  all  war  industries  should  be 
maintained,  and  methods  of  work  and  operation  on  the  part  of 
employers  or  workers  which  operate  to  delay  or  limit  produc- 

1  The  creation  of  this  board  was  recommended  in  the  report.  See 
Chapter  XIII  for  a  discussion  of  the  operation  of  this  board. 


WILSON  ADMINISTRATION'S  LABOR  POLICY     87 

tion,  or  which  have  a  tendency  to  increase  artificially  the  cost 
thereof,  should  be  discouraged. 

In  fixing  wages,  hours,  and  conditions  of  labor  regard  should 
always  be  had  to  the  labor  standards,  wage  scales,  and  other 
conditions  prevailing  in  the  localities  affected. 

The  right  of  all  workers,  including  common  laborers,  to  a 
living  wage  is  hereby  declared. 

In  fixing  wages,  minimum  rates  of  pay  shall  be  established 
which  will  insure  the  subsistence  of  the  worker  and  his  family 
in  health  and  reasonable  comfort. 

For  the  purpose  of  mobilizing  the  labor  supply  with  a  view 
to  its  rapid  and  effective  distribution,  a  permanent  list  of  the 
number  of  skilled  and  other  workers  available  in  different  parts 
of  the  Nation  shall  be  kept  on  file  by  the  Department  of  Labor, 
the  information  to  be  constantly  furnished  by  the  trade  unions, 
by  State  employment  bureaus  and  Federal  agencies  of  like 
character,  and  by  the  managers  and  operators  of  industrial 
establishments  throughout  the  country.  These  agencies  should 
be  given  opportunity  to  aid  in  the  distribution  of  labor,  as 
necessity  demands. 

Such  is  the  compass  or  chart  of  industrial  "  rights "  for 
both  employer  and  employe  which  the  Wilson  Administration 
had  formulated  as  a  guide  for  the  United  States  Government  as 
the  national  employer  and  for  all  others  engaged  on  war  work 
for  the  duration  of  the  conflict  with  Germany.  To  the  em- 
ployer and  the  Government  was  assured  maximum  production 
within  proper  and  reasonable  limitations.  To  the  worker  was 
assured  the  right  to  organize  and  a  certain  degree  of  protection 
to  his  economic  welfare.  To  the  public  was  assured  the  es- 
tablishment, even  though  in  a  limited  degree,  of  the  principles 
of  industrial  democracy  —  assured  at  least  for  the  period  of 
the  war  that  was  being  fought  against  autocracy  in  order  '*  to 
make  the  world  safe  for  democracy." 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    GOVERNMENT   AND   THE   RAILWAY   EMPLOYES 

THESE  principles  of  a  code  of  industrial  ethics  to  govern 
the  relations  between  employers  and  employes  engaged 
in  essential  war  production  were  not  conceived  out  of  nothing 
by  the  War  Labor  Conference  Board.  All  of  them  are  well 
recognized  principles  of  right  conduct  which  the  progress  of 
the  labor  movement  has  established  in  not  a  few  of  the  more 
important  industries.  The  real  difficulty  in  these  industries 
was  the  absence  of  properly  organized  machinery  for  the  ap- 
plication of  the  principles  to  the  concrete  cases  of  individual 
employes  —  machinery  in  the  conduct  and  operation  of  which 
both  employer  and  employe  could  have  explicit  confidence  as 
to  its  impartiality  and  disinterested  motives. 

This  situation  is  probably  exemplified  most  strikingly  in  the 
case  of  the  railroads  of  the  country.  They  employed  about 
1,700,000  men  in  pursuits  which  brought  them  within  the 
influence  of  the  labor  union.  The  numbers  engaged  in  the  prin- 
cipal occupational  groups  as  classified  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  J  were  as  follows : 

Maintenance  of  way 449,000 

Maintenance  of  equipment  and  mechanical 389,000 

Train  operation 227,000 

Yard  employes   184,000 

Clerks 183,000 

Station  employes 133,000 

Dispatchers  and  telegraphers 67,000 

Much  the  larger  number  of  these  employes  were  members  of 
some  one  of  the  fourteen  organizations  that  were  in  existence 

1  Statistics    of    Railways,    Interstate    Commerce    Commission. 

88 


GOVERNMENT  AND  RAILWAY  EMPLOYES     89 

among  them.  All  of  these,  with  the  exception  of  the  four 
brotherhoods  whose  members  operated  the  trains,  were  affiliated 
with  the  American  Federation  of  Labor.  In  probably  no  other 
single  industry  are  the  workers  more  strongly  and  compactly 
organized  into  labor  unions  or  brotherhoods.  Consequently 
they  have  been  able  to  establish  principles  governing  the  con- 
ditions of  their  employment  and  their  relations  with  the  em- 
ployers which  are  more  advantageous  to  the  employes  than 
those  that  prevail  in  almost  any  other  industry.  Nearly  all 
the  railroad  corporations  "  recognized  "  these  unions  and  dealt 
with  their  official  representatives  through  joint  bargaining  ma- 
chinery. This  had  reached  such  a  point  of  development  by 
1910  that  what  are  known  as  concerted  wage  movements  were 
conducted  at  the  same  time  against  all  the  railroads  in  each  of 
the  three  territorial  districts  by  two  or  more  of  the  brother- 
hoods whose  members  operate  the  trains ;  and  in  1914  all  four 
unions  representing  the  engineers,  firemen,  conductors,  and 
trainmen  united  in  a  common  demand  upon  all  the  railroads 
of  the  entire  country  for  the  eight  hour  work  day.  These  con- 
certed movements  usually  consumed  more  than  twelve  months 
from  the  time  of  their  inauguration  until  a  decision  was 
reached.  This  decision  was  made  in  every  case  but  that  of 
the  eight  hour  day  l  movement  by  a  board  of  arbitration  ap- 
pointed by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  unions  and  the  railroads  always  being  unable  to 
come  to  an  agreement  on  the  demands  of  the  employes.  On 
these  boards  representatives  of  the  unions  were  appointed  as 
members  and  thus  received  official  recognition.  All  this  in- 
volved hearings,  the  establishing  of  statistical  bureaus  by  both 
sides  to  the  controversy,  the  preparation  and  presentation  be- 
fore the  board  of  evidence  bearing  on  the  demands,  and  in  fact 
the  creation  of  almost  all  the  paraphernalia  of  courts  of  law 
necessary  for  the  ascertainment  of  the  facts  and  the  meting  out 
of  justice. 

1  The  eight-hour  work   day   in   train   operation   was   established   by 
federal  law  in  the  enactment  in  1914  of  the  Adamson  Act  by  Congress. 


90  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Notwithstanding  this  development  of  industrial  machinery 
the  relations  between  the  railways  and  their  employes  were  far 
from  being  satisfactory  to  the  workers,  to  the  officials  of  the 
companies,  or  to  the  public.  The  employes  complained  of  low 
wages,  of  maladjustments  in  wages  as  between  individuals  in 
the  same  occupation  and  as  between  occupations,  of  excessive 
hours  of  work  in  particular  occupations,  of  the  absence  of 
proper  machinery  for  deciding  fairly  the  many  disputed  ques- 
tions that  were  constantly  agitating  their  grievance  committees, 
and  so  on  indefinitely.  In  fact,  at  the  very  moment  of  the 
entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  the  engineers,  fire- 
men, conductors,  and  trainmen,  as  well  as  other  organized  rail- 
way employes,  were  making  demands  upon  the  transportation 
corporations.  The  necessities  of  war  required  that  the  direct 
control  and  operation  of  the  more  important  of  these  transpor- 
tation lines  be  taken  over  by  the  National  Government.  This 
action  in  December,  1917,*  had  the  effect  of  making  every  rail- 
road employe  on  these  lines  virtually  an  employe  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

Here,  too,  the  Wilson  Administration  exhibited  a  high  degree 
of  statesmanship  in  the  labor  policy  which  it  applied  to  the 
situation.  It  first  appointed  the  disinterested  public-spirited 
commission  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made.2  This 

1  The  statement  accompanying  the  Proclamation  of   President  Wil- 
son taking  over  the   railroads  under   federal   administration   said   that 
"  it  is  necessary  for  the  complete  mobilization  of  our  resources  that 
the   transportation    systems   of    the   country   should   be   organized   and 
employed   under  a   single   authority   and    a   simplified    method    of    co- 
ordination which  has  not  proved   possible  under  private  management 
and  control."    The  railroads  were  taken  possession  of  for  the  Gov- 
ernment by  the  Secretary  of  War  and  control  was  assumed  at  twelve 
o'clock  noon  December  8,  1917.    Control  and  operation  of  the  systems 
were   exercised    by    the    Secretary    of    the    Treasury,    appointed    and 
designated   as   Director   General   of   Railroads,   through   Regional    Di- 
rectors. 

2  Chapter  II,  page  19.    The  members  of  the  commission  were  Mr. 
Franklin  K.  Lane,  Secretary  of  the  Interior ;  Mr.  Charles  C.  McChord, 
a  member  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission;  Mr.  J.  Harry  Cov- 


GOVERNMENT  AND  RAILWAY  EMPLOYES     91 

commission  conducted  an  investigation  as  directed  and  reported 
its  findings  and  conclusions  to  the  Director  General  of  the 
United  States  Railroad  Administration.  It  found  wages  too 
low  in  many  occupations,  as  already  stated  on  page  19,  and 
it  recommended  specified  changes  in  compensation  which  it 
believed  would  be  more  fair  to  the  employes  affected.  These 
increases  it  estimated  would  total  $300,000,000  a  year  for  all 
the  railroads  of  the  entire  country.  Whatever  the  effects  upon 
the  mind  may  be  of  the  magnitude  of  this  amount,  says  its 
report,  "  we  regard  such  an  expenditure  as  necessary  for  the 
immediate  allaying  of  a  feeling  that  cannot  be  wisely  fostered 
by  national  inaction,  and  as  not  one  dollar  more  than  justice  at 
this  time  requires.  It  will  make  hard  places  smoother  for 
many  who  are  now  in  sore  need.  It  gives  no  bounty.  It  is 
not  a  bonus.  It  is  no  more  than  an  honorable  meeting  of  an 
obligation." 

The  findings  of  the  commission  as  to  increases  in  wages  were 
made  effective,  with  slight  modifications,  by  the  Director  Gen- 
eral under  date  of  May  26,  1918,  in  General  Order  No.  27. 
Some  of  the  monthly  increases  were  as  high  as  43  per  cent, 
for  employes  receiving  under  $46  per  month,  the  percentage 
gradually  decreasing  in  a  constant  ratio,  leaving  no  increase  to 
employes  whose  monthly  wages  were  $250  and  more  in  De- 
cember, 1915.  While  this  ratio  appears  uniform,  the  actual 
increases  in  dollars  and  cents  extended  from  $20  a  month  to 
the  lowest  paid  men  up  to  $33.60  for  those  receiving  $82  in 
December,  1915,  gradually  dropping  to  no  increase  for  the 
higher  paid  men.  Wherever  wages  or  rates  of  overtime  were 
higher  than  those  fixed  by  the  Director  General's  Order  they 
remained  undisturbed,  and  no  adjustment  of  hours  of  work  was 
to  be  permitted  which  would  serve  to  deprive  any  employe  of 
the  full  amount  of  the  increased  compensation  to  which  he 
was  entitled  under  the  award. 

ington,  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia ; 
and  Mr.  William  R.  Willcox,  formerly  chairman  of  the  New  York 
Public  Service  Commission. 


92  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Colored  firemen,  trainmen,  and  switchmen,  in  addition  to 
securing  the  wage  increase  recommended  by  the  commission, 
had  their  wages  advanced  on  June  i,  1918,  to  the  same  as  that 
of  white  men  employed  on  the  same  roads  in  the  same  kind 
of  work. 

On  the  question  of  establishing  the  eight  hour  work  day 
for  those  employes  not  so  benefited  by  the  Adamson  Act,  the 
Director  General  did  not  follow  the  adverse  recommendation 
of  the  Wage  Commission.  Instead,  in  the  rules  governing  con- 
ditions of  employment  which  he  promulgated,  the  eight 
hour  day  was  established  as  the  basis  upon  which  all  further 
wage  adjustments  were  to  be  made  without,  however,  reduc- 
ing the  hours  of  employment  or  increasing  at  that  time  the 
total  compensation  fixed  for  the  number  of  hours  worked  in 
excess  of  eight. 

Within  the  Railroad  Administration  there  was  created  a 
Division  of  Labor  with  a  director  at  its  head  who  had  super- 
vision over  all  labor  matters  as  advisor  to  the  Director  Gen- 
eral. Mr.  W.  S.  Carter,  president  of  the  Brotherhood  of  Lo- 
comotive Enginemen  and  Firemen,  was  appointed  director. 
"  One  of  the  principal  purposes  of  the  creation  of  the  Division 
of  Labor,"  he  says,  in  his  first  annual  report,1  "  was  to  provide 
means  whereby  the  controversies  that  constantly  arise  between 
railroad  officials  and  employes  would  be  promptly  and  equitably 
adjusted.  An  inability  to  adjust  these  controversies  under  past 
practices  resulted  in  strikes,  threatened  strikes,  or  a  constant 
unrest  among  employes  to  the  extent  that  the  efficiency  of  the 
service  had  greatly  diminished  at  the  time  that  the  roads  were 
taken  over  under  Federal  control." 

The  labor  situation  on  the  railroads  prior  to  their  being 
taken  over  by  the  Government  Mr.  Carter  summarizes  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  During  the  two  or  three  years  antedating  Federal  control 
of  the  railroads  an  alarming  situation  was  created  in  that  the 

1  Annual  Report  Director  General  of  Railroads,  Division  of  Labor, 
1918. 


GOVERNMENT  AND  RAILWAY  EMPLOYES     93 

employes'  organizations  as  a  whole  and  through  federations, 
found  themselves  confronted  with  similar  federations  on  the 
part  of  the  railroads,  the  roads  being  represented  by  confer- 
ence committees  and  the  conference  committees  being  subordi- 
nate to  '  advisory  committees.'  It  was  alleged  by  employes 
that  these  conference  committees  of  all  of  the  principal  rail- 
roads in  a  district  were  not  permitted  to  grant  the  demands 
of  employes  or  even  to  make  favorable  compromises  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  advisory  committee.  The  advisory 
committee,  it  is  alleged,  was  the  agent  of  the  great  banking 
institutions  that  controlled  the  financial  policy  of  all  the 
railroads. 

"  Arbitrations  have  been  resorted  to  in  the  later  years  in 
these  district  movements,  with  the  result  that  employes  reached 
the  conclusion  that  an  arbitration  award  depended  entirely 
upon  the  frame  of  mind  of  the  neutral  arbitrator.  Persons 
selected  to  perform  this  function  were  liberal  in  their  awards  in 
accordance  with  the  liberality  of  their  minds  when  appointed 
upon  such  arbitration  boards. 

"  There  seems  to  have  been  a  public  opinion  that  any  man, 
even  indirectly  connected  with  labor,  would  be  unqualified  to  act 
as  a  neutral  arbitrator,  with  the  result  that  most  estimable 
gentlemen  who  had  never  had  any  connection  with,  and  who 
had  little  knowledge  of,  labor  conditions  were  called  upon  to 
act  as  umpires  in  these  great  contests.  It  was  alleged  by  the 
employes  that  usually  these  arbitrators,  having  no  technical 
knowledge  of  wage  schedules,  often  made  awards  that  were 
difficult  of  interpretation,  if  they  did  not,  in  fact,  bring  about 
conditions  the  very  opposite  to  that  intended  by  the  neutral 
arbitrator.  It  also  became  apparent  that  in  the  application  of 
the  arbitration  award,  the  officials  of  a  railroad  were  the  sole 
administrators  thereof,  with  the  result  that  after  employes  had 
been  led  to  believe  that  an  arbitration  award  brought  them 
much  relief,  it  was  applied  in  a  manner  that  '  took  away  from 
them  more  than  had  been  given  them.' 

"  Later,  provisions  were  made  for  submitting  controversies 
over  the  application  of  an  arbitration  award  back  to  the  arbitra- 
tion board,  or  to  some  other  umpire,  but  this  resulted  in  the 
continuation  of  controversies  over  a  period  of  two  or  three 
years. 

"  It  may  be  truthfully  said  that  at  the  time  the  railroads 
passed  under  Federal  control,  because  of  these  vexatious  con- 
tentions, the  morale  of  railway  employes  had  sunk  to  a  low 


94  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

degree.     In  many  instances  there  was  an  entire  absence  of 
esprit  de  corps,  so  necessary  for  efficient  operation. 

"  It  was  with  the  knowledge  of  this  alarming  situation,  and 
with  a  determination  to  restore  harmonious  relations  between 
employes  and  the  railroads,  and  thereby  increase  the  efficiency 
of  the  railroads,  that  the  Division  of  Labor  of  the  Railroad 
Administration  was  created." 

Within  the  Division  of  Labor  was  established  the  Board  of 
Railway  Wages  and  Working  Conditions  consisting  of  three 
representatives  of  the  employes  and  an  equal  number  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  railroad  corporations.  The  duties  of  this 
board  were  to  hear  and  investigate  matters  presented  by  rail- 
way employes  or  their  representatives  affecting  such  matters 
as:  i.  Inequalities  as  to  wages  and  working  conditions, 
whether  as  to  individual  employes  or  classes  of  employes. 
2.  Conditions  arising  from  competition  with  employes  in  other 
industries.  3.  Rules  and  working  conditions  for  the  several 
classes  of  employes,  either  for  the  country  as  a  whole  or  for 
different  parts  of  the  country.  The  board  was  also  to  hear 
and  investigate  other  matters  affecting  wages  and  working 
conditions  referred  to  it  by  the  Director  General ;  it  was  solely 
advisory,  however,  and  was  to  submit  its  recommendations  to 
the  Director  General  for  his  determination. 

With  the  view  of  promptly  and  equitably  adjusting  "  any 
controversies  which  may  arise,  thereby  eliminating  misunder- 
standings which  tend  to  lessen  the  efficiency  of  the  service  " 
three  boards  were  created.  Railway  Board  of  Adjustment 
No.  i  consisted  of  eight  members,  four  selected  by  the  regional 
directors  of  the  eastern,  southern,  and  western  territorial 
grouping  of  the  roads  and  four  by  the  chief  executive  officers 
of  the  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Engineers,  Order  of  Rail- 
way Conductors,  Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Trainmen,  and 
Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Firemen  and  Enginemen. 

Similarly  Board  No.  2  was  to  adjust  controversies  between 
the  railroads  and  such  of  their  employes  as  were  engaged  as 
machinists,  boiler  makers,  blacksmiths,  iron  workers,  carmen, 
sheet  metal  workers,  electricians,  and  helpers  and  who  also  were 


GOVERNMENT  AND  RAILWAY  EMPLOYES     95 

members  of  the  various  unions  with  which  the  roads  had  en- 
tered into  agreement  as  to  basis  of  compensation  and  regula- 
tions of  employment.  This  board  consisted  of  twelve  mem- 
bers, half  of  them  selected  by  the  six  organizations  of  employes 
mentioned  in  the  "  memorandum  of  understanding  "  and  the 
other  six  by  the  regional  directors  of  the  Railroad  Administra- 
tion. Board  No.  3,  consisting  of  eight  members  selected  on 
the  same  principle  as  that  of  the  other  two  boards,  was  to  per- 
form a  like  function  with  regard  to  telegraphers,  switchmen, 
clerks,  and  maintenance  of  way  employes. 

These  boards  were  to  apply,  each  within  its  jurisdiction,  the 
agreements  as  to  basis  of  compensation  and  regulations  of 
employment  which  had  been  entered  into  between  the  various 
organizations  of  employes  and  the  railway  companies.  They 
had  no  jurisdiction  over  the  recommendation,  issuance,  or  in- 
terpretation of  wage  orders,  but  all  controversies  growing  out 
of  the  application  of  the  provisions  of  the  agreements  or  wage 
schedules,  and  all  other  disputes  which  were  not  promptly 
adjusted  by  the  officials  and  the  employes  on  any  of  the  roads 
operated  by  the  Government,  were  referred  to  the  board  having 
jurisdiction.  Separate  meetings  of  each  board  were  held  regu- 
larly at  stated  times  each  month  in  the  city  of  Washington. 
All  decisions  were  made  and  approved  by  the  entire  member- 
ship of  the  board,  the  presiding  officer  being  required  to  vote 
upon  all  decisions.  Each  board  selected  its  own  chairman. 

The  method  of  procedure  for  the  settlement  of  controversies 
was  identical  before  all  three  boards.  Personal  grievances  or 
controversies  arising  under  interpretation  of  wage  agreements, 
and  all  other  disputes  arising  between  officials  of  a  railroad  and 
its  employes  covered  by  the  "  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing," were  handled  in  the  usual  manner  which  had  become 
customary  under  private  operation,  that  is,  by  general  com- 
mittees of  the  employes  up  to  and  including  the  chief  operating 
officer  of  the  railroad  (or  some  one  officially  designated  by 
him).  If  an  agreement  was  not  reached,  the  chairman  of  the 
general  committee  of  employes  was  to  refer  the  matter  to  the 


96  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

chief  executive  of  the  organization  concerned ;  if  the  conten- 
tion of  the  employes'  committee  was  approved  by  such  ex- 
ecutive officer,  then  the  chief  operating  officer  of  the  railroad 
and  the  chief  executive  officer  of  the  organization  concerned 
referred  the  matter,  with  all  supporting  papers,  to  the  Di- 
rector of  the  Division  of  Labor  of  the  Railroad  Administra- 
tion who,  in  turn,  presented  the  case  to  the  board  of  adjust- 
ment having  jurisdiction.  This  board  promptly  heard  and  de- 
cided the  case,  giving  due  notice  of  the  time  set  for  hearing  to 
the  chief  operating  officer  of  the  railroad  and  the  chief  ex- 
ecutive officer  of  the  organization.  No  question  was  consid- 
ered by  the  board  unless  officially  referred  to  it  in  this  manner. 

In  hearings  before  the  board  of  matters  properly  submitted 
for  its  consideration,  the  railroad  was  represented  by  such  per- 
son or  persons  as  the  chief  operating  officer  designated,  and  the 
employes  by  such  representative  as  the  chief  executive  officer 
of  the  organization  concerned  designated.  In  each  controversy 
before  the  board  there  was  usually  presented  a  joint  concrete 
statement  of  facts.  The  board  had  full  authority,  however, 
to  require  information  in  addition  to  the  concrete  statement  of 
facts,  and  could  call  upon  the  chief  operating  officer  of  the 
railroad  or  the  chief  executive  officer  of  the  organization  con- 
cerned for  additional  evidence,  either  oral  or  written. 

Employes  not  members  of  the  organizations  having  agree- 
ments with  the  railroads  were  not,  because  of  this  fact,  denied 
the  advantages  of  these  boards  of  adjustment.  For  such  em- 
ployes special  provision  was  made  by  the  Division  of  Labor 
for  settling  their  controversies.  Jurisdiction  in  such  cases  over 
express  company  employes  was  also  vested  in  the  Division  of 
Labor.  Within  the  Division  a  Women's  Service  Section  was 
created  for  the  special  consideration  of  the  welfare  of  the  one 
hundred  thousand  1  females  employed  by  the  railroads. 

1  The  number  of  women  employes  of  the  railroads  in  January,  1917, 
was  31,400;  in  January,  1918,  61,162;  October,  1918,  101,785;  and  Oc- 
tober, 1919,  81,803  —  Report  of  Women's  Service  Section,  Division  of 
Labor,  United  States  Railroad  Administration,  December  31,  1919. 


GOVERNMENT  AND  RAILWAY  EMPLOYES     97 

The  importance  of  all  this  does  not  lie  in  an  account  of  the 
details  of  the  operation  of  this  machinery  but  rather  in  the 
fact  that  such  machinery  was  established.  To  provide  a  court 
or  tribunal  to  which  industrial  matters  in  dispute  can  be  taken 
by  the  aggrieved  employe  in  the  knowledge  and  belief  that  fair- 
ness and  impartiality  will  be  practiced  with  the  view  to  ad- 
ministering justice  as  between  employer  and  employe  is  an 
act  that,  in  itself,  goes  a  long  way  in  solving  the  so-called  labor 
problem.  As  many  as  2,658  separate  and  distinct  cases  of 
grievance  or  complaint  were  handled  by  the  three  boards  of 
adjustment  alone  in  the  less  than  twelve  month  period  from 
January  i  to  December  15,  1919.  This  number  does  not  in- 
clude the  cases  of  employes  unrepresented  on  the  boards,  nor 
those  submitted  to  the  Board  of  Wages  and  Working  Condi- 
tions. Such  matters  concerned  rate  of  pay,  claims  for  over- 
time, back  pay,  and  for  time  lost ;  bonus,  minimum  wage,  travel, 
time  compensation,  meals  and  lodging  as  extra  pay,  deductions 
from  wages,  vacations  with  pay,  time  and  one-half  pay  for 
holidays,  methods  of  computing  back  pay,  equal  pay  to  women, 
wage  differentials,  adjustment  of  wages,  piece  work,  occupa- 
tional classification,  occupational  qualification,  time  for  meals, 
assignment  of  work,  duties  of  helpers,  discrimination,  seniority 
rights,  promotion,  demotion,  suspension,  dismissal,  reinstate- 
ment, refusal  to  punch  time  card,  advance  notice  of  resigna- 
tion, and  so  on.  These  and  a  hundred  and  one  other  personal 
interest  matters  of  no  general  concern  but  which  are  of  vital 
importance  to  the  particular  individual  go  to  make  up  the 
grievances  and  complaints  which  unattended  to  result  in  the 
present-day  labor  problem.  They  affect  industrial  rights  that 
are  comparable  in  a  way  to  those  controversies  in  civil  life 
between  individuals  that  have  necessitated  the  establishing  of 
courts  of  law  for  their  just  settlement. 

This  first  experiment  on  a  large  scale  of  the  operation  of 
industrial  courts  or  tribunals,  under  the  direct  supervision  of 
the  National  Government,  for  the  just  settlement  of  disputes 
affecting  individuals  as  distinct  from  classes  or  groups  of  cm- 


98  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

ployes,  contains  the  germ  of  large  promise  for  the  successful 
working  out  of  our  coming  industrial  democracy.  It  is  true 
the  Government  had  previously  been  called  upon  at  various 
times  to  intervene  in  labor  controversies  in  the  industrial  state 
through  the  processes  of  mediation,  conciliation,  and  arbitra- 
tion, such  as  in  the  appointment  of  the  Anthracite  Strike  Com- 
mission in  1902  by  President  Roosevelt ;  in  the  creation  of  the 
four  arbitration  boards  at  different  times  between  1912  and 
1914  for  the  settlement  of  the  concerted  wage  movements  of 
the  railway  brotherhoods ;  through  the  Bureau  of  Mediation 
and  Conciliation  of  the  Department  of  Labor ;  and  in  the  opera- 
tion of  the  United  States  Board  of  Mediation  and  Concili- 
ation, the  latter  created  under  the  Newlands  act  in  1913  and 
confined  to  the  railroads.  But  the  operation  of  these  commis- 
sions or  boards  involved  the  settlement  of  questions  of  broad 
principles  as  affecting  groups  or  classes  of  workers  and  were 
not  tribunals  for  the  adjustment  of  what  might  be  called  per- 
sonal cases  involving  the  question  of  right  and  wrong  to  the 
individual. 

This  latter  was  the  function  performed  by  the  railway 
adjustment  boards.  With  the  basis  of  wages  and  the  principles 
of  employment  determined  in  the  agreement,  it  was  of  equal 
importance  to  the  successful  carrying  out  of  the  terms  of  the 
agreement  that  some  instrumentality  be  created  that  would  as- 
sure to  the  worker  a  fair  interpretation  of  what  the  basis  and 
principles  were  intended  to  mean  as  well  as  an  impartial  ap- 
plication of  that  meaning  to  the  varying  facts  of  individual 
employment.  This  is  vital  to  orderly  industrial  progress  and 
to  the  elimination  of  causes  for  misunderstandings  resulting 
in  lockouts  and  strikes  if  we  as  a  people  are  to  approach  to 
any  degree  of  democracy  in  industry,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
it  is  in  the  application  of  general  principles  to  concrete  cases 
that  the  worker  knows  he  is  or  is  not  being  treated  fairly. 
And  the  assurance  of  fair  and  just  treatment  is  of  the  essence 
of  social  contentment  —  it  is  the  antidote  to  discontent,  unrest, 
and  revolution. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   GOVERNMENT    AND   SHIPBUILDING    LABOR 

I  ^HE  inestimable  value  to  the  American  people  in  their 
•*•  prosecution  of  the  war  resulting  from  the  recognition  of 
the  labor  union  by  the  Wilson  Administration  as  one  of  the  car- 
dinal principles  of  the  Government's  labor  policy  is  probably  il- 
lustrated most  strikingly  in  the  shipbuilding  industry.  This 
policy  immediately  brought  to  the  construction  of  yards  and  of 
ships  the  support  of  organized  labor  without  which  there  could 
not  have  been  even  the  slightest  hope  of  meeting  the  unprec- 
edented situation  confronting  this  industry  —  a  situation  de- 
manding the  quickest  possible  expansion. 

The  shipbuilding  program  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corpora- 
tion in  July,  1917,  which  later  was  considerably  enlarged,  pro- 
posed the  construction  of  425  ships  with  an  aggregate  tonnage 
of  1,860,000  tons  at  a  cost  of  $275,000,000,  excluding  one  hun- 
dred wood  ships  the  contracts  for  which  were  still  being  ne- 
gotiated at  the  time.  This  program  did  not  include  contracts 
already  let  for  the  construction  of  new  ships  and  yards  at  a 
cost  of  $550,000,000,  nor  the  ships  already  under  construction 
that  were  commandeered  by  the  Government.  The  425  ship? 
comprised  348  wood  and  77  steel. 

In  1916,  according  to  statistics  of  the  Bureau  of  the  Census, 
there  were  a  total  of  only  44,962  employes  in  the  sixty-three 
shipyards  —  43,582  in  the  forty-five  steel  shipyards  and  1,380 
in  the  eighteen  wood  shipyards.  In  February,  1918,  figures 
compiled  by  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  show  a  total  of 
192,839  employes  in  112  shipyards — 162,880  in  fifty-three 
steel  shipyards  and  29,959  in  fifty-nine  wood  shipyards.  Here 
was  a  gain  in  the  number  of  shipyard  workers  of  nearly  150,000 

99 


ioo  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

in  less  than  two  years.  In  addition  to  these  112  yards  there 
were  twenty-four  nearing  completion.  This  gives  an  increase 
of  seventy-five  in  the  number  of  shipyards.  These  yards  were 
scattered  at  all  practicable  locations  along  the  American  coast 
line  of  the  Great  Lakes,  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,  and 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

This  great  expansion  in  the  capacity  of  the  old  yards  and 
in  the  number  of  new  yards  completed  and  under  construction 
gave  an  unprecedented  demand  for  workers  in  all  the  mechan- 
ical trades.  The  extent  of  this  demand  is  only  partly  indi- 
cated in  the  statement  that  at  the  beginning  of  1918  there  was 
an  immediate  need  for  the  enrollment  of  250,000  skilled  work- 
men as  shipyard  volunteers.  Within  sixty  days  from  that  date 
three  of  the  government  shipyards  were  to  be  completed  and 
soon  thereafter  these  would  require  more  than  60,000  work- 
men to  supply  the  three  eight-hour  shifts  with  which  the  yards 
were  to  be  operated.  At  that  time  the  Shipping  Board  con- 
trolled 716  shipways  of  which  302  were  for  wood  and  414  for 
steel  ships.  The  yards  were  working  only  one  eight-hour  shift 
a  day  and  for  only  six  days  a  week.  Within  a  few  months  all 
the  shipyards  would  have  need  for  386,000  mechanics. 

Before  this  time  arrived,  however,  the  general  labor  policy 
of  the  Government  had  been  formulated  and  was  made  to 
apply  to  all  the  shipyards  of  the  country,  privately  owned  as 
well  as  government  owned.  This  policy  was  embodied  in  an 
agreement  entered  into  in  August,  1917,  between  officials  of 
the  Navy  Department  and  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation, 
representing  the  Government,  representatives  of  shipyard  em- 
ployers, and  representatives  of  the  international  unions  whose 
members  were  engaged  in  the  various  crafts  in  the  yards. 
These  various  organizations  whose  presidents  signed  the  agree- 
ment are  indicative  of  the  many  different  kinds  of  workmen 
involved.  They  included  the  International  Association  of  Ma- 
chinists, the  International  Molders,  the  United  Brotherhood  of 
Carpenters  and  Joiners,  and  the  score  and  more  organizations 
representing  the  building  trades,  the  metal  trades,  the  plumbers 


GOVERNMENT  AND  SHIPBUILDING  LABOR     101 

and  steamfitters,  the  steam  and  operating  engineers,-  the  boiler- 
makers  and  iron  shipbuilders,  the  pattern  makers,  the  black- 
smiths and  helpers,  and  so  on. 

The  United  States  Shipping  Board  had  been  created  by  the 
Government  as  its  instrument  for  operating  all  ships,  excepting 
of  course  the  war  vessels  of  the  Navy  Department,  and  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  had  been  organized  by  the  Ship- 
ping Board  for  the  construction  of  all  ships  other  than  those 
being  built  for  the  Navy.  Thus  in  all  shipyards,  those  priv- 
ately owned  as  well  as  those  constructed  by  the  Government, 
the  Fleet  Corporation  and  the  Navy  Department  exercised  con- 
trol over  the  construction  of  all  vessels.  This  had  virtually 
the  same  effect  of  making  all  shipyard  workers  employes  of 
the  Government  as  had  the  taking  over  of  the  railroads  in  its 
effect  on  railway  employes. 

The  agreement  referred  to  as  having  been  entered  into  by 
representatives  of  the  Government,  of  employers,  and  of  em- 
ployes established  the  Shipbuilding  Labor  Adjustment  Board. 
Its  jurisdiction  extended  over  wages,  hours  of  work,  and  other 
conditions  of  employment  in  shipyards,  and  its  operation  af- 
fected all  workers  engaged  in  the  construction  of  the  emer- 
gency fleets  of  the  Government.  It  is  indicative,  as  we  have 
seen  were  also  the  railway  wage  adjustment  boards,  of  the  in- 
strumentalities of  peace  time  which  the  Government  accepted 
and  adapted  to  war  conditions.  Through  it  the  Government 
adopted  the  standards  as  to  wages  and  working  conditions  and 
the  methods  of  settling  industrial  disputes  which  the  labor 
movement  had  built  up  through  years  of  struggle  and  or- 
ganized effort  against  the  determined  opposition  of  the  em- 
ployer class. 

The  particular  machinery  which  this  agreement  created  for 
the  adjustment  of  disputes  and  which  was  to  be  applied  to 
those  arising  out  of  the  construction  and  repair  of  shipbuild- 
ing plants  as  well  as  of  ships,  took  the  form  of  a  board  com- 
posed of  three  members  appointed  by  the  United  States  Ship- 
ping Board  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  one  representing  the 


UNIVERSITY  OF  SOUTHERN  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


102  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

corporation  and  selected  by  it,  one  representing  the  public  and 
nominated  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  one  rep- 
resenting labor  named  by  Mr.  Samuel  Gompers.1  In  order  to 
meet  the  situation  resulting  from  the  existence  in  the  industry 
of  two  distinct  craft  groups,  provision  was  made  for  the  nomi- 
nation by  Mr.  Gompers  of  two  persons,  one  from  the  metal 
trades  to  sit  on  the  board  when  the  matter  under  consideration 
concerned  the  construction  of  shipyards  or  steel  ships  and  the 
other  from  among  the  trades  primarily  concerned  who  was  to 
sit  when  the  matter  under  consideration  had  reference  to 
wooden  hulls.  When  the  issues  before  the  board  concerned 
wages,  hours,  or  conditions  applying  to  the  production  of  both 
kinds  of  ships,  only  one  of  the  two  nominees  representing 
labor  was  to  sit,  this  to  be  determined  between  them  or,  in  the 
event  of  their  disagreement,  by  Mr.  Gompers.  The  agreement 
ran :  — 

"  When  matters  concerning  any  plant  or  plants  are  before  the 
board,  it  shall  invite  a  person  representing  and  designated  by 
the  owner  or  owners  of  such  plant  or  plants,  and  also  a  person 
representing,  or  selected  by,  the  majority  of  the  workers  in  the 
particular  craft  or  crafts  directly  interested  in  the  disputed 
matters,  both  of  said  representatives  to  sit  with  voting  power 
as  associate  members  of  said  board  in  connection  with  such 
matters.  If  a  question  coming  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
board  arises  with  reference  to  such  construction  in  a  private 
plant,  in  which  construction  is  also  being  carried  on  for  the 
Navy  Department,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  or  such  person 
as  he  may  designate  shall  sit  with  voting  power  as  a  member  of 
the  board.  In  the  event  of  a  tie  vote,  when  the  board  is  so 
constituted,  the  decision  shall  be  referred  to  the  chairman  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  or  to  such  person  as  he  may 
designate.  This  memorandum  shall  in  no  way  serve  as  a  prec- 
edent for  procedure  in  Government  plants  under  the  War  or 
Navy  Departments. 

"  The  plants  where  such  construction  is  being  carried  on  shall 
be  geographically  districted  by  the  board.  In  each  district,  the 
contractors  in  whose  plants  such  construction  is  being  carried 

1  President  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  with  which  the 
separate  unions  were  affiliated. 


GOVERNMENT  AND  SHIPBUILDING  LABOR     103 

on,  and  the  representatives  of  such  international  labor  organiza- 
tions as  have  members  engaged  in  such  production  or  construc- 
tion in  such  plants,  and  as  are  selected  for  the  purpose  by  the 
labor  member  of  the  board,  shall  be  called  upon,  under  condi- 
tions to  be  laid  down  by  it,  to  agree  upon  a  person  or  persons 
who  shall  act  under  the  direction  of  the  board  as  examiner  or 
examiners  in  such  district.  If  the  board  does  not  succeed  in 
having  an  examiner  so  selected,  then  the  board  shall  by  unani- 
mous action  select  a  person  or  persons  for  such  position.  The 
examiner  shall  be  subject  to  removal  by  the  board  at  any  time 
by  unanimous  vote." 

Provision  was  made  in  the  agreement  for  the  prompt  report- 
ing to  the  board  of  any  dispute  with  reference  to  wages,  hours, 
or  conditions  of  labor  which  could  not  be  adjusted  satisfac- 
torily to  the  principals  concerned.  But  before  such  report  was 
made  the  district  officer  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation 
was  to  confer  with  the  local  representatives  of  the  crafts  in- 
volved, *'  or  with  such  authorized  heads  of  any  local  labor  or- 
ganizations interested  therein  as  may  be  designated  by  the 
labor  member  of  the  board,  or  on  their  request  with  the  nat- 
ional head  or  heads  of  such  organization  or  organizations  or 
his  or  their  duly  authorized  representative  or  representatives." 
If  by  this  method  the  dispute  could  not  be  adjusted  then  the 
board  was  to  send  an  examiner  to  such  plant  to  bring  about  a 
mutually  satisfactory  adjustment.  If  this  also  failed  the  ex- 
aminer, in  his  report  to  the  board,  was  to  recommend  terms  of 
adjustment,  and  the  board  was  then  to  decide  the  questions 
at  issue. 

The  scales  of  wages,  hours,  and  other  conditions  of  employ- 
ment in  effect  July  15,  1917,  in  each  shipyard  where  ship  or 
plant  construction  was  being  carried  on,  were  taken  by  the 
board  as  the  basic  standards.  After  these  were  established 
then  consideration  was  to  be  given  by  the  board  to  any  cir- 
cumstances which  seemed  to  it  to  call  for  changes  in  wages, 
hours,  or  conditions.  The  board  was  to  keep  itself  fully  in1 
formed  as  to  the  relation  between  living  costs  in  the  several 
districts  and  their  comparison  between  progressive  periods  of 


104 

) 

time.  Retroactive  decisions  of  the  board  were  to  be  made  un- 
der proper  conditions,  in  which  cases  accounting  was  to  be 
made  in  accordance  with  the  directions  of  the  board.  While 
all  its  decisions  were  to  be  final  and  binding  on  all  parties,  in 
so  far  as  the  agreement  was  capable  of  achieving  such  result, 
it  was  provided  that  "  at  any  time  after  six  months  have 
elapsed  following  any  such  ratified  agreement  or  any  such  final 
decision  by  the  board  of  any  question  as  to  wages,  hours,  or 
conditions  in  any  plant,  such  question  may  be  reopened  for 
adjustment  upon  the  request  of  the  majority  of  the  craft 
or  crafts  at  such-  plant  affected  by  such  agreement  or  de- 
cision." 

It  cannot  be  expected  that  within  the  limits  of  a  single 
chapter  an  adequate  account  can  be  given  of  the  work  of  the 
Shipbuilding  Labor  Adjustment  Board.  Such  an  account  will 
not  be  attempted  here.  It  is  desired  merely  to  point  out  some 
of  the  broad  economic  principles  upon  which  the  operation  of 
the  board  was  based  and  to  indicate  the  nature  of  the  indus- 
trial problems  confronting  employers  and  employes  and  which 
are  the  causes  of  labor  disputes. 

In  one  of  its  earliest  decisions  the  board  stated  that  it  had 
been  convinced  by  the  unanimous  testimony  of  both  employers 
and  employes  that  a  uniform  minimum  wage  scale  and  uniform 
piece  rates  for  all  the  shipyards  on  the  Delaware  River,  from 
Bristol  on  the  north  to  Wilmington  on  the  south,  would  be  de- 
sirable. The  most  serious  obstacle  to  the  maintenance  of  a 
uniform  minimum  wage  scale  in  all  the  yards  of  the  Delaware 
River  district  was  found  by  the  board  to  be  the  variable  ex- 
pense for  transportation  to  and  from  work  of  the  employes  of 
the  yards  up  and  down  the  river  from  Philadelphia  owing 
largely  to  inadequate  local  housing  facilities.  To  equalize  this 
condition  the  board  authorized  shipyards,  whose  employes  were 
compelled  to  spend  regularly  more  than  eight  cents  a  day  each 
way  for  transportation  to  and  from  work,  to  provide  these 
employes  with  tickets  at  the  expense  of  the  shipbuilding  com- 
pany. The  object  of  this  was  partly  to  enable  yards  in  the 


GOVERNMENT  AND  SHIPBUILDING  LABOR      105 

vicinity  of  which  there  were  inadequate  housing  facilities  to 
draw  workmen  from  greater  distances. 

In  operation  in  the  different  yards  were  numerous  bonus, 
premium,  and  contract  systems  of  wage  payment  in  addition 
to  the  day  and  the  piece  wage  systems.  With  the  object  of  in- 
troducing a  greater  degree  of  uniformity  the  board  prescribed 
the  minimum  wage  and  the  piece  rate  scales  and  directed  that 
no  bonus  or  premium  in  addition  was  to  be  paid  in  specified  oc- 
cupations except  with  its  express  permission.  In  some  depart- 
ments, such  as  riveting  and  chipping  and  calking,  a  preference 
existed,  not  only  among  employers  but  also  among  the  workers 
themselves,  for  the  piece  wage  system.  The  rates  made  ef- 
fective by  the  board  were  the  result  of  conferences  between 
representatives  of  the  yard  owners  and  of  the  crafts  concerned 
in  which  both  sides  made  concessions.  In  consequence  the 
first  application  of  these  rates  was  of  limited  scope  but  the  in- 
tention was  to  extend  the  list  from  time  to  time  so  as  to  include 
operations  and  types  of  vessels,  such  as  torpedo-boat  destroy- 
ers and  cylindrical  oil  tankers,  for  which  fair  rates  could  not 
then  be  ascertained. 

Previous  attempts  on  the  part  of  shipyard  owners  to  es- 
tablish piece  rates  had  not  been  successful,  it  having  been  the 
experience  of  the  workers  that  the  piece  rate  was  invariably 
lowered  as  soon  as  they  indicated  their  ability  to  increase  their 
earnings  beyond  that  which  the  employer  considered  a  normal 
wage.  As  a  result  there  had  grown  up  in  many  of  the  yards 
rules  or  understandings  among  the  workers  which  limited  the 
amount  any  one  worker  was  to  produce  in  a  day.  To  combat 
this  possibility  developing  out  of  the  new  piece  rates  the  board 
established,  appeal  was  made  to  the  patriotism  of  the  workers. 

"  In  the  present  national  emergency,"  the  board  said,  "  it  is 
vitally  important  that  evvery  limitation  upon  output  be  removed. 
Every  shipyard  worker  must  appreciate  that  he  is  fighting  for 
his  country  when  he  drives  a  rivet  or  calks  a  seam  just  as 
effectively  as  the  soldier  in  the  trenches  when  he  wields  his 
bayonet  or  fires  a  gun.  And  as  the  soldier  is  paid  directly  by 


106  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

the  Government  so  the  shipyard  worker  must  realize  that  he 
now  receives  his  compensation  from  the  Government,  all  ship- 
building now  being  upon  Government  account."  To  bring 
home  to  piece  workers  that  the  Government  was  behind  them 
and  that  they  must  stand  behind  the  Government,  the  board 
directed  that  notices  be  posted  conspicuously  in  every  depart- 
ment of  every  shipyard  where  piece  work  was  carried  on  stat- 
ing in  effect  that  the  piece  rates  prescribed  as  part  of  its  award 
were  under  no  circumstances  to  be  lowered  during  the  duration 
of  the  war.  "  In  the  name  of  the  people  of  the  United  States," 
the  notice  read,  "  we  urge  employes  in  shipyards  to  do  their 
utmost  toward  winning  the  war  by  removing  all  limitations 
upon  output  and  hastening  in  every  possible  way,  each  accord- 
ing to  his  capacity,  the  production  of  ships." 

As  to  hours  of  employment  the  board  found  that  "  a  good 
deal  of  diversity  and  confusion  in  the  different  yards  exists," 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  eight-hour  day  had  not  been  uni- 
versally introduced,  while  the  half  holiday  on  Saturday  had 
been  firmly  established  by  the  workers  and  was  tenaciously 
adhered  to  by  them.  Under  the  federal  eight-hour  law  work 
in  excess  of  eight  hours  in  any  calendar  day  for  any  depart- 
ment of  the  Government  counted  as  overtime  and  was  to  be 
compensated  for  at  the  time-and-one-half  or  double  time  rate. 
In  view  of  the  effects  of  these  limitations  imposed  by  federal 
law  and  local  custom  the  board  deemed  it  necessary  to  pre- 
scribe the  following  rules  to  govern  hours  of  employment  in 
the  shipyards: 

Eight  hours  shall  constitute  a  day's  work  from  Monday 
until  Friday,  inclusive,  and  four  hours  on  Saturday. 

Work  in  excess  of  these  periods  on  any  week  day  shall  be 
calculated  as  overtime  and  paid  for  at  the  rate  of  time  and  one- 
half. 

Work  in  excess  of  sixty  hours  a  week  for  any  employe  shall 
not  be  permitted,  excepting  in  dry  docks,  or  when  ordered  by 
the  Navy  Department  or  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  or 
to  protect  life  or  property  from  imminent  danger. 

Work  on  Sundays  and  the  following  holidays  shall  be  paid 


GOVERNMENT  AND  SHIPBUILDING  LABOR      107 

for  at  the  rate  of  double  time :  New  Year's  Day,  Washington's 
Birthday,  Decoration  Day,  Fourth  of  July,  Labor  Day,  Thanks- 
giving Day,  and  Christmas  Day. 

Men  employed  on  night  shift  shall  receive  compensation  five 
per  cent,  higher  than  is  paid  to  those  employed  on  day  shift. 

"  Our  purpose  in  limiting  the  work  of  employes  under  ordi- 
nary circumstances  to  sixty  hours  a  week,"  says  the  report  of 
the  board,  "  is  to  discourage  the  practice  of  excessive  over- 
time, which  we  believe  leads  to  inefficiency  and  lessened  rather 
than  enlarged  production,  and  to  encourage  the  introduction  of 
the  two  and  three  shift  systems.  The  feasibility  of  working 
two  or  three  eight-hour  shifts  in  shipbuilding  plants  has  been 
conclusively  demonstrated,  and  we  urge  the  shipyards  of  the 
Delaware  River  district  to  take  immediate  steps  looking  toward 
the  introduction  of  additional  shifts  in  their  yards." 

Uniformity  in  wages,  hours,  and  other  conditions  in  the 
shipyards  of  the  north  Atlantic  coast  and  Hudson  River  dis- 
trict were  also  prescribed  by  the  board,1  partly  with  the  object 
of  preventing  the  shifting  of  men  from  yard  to  yard  so  as  to 
secure  greater  concentration  on  shipbuilding  in  all  yards.  At 
the  same  time  it  handed  down  a  modified  decision  establish- 
ing the  same  wage  rates  for  skilled  mechanics  in  the  south 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  shipyards. 

With  regard  to  working  conditions  in  shipyards  on  the  Great 
Lakes,  the  board  found  there  also  a  shifting  of  employes  from 
yard  to  yard  which  most  seriously  retarded  the  progress  of 
ship  construction.  It  applied  the  same  remedy  it  had  found 
efficacious  in  other  competitive  districts  —  uniformity  of  con- 
ditions of  employment  over  the  entire  area.  With  easily  acces- 
sible means  of  transportation  from  point  to  point  on  the  Lakes 
and  from  the  Lakes  to  the  seaboard,  the  Great  Lakes'  region 
virtually  constituted  a  part  of  the  same  competitive  area  as  the 

1  Decision  of  April,  1918.  The  wage  rates  fixed  were  made  retro- 
active for  the  region  about  New  York  harbor,  including  Bridgeport, 
Conn.,  to  March  n;  for  the  steel  yards  north  of  Bridgeport,  to  March 
30;  and  for  the  other  yards,  to  April  i. 


io8  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

north  Atlantic  coast  yards.  Movements  of  employes  front  the 
shipyards  of  the  Lake  region  to  those  of  the  Atlantic  coast 
in  response  to  higher  wages  proved  this.  It  was  also  demon- 
strated in  the  substantial  uniformity  in  the  wage  rates  in  the 
yards  of  Buffalo,  Cleveland,  Detroit,  and  Chicago  with  those 
of  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore.  This  led  the  board  to  estab- 
lish wage  scales,  hours  of  work,  and  other  conditions  for  the 
shipyards  of  the  Great  Lakes  similar  to  those  for  the  yards 
on  the  north  Atlantic  coast.  This  advanced  substantially 
the  wages  paid  to  nearly  all  crafts  in  the  Great  Lakes' 
yards.1 

Shipyard  owners  were  directed  by  the  board  to  cooperate 
with  employes  in  making  effective  the  following  rules  in  refer- 
ence to  machinery  for  the  settlement  of  industrial  disputes : 

The  employes  of  each  craft  or  calling  in  a  shop  or  yard  shall 
have  the  right  to  select  three  of  their  number  to  represent  them 
as  members  of  a  shop  committee.  Each  member  of  this  com- 
mittee shall  be  chosen  by  majority  vote  through  secret  ballot 
in  such  manner  as  the  employes  may  direct.  The  chairman  of 
such  shop  committee  shall  be  a  member  of  a  joint  shop  com- 
mittee. 

When  a  grievance  arises  it  shall  be  taken  up  by  the  craft  or 
laborers'  committee  with  the  foreman  or  general  foreman.  In 
the  event  the  grievance  has  not  been  adjusted,  it  shall  then  be 
taken  up  by  the  joint  shop  committee,  first  with  the  superin- 
tendent, and  then,  failing  a  settlement,  with  the  higher  officials 
of  the  company.  If  the  matter  cannot  be  adjusted  between 
the  joint  shop  committee  and  these  officials,  the  joint  shop  com- 
mittee shall  have  the  right  to  call  into  conference  a  representa- 
tive chosen  by  the  committee.  In  case  such  conference  fails 
to  result  in  a  satisfactory  adjustment,  the  grievance  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  examiner  to  be  appointed  by  the  Shipbuilding 
Labor  Adjustment  Board. 

Any  committeeman  who  shall  be  found  to  have  been  dis- 
charged without  just  or  sufficient  cause,  after  due  investigation 
shall  be  reinstated  with  full  pay  for  all  time  lost. 

1  To  make  certain  that  the  wages  of  no  individual  employe  were 
reduced  in  consequence  of  its  award,  the  board  inserted  a  provision 
to  this  effect. 


GOVERNMENT  AND  SHIPBUILDING  LABOR      109 

Other  regulations  of  employment  prescribed  by  the  board  for 
the  guidance  of  both  employers  and  employes  were  as  follows : 

Believing  that  in  this  national  emergency  past  differences 
between  employers  and  employes  must  be  forgotten  in  the  com- 
mon determination  to  produce  the  maximum  possible  number 
of  ships,  the  board  will  not  tolerate  any  discrimination  either 
on  the  part  of  employers  or  employes  between  union  and  non- 
union men. 

Employes  shall  be  paid  at  least  once  a  week  on  the  company's 
time  and  in  no  case  shall  more  than  five  days'  pay  be  held  back. 

Any  employe  laid  off  or  discharged  shall  within  twenty- four 
hours  receive  all  wages  due  him. 

No  employe  shall  be  required  by  the  employing  shipyard  to 
pay  any  assessment  for  insurance,  medical  attendance,  or  other 
benefits. 

Competent  medical  first  aid  shall  be  provided  for  employes 
requiring  such  aid  and  paid  for  by  the  employer. 

Shipyard  owners  are  directed  to  provide  for  their  employes 
adequate  and  sanitary  toilets,  washing  facilities,  and  pure  drink- 
ing water,  properly  cooled  during  the  summer  months. 

The  quick  and  uninterrupted  loading  and  unloading  of  ves- 
sels being  among  the  prime  essentials  of  war  service  overseas, 
it  was  also  necessary  for  the  Government  to  provide  machinery 
for  minimizing  the  possibility  of  labor  disturbances  between 
the  longshoremen  and  their  employers  interfering  with  this 
service,  coastwise  as  well  as  deep  sea.  Such  machinery  was 
established  in  August,  1917,  by  the  creation  of  the  National 
Adjustment  Commission  for  the  control  of  wages,  hours  of 
work,  and  conditions  of  employment  at  the  various  ports. 
This  commission  was  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
United  States  Shipping  Board,  the  War  Department,  the  ves- 
sel operators,  the  International  Longshoremen's  Association, 
and  the  Committee  on  Shipping  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense.  In  each  port  it  established  a  local  adjustment  com- 
mission consisting  of  representatives  of  the  Shipping  Board 
and  the  War  Department,  the  Longshoremen's  Association,  and 
the  Operating  companies.  Disputes  not  settled  locally  were  re- 
ferred to  the  National  Commission.  The  decision  of  the  latter 


no  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

was  binding  on  all  parties.  In  all  cases  work  was  to  continue 
without  interruption  until  an  adjustment  had  been  reached. 
The  union  rate  of  wages,  hours  of  work,  and  other  conditions 
of  employment  then  in  effect  were  adopted  as  the  standards. 

An  agreement  was  also  entered  into  between  representatives 
of  the  Government,  of  ship  owners  and  operators,  and  of  em- 
ployes covering  wages  and  working  conditions  of  men  em- 
ployed in  manning  in  ports  and  on  the  high  seas  the  emergency 
fleets  under  control  of  the  Government.  Provision  was  made 
for  a  standard  monthly  wage  for  all  employes  in  the  deck  and 
engine  departments,  for  overtime,  for  meal  money  on  shore, 
for  reimbursement  in  the  loss  of  personal  effects  of  seamen  by 
the  sinking  of  a  vessel,  for  a  bonus  to  crews  entering  the  war 
zone,  for  the  training  of  new  men  to  meet  the  need  of  the  in- 
creasing number  of  ships,  and  for  representatives  of  the  sea- 
men's union  to  gain  access  to  docks  and  the  decks  of  ships. 

Such  are  some  of  the  concrete,  practical  every-day  questions 
that  go  to  make  up  the  labor  problem  in  the  building  and 
operation  of  ships  and  which  must  be  determined  by  some  fair 
and  impartial  tribunal,  guided  solely  by  a  sense  of  justice  and 
the  right  concepts  of  the  true  meaning  of  industrial  democ- 
racy, if  society  is  to  be  saved  from  the  injury  that  accompanies 
and  flows  out  of  strikes  and  lockouts.  The  record  of  the  task 
accomplished  in  this  direction  during  the  war  by  the  various 
labor  adjustment  boards  which  the  Government  established  in 
the  shipping  industry  should  be  of  invaluable  assistance  to  both 
employers  and  employes  in  pointing  the  way  out  of  their  dif- 
ficulties and  towards  a  more  human  relation  in  the  conduct  of 
industrial  production. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   GOVERNMENT   AND   COAL    MINE   WORKERS 

NEITHER  the  Government  controlled  ships  nor  the  Gov- 
ernment controlled  trains  essential  to  the  transportation 
of  troops  and  munitions  could  have  been  built  and  operated 
without  skilled  workers.  Nor  could  they  have  been  operated 
without  coal,  and  this  coal  could  not  have  been  secured  without 
skilled  workers  in  the  mines.  Coal  mining,  many  contend,  is 
our  basal  industry;  that  upon  coal  all  the  other  industries  de- 
pend for  their  operation ;  that  without  this  fuel  the  war  could 
never  have  been  won.  However  this  may  be,  we  are  not  here 
concerned  with  probabilities  but  with  the  actual  conditions  in 
the  coal  mining  industry  which  confronted  the  United  States 
Government  and  with  the  labor  policy  it  applied  to  these  condi- 
tions to  secure  uninterrupted  production  of  this  very  essen- 
tial fuel. 

When  it  is  realized  that  as  many  as  757,000  men  were  em- 
ployed in  and  about  the  mines  the  year  the  United  States  en- 
tered the  war  and  that  they  produced  more  than  651,000,000  net 
tons  having  a  value  of  $1,533,000,000,  we  are  able  to  secure 
some  idea  of  the  magnitude  and  importance  of  this  great  in- 
dustry. This  number  of  men  exceeds  by  257,000  the  total 
number  making  up  the  first  increment  of  men  taken  by  the 
first  draft  to  comprise  the  new  National  Army  under  the  Se- 
lective Service  Act.  Their  wide  distribution  in  the  more  im- 
portant of  the  twenty-three  States  of  the  coal-producing  area 
was  as  follows : 


ii2  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Coal-Producing  Number  of 

State  'Employes 

Pennsylvania 328,000  x 

West  Virginia , 88,000 

Illinois 84,000 

Ohio 45>5°° 

Kentucky   35,ooo 

Alabama     28,000 

Indiana 26,500 

Iowa 14,000 

Colorado 14,000 

Virginia 1 1 ,000 

Kansas   10,500 

Tennessee    ^ 10,500 

The  remaining  eleven  coal-producing  States  in  the  order  of 
their  importance  as  to  the  number  of  mine  workers  employed 
are  Missouri,  Oklahoma,  Wyoming,  Maryland,  Washing- 
ton, Texas,  Montana,  New  Mexico,  Arkansas,  Utah,  and 
Michigan. 

By  far  the  larger  number  of  these  mine  workers  are  or- 
ganized in  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  one  of  the 
strongest  and  most  powerful  labor  unions  in  the  world.  Its 
particular  strength  as  an  organization  is  in  the  Central  Com- 
petitive Territory,  comprising  western  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  In- 
diana, and  Illinois ;  and  since  1902  in  the  anthracite  fields  of 
northeastern  Pennsylvania.  For  a  period  of  more  than  a 
quarter  of  a  century  the  members  of  this  organization  had  been 
working  under  joint  bargaining  agreements  with  the  coal  op- 
erators in  these  and  other  States  and  this  movement  jiad  slowly 
developed  into  that  which  is  today  one  of  the  strongest  pieces 
of  collective  bargaining  machinery  in  the  entire  country.  This 
does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  wages,  hours  of  work,  and  con- 
ditions of  employment  in  the  coal  industry  were  ideal,  or  even 
satisfactory,  but  it  does  mean  that  for  the  employe  these  had 
been  greatly  improved  throughout  the  period  and  also  that 
they  were  much  more  to  his  advantage  than  they  probably 

1  154,000  in  the  anthracite  and  174,000  in  the  bituminous  coal  mines. 


would  have  been  in  the  absence  of  such  machinery.  In  the 
anthracite  region  of  Pennsylvania  there  had  also  been  in  op- 
eration, since  the  great  strikes  of  1900  and  1902,  similar  in- 
dustrial machinery  for  settling  questions  of  employment  be- 
tween employes  and  employers.  Thus  in  this  industry  there 
was  already  "  recognition  of  the  union "  by  employers  and 
accompanying  industrial  institutions  for  the  control  and  set- 
tlement of  controversies.  This  is  not  true,  however,  of  all 
the  coal-producing  States  for  in  some,  such  as  West  Virginia 
for  illustration,  the  operators  still  opposed  the  union  and  con- 
ducted out-and-out  non-union  mines. 

But  at  the  time  the  United  States  Government  through  the 
necessities  of  war  times  assumed  control  of  the  coal  mining 
industry,  as  it  had  of  the  railway  and  shipping  industries,  it 
found  available  for  its  use  in  the  greater  part  of  the  industry 
this  well  organized  collective  bargaining  machinery.  It  was 
taken  over  and  used  virtually  as  it  then  existed.  For  the  pur- 
pose of  exercising  the  necessary  centralized  control  over  the 
industry  the  United  States  Fuel  Administration  was  created, 
and  within  this  organization  there  was  established  a  Bureau  of 
Labor  to  which  all  matters  relating  to  labor  conditions  and 
controversies  in  the  coal  mines  were  referred  for  settlement. 
Mr.  John  P.  White,  formerly  President  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers  of  America,  and  Mr.  Rembrandt  Peale,  a  coal  opera- 
tor from  the  central  Pennsylvania  fields,  were  appointed  joint 
heads  of  this  bureau,  with  power  to  consider  and  dispose  of  all 
matters  affecting  labor  in  the  industry  coming  within  the  jur- 
isdiction  of  the  Fuel  Administration  and  subject  to  the  pro- 
cedure prescribed  in  the  already  existing  joint  agreements  en- 
tered into  by  the  operators  and  miners  prior  to  the  war. 

The  general  labor  policy  of  the  Wilson  Administration  al- 
ready described  '  was  made  effective  in  the  coal  mining  as  in 
the  railroad  and  shipbuilding  industries.  In  conformity  there- 
with these  rules  were  enunciated  by  the  Fuel  Administration 
for  the  guidance  of  employers  and  employes: 

1  Chapter  VIII,  pages  80-88. 


ii4  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

No  strike  was  to  take  place  pending  the  settlement  of  any 
controversy  until  the  dispute  had  been  reviewed  and  decided 
by  the  Fuel  Administration. 

Where  there  was  a  joint  agreement  or  contract  between  em- 
ployer and  employes,  the  machinery  provided  therein  for  the 
settlement  of  controversies  was  to  be  invoked  and  the  remedy 
exhausted  without  reaching  an  adjustment  before  the  Fuel 
Administrator  was  to  intervene  or  mediate. 

The  Fuel  Administration  recognized  the  authority  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers  of  America  in  the  organized  coal  fields 
and  its  jurisdiction  over  controversies  arising  in  those  fields. 

Recognition  of  the  union  was  not  to  be  exacted  during  the 
continuance  of  the  war  except  where  already  recognized  by  col- 
lective bargaining. 

In  coal  mines  where  the  union  was  dominant,  that  is,  in  mines 
where  preference  in  employment  was  given  to  union  members, 
this  practice  was  to  continue ;  where  it  was  the  practice  for  both 
union  and  non-union  men  to  work  together,  its  continuance 
was  not  to  be  deemed  a  grievance  by  union  employes. 

Employers  were  required  to  relinquish  the  right  to  discharge 
employes  because  of  affiliation  with  labor  unions. 

Employers  were  required  to  recognize  the  right  of  their 
employes  to  organize  into  unions  by  peaceful  methods  that 
did  not  interrupt  production. 

An  automatic  penalty  clause  was  attached  to  all  agreements 
affecting  the  bituminous  coal  mines  1  and  was  made  a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  the  allowance  by  the  Fuel  Administration  of 
increased  prices  to  the  operators.2  This  clause  was  directed 
towards  the  prevention  of  a  stoppage  in  production  by  reason 
of  labor  disputes  so  as  to  secure  the  maximum  output. 

Economic  conditions  surrounding  the  soft  coal  industry  in 
ordinary  times  had  been  such  that  the  average  number  of  days 
worked  in  the  year  were  hardly  ever  more  than  230,  and  quite 
often  even  less,  so  that  the  average  hours  of  labor  each  day  had 
fallen  considerably  below  the  eight  hours  stipulated  in  the  wage 
agreement.  This  was  a  serious  handicap  to  continuous  max- 
imum production.  To  add  to  this  already  aggravated  situation 
effecting  a  limitation  of  production,  coal  miners  as  a  class  were 

1  This  did  not  apply  to  the  anthracite  fields  of  Pennsylvania. 

2  To  cover  wage  increases. 


GOVERNMENT  AND  COAL  MINE  WORKERS      115 

not  exempted  under  the  provisions  of  the  draft  act  and  in 
consequence  considerable  inroads  had  been  made  upon  the 
supply  of  mine  labor  by  the  first  draft.  Then,  too,  the  war 
had  not  only  stopped  completely  all  immigration  from  Europe 
into  the  coal  fields,  which  was  the  principal  source  of  unskilled 
labor  supply  for  the  mines,  but  its  effect  was  also  to  call  to 
Europe  many  of  the  nationalities  that  made  up  the  skilled  coal- 
mining population.  In  view  of  these  conditions  and  of  the 
enormously  increased  demand  for  coal,  it  was  vitally  neces- 
sary that  something  be  done  to  make  it  possible  for  miners  to 
work  in  the  mines  the  full  eight  hours  a  day  during  at  least 
five  days  each  week,  Saturday  being  a  half  holiday.  If  this 
were  possible  enough  coal  could  be  produced  to  eliminate  all 
fear  of  a  fuel  shortage. 

This  was  the  result  aimed  at  by  means  of  fines  automatically 
imposed  under  the  penalty  clause.  They  were  quite  distinct 
from  the  penalizing  fines  levied  by  employers  for  their  own 
benefit,  and  they  operated  to  protect  the  great  majority  of  the 
mine  workers  against  the  radical  and  indifferent  element 
among  the  employes  engaged  in  coal  mining. 

The  payment  to  the  worker  of  a  bonus  in  any  form  by  the 
operator  was  stated  by  the  Fuel  Administration  to  be  con- 
trary to  the  spirit  of  the  wage  agreements,  and  it  was  with 
the  view  of  prohibiting  the  bonus  practice  that  the  Administra- 
tion announced  that  "  if  any  operator  hereafter  undertakes  to 
pay  a  bonus  in  any  form  in  violation  of  the  terms  or  spirit  of 
the  agreements "  the  Administration  would  assume  that  the 
mine  price  of  coal  allowed  the  offending  operator  was  too  high 
and  accordingly  its  reduction  would  be  ordered.  A  conference 
of  coal  operators  themselves  went  even  further  and  requested 
the  Administration  "  to  close  down  any  mine  that  persists  in 
the  payment  of  bonuses  or  other  violations  of  the  Washington 
wage  agreements  and  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  Fuel 
Administration."  The  conference  emphasized  the  fact  that  the 
payment  of  bonuses,  premiums,  prizes,  and  so  on,  had  a  dis- 
organizing effect  in  causing  competition  for  labor,  with  the  re- 


ii6  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

suit  that  some  mines  got  more  than  their  needed  supply  of 
workers  while  other  mines  were  rendered  idle  or  nearly  so  on 
that  account.  The  practice  also  caused  dissatisfaction  among 
the  miners  as  a  whole,  besides  resulting  in  limitation  to  pro- 
duction through  the  time  lost  by  men  shifting  from  one  mine 
to  another  in  competition  for  the  highest  wages. 

An  increase  in  wages  to  bituminous  coal  mine  workers  was 
granted  in  an  agreement  entered  into  October  6,  1917,  between 
operators  and  mine  employes  of  the  Central  Competitive  Ter- 
ritory in  conference  with  the  Fuel  Administration.  These 
included  an  advance  of  ten  cents  a  ton  to  miners;  advances 
ranging  from  seventy-five  cents  to  one  dollar  and  forty  cents  a 
day  to  laborers;  and  an  advance  of  15  per  cent,  to  workers 
employed  on  yardage  and  dead  work.  These  were  equivalent 
to  an  increase  to  miners  of  50  per  cent,  and  to  the  best  paid 
laborers  of  78  per  cent,  over  the  wages,  of  April  i,  1914. 

The  anthracite  operators  and  mine  workers  on  May  5,  1916, 
had  entered  into  their  usual  agreement  covering  wages  and 
working  conditions  in  the  hard  coal  fields  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
this  was  to  extend  over  the  four-year  period  from  April  I, 
1916,  to  March  31,  1920.  The  abnormal  conditions  resulting 
from  the  war,  however,  and  in  particular  the  rapid  rise  in  the 
cost  of  living  to  the  workers,  made  necessary  a  revision  of  the 
terms  of  this  agreement  to  the  extent  of  increasing  the  wage 
compensation.  Accordingly  a  supplementary  agreement  was 
entered  into  on  April  25,  1917,  providing  for  wage  increases. 
Subsequently,  in  November  of  the  same  year,  a  further  re- 
vision was  made  with  the  consent  of  the  Fuel  Administration 
granting  an  additional  increase  in  wages. 

These  increases  in  wages  and  other  improved  conditions  of 
employment  in  coal  mining,  as  in  the  shipbuilding  and  railway 
industries,  were  brought  about  through  organized  machinery 
operating  under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  United  States 
Government  and  in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  the  labor 
policy  adopted  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  by  the  Wilson  Ad- 


GOVERNMENT  AND  COAL  MINE  WORKERS      117 

ministration.  This  machinery,  as  has  been  said,  was  largely 
an  adaptation  to  the  necessities  of  war  time  of  the  results  of 
institutional  development  which  the  progress  of  the  labor  move- 
ment in  peace  times  had  brought  about.  Its  operation  by  the 
Government  was  unquestionably  the  success  it  proved  to  be, 
insofar  as  the  securing  of  continuous  production  by  minimizing 
the  number  of  strikes  and  lockouts  is  considered,  largely  be- 
cause the  appeal  to  the  patriotic  motives  of  both  employers  and 
employes  was  strong  enough  to  override  for  the  time  being 
their  conflicting  economic  self-interests  as  competitors  in  the 
distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  cooperative  industry.  This  suc- 
cess was  also  due,  in  no  small  degree,  to  the  fact  that  in  the 
operation  of  this  machinery  the  Government  shifted  the  greater 
part  of  the  economic  burden  of  the  war  from  wages  and  profits 
to  prices  —  from  the  shoulders  of  the  wage  worker  and  the 
capitalist-producer  to  those  of  the  consumer.  It  did  this  by 
granting  to  the  manufacturers  and  other  producers  increases  in 
the  price  of  their  product  at  least  equal  to  the  increases  in 
wages  to  the  workers  to  meet  the  increase  in  their  cost  of 
living. 

In  making  this  statement  the  writer  is  conscious  of  the  ex- 
istence of  plausible  arguments  which  would  seem  to  refute  this 
conclusion.  Assuming  the  absence  of  Government  direction  of 
this  machinery,  it  is  quite  possible  and  even  probable  that 
prices  of  commodities  under  uncontrolled  competition  in  a 
sellers'  market  would  have  been  even  higher  to  the  consumer 
than  they  actually  were.  But  the  conclusion  is  based  on  the 
fact  that,  assuming  Government  direction,  it  was  possible  to 
have  brought  about  a  situation  in  which  the  wages  of  the 
worker  and  especially  the  profits  of  the  manufacturer  would 
have  borne  a  larger  share  and  therefore  prices  to  the  consumer 
a  more  equitable  share  of  the  cost  of  the  war.  It  is  a  question 
not  of  the  results  under  two  different  sets  of  circumstances  but 
of  the  effects  of  a  choice  of  policy  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. The  phase  of  the  situation  as  it  affected  prices  to 


ii8  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

the  consumer  is  discussed  in  succeeding  chapters.  Here  we 
are  concerned  with  only  two  of  the  three  elements  to  successful 
production  —  with  only  the  capitalist -producer  and  the  wage 
worker  in  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  Government. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  GOVERNMENT   AND   INDUSTRIAL   RELATIONS 

IN  all  those  industries  engaged  in  the  production  of  war 
essentials,  direct  control  of  which  was  not  taken  over  by 
the  Government  —  and  there  were  hundreds  and  thousands  of 
mills,  plants,  and  factories  making  up  these  industries  —  in  all 
these  the  labor  policy  of  the  Wilson  Administration  was  made 
operative  through  special  provisions  in  the  usual  form  of  con- 
tract which  was  entered  into  by  the  Government  departments 
with  the  manufacturer. 

In  these  contracts  the  producer  agreed  that :  ( i )  there 
would  be  no  interruption  to  continuous  and  maximum  produc- 
tion on  his  part  because  of  any  labor  controversy  with  his  em- 
ployes; (2)  all  such  controversies  were  to  be  referred  for  set- 
tlement if  necessary  to  designated  Government  departments 
providing  machinery  for  mediation,  conciliation,  and  arbitra- 
tion: and  (3)  he  would  accept  and  abide  by  the  decision  ren- 
dered by  this  governmental  agency.  The  contract  required  of 
the  manufacturer  that  he  was  to  have  it  understood  by  every 
worker  accepting  employment  in  his  plant  that  he  did  so  with 
the  definite  agreement  to  accept  and  abide  by  the  decisions  of 
the  Government  tribunal  in  the  settlement  of  any  question  af- 
fecting labor  submitted  to  it  for  adjudication. 

In  this  very  simple  way  thousands  of  industries  employing 
millions  of  men,  women,  and  children  in  the  production  of 
war  essentials  were  brought  under  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment,  especially  as  to  wages  and  hours  of  work,  as 
laid  down  by  the  United  States  Government.  Over  these  con- 
ditions the  Government  exercised  supervision  through  its 
various  departments  and  bureaus  and  commissions.  For  this 

119 


120  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

purpose  and  to  develop  and  maintain  satisfactory  relations  be- 
tween employers  and  employes  while  both  were  engaged  upon 
government  war  work,  there  were  organized  within  the  de- 
partments numerous  industrial  service  and  industrial  relations 
sections,  boards  of  control,  committees,  commissions,  and  so  on. 
So  numerous  were  these  that  it  is  not  possible  to  refer  to  all  of 
them.  But  the  general  character  of  their  work  can  be  indi- 
cated by  calling  brief  attention  to  the  operation  of  a  selected 
few. 

For  the  adjustment  and  control  of  wages,  hours  of  work, 
and  other  conditions  of  employment  for  workers  of  contractors 
engaged  in  the  construction  of  cantonments  and  army  camps 
there  was  established  in  the  construction  division  of  the  War 
Department  the  Cantonment  Adjustment  Commission,  after- 
wards the  Emergency  Construction  Adjustment  Commission. 
It  was  composed  of  three  members  appointed  by  the  Secretary 
of  War,  one  to  represent  the  Army,  one  the  public,  and  one  the 
workers,  the  latter  representative  being  nominated  by  the 
president  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor. 

The  principles  governing  the  labor  policy  of  this  commis- 
sion were  embodied  in  what  became  known  as  the  Baker- 
Gompers  agreement.  This  agreement  provided  as  basic  stand- 
ards in  each  cantonment  the  union  scale  of  wages,  hours 
of  work,  and  other  conditions  of  employment  in  effect  on  June 
i,  1917,  in  the  particular  locality  where  the  cantonment  was 
situated.  Consideration  was  to  be  given  to  special  circum- 
stances arising  that  should  require  advances  in  wages  or 
changes  in  other  terms  of  employment. 

An  official  interpretation  of  this  understanding 1  made  it 
clear  that  the  War  Department  did  not  agree  nor  did  it  commit 
itself  to  the  so-called  "  closed  shop,"  and  that  the  conditions  in 
effect  on  June  i,  1917,  which  were  adopted  as  the  basis  of  the 
agreement,  did  not  include  any  provisions  as  to  the  employment 
of  non-union  labor.  These  "  conditions  "  were  interpreted  as 

1  Correspondence  between  Mr.  Samuel  Gompers  and  Louis  B.  Wehle, 
Esq.,  under  date  of  June  20  and  22,  1917. 


INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  121 

applying  only  to  union  arrangements  as  to  overtime  and  work 
on  holidays  and  like  matters.  It  was  not  believed  to  be  le- 
gally feasible  to  adopt  any  understanding  in  such  an  agreement 
giving  preference  to  the  employment  of  union  labor.  Later  the 
provisions  of  this  Baker-Gompers  agreement  were  applied  to 
all  land  construction  work  of  the  War  Department,  the  com- 
mission's jurisdiction  being  extended  to  the  construction  of 
aviation  fields  and  warehouses  and  storage  facilities. 

The  agreement  provided  for  sessions  of  the  commission  in 
Washington  "  unless  specially  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  go  to  the  site  of  a  construction."  The  commission 
was  to  obtain  complete  information  of  union  scales  of  wages, 
hours  of  work,  and  other  conditions  of  employment  in  effect 
on  June  I,  1917,  in  the  several  localities  where  cantonments 
were  being  constructed  from  data  supplied,  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable, by  the  federal  Department  of  Labor. 

As  the  cantonment  sites  were  distributed  throughout  all  sec- 
tions of  the  country,  the  Secretary  of  War  was  to  appoint,  for 
the  period  of  construction  and  with  the  unanimous  approval  of 
the  commission,  a  responsible  impartial  examiner  for  each  dis- 
trict who  was  to  act  under  orders  of  the  commission. 

In  case  a  dispute  arose  which  it  developed  could  not  be 
adjusted  satisfactorily  by  the  contracting  officer  at  the  site 
and  the  employes  involved,  the  officer  was  to  issue  a  pro- 
visional order  which  was  subject  to  being  affirmed,  reversed, 
or  modified  by  the  commission.  The  actual  work  of  construc- 
tion was  not  to  be  interrupted.  In  case  this  provisional  order 
was  not  accepted  by  the  employes  the  contracting  officer  was 
to  notify  the  member  of  the  commission  representing  the  Army 
of  the  matter  in  dispute,  the  proposals  made  by  each  party 
for  adjustment,  and  of  the  provisional  order  which  he  had 
issued.  At  the  same  time  the  member  of  the  commission  desig- 
nated by  Mr.  Gompers  was  also  to  obtain  from  a  reliable  source 
a  report  on  the  matter  in  dispute.  In  case  the  controversy  was 
not  adjusted  satisfactorily  at  the  site,  the  commission  was  to 
send  at  once  an  examiner,  with  authority  and  acting  under  the 


122  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

orders  of  the  commission,  to  mediate  between  the  parties. 
Failing  in  this  the  examiner  was  to  report  promptly  and  fully 
to  the  commission  with  a  recommendation.  If  ordered  by  the 
commission  or  any  of  its  members  the  examiner  was  to  remain 
at  the  site  to  supply  any  further  information  that  might  be 
requested.  The  examiner  was  to  supervise  the  application  of 
the  commission's  rulings.  A  copy  of  the  rulings  was  to  be 
sent  to  the  contracting  officer  and  to  the  representatives  of  the 
parties  involved  in  the  controversy. 

The  Government's  policy  as  to  hours  of  work  by  employes 
of  all  Government  contractors  was  embodied  in  the  contract. 
The  progress  of  industrial  development,  the  activities  of  or- 
ganized labor  in  the  direction  of  shorter  hours  of  work,  and 
the  influence  of  statutory  enactments  had  all  been  tending 
towards  decreasing  the  work  day  from  twelve,  ten,  and  nine 
hours  to  eight  hours  as  the  standard.  The  National  Govern- 
ment had  established  this  standard  for  its  own  employes  by  the 
Act  of  Congress  of  June  19,  1912,  known  as  the  Eight  Hour 
Law.  Thus  slowly  and  steadily  by  voluntary  action  of  em- 
ployers, by  the  demands  of  the  labor  union,  and  by  the  force 
and  example  of  law  a  shorter  work  day  was  being  made  ef- 
fective in  all  the  principal  industries.  To  the  organized  worker 
such  a  standard  work  day  of  reasonably  limited  length  was  as 
much  a  matter  of  justice  as  was  the  rate  of  his  pay,  and  the 
securing  of  it  was  the  cause  of  almost  as  many  strikes  as  was 
his  demand  for  higher  wages.  But  he  consistently  objected  to 
it  if  its  establishment  meant  a  minimizing  of  his  wage  returns. 

War  necessity,  however,  demanded  not  a  decrease  but  rather 
an  increase  in  the  hours  of  work  each  day.  In  fact,  so  great 
was  the  need  of  increased  production  along  so  many  lines  that 
President  Wilson  deemed  it  advisable  to  authorize  in  Executive 
Orders  the  suspension  of  the  provisions  of  the  Eight  Hour 
Law.  This  possibility  had  been  anticipated  in  the  Naval  Ap- 
propriation Act  of  Congress  approved  March  4,  1917,  in  which 
it  was  provided  "  That  in  case  of  national  emergency  the  Pres- 
ident is  authorized  to  suspend  provisions  of  law  prohibiting 


INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  123 

more  than  eight  hours  of  labor  in  any  one  day  of  persons  en- 
gaged upon  work  covered  by  contracts  with  the  United  States: 
Provided  further,  That  the  wages  of  persons  employed  upon 
such  contracts  shall  be  computed  on  a  basic  day  rate  of  eight 
hours  work,  with  overtime  rates  to  be  paid  for  at  not  less  than 
time  and  one-half  for  all  hours  worked  in  excess  of  eight 
hours." 

The  application  of  this  provision  resulted  in  the  continuance 
of  the  ten  hour  day  in  many  industries  already  operating  on 
that  basis  and  in  the  extension  from  eight  to  ten  hours  of  the 
working  time  of  many  Government  plants,  such  as  arsenals, 
as  well  as  of  factories  having  the  eight  hour  day  and  under 
contract  with  the  Government.  But  in  going  to  the  ten  hour 
day  basis  overtime  rates  were  paid  for  all  time  worked  each 
day  beyond  eight  hours.  This  meant,  for  illustration,  that  a 
mechanic  being  paid  a  rate  of  eighty  cents  an  hour  and  who 
consequently  earned  $6.40  a  day,  received  on  the  time  and  one- 
half  basis  for  overtime  $1.20  cents  additional  for  every  hour 
worked  beyond  eight  hours.  If  he  worked  nine  hours  he 
earned  the  basic  $6.40  plus  the  $1.20,  or  $7.60,  and  if  he  worked 
ten  hours  he  received  the  basic  $6.40  plus  $2.40,  or  $8.80. 
If  the  mechanic  happened  to  be  a  member  of  one  of  the  crafts 
that  had  succeeded  in  establishing  the  double  time  basis  of  pay 
for  overtime  beyond  eight  hours,  he  received  twice  the  basic 
hourly  rate  of  eighty  cents,  or  $1.60,  for  every  hour  worked 
beyond  the  eight  hours.  This  time  and  one-half  and  double 
time  rate  for  all  overtime,  which  organized  labor  had  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing  in  many  industries  prior  to  the  war,  was 
intended  primarily  as  a  penalty  against  excessive  overtime  but 
under  war  emergency  conditions  it  became  all  too  frequently 
the  means  of  increasing  the  day  wage  rate. 

In  carrying  out  in  other  directions  the  labor  policy  of  the 
Wilson  Administration  various  departments  of  the  Govern- 
ment, having  contracts  with  large  numbers  of  manufacturers, 
issued  general  regulations  embodying  detailed  rules  governing 
employment  which  the  manufacturer  and  employes  were  to  ob- 


124  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

serve.  These  working  conditions  as  formulated  by  the  Ord- 
nance 1  and  the  Quartermaster's  Departments  of  the  Army  give 
a  comprehensive  view  of  the  principles  of  industrial  relations 
which  it  was  believed  should  prevail  in  industries  turning  out 
contract  orders  for  the  Government.  They  were  adopted  as 
the  standards  by  other  branches  of  the  Government  and  made 
quite  generally  effective. 

The  following  suggestions  are  commended  to  the  careful  con- 
sideration of  arsenal  commanders  and  manufacturers  executing 
orders  for  this  department : 

In  view  of  the  urgent  necessity  for  a  prompt  increase  in  the 
volume  of  production  of  practically  every  article  required  for 
the  conduct  of  the  war,  vigilance  is  demanded  of  all  those  in 
any  way  associated  with  industry,  lest  the  safeguards  with 
which  the  people  of  this  country  have  sought  to  protect  labor 
should  be  unwisely  and  unnecessarily  broken  down. 
-.  It  is  a  fair  assumption  that  for  the  most  part  these  safeguards 
are  the  mechanisms  of  efficiency.  Industrial  history  proves 
that  reasonable  hours,  fair  working  conditions,  and  a  proper 
wage  scale  are  essential  to  high  production.  During  the  war 
every  attempt  should  be  made  to  conserve  in  every  possible  way 
all  of  our  achievements  in  the  way  of  social  betterment. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  following  memorandum  no  effort 
has  been  made  to  establish  or  even  to  suggest  definite  rules  of 
conduct.  The  memorandum  presents  what  may  be  considered 
a  fair  if  tentative  basis. 

The  department  wishes  to  be  assured  that  schedules  of  hours 
obviously  excessive  or  wage  scales  distinctly  unfair  or  working 
conditions  such  as  should  not  be  tolerated  will  certainly  be 
brought  to  its  attention. 

I.     HOURS  OF  LABOR 

i.  Daily  Hours — The  day's  work  should  not  exceed  the  cus- 
tomary hours  in  the  particular  establishment  or  the  standard 
already  attained  in  the  industry  and  in  the  community.  It 
should  certainly  not  be  longer  than  ten  hours  for  an  adult  work- 
man. The  drift  in  the  industrial  world  is  toward  an  eight  hour 
day  as  an  efficiency  measure.  It  has  also  been  shown  that 

1  General  Orders  No.  13,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  November  15,  191?. 


INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  125 

hours  of  labor  must  be  adapted  to  the  age  and  sex  of  the  worker, 
and  the  nature  of  the  occupation. 

2.  Overtime — The  theory  under  which  we  pay  "  time  and  a 
half  "  for  overtime  is  a  tacit  recognition  that  it  is  usually  un- 
necessary and  always  undesirable  to  have  overtime.     The  ex- 
cess payment  is  a  penalty  and  intended  to  act  as  a  deterrent. 
There  is  no  industrial  abuse  which  needs  closer  watching  in 
times  of  war. 

3.  Shifts  in  Continuous  Industries — Eight  hours  per  shift 
should  be  a  maximum  in  continuous  twenty-four  hour  work. 

4.  Half  Holiday  on  Saturday — The  half  holiday  on  Satur- 
day is  already  a  common  custom  in  summer,  and  it  is  advan- 
tageous throughout  the  year,  especially  if  the  work  day  be  ten 
hours  long  the  other  days  of  the  week.     The  working  period 
on  Saturday  should  not  exceed  five  hours.     An  occasional  shift 
of  two  or  three  hours  on  Saturday  afternoon  is  unobjectionable 
if  essential,  but  the  additional  hours  should  be  regarded  as 
overtime  and  paid  for  on  that  basis. 

5.  Hours  Posted — It  is  desirable  that  the  hours  of  labor  for 
every  tour  be  p.osted. 

6.  Holidays — The  observance  of  national  and  local  holidays 
will  give  opportunity  for  rest  and  relaxation  which  tend  to 
make  production  more  satisfactory. 

7.  One  Day  of  Rest  in  Seven — One  day  of  rest  in  seven 
should  be  a  universal  and  invariable  rule. 

II.     STANDARDS  IN  WORKROOMS 

1.  Protection  Against  Hazards  and  Provisions  for  Comfort 
and   Sanitation — Existing  legal   standards  to  prevent   danger 
from  fire,  accident,  occupational  diseases,  or  other  hazards,  and 
to  provide  good  light,  adequate  ventilation,  sufficient  heat,  and 
proper  sanitation  should  be  observed  as  minimum  requirements. 

2.  Location  of  Toilets — All  toilets  should  be  sanitary  and 
readily  accessible. 

3.  Extreme  Temperatures — Those  processes  in  which  work- 
ers are  exposed  to  excessive  heat,  that  is,  over  eighty  degrees; 
or  excessive  cold,  that  is,  under  fifty  degrees,  should  be  care- 
fully supervised  so  as  to  render  the  temperature  conditions  as 
nearly  normal  as  possible.     When  extreme  temperatures  are 
essential  workers  should  not  only  be  properly  clothed  but  avoid 
sudden  changes. 

4.  Lights — If  any  light  is  at  the  level  of  the  worker's  eyes  it 
should  be  so  shaded  that  its  rays  will  not  directly  strike  the  eyes. 


126  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

III.    WAGES 

i.  Wage  Standards — Standards  already  established  in  the 
industry  and  in  the  locality  should  not  be  lowered.  The  mini- 
mum wage  rates  should  be  made  in  proper  relation  to  the  cost 
of  living,  and  in  fixing  them  it  should  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion that  the  prices  of  necessities  of  life  have  shown  great  in- 
creases. 

IV.     NEGOTIATIONS  BETWEEN  EMPLOYERS  AND  EMPLOYES 

The  need  of  preserving  and  creating  methods  of  joint  nego- 
tiations between  employers  and  groups  of  employes  is  especially 
great  in  the  light  of  the  critical  points  of  controversy  which 
may  arise  in  a  time  like  the  present.  Existing  channels  should 
be  preserved  and  new  ones  opened,  if  required,  to  provide  for 
easier  discussion  between  an  employer  and  his  employes  over 
controversial  points. 

V.     STANDARDS  FOR  EMPLOYMENT  OF  WOMEN 

1.  Hours    of    Labor — Existing    legal    standards    should    be 
rigidly  maintained,  and  even  where  the  law  permits  a  nine  or 
ten  hour  day,  effort  should  be  made  to  restrict  the  work  of 
women  to  eight  hours. 

2.  Prohibition  of  Night  Work — The  employment  of  women 
on  night  shifts  should  be  prevented  as  a  necessary  protection, 
morally  and  physically. 

3.  Rest  Periods — No  woman  should  be  employed  for  a  longer 
period  than  four  and  one-half  hours  without  a  break  for  a 
meal,  and  a  recess  of  ten  minutes  should  be  allowed  in  the 
middle  of  each  working  period. 

4.  Time  for  Meals — At  least  thirty  minutes  should  be  allowed 
for  a  meal,  and  this  time  should  be  lengthened  to  forty-five 
minutes  or  an  hour  if  the  working  day  exceeds  eight  hours. 

5.  Place  for  Meals — Meals  should  not  be  eaten  in  the  work- 
room. 

6.  Saturday    Half    Holiday — The    Saturday    half    holiday 
should  be  considered  an  absolute  essential  for  women  under 
all  conditions. 

7.  Seats — For   women   who  sit  at  their   work,   seats   with 
backs  should  be  provided,  unless  the  occupation  renders  this 
impossible.     For  women  who  stand  at  their  work,  seats  should 
be  available  and  their  use  permitted  at  regular  intervals. 

8.  Lifting  Weights — No  woman  should  be  required  to  lift 


INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  127 

repeatedly  more  than  twenty-five  pounds  in  any  single  load. 

9.  Replacement  of  Men  by  Women — When  it  is  necessary  to 
employ  women  in  work  hitherto  done  by  men,  care  should  be 
taken  to  make  sure  that  the  task  is  adapted  to  the  strength  of 
women.     The  standard  of  wages  hitherto  prevailing  for  men 
in  the  process  should  not  be  lowered  where   women  render 
equivalent  service.     The  hours  for  women   engaged  in   such 
processes,  of  course,  should  not  be  longer  than  those  formerly 
worked  by  men. 

10.  Tenement  House  Work — No  work  shall  be  given  out  to 
be  done  in  rooms  used  for  living  purposes  or  in  rooms  directly 
connected  with  living  rooms  in  any  dwelling  or  tenement. 

VI.     STANDARDS  FOR  EMPLOYMENT  OF  MINORS 

1.  Age — No  child  under  fourteen  years  of  age  shall  be  em- 
ployed at  any  work  under  any  conditions. 

2.  Hours  of  Labor — No  child  between  the  ages  of  four- 
teen and  sixteen  years  shall  be  employed  more  than  eight  hours 
a  day  or  forty-eight  hours  a  week,  and  night  work  is  prohibited. 

3.  Federal  Child  Labor  Laws — These  and  other  provisions 
of  the  Federal  child  labor  law  must  be  strictly  observed. 

4.  Minors  Under  Eighteen — Minors  of  both   sexes  under 
eighteen  years  of  age  should  have  the  same  restrictions  upon 
their  hours  as  already  outlined  for  women  employes. 

\Vithin  the  Ordnance  Department  of  the  Army  an  Industrial 
Service  Section  exercised  control  over  all  matters  pertaining 
to  labor  engaged  in  the  production  of  ordnance  supplies,  equip- 
ment, and  material,  including  the  work  at  the  Government  ar- 
senals. Its  jurisdiction  covered  specifically  all  subjects  con- 
cerning hours  of  labor,  rates  of  pay,  housing,  transportation, 
dilution  of  labor,  women  in  industry,  community  conditions 
affecting  labor,  stealing  of  labor  by  one  employer  from  another, 
prevention  of  wage  or  other  labor  disputes,  supply  and  distribu- 
tion of  labor  essential  to  ordnance  production,  relations  on  all 
these  matters  with  the  industrial  service  sections  of  other  pro- 
curement bureaus  and  with  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
the  Department  of  Labor,  the  Public  Health  Service  on  mat- 
ters affecting  health,  safety,  and  sanitation,  and  with  all  other 
agencies  dealing  with  labor. 


128  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

There  was  a  like  service  section  in  the  Signal  Corps  bureau 
of  the  War  Department,  and  similarly  an  industrial  relations 
section  in  the  Bureau  of  Aircraft  Production  in  charge  of  all 
such  matters  affecting  the  production  of  aircraft.  A  like  sec- 
tion in  the  Quartermaster's  Department  of  the  Army  had  jur- 
isdiction over  related  matters  in  all  plants  carrying  contracts 
of  that  department,  with  the  exception  of  those  of  the  needle 
trades,  and  these  contracts  were  very  numerous. 

For  the  so-called  needle  trades  engaged  principally  in  the 
making  of  clothing  for  the  troops,  a  special  Board  of  Control 
was  organized  as  these  industries  presented  problems  fre- 
quently quite  different  from  those  of  ordinary  production. 
The  head  of  this  board  had  the  title  "  Administrator  of  Labor 
Standards,"  and  his  work  was  confined  to  the  trades  engaged 
in  the  production  of  army  clothes.  Its  duties  stressed  safety, 
sanitation,  and  healthful  conditions  in  clothing  factories  more 
than  they  did  the  settlement  of  labor  disputes,  although  these 
latter  were  within  its  jurisdiction,  an  investigation  in  1917  hav- 
ing disclosed  that  Army  clothing  was  being  manufactured  in 
some  cases  under  conditions  not  in  accord  with  standards  which 
should  be  maintained  on  work  done  for  the  Government.  The 
operation  of  the  board  was  directed  against  sweatshop  and 
similar  conditions  which  had  long  before  the  war  been  recog- 
nized as  serious  industrial  evils.  It  aimed  to  establish  and  en- 
force the  observance  of  sound  industrial  and  sanitary  condi- 
tions in  the  manufacture  of  Army  clothing,  in  the  inspection 
of  factories,  in  the  establishing  of  proper  standards  on  Gov- 
ernment work,  in  passing  upon  the  industrial  standards  main- 
tained by  bidders  on  Army  clothing,  and  in  all  respects  to  bring 
about  more  just  working  conditions  in  this  industry. 

Supervision  over  the  wage  rates  of  all  employes  of  manu- 
facturers supplying  to  the  Government  leather  goods,  harness 
and  accessories,  not  including  shoes,  was  vested  in  the  National 
Harness  and  Saddlery  Adjustment  Commission,  consisting  of 
one  representative  each  of  the  War  Department,  of  the  em- 
ployers, and  of  the  International  Leather  Worker's  Union. 


INDUSTRIAL  RELATIONS  129 

For  the  purpose  of  adjusting  wages  in  the  navy  yards  and 
arsenals  an  Arsenal  and  Navy  Yards  Commission  was  jointly 
created  by  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy.  It  was  to  have 
jurisdiction  of  cases  that  were  not  settled  by  representatives  of 
the  particular  departments  but  as  this  was  successfully  ac- 
complished in  every  case  the  commission  itself  was  not  called 
upon  to  function.  General  supervision  over  wage  matters  in 
navy  yards  was  placed  under  an  assistant  to  the  Assistant  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy  and  in  arsenals  under  a  major  in  the  office 
of  the  Secretary  of  War.  Original  jurisdiction  over  industrial 
relations  in  the  navy  yards  was  placed  under  the  commanding 
officer  or  industrial  manager.  In  the  so-called  "  outside " 
plants  working  on  navy  contracts  these  matters  were  under 
the  production  inspector  who  was  charged  with  reporting  to 
the  Department  direct.  In  case  of  a  strike  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment depended  upon  the  most  convenient  available  adjusting 
machinery  or  governmental  agency.  In  the  Bureau  of  Yards 
and  Docks  of  the  Department,  which  had  charge  of  consider- 
able building  construction  work,  commissioned  officers  were 
specially  assigned  to  look  after  wage  and  other  labor  matters. 

Under  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  an  Industrial  Re- 
lations Division  operated  separately  and  distinct  from  the  Ship- 
building Wage  Adjustment  Board  of  the  United  States  Ship- 
ping Board.  Its  service  section  counseled  and  advised  as  to 
scientific  employment,  administered  draft  deferments,  and  su- 
pervised transfers  and  related  matters  in  the  handling  of  the 
personnel  in  the  shipyards.  Its  health  and  sanitation  section 
assisted  and  cooperated  with  shipyard  communities  in  all  mat- 
ters affecting  the  health  and  physical  welfare  of  the  shipyard 
workers.  Its  safety  engineering  section  directed  efforts 
towards  reducing  and  minimizing  the  number  of  accidents  not 
only  in  the  building  of  ships  but  also  in  the  construction  of 
ship  material,  recommending  machine  guards  and  safety  de- 
vices and  conducting  safety  campaigns  of  education  among  the 
workers.  Its  education  and  training  section  instituted  train- 
ing centers  in  different  parts  of  the  country  fpr  qualifying 


130 

workers  to  do  shipyard  work  and  also  for  increasing  the  skill 
of  employes  already  in  the  yards.  The  Industrial  Relations 
group  in  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  also  contained  a 
labor  administration  section  for  advising  and  counseling  con- 
tractors, especially  of  plants  supplying  ship  accessories,  in  the 
proper  handling  of  disputes  with  their  employes. 

An  Industrial  Relations  Division,  in  charge  of  a  manager 
and  with  a  corps  of  special  representatives  and  welfare  direc- 
tors, operated  within  the  United  States  Housing  Corporation 
and  had  jurisdiction  over  all  the  labor  matters  having  to  do 
with  the  construction  of  the  eighty-seven  building  projects  of 
the  Corporation  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  This  division  for- 
mulated the  principles  governing  the  relations  of  the  housing 
contractors  with  their  37,000  employes  and  supervised  the  se- 
curing of  an  adequate  supply  of  labor,  the  wages  paid,  hours 
of  work,  prevention  of  accidents,  settlement  of  controversies, 
provisions  for  the  health,  comfort,  and  welfare  of  the  work- 
ers at  isolated  projects,  and  all  the  other  multitudinous  phases 
of  the  labor  problem  in  war  times.1 

The  work  of  these  and  other  industrial  service  or  relations 
sections  or  divisions  in  the  direction  of  the  application  of  the 
labor  policy  of  the  Wilson  Administration  was  carried  on  in 
close  cooperation  with  that  of  other  branches  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  in  particular  with  that  of  the  Department  of  Labor, 
so  that  it  was  correlated  and  made  to  accomplish  with  as  little 
friction  as  possible  a  continuity  in  production.  This  goal  of 
uninterrupted  production  was  their  primary  object. 

1  For  an  interesting  account  of  the  detailed  facts  that  go  to  make 
up  so  many  labor  controversies  see  Report  of  Industrial  Relations 
Division  in  Vol.  r  of  Report  of  United  States  Housing  Corporation, 
Department  of  Labor,  Washington,  D.  C 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  NATIONAL  WAR  LABOR  BOARD 

THAT  the  national  Government  found  it  necessary  to  call 
into  existence  so  many  agencies  for  the  control  of  labor 
relations  in  production  should  not  be  surprising  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  the  Government  was  engaged  in  the  operation 
of  a  nation-wide  workshop,  with  plants  in  every  State  and 
almost  every  city  employing  millions  of  workers  in  thousands 
of  different  occupations  surrounded  by  special  labor  condi- 
tions. The  wonder  is  that  the  task  was  accomplished  with  so 
few  such  agencies.  Among  the  most  important  of  these  is  the 
National  War  Labor  Board  recommended  by  the  War  Labor 
Conference  Board1  in  its  report  of  March  29  and  created  by 
Presidential  Proclamation  April  8,  1918.  This  board  had  jur- 
isdiction over  all  matters  of  labor  controversies  between  em- 
ployers and  employes  in  all  fields  of  industrial  or  other  activity 
affecting  war  production  where  there  did  not  already  exist  by 
agreement  or  federal  law  a  means  of  settlement.  Even  where 
such  agencies  were  provided,  jurisdiction  was  with  the  War 
Labor  Board  in  case  these  agencies  failed  to  secure  adjust- 
ment. 

"  The  powers,  functions,  and  duties  of  the  National  War 
Labor  Board,"  says  President  Wilson's  Proclamation,  "  shall 
be :  To  settle  by  mediation  and  conciliation  controversies  aris- 
ing between  employers  and  workers  in  fields  of  production 
necessary  for  the  effective  conduct  of  the  war,  or  in  other 
fields  of  national  activity,  delays  and  obstructions  in  which 
might,  in  the  opinion  of  the  National  Board,  affect  detri- 
mentally such  production ;  to  provide,  by  direct  appointment, 

1  See  Chapter  VIII,  page  85. 

131 


132  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

or  otherwise,  for  committees  or  boards  to  sit  in  various  parts 
of  the  country  where  controversies  arise  and  secure  settlement 
by  local  mediation  and  conciliation ;  and  to  summon  the  parties 
to  controversies  for  hearing  and  action  by  the  National  Board 
in  event  of  failure  to  secure  settlement  by  mediation  and 
conciliation." 

The  principles  observed  and  the  methods  followed  by  the 
War  Labor  Board  in  exercising  its  powers  and  functions  and 
in  performing  ks  duties  were  those  specified  in  the  report  of 
the  Labor  Conference.1  The  board  was  to  refuse  to  take  cog- 
nizance of  a  controversy  between  employer  and  employes  where 
there  was  a  means  of  settlement  which  had  not  been  invoked. 
The  Proclamation  of  the  President  urged  upon  all  employers 
and  employes  within  the  United  States  "  the  necessity  of  utiliz- 
ing the  means  and  methods  thus  provided  for  the  adjustment  of 
all  industrial  disputes,"  and  requested  that  "  during  the  pend- 
ency of  mediation  or  arbitration  through  the  said  means  and 
methods  there  shall  be  no  discontinuance  of  industrial  opera- 
tions which  would  result  in  curtailment  of  the  production  of 
war  necessities." 

The  War  Labor  Board  consisted  of  the  same  members  se- 
lected in  the  same  manner  and  by  the  same  agencies  as  the 
War  Labor  Conference  Board.  It  was  provided  in  the  report 
outlining  the  organization  of  the  board  that  if  its  efforts  failed 
to  bring  about  a  voluntary  settlement,  and  its  members  were 
unable  unanimously  to  agree  upon  a  decision,  then  in  that  case 
and  only  as  a  last  resort,  an  umpire  was  to  hear  and  finally 
decide  the  controversy  under  simple  rules  of  procedure  pre- 
scribed by  the  board.  The  umpire  was  to  be  chosen  by  unani- 
mous vote  of  the  board,  failing  which  the  name  of  the  umpire 
was  to  be  drawn  by  lot  from  a  list  of  ten  suitable  and  dis- 
interested persons  nominated  for  the  purpose  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  These  ten  men  were  Mr.  Henry  Ford 
of  Detroit ;  Mr.  Matthew  Hale  of  Boston ;  Mr.  J.  Harry  Cov- 
ington  and  Mr.  Charles  C.  McChord  of  Washington,  D.  C. ; 

1  See  Chapter  VIII,  page  86. 


THE  NATIONAL  WAR  LABOR  BOARD    133 

Mr.  V.  Evcrit  Macy  and  Mr.  William  R.  Willcox  of  New 
York ;  Mr.  Julian  W.  Mack  of  Chicago ;  Mr.  Henry  Suzzallo 
of  Seattle;  Mr.  John  Lind  of  Minneapolis;  and  Mr.  Walter 
Clark  of  Raleigh,  N.  C. 

The  place  of  each  member  of  the  board  unavoidably  de- 
tained from  attending  one  or  more  of  its  sessions  was  to  be 
filled  by  a  substitute  to  be  named  by  such  member,  the  substi- 
tute having  the  same  representative  character  as  his  principal. 

The  action  of  the  board  could  be  invoked  in  respect  to  con- 
troversies within  its  jurisdiction  by  the  Secretary  of  Labor  or 
by  either  side  in  a  controversy  or  its  duly  authorized  repre- 
sentative. The  board,  after  summary  consideration,  could  re- 
fuse further  hearing  if  the  case  was  not  of  such  character  or 
importance  to  justify  it. 

In  the  appointment  of  committees  of  its  own  members  to  act 
for  the  board  in  general  or  local  matters,  and  in  the  creation  of 
local  committees,  the  employers  and  the  workers  were  to  be 
equally  represented. 

The  two  representatives  of  the  public  in  the  board  were  to 
preside  alternately  at  successive  sessions  of  the  board  or  as 
agreed  upon. 

The  policy  to  be  observed  by  the  board  in  its  mediating  and 
conciliatory  action,  and  by  the  umpire  in  his  consideration  of 
a  controversy,  were  outlined  in  the  report  of  the  Conference 
Board.1 

The  plan  of  procedure  and  method  that  was  followed  in 
cases  within  its  jurisdiction  provided  for  the  appointment  of 
subcommittees  of  two  members  to  act  for  the  board  in  every 
local  controversy,  and  the  appointment  of  permanent  local  com- 
mittees in  cities  and  districts  to  act  in  cases  therein  arising. 
A  method  of  investigating  industrial  disputes  by  field  agents 
sent  into  territories  by  the  board  from  Washington  was  also 
provided  for,  as  was  also  the  method  to  be  followed  by  per- 
sons desiring  to  bring  a  condition  to  the  attention  of  the  board. 

Under  its  form  of  procedure  the  board  sat  in  hearing  only 

1  See  Chapter  VIII,  page  86. 


i34  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

when  its  sections  or  subcommittees  or  local  committees  found 
it  impossible  to  settle  a  controversy,  and  then  it  sat  as  a  board 
of  arbitration  to  decide  the  controversy  and  make  an  award. 

In  compliance  with  the  direction  of  the  President's  Procla- 
mation the  board  heard  appeals  in  the  following  cases:  (i) 
Where  the  principles  established  by  him  in  such  Proclamation 
had  been  violated;  (2)  where  an  award  made  by  a  board  had 
not  been  put  into  effect,  or  where  the  employes  had  refused  to 
accept  or  abide  by  such  award;  (3)  determination  of  questions 
of  jurisdiction  as  between  Government  boards. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  present  the  many  activities 
of  the  board  or  even  to  summarize  its  decisions  in  the  more 
important  labor  controversies.  Many  of  those  that  came  be- 
fore it  for  settlement  were  similar,  as  to  the  industrial  issues 
involved  and  in  many  of  their  details,  to  those  confronting 
other  agencies  of  the  Government  which  have  already  been 
discussed.  Several  decisions  involving  broad  economic  prin- 
ciples will  be  referred  to  briefly. 

In  readjusting  the  wage  schedules  in  eight  plants  at 
Waynesboro,  Pennsylvania,  the  board  fixed  forty  cents  an  hour 
as  the  minimum  rate  to  be  paid  any  class  of  workers,  including 
common  laborers.  This  minimum  however,  was  not  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  living  wage  standard,  which  latter  is  the  minimum 
wage  that  permits  or  enables  the  worker  and  his  family  to 
subsist  in  health  and  reasonable  comfort.  In  this  case  the 
award  of  the  board  gave  many  of  the  workers  wage  increases 
considerably  in  excess  of  their  demands,  to  gain  which  they 
had  gone  out  on  strike.  They  had  demanded  for  common 
laborers  a  minimum  of  thirty  cents  an  hour,  these  workers  at 
the  time  receiving  as  little  as  twenty-two  cents  an  hour.  The 
increase  to  the  lowest  paid  men  thus  amounted  to  81  per  cent. 
The  board  did  not  decide  to  establish  generally  throughout  in- 
dustry this  minimum  wage  of  forty  cents  an  hour.  Its  policy 
was  to  determine  and  apply  a  fair  living  wage  in  each  case  on 
the  basis  of  the  particular  facts. 

This  principle  is  illustrated  in  its  decisions  in  street  railway 


THE  NATIONAL  WAR  LABOR  BOARD    135 

controversies  many  of  which  came  before  the  board.  In  these 
cases  the  board  established  a  different  rate  for  street  car  em- 
ployes in  the  smaller  city  doing  similar  work  to  employes  in 
the  large  city.  While  in  all  cases  substantial  wage  increases 
were  granted  the  rates  established  varied,  there  being  no  flat 
minimum  or  maximum  that  was  applied  generally.  Wages  for 
motormen  and  conductors  in  the  larger  cities  were  fixed  at 
from  forty-eight  to  fifty  and  one-half  cents  an  hour  and  the 
rate  for  apprentice  motormen  and  conductors  at  forty-three 
cents.  In  the  smaller  cities  the  pay  for  motormen  and  con- 
ductors was  increased  to  forty-five  cents  and  for  apprentice 
motormen  and  conductors  to  forty-one  cents  an  hour.  In  the 
case  of  small  interurban  roads,  where  the  employes  as  a  gen- 
eral thing  live  in  rural  communities,  the  wage  for  motormen 
and  conductors  was  fixed  at  forty-two  cents  and  for  appren- 
tices at  thirty-eight  cents  an  hour.  Thus  the  board  in  fixing 
the  wage  rate  took  into  consideration  local  conditions  and 
such  other  facts  as  were  applicable  in  individual  cases. 

In  many  of  the  street  railway  cases  trackmen,  pitmen,  pit- 
men's helpers,  controllers,  oilers,  and  so  on  also  demanded 
increased  wages  and  improved  working  conditions,  and  these 
employes  had  their  wages  increased  at  first  in  the  same  ratio  as 
the  highest  increase  to  conductors  and  motormen.  It  was  later 
found  that  even  this  increase  did  not  provide  these  men  with 
a  wage  sufficient  under  the  living  wage  principle,  and  the  arbi- 
trators therefore  later  fixed  forty-two  cents  an  hour  as  a  mini- 
mum for  these  men.  In  these  street  railway  cases  the  board 
formulated  a  definite  policy  on  the  question  of  the  ability  to 
pay  increases  in  wages  by  street  railway  corporations,  which 
policy  was  based  upon  the  facts  and  arguments  presented  at  its 
hearings. 

The  board's  finding  in  the  case  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Cor- 
poration was  one  of  the  most  important  in  many  respects  of 
any  of  its  decisions.  It  granted  the  workers  the  right  to  or- 
ganize and  to  bargain  collectively ;  ordered  the  revision  or  com- 
plete elimination  of  the  bonus  system  in  operation  at  the  plant ; 


136  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

directed  the  revision  of  piece  work  rates;  established  a  desig- 
nated and  guaranteed  minimum  hourly  wage  rate  for  some  five 
thousand  machine  shop  workers;  applied  the  payment  of  time 
and  one-half  for  all  overtime  and  double  time  payment  for 
Sundays  and  holidays ;  provided  for  just  overtime  payment  to 
piece  workers;  and  called  upon  the  company  to  pay  men  and 
women  alike  when  performing  the  same  work,  and  to  allot 
women  no  tasks  disproportionate  to  their  strength. 

In  the  revision  of  the  piece  work  rajes  by  the  plant  m%n- 
agement  it  was  to  cooperate  with  committees  of  the  workers 
and  representatives  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  the  latter 
being  the  Government  department  principally  interested  in  the 
output  of  the  plant.  A  permanent  local  board  of  mediation 
and  conciliation,  consisting  of  six  members,  three  chosen  by 
the  company  and  three  by  the  workers,  was  created  to  effect 
agreements  on  disputed  points  in  the  future  and  on  similar 
matters  not  covered  in  the  award,  the  board  to  be  presided 
over  by  a  chairman  selected  by  and  representing  the  Secretary 
of  War.  In  addition,  an  examiner  of  the  board  was  assigned 
to  interpret  and  enforce  the  award,  with  specific  instructions  to 
investigate  and  report  to  the  board  all  charges  of  company  dis- 
crimination against  union  men.  As  many  as  twenty-eight 
thousand  workers  were  affected  by  this  award. 

Upon  the  request  of  employers  representing  fifty-three  firms 
and  corporations  employing  more  than  fifty  thousand  workers 
in  Bridgeport,  Connecticut,  comprising  virtually  the  entire 
working  industrial  population  of  that  city,  the  board  undertook 
the  settlement  of  wage  and  other  demands  that  threatened  to 
disrupt  the  complete  system  of  industrial  relations  between 
employers  and  employes  that  had  been  built  up  in  that  city. 
Each  of  the  companies  signed  an  agreement  binding  it  to  abide 
by  whatever  decision  was  made  by  the  board. 

The  grievances  of  workers  which 'had  created  the  general 
unrest  at  Bridgeport  throughout  six  months  and  more  of  the 
war  period,  during  which  time  several  strikes  had  occurred, 
included  charges  by  employes  that  employers  organized  in  the 


THE  NATIONAL  WAR  LABOR  BOARD    137 

Manufacturers'  Association  had  maintained  a  "  black  list "  of 
union  workers;  the  demand  for  the  right  of  employes  to  par- 
ticipate through  chosen  representatives  in  a  reclassification  of 
workers  in  the  various  plants ;  and  requests  for  increases  in 
wages  to  meet  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living. 

In  one  of  its  awards  the  board  ordered  the  General  Electric 
Company  to  eliminate  individual  employment  contracts  in  its 
plant  at  Pittsfield,  Massachusetts,  and  to  establish  there  a  just 
system  of  collective  bargaining  between  the  company  and  its 
men.  This  decision  banishing  the  individual  contract  was  the 
first  of  its  kind  made  by  the  board.  The  practice  of  the  com- 
pany was  to  submit  this  contract  to  the  men  as  they  entered 
upon  employment  at  the  plant  but  the  board  characterized  it  as 
a  source  of  irritation.  Its  abolition  was  one  of  the  principal 
demands  of  the  workers.  The  order  of  the  board  was  to  the 
effect  that  such  of  the  contracts  as  were  then  in  existence 
should  be  discontinued  and  no  others  made  in  the  future. 
Such  contracts  prevail  in  a  large  number  of  industrial  estab- 
lishments throughout  the  country  and  are  devised  to  supplant 
or  take  the  place  of  joint  bargaining  agreements.  In  place  of 
the  individual  contract  system  at  the  General  Electric's  plant 
at  Pittsfield  the  board  directed  the  establishment  of  a  system  of 
employe  representation  in  dealing  with  labor  matters.  This 
comprised  the  election  by  the  workers  of  committees  from 
among  themselves  to  represent  them  in  dealing  with  the  firm 
as  to  wages,  hours,  and  conditions  of  employment.  Up  to  the 
time  of  the  board's  award  the  company  had  not  recognized 
either  committees  or  individuals  representing  groups  of  work- 
ers at  its  Pittsfield  plant  although  at  its  Schenectady  plant, 
where  there  was  a  stronger  union  of  its  employes,  committee 
representation  had  been  recognized  and  adopted. 

In  the  case  of  the  telegraph  companies  and  their  employes 
the  board  arrived  at  a  decision,  the  essential  points  of  which  are 
as  follows:  (i)  Employes  have  a  right  to  join  a  union  if 
they  so  desire,  and  men  discharged  for  belonging  to  the  union 
should  be  reinstated;  (2)  the  company  should  not  be  required 


138  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

to  deal  with  the  union  or  to  recognize  it;  (3)  committees  of 
employes  should  be  recognized  in  presenting  grievances;  (4) 
where  employes  and  employers  fail  to  agree,  the  question  in 
dispute  should  be  determined  by  the  National  War  Labor 
Board;  (5)  the  telegraphers'  union  should  not  initiate  strikes 
or  permit  its  members  to  initiate  them,  but  should  submit  all 
grievances  to  the  National  War  Labor  Board. 

Officials  of  the  telegraph  companies  at  first  balked  upon  ac- 
cepting this  decision.  President  Wilson  in  a  letter  to  the 
President  of  the  Postal  Telegraph  Company  under  date  of 
June  n,  1918,  stated  that  in  his  judgment  "It  is  imperatively 
necessary  in  the  national  interest  that  decisions  of  the  National 
War  Labor  Board  should  be  accepted  by  both  parties  in  labor 
disputes.  To  fail  to  accept  them  is  to  jeopardize  the  interest 
of  the  Nation  very  seriously,  because  it  constitutes  a  rejection 
ef  the  instrumentality  set  up  by  the  Government  itself  for  the 
determination  of  labor  disputes,  set  up  with  a  sincere  desire  to 
arrive  at  justice  in  every  case  and  with  the  express  purpose  of 
safeguarding  the  Nation  against  labor  difficulties  during  the 
continuation  of  the  present  Avar.  All  these  circumstances  being 
taken  into  consideration,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  it  is  a 
patriotic  duty  to  cooperate  in  this  all-important  matter  with 
the  government,  by  the  use  of  the  instrumentality  which  the 
Government  has  set  up.  I,  therefore,  write  to  ask  that  I  may 
have  your  earnest  cooperation  in  this  matter,  as  in  all  others, 
and  that  you  will  set  an  example  to  the  other  employers  of  the 
country  by  a  prompt  and  cordial  acquiescence." 

President  Mackay  of  the  Telegraph  Company  replied  to  the 
effect  that  "  this  company  has  done  its  very  utmost  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  to  assume  its  full  share  of  responsibility 
to  thev Government  and  to  the  public  and  that,  in  order  to  still 
further  sHbw  its  sincerity  and  earnest  desire  to  be  of  service 
at  this  time  of  national  trial,  we  can  not  but  respond  to  your 
request  that  we  waive,  during  the  war,  our  right  to  discharge 
employes  who  join  a  union,  and  you  may  rely  upon  our  doing 
so." 


THE  NATIONAL  WAR  LABOR  BOARD   139 

A  complete  volume  could  be  written  on  the  activities  and 
decisions  of  the  National  War  Labor  Board,  and  the  impor- 
tance of  these  to  our  industrial  society  are  not  to  be  measured 
by  the  limited  space  necessarily  accorded  to  its  work  here. 
The  principles  upon  which  it  operated  and  the  economics  of 
its  decisions  are  deserving  of  wide  practice  in  all  our  indus- 
tries, in  peace  as  much  as  in  war  times,  if  America  is  to  solve 
successfully  the  one  problem  most  vital  to  its  continuance  as 
a  Nation  —  the  problem  of  justice  in  the  production  and  dis- 
tribution of  wealth. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF   LABOR 

THE  National  War  Labor  Board  was  only  a  part  of  the 
program  formulated  by  the  Council  of  National  Defense 
for  Governmental  machinery  to  be  organized  and  put  in  mo- 
tion by  the  Department  of  Labor  in  order  to  make  effective  the 
war  labor  policy  of  the  Wilson  Administration.  This  federal 
Department  was  already  in  existence,  having  been  separated 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Wilson  Administration  in  1913  from 
the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  and  made  an  inde- 
pendent Department  with  its  Secretary  a  member  of  the 
President's  Cabinet.  To  this  Department  was  delegated  the 
task  of  providing  for  every  phase  of  the  labor  problem  that 
affected  continuous  and  maximum  war  production. 

In  designating  in  January,  1918,  Mr.  William  B.  Wilson,  the 
Secretary  of  Labor,  as  National  Labor  Administrator,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  clothed  that  official  with  full  power  and  wide  au- 
thority. How  comprehensive  this  was  is  only  slightly  indicated 
in  the  statement  that  it  included  housing,  transportation,  dis- 
tribution, health,  and  even  training  of  war  workers.  To  assist 
in  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  the  Secretary  of  Labor  ap- 
pointed an  advisory  council  which  included  representatives  of 
the  War,  Navy,  and  Agricultural  Departments  and  the  Ship- 
ping Board.  This  interdepartmental  arrangement  tended  to- 
ward eliminating  conflicts  and  questions  of  jurisdiction  as  well 
as  the  duplication  of  machinery  and  effort  in  supplying  war 
industries  with  labor,  and  in  their  places  established  coopera- 
tion. The  object  was  to  secure  centralization  and  unification 
of  efforts  on  the  part  of  employers,  employes,  and  the  public. 

The  program  designed  to  meet  the  situation  provided  agen- 

140 


THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR  141 

cies  for  the  following  purposes  in  addition  to  those  of  the 
National  War  Labor  Board : 

For  supplying  houses  for  war  workers,  transportation,  safe- 
guarding conditions  of  living,  and  so  on. 

For  safeguarding  conditions  of  labor  in  the  production  of 
war  essentials,  including  protection  in  industrial  hygiene, 
safety,  women  and  child  labor,  and  so  on.  A  special  women 
in  industry  bureau  was  created. 

For  furnishing  an  adequate  and  stable  supply  of  labor  to 
war  industries,  including  (i)  a  system  of  labor  exchanges,  (2) 
a  method  and  system  of  administration  for  the  training  of 
workers,  (3)  an  agency  for  determining  priorities  of  labor 
demand,  and  (4)  agencies  for  the  dilution  of  skilled  labor. 

For  assembling  and  presenting  information,  collected  through 
various  existing  governmental  agencies  and  by  independent  re- 
search, necessary  to  effective  executive  action. 

For  developing  public  sentiment,  securing  an  exchange  of 
information  between  departments  of  the  labor  administration, 
and  the  promotion  in  industrial  plants  of  local  machinery  help- 
ful in  accomplishing  the  national  labor  program. 

For  the  correlation  of  all  these  and  other  governmental 
agencies  in  order  to  secure  team  work,  centralization  of  ad- 
ministration, uniformity  in  policy,  elimination  of  duplication 
of  effort,  and  so  on. 

All  this  was  in  addition  to  the  regular  work  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  which  latter  also  was  adapted  where  necessary 
to  meet  the  war  demands  and  which  included  the  Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics,  the  Bureau  of  Immigration,  the  Bureau  of 
Naturalization,  the  Children's  Bureau,  and  the  Bureau  of 
Mediation  and  Conciliation. 

For  the  housing  of  war  workers  the  Bureau  of  Housing  and 
Transportation  was  created  within  the  department  of  Labor. 
In  order  to  meet  the  practical  conditions  confronting  the  actual 
letting  of  contracts  and  the  direction  of  the  construction  of 
houses,  the  Bureau  had  incorporated  by  the  State  of  New 
York  the  United  States  Housing  Corporation.  Separate  pro- 


142  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

vision  for  the  construction  of  houses  for  shipyard  workers  was 
made  by  the  Division  of  Housing  and  Transportation  of  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation, 

To  most  people  houses  for  workers  to  live  in  and  the  winning 
of  the  war  are  unrelated  facts  but  not  to  those  who  were  made 
familiar  by  the  stress  of  war  times  with  the  actual  conditions. 
There  is  no  one  who  will  deny  that  buildings  at  cantonments 
are  a  war  essential,  that  uniforms  and  rifles  and  ammunition 
are  equally  necessary,  but  there  were  few  in  the  country  at 
the  time  who  realized  that  houses  for  workers  engaged  in  the 
production  of  rifles  and  uniforms  and  shells  were  equally  neces- 
sary. The  prosecution  of  every  practical  line  of  war  endeavor 
sooner  or  later,  and  quite  often  sooner  than  later,  faced  the 
question  of  houses  for  war  workers  as  the  crucial  problem  that 
had  to  be  worked  out  in  some  way  if  production  was  not  to  be 
seriously  interfered  with.  An  enormous  labor  turnover  was 
being  reported  by  all  war  industries,  the  primary  cause  of 
which  was  inadequate  housing  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
congested  manufacturing  centers  coupled  with  an  insufficiency 
or  total  lack  of  transportation  facilities  between  the  places  in 
which  the  workers  were  employed  and  their  homes.  The  loss 
in  production  of  materials  essential  to  the  Government's  war 
program  was  in  consequence  rapidly  assuming  alarming  pro- 
portions. Private  house  construction  was  virtually  at  a  stand- 
still due  partly  to  difficulties  in  procuring  materials  and  un- 
certainty as  to  financial  returns. 

Evidence  of  this  is  in  abundance  in  the  testimony  and  re- 
ports obtained  by  the  committee  on  housing  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  appointed  in  October,  1917,  to  investigate  the 
housing  problem  in  connection  with  workers  employed  on 
Government  contracts  and  the  relation  of  that  problem  to  the 
output  of  war  materials.  The  committee  found  that  with  few 
exceptions  the  Government  contracts  for  guns,  ammunition, 
ships,  and  other  war  materials  were  being  let  with  little  or  no 
consideration  of  the  housing  needs  incident  to  a  rapid  and  large 
increase  of  labor  at  those  plants  receiving  the  contracts.  In 


THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR  143 

one  New  England  manufacturing  city,  for  illustration,  sixteen 
concerns  were  engaged  upon  war  contracts  needing  ten  thou- 
sand additional  men  for  whom  there  existed  virtually  no  liv- 
ing accommodations.  At  one  steel  plant,  mainly  employed 
with  Government  contracts  and  with  extensive  additions  to  its 
plant  approaching  completion,  immediate  provision  for  houses 
was  necessary  if  the  production  of  guns,  gun  carriages,  and 
other  munitions  was  not  to  be  curtailed  fully  one-third  of  the 
plant's  possible  output. 

In  the  Norfolk,  Virginia,  district  where  $200,000,000  was 
being  expended  on  Government  contracts,  thirty-five  thousand 
new  workers  had  exhausted  as  early  as  February,  1918,  all 
available  housing  facilities.  The  war  production  program  for 
that  district  called  for  an  additional  thirty-five  thousand  work- 
ers to  be  brought  in  from  other  parts  of  the  country  but  there 
were  no  housing  accommodations  for  them.  Houses  were  also 
badly  needed  at  New  Brunswick,  New  Jersey,  for  workers  en- 
gaged in  aircraft  production ;  at  Bath,  Maine,  for  employes 
constructing  torpedo  boat  destroyers ;  at  Indian  Head,  Mary- 
land, one  of  the  Navy's  proving  grounds ;  at  Mare  Island, 
California,  in  the  Government  arsenal ;  at  the  Philadelphia 
Navy  Yard ;  at  Bremerton,  Washington ;  and  at  a  hundred  and 
more  points  of  production  widely  scattered  over  the  country. 
In  the  National  Capital  it  was  found  imperative  that  the  Gov- 
ernment through  its  Housing  Corporation  construct  sixteen 
dormitory-hotels  for  women  war  workers  to  assist  in  accom- 
modating the  more  than  fifty  thousand  additions  to  the  cler- 
ical positions  in  the  various  departments  of  the  Government. 

On  May  16,  1918,  President  Wilson  affixed  his  signature 
to  the  housing  act  and  in  June  the  United  States  Housing 
Corporation  entered  actively  upon  carrying  to  early  completion 
its  extensive  war  housing  program.  The  policy  followed  was 
one  under  which  the  Government  itself  built,  owned,  and 
rented  all  houses  which  the  Housing  Corporation  through  its 
contractors  constructed  during  the  war.  The  appropriation 
made  available  to  the  bureau  exceeded  $100,000,000,  of  which 


144  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

$10,000,000  was  specifically  set  aside  for  the  needs  of  the 
District  of  Columbia.  Even  with  a  sum  of  this  magnitude  it 
was  not  possible  for  the  National  Government  to  assist  every 
community  which  was  embarrassed  by  a  housing  shortage. 
As  a  prerequisite  to  affirmative  action  upon  their  requests,  the 
bureau  insisted  upon  certification  by  that  branch  of  the  War 
or  Navy  Department  whose  contracts  were  most  directly  af- 
fected. In  cases  the  needs  of  the  situation  were  met  by  the 
bureau  through  improving  or  extending  on  Government  loan 
the  transportation  facilities  in  communities  contiguous  to  the 
manufacturing  centers.  Altogether  at  the  signing  of  the  Armis- 
tice the  Housing  Corporation  had  in  various  stages  of  con- 
struction eighty-seven  separate  housing  projects  in  different 
parts  of  the  country.  Of  these,  twenty-five  were  carried  to 
completion,  work  on  all  the  others  being  discontinued  shortly 
after  the  Armistice. 

Another  new  agency  of  the  Department  of  Labor  during  the 
war  emergency  was  the  Division  of  Women  in  Industry.  This 
was  in  recognition  of  the  growing  importance  of  the  work  of 
women  in  industrial  pursuits  which  necessitated  a  national 
policy  in  determining  the  conditions  of  their  employment.  The 
immediate  task  of  the  Division  was  to  develop  policies  and 
methods  which  would  result  in  the  most  effective  use  of 
women's  services  in  production  for  the  war,  while  at  the  same 
time  preventing  their  employment  under  injurious  conditions. 
It  also  confronted  the  task  of  coordinating  work  for  women  in 
other  departments  of  the  Government  as  well  as  cooperating 
with  State  departments  of  labor,  working  with  and  through 
them,  in  order  to  bring  about  unity  of  action  in  the  national 
problems  of  women's  work.  It  was  a  clearing  house  for 
women  labor  for  the  entire  country,  not  the  least  important 
of  its  duties  being  the  conservation  of  existing  labor  standards 
and  the  establishing  of  additional  standards  whenever  the  con- 
ditions required  such  action. 

How  necessary  this  was  is  indicated  in  the  fact  that  the 
unprecedented  shortage  of  labor  brought  about  by  the  military, 


THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR  145 

naval,  and  industrial  demands  of  the  Government,  not  only 
for  male  soldiers  and  sailors  but  also  for  workers  for  the  pro- 
duction of  war  materials,  naturally  resulted  in  widespread  re- 
course to  the  substitution  of  the  labor  of  women.  In  even 
greater  numbers  than  preceding  the  war  they  became  clerks, 
cashiers,  and  accountants  in  manufacturing-,  mercantile,  and 
financial  establishments,  in  the  offices  of  transportation  com- 
panies, and  other  public  utilities ;  sales  clerks  and  floor  walkers 
in  mercantile  establishments,  including  among  others  depart- 
ment stores,  specialty  shops,  shoe  stores,  men's  furnishing 
stores,  florists'  shops,  jewelry  stores,  drug  stores;  street  car 
conductors,  elevator  attendants;  waitresses,  attendants  at  soda 
water  fountains,  taxi  drivers,  chauffeurs,  workers  on  the  farms, 
and  so  on. 

More  and  more  as  the  war  progressed  the  Government  itself 
had  to  depend  upon  women  to  perform  the  tremendously  in- 
creased volume  of  work  in  the  civil  branches.  The  force  of 
civilian  employes  in  the  National  Capital  alone  increased  from 
thirty  thousand  to  approximately  seventy  thousand  during  the 
first  year  of  the  war  and  of  this  increase  more  than  twenty- 
five  thousand  were  women.  The  United  States  Civil  Service 
Commission  was  then  calling  for  women  for  Government  work 
in  as  many  as  sixty  different  occupations,  such  as  stenogra- 
phers; typists;  bookkeepers;  clerks  of  a  score  and  more  clas- 
sifications requiring  training  in  some  special  or  technical  line; 
statisticians ;  operators  of  various  kinds  of  calculating,  address- 
ing, and  duplicating  machines ;  proof  readers ;  law  clerks ;  wel- 
fare executive  secretaries ;  draftsmen ;  telegraph  and  telephone 
operators;  trained  nurses;  chemists;  physicists;  library  assis- 
tants; inspectors  of  undergarments;  finger-print  classifiers; 
employment  managers ;  and  many  others.  Departmental  heads 
issued  instructions  to  give  preference  to  women  employes  in 
filling  vacancies  as  well  as  for  new  appointments  to  clerical 
positions.  Women  became  ship  draftsmen  in  the  navy  yard 
service  and  mechanical,  marine,  engine,  and  boiler  draftsmen 
in  the  Navy  Department;  passenger-rate,  freight-rate,  and  ex- 


146  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

press-rate  clerks  in  the  depot  Quartermaster's  offices  of  the 
War  Department ;  schedule,  store,  index,  and  catalogue  clerks 
in  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the  War  Department ; 
and  negative  cutters  in  the  Geological  Survey. 

An  analysis  of  thousands  of  calls  for  women  labor  on  war 
contracts  shows  the  making  of  munitions,  spinning,  weaving, 
knitting,  sewing,  and  the  conserving  of  food  to  be  among  the 
more  important  demands.  They  were  employed  in  the  gas 
mask  plants  as  inspectors  and  throughout  every  step  of  the 
entire  process  of  manufacture,  girls  being  trained  in  the  special 
art  of  sewing  the  face  pieces.  They  worked  in  munitions  es- 
tablishments on  drill  presses,  in  making  and  marking  fuses, 
in  loading  the  shells,  in  gauging  machinery  and  shells,  in  as- 
sembling artillery,  and  in  inspection,  drafting,  electrical,  and 
carpentry  work. 

Naturally  the  conditions  under  which  these  women  were  em- 
ployed was  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  Government.  Sugges- 
tions as  to  employment,  management,  and  health  conditions 
were  made  to  manufacturers.  Employments  involving  special 
hazards,  such  as  the  use  of  industrial  poisons,  were  to  be 
guided  by  the  standards  as  to  health,  comfort,  and  safety  set 
up  by  the  National  Government  and  the  State  labor  depart- 
ments. The  standards  as  to  hours,  night  work,  wages,  and 
general  conditions  of  labor  established  by  the  Chief  of  Ord- 
nance and  the  Quartermaster  General *  were  adopted  by  the 
Division  of  Women  in  Industry. 

The  enormous  increase  in  the  demand  for  workers  in  in- 
dustrial pursuits  of  all  kinds,  coupled  with  the  depletion  of  the 
supply  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  nearly  three  million  able 
bodied  men  who  were  in  the  Army  camps  and  Navy  service 
and  the  practical  stoppage  by  the  war  of  the  annual  immigra- 
tion of  one  million  aliens  from  Europe,  brought  about  the 
critical  situation  which  forced  the  creation  of  the  United  States 
Employment  Service  of  the  Department  of  Labor.  Industries 
with  Government  war  contracts  were  short  four  hundred 

1  See  Chapter  XII,  pages  125  to  127. 


THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR  147 

thousand  workers  by  June,  1918,  and  the  railway  and  coal 
mining  industries  were  also  being  seriously  handicapped  by  the 
lack  of  men.  In  Connecticut  and  Maryland  alone  munition 
plants  needed  thirty-five  thousand  skilled  machinists.  There 
was  no  Government  coordination  between  the  letting  of  con- 
tracts and  the  available  labor  supply  in  the  vicinity  of  the  plants 
any  more  than  we  have  seen  consideration  was  given  in  the 
letting  of  contracts  to  the  housing  supply  for  the  workers. 
There  was  in  existence  no  machinery  for  gauging  present  and 
future  demands  for  labor  by  these  war  industries,  or  lor  meas- 
uring the  relative  importance  of  these  demands  as  between  in- 
dustries, or  for  supplying  the  demands,  or  for  determining  be- 
tween essential  and  less  essential  industries.  There  were  no 
means  of  preventing  labor  from  leaving  the  farms  where  the 
need  was  as  great  as  that  of  the  industries  into  which  they 
poured  because  of  the  high  wages  the  competitive  bidding  of 
contractors  had  brought  about. 

It  is  true  there  were  in  existence  thousands  of  private  em- 
ployment agencies  scattered  throughout  the  principal  cities  of 
the  country  but  these  soon  broke  down  and  their  operation 
was  more  harmful  than  otherwise  because  of  their  practices 
and  competitive  methods.  There  were  also  State  employment 
agencies  in  some  of  the  more  important  manufacturing  States 
but  the  problem  of  labor  distribution  that  confronted  them  was 
wholly  beyond  their  antiquated  machinery  to  meet  the  un- 
precedented emergency.  In  the  Department  of  Labor  there 
was  also  a  Division  of  Information  under  the  Bureau  of  Im- 
migration but  this  was  limited  in  its  operation  to  incoming  aliens 
whose  arrival  had  been  stopped  by  the  war.  In  brief,  the 
Government  found  itself  confronted  by  an  abnormal  situation 
for  which  no  provision  had  been  made. 

Out  of  this  necessity  came  the  ofganization  of  the  United 
States  Employment  Service.  So  important  was  its  establish- 
ment deemed  to  be  that  President  Wilson  issued  a  statement 
to  the  public  under  date  of  June  17,  I9i8vin  which  he  said  in 
part:  "There  has  been  much  confusion  as  to  essential  pr.o- 


148  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

ducts.  There  has  been  ignorance  of  conditions  —  men  have 
gone  hundreds  of  miles  in  search  of  a  job  and  wages  which 
they  might  have  found  at  their  doors.  Employers  holding 
Government  contracts  of  the  highest  importance  have  com- 
peted for  workers  with  holders  of  similar  contracts,  and  even 
with  the  Government  itself,  and  have  conducted  expensive  cam- 
paigns for  recruiting  labor  in  sections  where  the  supply  of 
labor  was  already  exhausted.  California  draws  its  unskilled 
labor  from  as  far  east  as  Buffalo,  and  New  York  from  as  far 
west  as  the  Mississippi.  Thus  labor  has  been  induced  to  move 
fruitlessly  from  one  place  to  another,  congesting  the  railways 
and  losing  both  time  and  money.  Such  a  condition  is  unfair 
alike  to  employer  and  employe,  but  most  of  all  to  the  Nation 
itself,  whose  existence  is  threatened  by  any  decrease  in  its  pro- 
ductive power." 

The  obvious  solution,  said  the  President,  was  a  central 
agency  acting  as  the  voice  of  all  the  industrial  agencies  of  the 
Government  and  having  sole  direction  of  all  recruiting  of 
civilian  workers  in  war  work,  with  power  to  assure  to  essential 
industry  an  adequate  supply  of  labor,  even  to  the  extent  of 
withdrawing  workers  from  non-essential  production.  It 
should  also,  he  said,  protect  labor  from  insincere  and  thought- 
less appeals  made  to  it  under  the  plea  of  patriotism,  and  assure 
the  worker  that  when  he  is  asked  to  volunteer  in  some  priority 
industry  the.  need  is  real.  The  President  urged  all  employers 
engaged  in  war  work  to  refrain  after  August  I,  1918,  from 
recruiting  unskilled  labor  in  any  manner  except  through  this 
central  agency,  and  appealed  to  labor  to  respond  "  as  loyally 
as  heretofore  to  any  calls  issued  by  this,  agency  for  voluntary 
enlistment  in  essential  industry." 

In  carrying  out  this  program  the  Employment  Service  was 
organized  as  the  national  labor  mobilization  and  distribution 
machine,  serving  as  a  civilian  recruiting  agency  for  war  work 
in  a  somewhat  similar  way  as  the  agencies  recruiting  for  the 
actual  fighting  branches  of  the  Government.  Partly  because 
of  the  unprecedented  labor  turnover,  the  Service  confronted 


THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR  149 

the  huge  task  of  placing  during  1918  millions  of  workers  in 
agriculture,  shipbuilding,  and  the  other  war  industries.  The 
plan  of  organization  included  the  establishing  of  a  network  of" 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  labor  exchanges  in  virtually  every  im- 
portant city  in  the  United  States.  Five  divisions  handled  the 
details  of  its  operations,  these  being  the  division  of  informa- 
tion, of  farm  service,  of  women's  work,  of  reserves,  and  of  in- 
vestigation. It  functioned  in  cooperation  with  similar  activ- 
ities of  bureaus  of  the  various  States. 

Control  was  first  undertaken  of  the  recruitment  and  dis- 
tribution of  unskilled  labor  for  war  production.  After  Au- 
gust i,  1918,  no  employer  engaged  wholly  or  partly  in  war 
work  whose  maximum  force  exceeded  one  hundred  workers, 
either  skilled  or  unskilled,  was  to  secure  unskilled  labor  ex- 
cept through  or  under  the  direction  of  the  Employment  Service, 
excepting  railroads  and  farmers.  Advertising  of  any  kind  for 
unskilled  labor,  whether  by  card,  poster,  newspaper,  handbill, 
or  other  medium  was  prohibited  to  such  employers.  No  re- 
strictions were  placed  upon  them  in  recruiting  skilled  labor 
other  than  that  they  should  avoid  causing  restlessness  among 
or  employing  men  already  engaged  in  other  war  work,  includ- 
ing railroads,  farms,  and  coal  mines,  as  well  as  work  covered 
by  contract  for  Government  departments.  The  Service  op- 
erated through  its  own  officials  and  branch  office  employes,  the 
one  hundred  and  fifteen  State  employment  offices,  the  recruit- 
ing agencies  of  the  manufacturers,  the  fourth  class  post- 
masters and  rural  carriers  of  the  Post  Office  Department,  the 
"  Four  Minute  Men  ''  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Information, 
and  its  own  Public  Service  Reserve.1 

In  an  effort  to  speed  up  the  Shipping  Board's  building  pro- 
gram the  Service  called  upon  the  technical  educational  institu- 
tions to  organize  every  available  young  man  between  eighteen 

1  A  registration  agency  for  patriotic  citizens  who  desired  to  offer 
their  services  to  the  Government  either  with  or  without  compensation 
and  to  work  either  directly  in  Government  enterprises  or  in  enterprises 
engaged  in  service  for  the  Government. 


150  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

and  twenty-one  years  of  age  to  serve  as  apprentices  in  the  ship- 
yards in  which  wooden  vessels  were  being  constructed.  It  also 
made  an  appeal  to  the  presidents  of  more  than  six  hundred 
colleges  and  universities  asking  their  help  in  mobilizing  their 
students  on  farms  during  the  summer.  To  assist  in  farm  work 
there  was  also  organized  the  Boys'  Working  Reserve  for  young 
men  between  sixteen  and  twenty-one  years  of  age  who  were  to 
give  their  spare  time  in  productive  enterprise  without  interrupt- 
ing their  studies  at  school.1  Manufacturers  were  persuaded 
to  dispense  with  the  services  of  a  portion  of  their  employes  fo? 
temporary  periods  of  from  one  to  four  weeks  to  assist  in  the 
cultivation  of  food  crops.  Steps  were  taken  by  the  Commis- 
sioner of  Indian  Affairs  for  determining  the  number  of  In- 
dians on  reservations  who  could  be  spared  for  farm  and  other 
work  in  other  localities  and  who  could  be  induced  to  accept 
employment  at  the  prevailing  wage. 

Sections  of  the  immigration  law  were  suspended  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  Labor  so  as  to  permit  the  importation  of  laborers 
from  Mexico  during  the  period  of  the  war  to  engage  in  agri- 
cultural pursuits,  in  the  maintenance  of  way  on  railroads,  in 
mining  enterprises  in  which  Mexican  laborers  had  customarily 
been  employed,  and  in  common  labor  work  in  connection  with 
Government  construction  in  Texas,  New  Mexico,  Arizona,  and 
southern  California.  These  immigrants  were  exempted  from 
the  payment  of  the  head  tax,  the  application  of  the  literacy 
test,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  contract-labor  provision  of 
the  immigration  act.  The  Department  of  Labor  also  brought 
in  laborers  from  Porto  Rico  and  the  Virgin  Islands  for  work 
on  Government  contracts,  on  the  railroads,  and  in  agricultural 
pursuits  in  the  South  and  Southwest,  the  number  it  was  planned 
as  early  as  January,  1918,  to  bring  into  the  country  exceeding 
one  hundred  thousand. 

Over  the  formulation  of  principles  and  policies  and  the  es- 

1  In  New  York  State  alone  upwards  of  five  thousand  boys,  located 
in  groups  under  leaders  in  camps,  schoolhouses,  barns,  and  the  like, 
were  engaged  at  one  time  in  farm  work. 


THE  FEDERAL  DEPARTMENT  OF  LABOR  151 

tablishing  of  practices  and  standards  having  to  do  with  the 
distribution  of  labor  and  the  conditions  of  employment  the  War 
Labor  Policies  Board  was  given  jurisdiction.  The  functions  of 
this  board  were  strictly  administrative  and  are  not  to  be  con- 
fused, as  they  were  quite  frequently  in  the  public  mind,  with 
those  of  the  National  War  Labor  Board.  The  Policies  Board 
assisted  in  correlating  and  unifying  the  operation  of  the  various 
Government  departments  on  industrial  matters  in  the  practice 
of  which  it  was  agreed  there  should  be  uniformity  of  action. 
It  was  concerned  primarily  with  such  questions  as  standard- 
ization of  labor  and  in  particular  of  wages  in  Government 
plants  and  those  on  war  contracts ;  the  providing,  distributing, 
and  maintaining  of  a  stable  and  adequate  supply  of  workers ; 
labor  dilution  and  training ;  priority  demands  for  labor ;  and  the 
safeguarding  of  employment,  living,  and  housing  conditions  for 
workers  engaged  in  war  work. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  GOVERNMENT,   WAGES,   AND  THE   COST   OF  LIVING 

/~T~*HE  task  set  the  National  Government  by  the  war 
•*•  emergency  in  the  control  and  direction  of  the  economic 
forces  affecting  industrial  production  by  the  workers  was  as 
great  and  as  unprecedented  as  was  the  military  task  of  winning 
the  war.  Production  of  commodities  and  of  services  under 
this  emergency  meant  as  complete  and  as  revolutionary  changes 
in  habits,  in  processes,  and  in  practices  of  industry  as  did  the 
conduct  of  the  war  in  its  effect  upon  established  principles  of 
military  operations.  The  United  States  Government  was  no 
more  prepared  for  this  nationalization  of  production  than  it 
was  for  a  war  in  a  foreign  country  of  the  magnitude  which  the 
European  conflict  assumed.  It  was  compelled  to  undertake  the 
impossible ;  it,  of  course,  fell  short  of  that  accomplishment. 
But  the  results  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other  do  not  so  much 
justify  criticism  of  the  Government  and  its  agencies  for  the 
efforts  that  failed  as  they  justify  praise  for  those  other  efforts 
that  succeeded.  And  among  these  efforts  deserving  of  com- 
mendation is  the  Government's  adoption  and  enforcement  of  a 
policy  as  to  wages  which  emphasized  their  social  rather  than 
their  economic  aspects. 

Compensation  to  the  men  in  the  service  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  was  determined  by  law  and  had  no  essential  relation  to 
the  tasks  they  were  to  be  called  upon  to  perform.  In  both 
these  branches  of  war  service  the  Government  supplied  the 
men  with  food,  clothing,  and  shelter  in  addition  to  their  stipu- 
lated monthly  pay.  But  to  the  millions  of  citizens  voluntarily 
enlisted  in  the  war  industries  of  the  Government  the  question 

152 


WAGES  AND  THE  COST  OF  LIVING          153 

of  wages  was  quite  a  different  problem.  These  workers  had 
to  meet  all  their  living  expenses  and  the  cost  of  these  was 
constantly  and  rapidly  increasing.  What  was  to  be  the  method 
of  determining  fair  wages,  for  the  Government,  of  course,  as 
employer  would  not  want  to  pay  other  than  fair  wages  to  the 
workers  ? 

The  answer  the  Government  made  to  this  question  was  vir- 
tually as  follows :  "  We  know  the  industrial  workers  of  the 
country  in  all  trades  and  occupations  have  for  years  been  striv- 
ing and  struggling  to  increase  their  money  wages.  We  know 
they  claim  the  present  wage  basis  to  be  unfair  and  unjust. 
The  Government  cannot  be  expected,  however,  under  the 
emergency  circumstances  of  war,  to  pass  judgment  upon  the 
justice  or  injustice  of  present  wages.  But  the  Government 
does  intend  to  do  this :  Accepting  the  present  wage  basis,  there 
shall  be  increases  periodically  to  correspond  with  the  increase 
in  the  cost  of  living  to  the  workers.  That  is,  as  the  cost  of 
food,  clothing,  and  shelter,  and  so  on  increases,  wages  will  be 
increased." 

This  policy  was  reflected  in  the  action  of  every  Government 
agency  having  to  do  with  the  wages  of  war  workers.  For  il- 
lustration, one  of  the  first  of  these  agencies  to  take  action  was 
the  Railroad  Wage  Commission.  In  its  report  to  the  Director 
General  of  the  Railroad  Administration  it  stated  that  the 
standards  it  sought  to  meet  were  the  right  thing  "  at  this  time," 
a  measure  of  justice,  and  consideration  for  the  needs  of  the 
men,  whether  organized  or  unorganized,  whether  replaceable  or 
not  replaceable.  To  the  mind  of  the  commission  the  object 
sought  was  qualified  materially  by  the  phrase  "  at  this  time." 
The  existing  state  of  war,  it  believed,  prohibited  anything  ap- 
proximating a  determination  of  ideal  conditions.  The  question 
which  it  formulated  and  for  which  it  sought  an  answer  was 
this :  "  By  what  amount  have  the  railroad  workers  been  disad- 
vantaged  by  reason  of  the  war,  and  how  may  that  disadvantage 
be  overcome  with  the  largest  degree  of  equity  ?  " 

The  way  the  commission  met  the  situation  was  as  follows : 


154  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

"  We  have  had  a  most  exhaustive  study  made  of  the  cost 
of  living  today  as  contrasted  with  the  cost  of  living  for  the 
latter  part  of  1915,  when  by  the  reaction  of  the  European  war 
the  American  people  first  felt  keenly  the  increase  in  the  bur- 
dens of  life  and  the  need  for  higher  wages.  This  study  has 
been  made  without  reference  primarily  to  those  quite  thorough 
investigations  which  have  been  carried  on  by  the  Department  of 
Labor  and  other  governmental  and  many  private  agencies.  And 
to  our  minds  it  conclusively  establishes  two  things :  ( I )  That  the 
cost  of  living  has  increased  disproportionately  among  those  of 
small  incomes,  and  (2)  that  there  is  a  point  up  to  which  it  is 
essential  that  the  full  increased  cost  shall  be  allowed  as  a  wage 
increase,  while  from  this  point  on  the  increase  may  be  gradually 
diminished. 

"  This  study  of  the  cost  of  living  was  not  made  from  paper- 
statistics  exclusively,  by  the  gathering  of  prices  and  compari- 
sons of  theoretical  budgets.  It  was  in  no  inconsiderable  part 
an  actual  study  from  life,  one  of  the  most  interesting  and  valu- 
able groups  of  figures  having  been  gathered  by  the  newspapers 
of  the  country,  by  interviews  with  those  of  the  working  class, 
and  the  inspection  of  their  simple  books  of  accounts.  Roughly, 
it  may  be  said  that  the  man  who  received  eighty-five  dollars  a 
month  on  January  I,  1916,  now  needs  40  per  cent,  additional 
to  his  wage  to  give  him  the  same  living  that  he  had  then.  Be- 
low that  wage  a  larger  percentage  must  be  allowed  because  the 
opportunity  for  substitution  and  other  methods  of  thrift  de- 
cline almost  to  a  vanishing  point,  for  above  that  wage  a  growing 
proportion  of  the  increase  will  go  to  those  things  essential  to 
cultured  life,  but  non-essential  to  actual  living.  In  fairness, 
therefore,  a  sufficient  increase  should  be  given  to  maintain  that 
standard  of  living  which  had  obtained  in  the  prewar  period, 
when  confessedly  prices  and  wages  were  both  low."  i 

This,  then,  was  the  goal  aimed  at  by  all  the  Government 
Departments  and  agencies  having  control  directly  and  indi- 
rectly over  wages.  For  this  purpose  they  depended  for  their 
measurement  of  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  upon  the 
report  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  of  the  Department  of 
Labor.  This  report  dealt  principally  with  the  prices  of  food 
products,  although  occasionally  special  reports  were  issued 

1  Report  of  the  Railroad  Wage  Commission  to  the  Director  General. 


WAGES  AND  THE  COST  OF  LIVING         155 

treating  of  increases  in  the  price  of  clothing,  fuel  and  lighting, 
and  rent.  For  its  prices  of  foods  the  Bureau  depended  upon 
reports  from  selected  and  dependable  retail  dealers  in  fifty 
cities  in  different  parts  of  the  country  giving  quotations  on 
similar  grades  of  commodities  that  would  permit  of  fairly  ac- 
curate comparisons  over  stated  periods  of  time.  These  com- 
modities were  weighted  in  relation  to  each  other  according  to 
their  importance  in  the  consumption  of  the  average  working- 
man's  family.  Twenty-two  of  the  most  essential  foods  are  sir- 
loin steal,  round  steak,  rib  roast,  chuck  roast,  plate  beef,  pork 
chops,  bacon,  ham,  lard,  hens,  flour,  corn  meal,  eggs,  butter, 
milk,  bread,  potatoes,  sugar,  cheese,  rice,  coffee,  and  tea. 

For  the  six-year  period  from  November,  1913,  to  November, 
1919,  the  increase  in  the  prices  of  these  twenty-two  articles 
combined  was  92  per  cent.  Articles  which  more  than  doubled 
in  price,  that  is  increased  more  than  100  per  cent.,  were  sugar, 
131  per  cent;  lard,  129  per  cent;  flour  124  per  cent. ;  corn 
meal,  113  per  cent.;  potatoes,  105  per  cent.;  bread,  104  per 
cent.;  and  rice  102  per  cent.1  By  November,  1917,  at  the  time 
of  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  by  Germany,  the  increase  in  the 
price  of  all  twenty-two  articles  had  reached  60  per  cent.,  and 
by  November  a  year  later  84  per  cent.,  above  the  1913  average. 
This  percentage  increase  in  food  prices  at  any  particular  time 
applied  to  the  existing  wages  in  relation  to  their  1913  basis 
indicated  the  per  cent,  increase  in  wages  necessary  for  the 
workingman  to  keep  abreast  of  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  liv- 
ing. This  was  the  principal  on  which  the  Government  agencies 
operated  during  the  war  in  granting  increases  in  wages  to 
its  war  workers  other  than  those  in  the  strictly  military  service 
of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Food,  of  course,  is  not  the  only,  although  it  is  the  most  im- 
portant, factor  entering  into  the  workingman's  cost  of  living. 
For  illustration,  reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  show 
the  following  increases  in  other  elements  in  the  cost  of  living 
to  workers  in  the  New  York  shipbuilding  district  from  the 

1  Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol.  X,  No.  i,  January,   1920. 


156  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

beginning  of  the  European  war  up  to  December,  1917:  Men's 
clothing,  51  per  cent. ;  women's  clothing,  52  per  cent.;  furniture 
and  furnishing,  56  per  cent. ;  housing  2.6  per  cent. ;  fuel  and 
light,  20  per  cent. ;  miscellaneous  items,  45  per  cent.  Of  ex- 
penditures of  the  average  family  45  per  cent,  go  to  pay  for 
food,  13  per  cent,  for  housing  in  the  form  of  rent,  and  20 
per  cent,  for  fuel  and  light.  The  average  expenditure  of  each 
608  families  of  these  shipyard  workers  was  found  to  be 
$1,348.64  during  1917. 

Such  a  principle  for  determining  wage  increases  is  not,  of 
course,  ideal  and  is  not  to  be  commended  as  a  proper  basis  for 
wage  increases  under  peace  time  conditions.  As  a  war 
emergency  it  was  probably  the  best  that  could  have  been 
adopted.  But  it  errs  fundamentally  in  that  it  operates  rigidly 
to  keep  the  workers'  standard  of  living  at  a  standstill  —  it 
makes  no  provision  for  the  necessary  increase  in  that  standard. 
Even  more  than  this,  it  actually  operates  to  lower  the  standard 
in  that  the  increase  in  wages  to  the  worker  comes  at  the  end 
and  not  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  price  increases  and 
does  not  compensate  him  for  the  difference,  measured  by  the 
increase,  which  he  has  had  to  pay  in  the  meantime,  unless  the 
award  is  made  to  apply  retroactively  to  the  time  when  the 
price  increases  started.  An  exception  to  the  statement  as  to  a 
decreasing  standard  of  living  is  found,  of  course,  in  those 
cases  where  the  cost  of  living  decreases  and  wages  continue 
the  same,  but  this  was  not  the  economic  tendency  during  the 
war  period.  An  even  stronger  objection  to  the  cost  of  living 
principle  as  applied  to  wage  increases  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  wage  basis  taken  as  the  standard  may  not,  and 
usually  does  not,  represent  a  just  standard  of  living  to  the 
worker.  Most  assuredly  the  low  pre-war  basis  of  wages  is 
not  by  any  means  representative  of  that  standard  of  living  of 
the  American  workingman  which  is  essential  to  his  status  as  a 
citizen  of  a  democracy! 

The  Government  having  determined  upon  the  policy  that  the 
wages  of  war  workers  in  industries  should  be  increased  during 


WAGES  AND  THE  COST  OF  LIVING          157 

the  period  of  the  war  in  such  proportion  as  was  made  neces- 
sary by  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living,  the  question  naturally 
arose  as  to  who  or  what  class  or  group  in  society  was  to  meet 
these  increases  in  wages.  The  increases  could  come  from  one 
or  both  of  two  sources  —  from  a  decrease  in  the  profits  of  the 
manufacturers  and  producers  or  from  an  increase  in  prices  to 
the  consumers. 

"  It  is  obvious  that  these  advances  in  wages  must  be  taken 
either  from  the  operator  or  the  consumer,"  x  says  the  Fuel  Ad- 
ministrator, in  a  letter  to  President  Wilson  under  date  of  Oc- 
tober 6,  1917,  in  which  he  approves  of  wage  increases  of  50 
per  cent,  to  bituminous  coal  miners  and  78  per  cent,  to  mine 
laborers.  It  was  his  understanding,  he  said,  that  in  fixing 
provisional  prices  by  the  Government  for  the  sale  of  coal,  it 
was  intended  to  allow  a  fair  profit  to  the  operators.  "  On  the 
assumption  that  the  prices  fixed  yielded  a  fair  profit  to  the  op- 
erator," continued  the  statement,  "  it  is  clear  that  if  this  in- 
crease of  wages  is  to  fall  entirely  upon  the  operators,  their 
profits  will  no  longer  be  fair,  unless  the  result  of  the  increase 
bears  an  insignificant  relation  to  these  profits.  This  question 
was  submitted  to  me  as  Fuel  Administrator.  It  is  not  pos- 
sible to  estimate  the  exact  effect  of  the  proposed  increases 
upon  the  prices  fixed.  But  the  experts  of  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission  and  of  the  Fuel  Administration  have  made  as 
careful  computation  as  the  data  in  hand  permit.  I  have  asked 

1  The  increase  could  have  been  taken  partly  from  the  operator  and 
partly  from  the  consumer,  and  in  such  a  policy  there  would  have 
been  a  greater  degree  of  economic  justice  as  between  the  wage  earner, 
the  capitalistic  producer,  and  the  consumer,  in  that,  as  already  stated, 
the  wage  worker  was  not  wholly  compensated  for  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living  through  his  wages  being  increased  only  after  he  had 
borne  for  a  time  the  increased  cost  of  living.  The  producer  could 
have  been  made  to  bear  his  proper  proportion  by  increasing  the  price 
of  his  commodity  somewhat  less  than  the  whole  of  the  wage  increase, 
and  this  would  automatically  have  transferred  to  the  consumer  his 
proper  proportion  of  the  economic  burden.  Instead,  the  effect  of  the 
Government's  policy  was  to  transfer  to  the  consumer  an  undue  pro- 
portion of  the  inescapable  increase  in  the  cost  of  living. 


158  THE  WORKERS  AT  AVAR 

these  gentlemen  to  exclude  from  their  computations  any  al- 
lowance which  could  properly  be  regarded  as  an  indirect 
increase  of  the  profits  of  the  operators,  and  to  make  their 
calculations  with  the  sole  object  in  view  of  covering  the  in- 
crease in  wages  by  interpreting  the  above  proposals  in  terms  of 
the  prices  fixed  by  you,  that  is  to  say,  to  advise  me  how  many 
cents  per  ton  on  coal  produced  the  proposed  wage  increases 
mean." 

The  supplemental  agreement  of  November  17,  1917,  be- 
tween the  anthracite  operators  and  mine  workers  covering 
wages  and  working  conditions  in  the  anthracite  fields  of  Penn- 
sylvania, approved  by  the  Fuel  Administration,  contained  a 
clause  to  the  effect  that  the  increase  in  wages  agreed  to  "  would 
become  effective  only  on  condition  that  the  selling  price  of 
coal  would  be  advanced  by  the  United  States  Government  suf- 
ficient to  cover  the  increased  cost  of  production,"  and  the  agree- 
ment was  not  to  take  effect  "  until  the  first  day  of  the  pay 
period  following  the  order  granting  such  increased  price." 
Under  these  conditions  the  agreement  was  to  be  effective  dur- 
ing the  period  of  the  war  or  until  March  31,  1920,  in  case  the 
war  was  not  terminated  before  that  time.  Under  date  of  No- 
vember 28,  1917,  the  President  in  an  Executive  Order  in- 
creased the  selling  price  of  anthracite  by  the  addition  of  thirty- 
five  cents  to  each  of  the  prices  prescribed  and  adjusted  by  him 
for  anthracite  at  the  mines  under  date  of  August  23,  1917,  and 
adjusted  as  to  pea  coal  October  I,  1917.  This  price  increase 
was  the  amount  the  Fuel  Administrator  had  determined  was 
necessary  to  meet  the  increase  in  wages. 

The  act  approved  August  10,  1917,  provided  among  other 
things  as  follows :  "  That,  by  reason  of  the  existence  of  a 
state  of  war,  it  is  essential  to  the  national  security  and  defense, 
for  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war  and  for  the  support 
and  maintenance  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  to  assure  an  adequate 
supply  and  equitable  distribution  and  to  facilitate  the  move- 
ment of  foods,  feeds,  fuel,  including  fuel  oil  and  natural  gas, 
and  fertilizer  and  fertilizer  ingredients,  tools,  utensils,  imple- 


WAGES  AND  THE  COST  OF  LIVING          159, 

ments,  machinery,  and  equipment  required  for  the  actual  pro- 
duction of  foods,  feeds,  and  fuel,  hereafter  in  this  act  called 
necessaries ;  to  prevent,  locally  or  generally,  scarcity,  monopo- 
lization, hoarding,  injurious  speculation,  manipulation,  and 
private  controls  affecting  such  supply,  distribution,  and  move- 
ment ;  and  to  establish  and  maintain  governmental  control  of 
such  necessaries  during  the  war.  For  such  purposes  the  in- 
strumentalities, means,  methods,  powers,  authorities,  duties,  ob- 
ligations, and  prohibitions  hereinafter  set  forth  are  created,  es- 
tablished, conferred,  and  prescribed.  The  President  is  author- 
ized to  make  such  regulations  and  to  issue  such  orders  as  are 
essential  effectively  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  this  act." 

Under  the  price  fixing  authority  thus  conferred  on  the  Presi- 
dent by  Congress  the  various  Departments  of  the  Government 
operated  on  the  principle  of  increasing  prices  of  manufac- 
turers and  producers  equal  to  the  wage  increases  they  were 
called  upon  to  meet  by  the  enforcement  of  the  Government 
policy  of  advancing  wages  proportionately  to  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living.  In  determining  the  "  just,  reasonable,  and  fair 
profit  ".for  articles  under  the  control  of  the  Food  Administra- 
tion, for  illustration,  President  Wilson  issued  an  Executive 
Order  under  date  of  November  27,  1917,  authorizing  and  di- 
recting the  United  States  Food  Administrator,  in  prescribing 
regulations  for  licenses,  to  establish  as  a  basis  "  the  normal 
average  profit  which  persons  engaged  in  the  same  business  and 
place  obtained  prior  to  July  I,  1914,  under  free  competitive 
conditions."  The  order  also  directed  the  Food  Administrator 
to  "  indicate,  if  he  shall  see  fit  to  do  so,  what  margin  over  cost 
will  return  such  a  just,  reasonable,  and  fair  profit;  to  take 
such  legal  steps  as  are  authorized  by  said  act l  to  prohibit  the 
taking  of  any  greater  profit." 

These  licenses  were  prescribed  for  manufacturers,  whole- 
salers, and  other  distributors  of  staple  food  products,  includ- 
ing also  importers,  packers,  canners,  commission  men,  brokers, 
auctioneers,  storage  warehousemen,  and  retailers  doing  an  an- 

1  Act  of  Congress  approved  August  10,  1917. 


160  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

» 

nual  business  in  excess  of  $100,000.  The  smaller  retailers  were 
not  placed  under  license  but  were  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
the  food  law  forbidding  speculation,  hoarding,  and  excessive 
profits  and  were  also  controlled  indirectly  through  the  licens- 
ing regulations  governing  wholesalers  who  were  obligated  to 
cut  off  all  supplies  to  dealers  who  exacted  exorbitant  profits  on 
the  necessities  of  life.  The  licensed  foods  included  beef,  pork, 
mutton,  fish,  poultry,  eggs,  milk,  butter,  cheese,  flour,  sugar, 
cereals,  lard,  beans,  peas,  fruits,  vegetables,  several  lines  of 
canned  goods,  and  other  products.  The  penalty  for  operating 
without  a  license  was  a  fine  of  five  thousand  dollars  or  two 
years'  imprisonment. 

The  purposes  of  licensing  were  to  encourage  production,  con- 
serve supplies,  and  control  the  distribution  of  food  products 
and  fuel.  These  ends  it  was  hoped  would  be  accomplished  by 
limiting  the  prices  charged  to  a  reasonable  amount  over  ex- 
penses thus  preventing  speculative  profits  from  a  rising  market, 
assisting  the  movement  of  all  food  commodities  in  a  direct  line 
from  producer  to  consumer  without  delay,  and  keeping  at  a 
minimum  the  number  of  contracts  for  future  delivery  as  well 
as  dealings  in  future  contracts. 

By  Presidential  proclamation  signed  May  14,  1918,  all  in- 
dividuals, partnerships,  associations,  and  corporations,  except 
those  specifically  exempted  by  the  food  control  act,  engaged  in 
the  importation,  manufacture,  storage,  and  distribution  of  tools, 
utensils,  implements,  machinery,  and  certain  other  farm  equip- 
ment, were  required  to  secure  Federal  licenses  not  later  than 
June  20,  1918.  In  this  way  these  dealers  also  were  brought  un- 
der Government  control,  inspection,  and  regulation  as  to  profits, 
resales  within  the  trade,  attempts  to  monopolize,  unreasonable 
increases  of  prices  or  restrictions  of  supplies,  and  willful  waste 
of  farm  equipment. 

Thus  is  indicated  briefly  the  devices  the  Government  had  re- 
course to  in  order  to  control  prices.  That  there  was  profiteer- 
ing in  spite  of  this  Government  policy  cannot  be  denied  but  it 
is  unquestionably  also  true  that  this  profiteering  was  con- 


WAGES  AND  THE  COST  OF  LIVING          161 

siderably  less  than  it  would  have  been  if  the  Government  had 
not  exercised  such  control.  In  its  absence  the  unorganized, 
and  for  this  reason  defenceless,  American  consumer  would 
have  experienced  the  barbarous  and  disastrous  effects  upon  his 
economic  status  of  the  manipulation  of  the  law  of  supply  and 
demand  in  the  hands  of  those  whose  sole  object  is  the  maximum 
profit.  Manufacturers  generally  would  have  taken  advantage 
of  the  situation  and  there  would  have  been  a  national  orgy  in 
a  race  among  them  to  see  which  could  pile  up  the  greatest 
amount  of  profits.  In  a  seller's  market  they  would  have  de- 
manded "  all  the  traffic  will  bear  " —  would  have  exacted  "  the 
pound  of  flesh." 

Even  as  it  was  the  public  consequences  are  proving  far- 
reaching  in  their  effects.  Through  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment permitting  increases  in  prices  to  manufacturers  and  pro- 
ducers equal  to  the  increases  in  wages  granted  to  meet  the 
increase  in  cost  of  living,  there  was  transferred  to  virtually 
all  commodities  increases  in  prices  at  least  equal  to  the  in- 
crease in  cost  of  living  as  measured  by  food  products.  This  in 
turn  brought  still  greater  pressure  on  the  wage  worker  for  he, 
too,  is  a  consumer  of  these  other  commodities.  And  in  this 
dual  relation  of  the  worker  lies  all  the  perplexities  of  the 
economic  tendencies  that  have  been  characterized  as  "  The 
Vicious  Cycle." 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  VICIOUS   CYCLE  AND  THE   LABOR   UNION 

THE  economics  of  increasing  wages  in  proportion  to  the 
increase  in  the  cost  of  living,  as  measured  by  the  in- 
crease in  food  prices,  and  in  turn  of  increasing  prices  of  other 
commodities  in  proportion  to  these  wage  increases  operated  in- 
evitably to  produce  "  The  Vicious  Cycle  "  which  has  come  to 
plague  the  Wilson  Administration  and  the  American  people. 
This  is  evidenced  by  the  predicament  in  which  the  Government 
found  itself,  following  the  Armistice,  in  consequence  of 'the 
demands  for  higher  wages  of  industrial  workers  in  all  lines 
of  activity,  and  in  particular  of  the  organized  railway  em- 
ployes, who  were  working  directly  for  the  Railroad  Adminis- 
tration of  the  United  States  Government,  and  of  the  coal  mine 
workers  which  resulted  in  the  strike  of  November-Decem- 
ber, 1919. 

Those  employed  in  railroad  shops,  including  mechanics  of 
all  kinds  such  as  toolmakers,  bbilermakers,  riveters,  black- 
smiths, sheet  metal  workers,  electricians,  inspectors',  car  re- 
pairers, and  helpers,  had  repeatedly  made  requests  for  increases 
in  their  wages  to  meet  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living,  their 
specific  demands  being  for  a  standardized  hourly  rate  of  eighty- 
five  cents.  Their  wages  at  the  time  varied  between  fifty- 
eight  and  sixty-eight  cents  an  hour.  These  requests  had 
passed  through  all  the  stages  already  described  1  as  having  been 
provided  for  by  the  Railroad  Administration  for  the  settlement 
of  labor  disputes,  even  to  the  extent  of  involving  a  proposal  to 
create  an  entirely  new  tribunal,  and  in  August,  1919,  had 
reached  the  Director-General  and  the  President  of  the  United 

1  Chapter  IX. 

162 


THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  163 

States  without  a  settlement  and  with  the  shopmen  voting  by 
ballot  to  go  out  on  strike  on  September  2  to  enforce  their  de- 
mands. Sporadic  strikes,  unauthorized  by  the  national  of- 
ficers of  the  unions,  had  already  taken  place  in  various  shops 
on  different  railroads.  Other  railway  organizations,  particu- 
larly the  four  brotherhoods  whose  members  were  engaged  in 
the  operation  of  trains,  were  also  pressing  their  demands  for 
wage  increases.  So  serious,  indeed,  had  the  situation  become 
that  President  Wilson  on  August  25,  1919,  issued  an  appeal  to 
the  railway  workers  and  a  statement  to  the  public. 

In  this  appeal  the  President  stressed  the  patriotism  of  the 
railway  workers  and  stated  that  the  primary  step  for  recon- 
struction was  to  increase  production  and  facilitate  transporta- 
tion, "  so  as  to  make  up  for  the  destruction  wrought  by  the 
war,  the  terrible  scarcities  it  created,  and  so  as  soon  as  possible 
relieve  our  people  of  the  cruel  burden  of  high  prices."  "  The 
railways,"  he  said,  "  are  at  the  centre  of  this  whole  process." 
The  appeal  explained  that  the  Government  was  approaching 
the  conditions  with  the  object  of  reducing  the  cost  of  living 
rather  than,  as  during  the  war,  of  increasing  wages  so  as  to 
meet  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living.  On  this  point  the 
appeal  said :  "  The  Government  has  taken  up  with  all  its 
energy  the  task  of  bringing  the  profiteer  to  book,  making  the 
stocks  of  necessaries  in  the  country  available  at  lowered  prices, 
stimulating  production,  and  facilitating  distribution,  and  very 
favorable  results  are  already  beginning  to  appear.  There  is 
reason  to  entertain  the  confident  hope  that  substantial  relief 
will  result,  and  result  in  increasing  measure.  A  general  in- 
crease in  the  level  of  wages  would  check  and  might  defeat  all 
this  at  its  very  beginning.  Such  increases  would  inevitably 
raise,  not  lower,  the  cost  of  living.  Manufacturers  and  pro- 
ducers of  every  sort  would  have  innumerable  additional  pre- 
texts for  increasing  profits  and  all  efforts  to  discover  and  defeat 
profiteering  l  would  be  hopelessly  confused.  I  believe  that  the 

1  The  Federal  Trade  Commission  had  reported  on  profiteering  to  the 
President  as  early  as  June,  1918.  This  was  in  response  to  the  direc- 


164  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

present  efforts  to  reduce  the  cost  of  living  will  be  successful 
if  no  new  elements  of  difficulty  are  thrown  in  the  way,  and  I 
confidently  count  upon  the  men  engaged  in  the  service  of  the 
railways  to  assist,  not  obstruct.  It  is  much  more  in  their  in- 
terest to  do  this  than  to  insist  upon  wage  increases  which  will 
undo  everything  the  Government  attempts." 

The  President  added  that  if  the  efforts  of  the  Government  to 
bring  the  cost  of  living  down  should  fail,  after  it  had  had  time 
enough  to  establish  either  success  or  failure,  "  it  will,  of  course, 
be  necessary  to  accept  the  higher  costs  of  living  as  a  per- 
manent basis  of  adjustment,  and  railway  wages  should  be 
readjusted  along  with  the  rest.  All  that  I  am  now  urging  is 
that  we  should  not  be  guilty  of  the  inexcusable  inconsistency  of 
making  general  increases  in  wages  on  the  assumption  that  the 
present  cost  of  living  will  be  permanent  at  the  very  time  that 
we  are  trying  with  great  confidence  to  reduce  the  cost  of  living, 
and  are  able  to  say  that  it  is  actually  beginning  to  fall." 

In  the  statement  to  the  public  the  President,  among  other 
things,  said  that  while  the  increase  in  cost  of  living  argument 
of  the  railway  shopmen  was  indeed  a  potent  one,  their  de- 
mands for  increased  wages,  and  all  similar  demands,  were  in 
effect  this :  "  That  we  make  increases  in  wages,  which  are 
likely  to  be  permanent,  in  order  to  meet  a  temporary  situation 
which  will  last  nobody  can  certainly  tell  how  long,  but  in  all 
probability  only  for  a  limited  time.  Increases  in  wages  will, 

tion  under  Senate  resolution  No.  255  that  the  Commission  furnish  the 
Senate  with  any  and  all  facts,  figures,  data,  or  information  in  its  posses- 
sion relative  to  profiteering  which  would  in  any  way  enable  Congress 
to  deal  with  the  matter.  In  substance  the  Commission  reported  that 
the  outstanding  revelations  were  the  heavy  profit  made  by  the  low- 
cost  concerns  under  a  governmental  fixed  price  for  the  whole  coun- 
try, by  the  meat  packers  and  those  allied  with  them,  and  by  the  flour 
millers,  and  the  trade  tendency  to  increase  and  maintain  prices  against 
the  forces  of  competition.  The  Commission  stated  that  it  had  reason 
to  know  that  profiteering  existed  and  that  much  of  it  was  due  to  ad- 
vantages taken  of  the  necessities  of  the  times,  as  evidenced  in  the  war 
pressure  for  heavy  production,  and  some  of  it  to  inordinate  greed  and 
bare-faced  fraud. 


THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  165 

moreover,  certainly  result  in  still  further  increasing  the  costs 
of  production  and,  therefore,  the  cost  of  living,  and  we  should 
only  have  to  go  through  the  same  process  again.  Any  sub- 
stantial increase  of  wages  in  leading  lines  of  industry  at  this 
time  would  utterly  crush  the  general  campaign  which  the  Gov- 
ernment is  waging,  with  energy,  with  vigor,  and  substantial 
hope  of  success,  to  reduce  the  high  cost  of  living.  And  the  in- 
creases in  the  cost  of  transportation  which  would  necessarily 
result  from  increases  in  the  wages  of  railway  employes  would 
more  certainly  and  more  immediately  have  that  effect  than  any 
other  enhanced  wage  costs.  Only  by  keeping  the  cost  of  pro- 
duction on  its  present  level,  by  increasing  production  and  by 
rigid  economy  and  saving  on  the  part  of  the  people  can  we 
hope  for  large  decreases  in  the  burdensome  cost  of  living  which 
now  weighs  us  down." 

The  fact  that  the  railroads  of  the  country  were  under  direct 
Government  control  with  an  annual  guaranteed  return  to  the 
transportation  corporations  gave  to  the  proposed  wage  in- 
creases not  the  ordinary  aspect  of  possible  effects  upon  the  bal- 
ance sheets  of  these  corporations  but  that  of  determining  the 
burden  of  taxation  which  must  fall  upon  the  people  to  the  ex- 
tent of  such  increases.  "  For  it  is  neither  wise  nor  feasible," 
said  the  President,  "  to  take  care  of  increases  in  the  wages  of 
railroad  employes  at  this  time  by  increases  in  freight  rates. 
It  is  impossible  at  this  time,  until  peace  has  come  and  normal 
conditions  are  restored,  to  estimate  what  the  earning  capacity 
of  the  railroads  will  be  when  ordinary  conditions  return. 
There  is  no  certain  basis,  therefore,  for  calculating  what  the 
increases  of  freight  rates  should  be,  and  it  is  necessary,  for  the 
time  being  at  any  rate,  to  take  care  of  all  increases  in  the  wages 
of  railroad  employes  through  appropriations  from  the  public 
treasury.  In  such  circumstances,  it  seems  clear  to  me,  and  I 
believe  will  seem  clear  to  every  thoughtful  American,  includ- 
ing the  shopmen  themselves  when  they  have  taken  second 
thought,  and  to  all  wage  earners  of  every  kind,  that  we  ought  to 
postpone  questions  of  this  sort  till  normal  conditions  come 


166  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

again  and  we  have  the  opportunity  for  certain  calculation  as 
to  the  relation  between  wages  and  the  cost  of  living." 

To  the  President's  appeal  the  officials  of  the  railway  em- 
ployes' unions  accorded  compliance  and  again  exhibited  pa- 
tience under  aggravating  circumstances.  But  in  April.  1920, 
this  patience  of  the  rank  and  file  broke  under  the  economic 
pressure  of  even  higher  prices  and  resulted  in  a  widespread 
two  weeks'  "  outlaw  "  strike  of  members  of  these  unions,  so- 
called  because  they  left  their  places  of  employment  in  disobe- 
dience of  the  instructions  of  their  national  officers.  In  the 
case  of  the  coal  mine  workers  the  trend  of  events  was  quite 
different. 

At  the  first  convention  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of 
America  following  the  signing  of  the  Armistice,  held  at  Cleve- 
land, Ohio,  in  September,  1919,  this  supreme  authority  of  the 
mine  employes  adopted  a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  the 
agreement  then  existing  between  the  workers  and  the  operators, 
now  that  the  war  was  over,  automatically  expired,  and  that 
new  contracts  should  be  entered  into  not  later  than  November 
i,  1919.  It  formulated  and  expressed  the  principles  that 
should  govern  its  representatives  in  making  a  new  agreement, 
these  principles  being  a  60  per  cent,  increase  in  wages  and  the 
adoption  of  a  six  hour  day  and  a  five  day  week.  This  work- 
ing time  was  not  intended  to  reduce  the  number  of  working 
hours  but  on  the  contrary  was  designed  to  spread  them  more 
evenly  throughout  the  year,  the  seasonal  conditions  of  em- 
ployment in  the  industry  being  such  as  to  deprive  the  men 
of  all  work  during  certain  months  of  the  year.  The  mines  on 
the  average  supplied  work  for  not  more  than  225  days  in  the 
year  and  during  those  working  days  the  miners  must  earn 
enough  to  support  themselves  and  their  families  for  the  entire 
365  days.  At  this  convention  there  were  nearly  twenty-two 
hundred  delegates  from  local  unions  in  all  the  twenty-eight  coal 
producing  States,  this  being  the  largest  attended  convention  in 
the  history  of  the  United  Mine  Workers.  These  delegates 
represented  a  paid  up  membership  in  the  organization  of  434,- 


THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  167 

967;  in  their  national  treasury  alone  there  was  a  fund  of 
$1,728,000. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  l  to  the  joint  bargaining 
machinery  existing  between  the  miners  and  operators  for  the 
settlement  of  their  differences  as  to  wages  and  conditions  of 
employment  which,  after  the  progress  of  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  century,  had  reached  a  high  state  of  development,  prob- 
ably equal  to  that  attained  by  the  joint  agreement  between  the 
railway  train  employes  and  the  transportation  corporations. 
This  trade  agreement  machinery  had  operated  to  protect  and 
advance  the  economic  and  social  welfare  of  the  coal  miners 
of  the  country;  it  had  also  proven  beneficial  in  many  ways  to 
the  operators.  Following  the  Cleveland  convention,  several 
months  of  "  bargaining "  in  conferences  with  representatives 
of  the  operators  failed,  as  was  usually  the  case,  to  bring  about 
an  agreement  between  the  two  sides  as  to  the  provisions  of  a 
new  contract.  The  best  offer  the  operators  would  make  was 
a  20  per  cent,  increase  in  wages.  Finally,  when  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  joint  bargaining  machinery  was  in  a  deadlock 
and  that  progress  in  negotiations  had  become  clogged  thereby, 
the  Secretary  of  Labor,  under  the  provisions  of  the  law  em- 
powering him  to  act  as  a  conciliator,  called  representatives  of 
the  two  parties  into  conference  in  Washington.  This  was  in 
October,  1919.  He  suggested  as  a  basis  for  settlement  an  in- 
crease in  wages  to  mine  employes  of  31.6  per  cent.  This  figure 
he  arrived  at  by  computing  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living 
after  allowing  for  the  increases  in  wages  that  had  already  been 
granted  to  mine  workers. 

At  this  point  in  the  proceedings  the  Fuel  Administration, 
which  had  been  devised  as  a  war  emergency  organism  of  the 
National  Government  but  which  had  virtually  ceased  to  func- 
tion following  the  Armistice,  was  injected  into  the  controversy. 
Through  Fuel  Administrator  Harry  A.  Garfield,  President  of 
Williams  College,  opposition  was  made  to  the  31.6  per  cent, 
proposal  and  insistence  was  placed  instead  upon  an  increase  of 

i  Chapter  XL 


168  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

only  14  per  cent.,  the  claim  being  advanced  to  support  it  that 
such  an  increase  would  enable  the  wages  of  the  mine  em- 
ployes to  keep  pace  with  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living. 
There  followed  differences  of  opinion  between  these  depart- 
ments of  the  Government  which  were  thrashed  out  in  Cabinet 
meetings.  Unfortunately  for  the  best  interests  of  the  public, 
President  Wilson  was  still  indisposed  as  the  result  of  his  physi- 
cal breakdown  on  his  tour  of  the  country  in  behalf  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  Fuel  Administration  contended  be- 
fore the  Cabinet  that  the  question  of  wage  increase  to  mine 
workers  was  within  its  jurisdiction  and  not  that  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Labor,  inasmuch  as  the  Administration  had  been  en- 
trusted by  law  with  authority  over  coal  prices  and  any  change 
in  wages  to  mine  employes  would  naturally  affect  these  prices. 
It  opposed  any  increase  in  wages  that  meant  an  increase  in  the 
price  of  coal  and  maintained  that  a  14  per  cent,  increase  in 
wages  could  be  granted  without  increasing  coal  prices,  this 
amount  of  increase  to  be  absorbed  from  the  profits  of  the 
operators.  It  expressed  its  belief  that  this  would  result  in 
reasonable  wages  to  the  mine  workers  and  a  reasonable  profit 
to  the  operators. 

The  Cabinet  decided  in  favor  of  the  Fuel  Administration. 
The  public  by  this  time  had  got  the  impression  that  somebody 
on  the  part  of  the  Government  was  muddling  the  whole  affair, 
as  the  operators  themselves  had  offered  a  20  per  cent,  increase. 
The  settlement  proposed  by  the  Fuel  Administration  and  fin- 
ally adopted  by  the  Cabinet  embodied  the  appointment  by  the 
President  of  a  permanent  consultative  commission  with  purely 
advisory  powers  to  examine  wages  and  other  coal  mining  data 
and  announce  conclusions  but  without  authority  to  enforce  its 
rulings  upon  either  party  to  the  controversy. 

The  representatives  of  the  mine  workers  refused  to  accept 
the  14  per  cent,  increase  in  wages  as  a  basis  for  a  contract  with 
the  operators  and  in  compliance  with  instructions  of  the  con- 
vention which  formulated  the  demands,  they  ordered  on  Oc- 
tober 16  a  strike  of  all  soft  coal  mine  workers,  effective  No- 


THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  169 

vember  I.  Those  into  whose  hands  fell  temporarily  the  con- 
duct of  the  Administration  during  the  indisposition  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  issued  "  a  statement  by  the  President  "  on  Oc- 
tober 25  reiterating  commonplace  sentences  as  to  the  public 
consequences  of  such  a  strike  and  urging  the  miners  to  con- 
tinue at  work  "until  a  treasonable  opportunity  has  been  af- 
forded for  dealing  with  the  cost  of  living."  It  characterized 
the  proposed  suspension  of  mining  operations  as  being  "  not 
only  unjustifiable,  it  is  unlawful";  "a  grave  moral  and  legal 
wrong  " ;  "  a  fundamental  attack,  which  is  wrong  both  morally 
and  legally,  upon  the  rights  of  society  and  upon  the  welfare  of 
our  country."  In  the  statement  both  the  national  and  local 
officers  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  were  requested  "  to  recall 
all  orders  looking  to  a  strike  on  November  I,  and  to  take  what- 
ever steps  may  be  necessary  to  prevent  any  stoppage  of  work." 

To  this  statement  the  officials  of  the  miners'  union  replied  to 
the  effect  that  a  strike  of  bituminous  miners  could  not  be 
avoided.  "  A  regularly  constituted  convention  of  representa- 
tives of  United  Mine  Workers,"  said  the  statement  of  the  min- 
ers' officials,  "  ordered  a  strike  of  bituminous  mine  workers  to 
become  effective  November  I  in  the  event  a  wage  scale  was 
not  negotiated  before  that  time.  The  highest  authority  of  the 
organization  has  acted  in  this  manner,  and  no  representatives  of 
the  organization  have  authority  to  set  such  action  aside.  The 
facts  are  that  the  same  supreme  authority  which  ordered  the 
pending  strike  is  the  same  as  that  which  approved  the  contract 
which  has  now  expired. 

"  The  fundamental  causes  which  prompted  the  mine  workers 
to  take  this  drastic  action  are  deep  seated.  For  two  years  their 
wages  have  remained  stationary.  They  appealed  one  year  ago 
to  the  Federal  Fuel  Administrator,  Dr.  Garfield,  and  from 
him  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  for  an  increase  in 
wages  sufficient  to  meet  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  the  neces- 
saries of  life.  Their  appeal  was  rejected  and  their  request 
refused.  Notwithstanding  this,  they  continued  mining  coal 
until  now  their  contract  expires,  when  they  are  determined 


170  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

that  their  grievances  must  be  adjusted  in  a  reasonably  satis- 
factory manner. 

"  The  courts  have  held  that  the  workingmen  have  a  right 
to  strike  and  may  quit  work  either  singly  or  collectively  for  the 
purpose  of  redressing  grievances  and  righting  wrongs.  The 
Constitution  and  the  guarantees  of  this  free  government  give 
men  the  right  to  work  or  quit  work  individually  or  collectively. 
The  mine  workers,  therefore,  are  but  exercising  the  right 
guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  and  which  cannot  be  taken 
away  by  the  representatives  of  government  when  they  quit  work 
or  when  they  refuse  to  work  until  their  grievances  are 
adjusted." 

The  attitude  of  the  Government  as  represented  by  the  De- 
partment of  Justice  was  explained  in  a  public  statement  by  the 
newly  appointed  Attorney  General.  It  had  the  effect  of  plac- 
ing the  Government  in  the  position  of  the  operators  as  op- 
ponents of  the  mine  workers.  This  statement  among  other 
things  said: 

"  The  proposed  strike  was  ordered  in  a  manner,  for  a  pur- 
pose and  with  a  necessary  effect,  which  taken  together  put  it 
outside  the  pale  of  the  law.  ...  By  enacting  the  food  and 
fuel  control  act  Congress  has  recognized  the  vital  importance 
in  the  present  circumstances  of  maintaining  production  and 
distribution  of  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  has  made  it  unlawful 
for  any  concerted  action,  agreement  or  arrangement  to  be 
made  by  two  or  more  persons  to  limit  the  facilities  of  trans- 
portation and  production,  or  to  restrict  the  supply  and  distribu- 
tion of  fuel,  or  to  aid  or  abet  the  doing  of  any  act  having  this 
purpose  or  effect.  Making  a  strike  effective  under  the  cir- 
cumstances which  I  have  described  amounts  to  such  concerted 
action  or  arrangement. 

"  It  is  the  solemn  duty  of  the  Department  of  Justice  to  en- 
force this  statute.  We  have  enforced  it  in  many  cases.  We 
must  continue  to  do  so  irrespective  of  the  persons  involved  in 
its  violation.  .  .  .  The  facts  present  a  situation  which  chal- 
lenges the  supremacy  of  the  law,  and  every  resource  of  the 


THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  171 

Government  Avill  be  brought  to  bear  to  prevent  the  national 
disaster  which  would  inevitably  result  from  the  cessation  of 
mining  operations." 

In  carrying  out  this  policy  the  Department  of  Justice  on  No- 
vember 8  sued  out  in  the  United  States  District  Court  at  In- 
dianapolis an  injunction  process  to  prevent  the  continuance  of 
the  strike.  This  mandate  of  the  court  restrained  the  officials 
of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  from  in  any  way  ad- 
vising their  membership  on  the  situation,  or  contributing  any 
of  the  moneys  of  the  miners'  union  to  assist  the  men  on  strike ; 
it  also  restrained  them  from  discussing,  writing  or  entering  into 
any  kind  of  a  conversation  with  their  membership  on  the 
strike  situation.  The  Department  of  Justice  proceeded  even 
further.  It  demanded  from  and  the  court  issued  an  order 
commanding  the  officers  of  the  miners'  union  to  recall  and  with- 
draw the  strike  notification  by  six  o'clock  Tuesday,  November 
II. 

Both  the  restraining  order  and  the  injunction,  insofar  as  the 
prohibitory  features  are  considered,  were  predicated  upon  the 
Lever  Act  of  August  10,  1917,  the  temporary  war  measure 
referred  to  and  which  Congress  enacted  primarily  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  speculation  and  profiteering  of  the  food 
and  fuel  supplies  of  the  country.  "  There  never  was  in  the 
minds  of  the  Congress  in  enacting  that  law  or  in  the  mind  of 
the  President  when  he  signed  it,"  says  an  official  statement  of 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor,1  "  that  the  Lever  Act  would 
be  applied  to  workers  in  cases  of  strikes  or  lockouts.  The  food 
controller,  Mr.  Hoover,  specifically  so  stated.  Members  of  the 
committee  having  the  bill  in  charge  have  in  writing  declared  that 
it  was  not  in  the  minds  of  the  committee,  and  the  then  Attorney 
General,  Mr.  Gregory,  gave  assurance  that  the  Government 
would  not  apply  that  law  to  the  workers'  efforts  to  obtain  im- 
proved working  conditions.  Every  assurance  from  the  highest 
authority  of  our  Government  was  given  that  the  law  would 
not  be  so  applied."  Nevertheless  officials  of  the  United  Mine 

1  Issued  under  date  of  November  9,  1919. 


i;2  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Workers  of  America  were  required  to  give  bond  in  the  amount 
of  $10,000  each  on  the  charge  of  criminal  contempt  of  court 
for  alleged  violation  of  the  Federal  courts'  injunction,  such 
charges  being  filed  against  eighty-four  officers  of  the  union. 

On  November  9  a  specially  called  meeting  of  the  executive 
council  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  representing 
114  national  and  international  unions  and  an  individual  mem- 
bership of  more  than  four  million  workers  engaged  in  all  the 
occupations  throughout  the  country,  took  up  consideration  in 
a  most  serious  attitude  of  mind  the  coal  miners'  strike  and  the 
action  of  the  Government  in  relation  to  it.  The  policy  of  the 
Department  of  Justice  was  a  stunning  blow  to  the  hopes  of 
the  workers,  being  so  diametrically  opposed  to  the  harmonious 
working  relations  which  had  been  established  and  which  had 
continued  all  through  the  war.  The  attitude  of  organized 
labor  as  represented  by  this  supreme  advisory  authority  of  the 
labor  unions  was  expressed  in  an  "  appeal  to  the  public  "  con- 
taining among  other  things  the  following : 

"  Never  in  the  history  of  our  country  has  any  such  manda- 
tory order  been  obtained  or  even  applied  for  by  the  Government 
or  by  any  person,  company  or  corporation. 

"  The  autocratic  action  of  our  Government  in  these  proceed- 
ings is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  staggers  the  human  mind.  In  a 
free  country  to  conceive  of  a  Government  applying  for  and 
obtaining  a  restraining  order  prohibiting  the  officials  of  a  labor 
organization  from  contributing  their  own  money  for  the  purpose 
of  procuring  food  for  women  and  children  that  might  be  starv- 
ing, is  something  that  when  known  will  shock  the  sensibilities 
of  man  and  will  cause  resentment.  Surely  the  thousands  of 
men  who  are  lying  in  France,  under  the  soil,  whose  blood  was 
offered  for  the  freedom  of  the  world,  never  dreamed  that  so 
shortly  afterward  in  their  own  country  450,000  workers  en- 
deavoring to  better  their  working  conditions,  would  have  the 
Government  decide  that  they  were  not  entitled  to  the  assistance 
of  their  fellow  men  and  that  their  wives  and  children  should 
starve,  by  order  of  the  Government. 

"  It  is  a  well-established  principle  that  the  inherent  purpose 
of  the  injunction  processes,  where  there  is  no  other  adequate 
remedy  at  law,  was  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  property  and 


THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  173 

property  rights  only,  thereby  exercising  the  equity  power  of 
the  courts  to  prevent  immediate  and  irreparable  injury.  It 
was  never  intended  and  there  is  no  warrant  of  the  law  in  all 
our  country  to  use  the  injunction  power  of  equity  courts  to 
curtail  personal  rights  or  regulate  personal  relations.  It  was 
never  intended  to  take  the  place  of  government  by  law  by 
substituting  personal  and  discretionary  government.  The 
Lever  Act  provides  its  own  penalties  for  violators  of  its  pro- 
visions. The  injunction  issued  in  this  case  has  for  its  purpose 
not  a  trial  by  court  and  a  jury,  but  an  order  of  the  court  pred- 
icated upon  the  assumption  that  the  law  might  be  violated 
and  by  which  the  defendants  may  be  brought  before  the  court 
for  contempt  and  without  any  trial  by  jury. 

"  We  declare  that  the  proceedings  in  this  case  are  unwar- 
ranted, as  they  are  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  our  country, 
and  we  declare  that  it  is  an  injustice  which  not  only  the  workers 
but  all  liberty-loving  Americans  will  repudiate  and  demand 
redress.  The  citizenship  of  our  country  cannot  afford  to  per- 
mit the  establishment  or  maintenance  of  a  principle  which 
strikes  at  the  very  foundation  of  justice  and  freedom.  To  re- 
store the  confidence  in  the  institutions  of  our  country  and  the 
respect  due  the  courts,  this  injunction  should  be  withdrawn  and 
the  records  cleansed  from  so  outrageous  a  proceeding. 

"  By  all  the  facts  in  the  case  the  miners'  strike  is  justified. 
We  indorse  it.  We  are  convinced  of  the  justice  of  the  miners' 
cause.  We  pledge  the  miners  the  full  support  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  and  appeal  to  the  workers  and  the  citizen- 
ship of  our  country  to  give  like  endorsement  and  aid  to  the  men 
engaged  in  this  momentous  struggle." 

With  the  statement  that  they  were  Americans  and  being 
Americans  could  not  fight  their  Government,  the  officials  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers  issued  under  protest  on  November 
II  a  formal  order,  upon  the  approval  and  in  compliance  with 
the  mandate  of  the  court,  withdrawing  and  canceling  the  strike 
order  of  October  16.  But  the  individual  mine  workers  had 
become  so  aroused  against  the  Government  by  what  they  be- 
lieved to  be  the  unjustifiable  interference  of  the  Department  of 
Justice  that  they  continued  almost  to  a  man  to  remain  away 
from  the  mines,  so  that  at  the  end  of  the  week  following  the 
issuance  of  the  order  canceling  the  strike  there  was  virtually 


174  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

no  improvement  in  the  number  of  miners  at  work  and  in  con- 
sequence no  appreciable  increase  in  the  output  of  coal. 

It  was  a  blind  alley  into  which  the  Department  of  Justice  had 
misled  the  Government  and  the  American  people  and  out  of 
which  there  was  no  graceful  retreat,  in  fact,  no  escape  at  all 
except  by  retracing  the  way  by  which  they  were  led  into  it. 
Four  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  mine  workers  could  not  be 
put  in  jail,  and  even  if  this  could  be  done  it  would  not  pro- 
duce the  coal  for  which  by  this  time  there  was  a  moht  urgent 
and  pressing  demand. 

There  is  evidence  that  at  this  juncture  President  Wilson 
himself  entered  into  the  situation  to  take  it  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  amateurs  who  had  only  made  bad  matters  worse.  The 
officials  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  were  called  from  their 
headquarters  in  Indianapolis  to  the  National  Capital  and  in 
conference  on  December  6  had  submitted  to  them  by  the  Secre- 
tary to  the  President  and  the  Attorney  General  a  proposal  from 
the  President  which  the  officials  at  once  accepted.  This  em- 
bodied, in  addition  to  an  immediate  increase  of  14  per  cent, 
in  wages,  the  appointment  of  a  commission  of  three  to  be  com- 
posed of  one  representative  each  of  operators,  miners,  and 
the  general  public  with  full  authority  to  investigate  wages, 
profits,  and  all  conditions  surrounding  the  industry,  with  power 
to  increase  wages  further  if  they  so  decided,  and  with  equal 
power  over  the  price  of  coal.  The  Fuel  Administration  was 
to  be  eliminated  as  a  factor  in  prices  and  wages.  Upon  an- 
.nouncement  of  this  agreement  Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  ten- 
dered his  resignation  which  was  accepted.  The  operators  in 
a  public  statement  announced  that  they  had  not  been  consulted 
and  were  not  bound  by  the  terms  of  any  such  agreement.  But 
it  was  under  these  terms,  after  a  strike  that  had  continued  for 
forty  days,  that  the  mine  workers  returned  to  their  employ- 
ments in  the  mines. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

CAUSES  AND  EFFECTS   OF  THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE 

THIS  failure  in  the  coal  miners'  strike  of  the  Government 
as  expressed  in  its  court  of  law  —  this  ineffectiveness  of 
machinery  embodying  the  highest  expression  of  a  free  people's 
sovereign  power  —  this  employment  by  the  Department  of  Jus- 
tice of  legal  principles  which  the  development  of  socialized 
production  has  made  antiquated  —  this  absence  of  proper  and 
adequate  institutional  agencies  for  protecting  and  safeguard- 
ing the  public  welfare  —  all  this  is  a  tremendously  serious 
matter  to  the  American  people.  So  also  is  the  fact  of  450,000 
men,  with  families  dependent  upon  them  for  the  necessities 
of  life,  being  compelled  by  the  economic  pressure  of  the  high 
cost  of  living  to  cease  the  work  by  means  of  which  alone  they 
secure  the  money  wages  with  which  to  purchase  these  neces- 
sities. When  such  events  as  these  transpire  in  a  society  which 
boasts  of  its  democracy  then  something  has  occurred  which 
should  startle  the  thinking  members  of  that  society  into  a  pains- 
taking examination  of  the  practical  workings  of  its  boasted 
principles  of  democracy  with  the  view  of  sounding  the  depths 
to  discover  what  is  amiss  in  the  working  out  of  those  prin- 
ciples. 

It  is  true  the  Wilson  Administration,  within  the  limitations 
of  its  authority,  had  put  forth  efforts  months  before  the  coal 
miners'  strike  to  reduce  the  cost  of  living,  after  completely  re- 
versing its  war-period  policy  of  increasing  wages  to  correspond 
with  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  and  of  increasing  prices 
to  compensate  the  producer  for  the  increased  wages.  In  a 
special  message  to  Congress  on  August  8,  1919,  the  President 
recounted  these  efforts  and  suggested  "  effective  legal 


176  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

remedies "  for  Congress  to  supply  by  new  legislation.     The 
message  explained  the  situation  as  follows: 

"  I  have  sought  this  opportunity  to  address  you  because  it  is 
clearly  my  duty  to  call  your  attention  to  the  present  cost  of 
living  and  to  urge  upon  you  with  all  the  persuasive  force  of 
which  I  am  capable  the  legislative  measures  which  would  be 
most  effective  in  controlling  it  and  bringing  it  down.  The 
prices  the  people  of  this  country  are  paying  for  everything  that 
it  is  necessary  for  them  to  use  in  order  to  live  are  not  justified 
by  a  shortage  in  supply,  either  present  or  prospective,  and  are 
in  many  cases  artificially  and  deliberately  created  by  vicious 
practices  which  ought  immediately  to  be  checked  by  law.  They 
constitute  a  burden  upon  us  which  is  the  more  unbearable 
because  we  know  that  it  is  willfully  imposed  by  those  who  have 
the  power  and  that  it  can  by  vigorous  public  action  be  greatly 
lightened  and  made  to  square  with  the  actual  conditions  of  sup- 
ply and  demand.  Some  of  the  methods  by  which  these  prices 
are  produced  are  already  illegal,  some  of  them  criminal,  and 
those  who  employ  them  will  be  energetically  proceeded  against ; 
but  others  have  not  yet  been  brought  under  the  law,  and  should 
be  dealt  with  at  once  by  legislation. 

"  I  need  not  recite  the  particulars  of  this  critical  matter ;  the 
prices  demanded  and  paid  at- the  sources  of  supply,  at  the  fac- 
tory, in  the  food  markets,  at  the  shops,  in  the  restaurants  and 
hotels,  alike  in  the  city  and  in  the  village.  They  are  familiar 
to  you.  They  are  the  talk  of  eVery  domestic  circle  and  of  every 
group  of  casual  acquaintances  even.  It  is  matter  of  familiar 
knowledge,  also,  that  a  process  has  set  in  which  is  likely,  unless 
something  is  done,  to  push  prices  and  rents  and  the  whole  cost 
of  living  higher  and  yet  higher,  in  a  vicious  cycle  to  which  there 
is  no  logical  or  natural  end.  With  the  increase  in  the  prices  of 
the  necessaries  of  life  come  demands  for  increases  in  wages — 
demands  which  are  justified  if  there  be  no  other  means  of 
enabling  men  to  live.  Upon  the  increase  of  wages  there  follows 
close  an  increase  in  the  price  of  the  products  whose  producers 
have  been  accorded  the  increase  —  not  a  proportionate  increase, 
for  the  manufacturer  does  not  content  himself  with  that,  but 
an  increase  considerably  greater  than  the  added  wage  cost  and 
for  which  the  added  wage  cost  is  oftentimes  hardly  more  than 
an  excuse.  The  laborers  who  do  not  get  an  increase  in  pay 
when  they  demand  it  are  likely  to  strike,  and  the  strike  only 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  177 

makes  matters  worse.  It  checks  production,  if  it  affects  the 
railways  it  prevents  distribution  and  strips  the  markets,  so  that 
there  is  presently  nothing  to  buy,  and  there  is  another  excessive 
addition  to  prices  resulting  from  the  scarcity." 

Among  the  recommendations  of  the  President  for  Congres- 
sional action  was  the  appropriation  of  funds  to  specified  Gov- 
ernment departments  and  commissions  for  the  collection  and 
making  public  to  consumers  of  facts  as  to  the  supply  and 
prices;  the  extension  of  the  Food  Control  Act  both  as  to  the 
period  of  time  during  which  it  should  remain  in  operation  and 
as  to  the  commodities  to  which  it  applied;  the  providing  of  a 
penalty  for  profiteering ;  the  regulation  of  cold  storage ;  re- 
quiring that  all  goods  destined  for  interstate  commerce  be 
plainly  marked  with  the  price  at  which  they  left  the  producer; 
the  licensing  of  all  corporations  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce; and  the  controlling  of  security  issues. 

In  his  regular  message  to  Congress  on  December  2,  1919, 
President  Wilson  again  called  the  attention  of  that  body  to 
"  the  widespread  condition  of  political  restlessness  in  our  body 
politics,"  and  stated  as  one  of  its  contributing  causes  the  "  heart- 
less profiteering  resulting  in  the  increase  of  the  cost  of  living." 
He  renewed  his  recommendations  of  August  8  for  "  legislative 
measures  which  would  be  effective  in  controlling  and  bringing 
down  the  present  cost  of  living." 

Upon  only  one  of  these  recommendations  had  Congress  taken 
action ;  it  had  not  even  provided  a  legal  penalty  for  profiteering. 
Thus  is  reflected  the  failure  of  another  of  the  agencies  of  the 
people's  Government  —  of  their  Congress  —  to  provide  ade- 
quately for  the  distressing  situation,  assuming  that  the  reme- 
dies proposed  by  the  President  would  have  safeguarded  the 
public  welfare  which  was  being  gravely  menaced. 

The  Wilson  Administration  did  conscientiously  strive,  in  a 
number  of  ways,  such  as  investigations  and  prosecutions 
through  its  Department  of  Justice,  to  bring  down  the  high 
prices  but  the  feeble  efforts  its  lack  of  proper  organization  for 


178  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

the  purpose  enabled  it  to  put  forth,  in  opposition  to  the  more 
powerfully  organized  self-interest  of  producers  and  sellers, 
could  not  be  other  than  unsuccessful.  The  Government  was 
not  prepared  for  controlling  the  economic  self-interest  of  pro- 
ducers in  a  sellers'  market  —  of  limiting  the  effects  of  the 
ever-widening  circles  of  increasing  prices  which  radiated  out  in 
all  directions  from  the  center  of  increases  in  food  prices.  This 
economic  self-interest  operated  to  produce  an  effect  somewhat 
similar  to  that  which  results  from  throwing  a  pebble  into  the 
still  waters  of  the  lake,  the  first  circle  ensuing  being  analogous 
to  the  increase  in  the  price  of  food.  Some  of  the  effects  of 
these  circles  of  increasing  prices  have  their  significance, 

"  New  York,  Nov.  27. —  Profits  several  times  in  excess  of 
the  entire  capital  invested  came  back  to  many  coal  operators  in. 
1917,  William  G.  McAdoo,  formerly  secretary  of  the  treasury, 
declared  in  a  further  statement l  tonight  relative  to  the  coal 
controversy.  The  statement  follows: 

"  *  The  coal  operators  assert  that  I  gave  out  confidential  infor- 
mation when  I  stated  that  profits  of  the  mine  owners  in  1917 
ranged  from  15  to  2000  per  cent,  on  capital  stock  before  de- 
duction of  taxes.  This  was  not  confidential  information.  The 
Treasury  Department  may  publish  statistical  matter  of  this 
character  any  time.  In  fact,  information  concerning  this  very 
subject  was  furnished  by  me  to  the  United  States  Senate  in  re- 
sponse to  a  resolution  introduced  by  Senator  Borah  concerning 
profiteering  and  was  published  July  5,  1918,  In  this  report  the 
returns  of  several  hundred  coal  companies  showed  profits  rang- 
ing from  15  to  800  per  cent,  on  their  invested  capital  in  1917. 
The  range  of  profits  was  higher  on  capital  stock.  In  short, 
many  coal  operators  got  back  their  entire  invested  capital 
several  times  out  of  their  profits  in  1917,  as  shown  by  the  re- 
ports, and  must  now  be  on  velvet.'  "  z 

"  In  1917  all  bituminous  coal  mines  east  of  the  Mississippi 
River  made  what  might  be  termed  fabulous  profits,  the  general 

1  On  November  26  Mr.  McAdoo  had  issued  a  statement  to  the  public 
in  which  he  charged  the  coal  operators  with  making  "shocking  and 
indefensible  profits  in  1917." 

2  Associated  Press  dispatch  in  "Philadelphia  Public  Ledger,"  Nov.  28,, 
1919- 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE          179 

average  being  from  100  to  150  per  cent,  on  invested  capital,  the 
range  being  from  15  to  800  per  cent."  1 

"  The  directors  of  the  American  Car  and  Foundry  Company 
yesterday  declared  a  quarterly  dividend  of  3  per  cent,  on 
the  common  shares.  Three  months  ago  the  declaration  on  the 
common  was  2  per  cent.,  so  that  the  stock  is  now  on  a  12 
per  cent,  annual  basis  instead  of  8  per  cent.  The  directors 
increased  the  reserve  for  common  stock  dividends  from 
$7,200,000  to  $10,800,000,  this  to  be  paid  when  and  as  declared 
by  the  directors.  The  latter  amount  provides  funds  for  divi- 
dends at  12  per  cent,  over  a  period  of  about  three  years."  2 

"  The  annual  report  of  the  American  Locomotive  Company 
for  the  fiscal  year  ended  June  30,  shows  earnings^which  have 
never  been  surpassed  in  the  history  of  the  company.  The  gross 
earnings  amounted  to  $108,923,524,  an  increase  of  approxi- 
mately $28,000,000  over  the  gross  earnings  in  the  previous  re- 
port. After  all  charges,  taxes,  and  preferred  dividends  there 
was  a  balance  available  for  the  common  stock  of  $10,262,567, 
or  the  equivalent  of  $41.05  on  the  250,000  shares  outstanding. 
The  previous  peak  for  earnings  was  shown  in  the  report  for 
the  year  ended  in  June,  1916,  when  there  was  $9,019,429,  or 
$36.08  a  share  for  the  common  stock,"  * 

"  Of  all  textile  prices,  the  advances  in  cotton  yarns  are  in  a 
class  by  themselves.  Such  advantage  has  been  taken  of  the 
dearth  of  cotton  yarns  that  prices,  especially  for  the  finer 
counts,  are  stupidly  high  and  excite  resentment.  The  profiteer- 
ing landlord  who  boosts  rents  150  per  cent,  has  a  heart  com- 
pared with  the  cotton  yarn  spinner  whose  prices  range  from 
four  and  a  half  to  seven  times  what  they  were  in  1915.  Any 
attempt  to  justify  present  yarn  prices  on  a  basis  of  fair  profit 
to  the  mill  and  decent  regard  for  living  costs  to  the  public, 
must  explain  away  the  100  per  cent,  stock  dividends 
declared  by  spinning  mills  and  the  statements  of  profits  issued 
by  several  groups  on  the  flotation  of  additional  stock  to  increase 
control  of  this  business.  ...  A  necessary  part  of  our  recon- 
struction is  a  rebellion  against  grossly  excessive  profits.  It 

1  Statement  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Carter  H.  Glass,   Nov. 
26,  1919. 

2  "  New  York  Times,"  October  5,  1919. 


i8o  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

will  occur  when  the  public  learns  who  are  making  them  and 
refuses  to  pay  tribute  which  is  unjust  and  dishonorable."1 

"  The  American  Woolen  Company  yesterday  issued  the  best 
annual  report  in  its  history,  the  net  profits  for  1919  amounting 
to  $15,513,415  after  making  provision  for  Federal  taxes.  In 
1918  the  net  profits  were  $12,324,084.  The  net  profits  of  1918 
were  slightly  higher  than  those  reported  in  the  present  state- 
ment but  in  that  year  no  allowance  was  made  for  Federal  taxes. 
After  all  charges  there  was  a  surplus  available  for  dividends 
last  year  of  $10,779,804,  or  the  equivalent  of  $39.89  a  share  on 
the  common  stock,  after  making  allowance  for  the  preferred 
distribution.  .  .  .  The  surplus  of  the  company  now  stands  at 
$31,754,427."  2 

"  The  United  States  Steel  Corporation  in  its  report  for  the 
first  quarter  of  this  year,  issued  yesterday,  shows  net  earnings 
of  $42,089,019,  a  total  greater  than  for  any  quarter  of  1919. 
Not  since  the  third  quarter  of  1918  has  the  corporation  been 
able  to  present  such  an  excellent  record.  .  .  .  The  record  of 
earnings  was  considered  by  many  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
ever  put  out  by  the  corporation.  ...  It  had  been  expected  by 
some  that  the  corporation  would  resume  extra  dividend  pay- 
ments at  this  time,  provided  earnings  seemed  to  warrant  such 
disbursements.  The  surplus  after  dividends  would  have  per- 
mitted a  large  extra  declaration,  but  the  surplus  earnings  went 
into  the  corporation's  already  well  stocked  reserve  fund." 3 

"  A  reflection  of  the  activity  which  prevailed  in  the  automo- 
bile industry  during  the  first  six  months  of  this  year  is  found  in 
the  half  yearly  report  of  the  General  Motors  Corporation.  The 
net  profits  amounted  to  $48,900,800,  or  nearly  double  the 
amount  reported  for  the  corresponding  period  of  last  year. 
The  surplus  for  the  six  months  of  this  year  after  dividends  was 
$20,283,508  as  compared  with  a  surplus  of  $6,098,825  for  the 
first  six  months  of  last  year.  The  surplus  for  the  present  half 

1  Public  Ledger  report  of  an  address  by  Mr.  Lincoln  Cromwell,  of 
William  Iselin  &  Company  and  in  charge  during  the  war  of  knit  goods 
buying  for  the  War  Department  and  of  knitting  mill  production  for 
the  War  Industries  Board,  made  before  the  sixteenth  annual  conventioa 
of  the  National  Association  of  Hosiery  and  Underwear  Manufacturers 
in  Philadelphia,  April  27,  1920. 

2  "  New  York  Times,"  April  28,  1920. 
*  Ibid.,  April  28,  1920. 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  181 

year  is  just  about  the  equivalent  of  the  total  surplus  of  the  com- 
pany on  June  30,  1918.  The  total  surplus  now  stands  at 
$53,692,445." 

"  The  preliminary  report  of  the  American  Telephone  and 
Telegraph  Company  for  the  year  ended  December  31,  1919, 
shows  a  net  income  available  for  dividends  of  $44,377,865,  this 
being  the  equivalent  of  $10.04  a  share  earned  on  the  capital 
stock.  In  the  report  of  the  preceding  year  the  net  income  was 
$43,901,324  or  $9.93  a  share.  The  total  income  of  $70,461,130 
is  an  increase  of  approximately  $9,400,000  over  that  of  1918. 
Net  earnings  show  a  gain  over  the  preceding  year.  They 
amounted  to  $60,225,461,  as  compared  with  $54,293,016  a  year 
ago.  In  1916  the  net  earnings  were  $44,743,376  and  in  1917 
they  amounted  to  $48,940,466."  2 

"  From  December  31,  1914,  to  December  31,  1918,  one  hun- 
dred and  four  industrial  companies,  after  heavy  expenditures 
for  new  construction  and  acquisitions  and  record-breaking  divi- 
dends, added  a  total  of  nearly  $2,000,000,000  to  working 
capital.  Practically  all  this  increase  came  from  surplus  earn- 
ings. Although  these  corporations  represent  only  a  small  part 
of  the  great  industrial  wealth  of  the  United  States,  they  give 
a  good  idea  of  the  country's  tremendous  expansion  in  values 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war.  Nearly  all  lines 
of  trade  and  industry  prospered  during  the  war."  3 

Similar  reports  of  unprecedentedly  large  earnings  accom- 
panying the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living,  which  earnings  were 
distributed  to  stockholders  in  dividends  of  various  kinds  and 
added  to  surplus  funds  of  the  corporations,  were  also  made  by 
virtually  every  corporation  dealing  in  the  commodities  which 
enter  into  the  necessities  of  the  daily  life  of  the  American 
people.  Meats,  sugar,  flour,  tobacco,  shoes,  copper  —  these 
and  all  the  other  articles  of  daily  consumption  also  bore  their 

***  New  York  Times,"  October  5,  1919. 

2  "  New  York  Times,"  January  15,  1920. 

3  "  Christian  Science  Monitor,"  September  8,  1919.     See  also  testimony 
submitted  by  Mr.  W.  Jett  Lauck  before  the  Railroad  Labor  Board  in 
behalf  of  the  demands  of  railway  employes  for  higher  wages,  May, 
1920. 


1 82 

share  of  the  tribute  that  went  to  increase  the  cost  of  living  to 
the  workers.  Does  not  this  suggest  that  something  is  amiss 
with  the  working  out  of  the  principles  of  American  democracy? 
Did  not  our  soldiers  go  all  the  way  to  France  to  overthrow 
Prussian  autocracy? 

But  these  brief  references  to  the  financial  reports  of  cor- 
porations showing  the  huge  profits  they  exacted  through  their 
control  of  the  price  machinery  of  the  high  cost  of  living  reflect 
only  one  side  of  the  picture  of  the  effects  of  extortionate  prices. 
Let  us  take  a  brief  glance  also  at  the  reverse  side. 

Within  nine  months  of  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  by  Ger- 
many the  five  leading  headlines  to  news  articles  or  "  stories  " 
on  the  front  page  of  the  "  New  York  Times  "  were  the  fol- 
lowing : 

B.  R.  T.1  AGAIN  SHUTS  DOWN  J  HYLAN  2  INTERVENES  FOR  UNION. 
CAR  STRIKERS  DEFY  POLICE.  DRAG  CREWS  FROM  POSTS  DESPITE 
BLUECOATS  ORDERED  TO  GUARD  THEM.  MAYOR  APPEALS  TO 
COURTS  BUT  FEDERAL  JUDGE  REFUSES  TO  COMPEL  RECEIVER  TO 
DEAL  WITH  LEADERS.  ASSERT  QOOO  MEN  ARE  OUT.  COMPANY 
AGAIN  ABANDONS  SERVICE  AT  NIGHT,  BUT  PROMISES  TO  RESUME 
THIS  MORNING. 

ACTORS  STRIKE,  SENDING  12  BROADWAY  AUDIENCES  HOME.  IOO 
LEADING  PLAYERS  OUT.  MANAGERS  GET  NOTICE  OF  FROM  FIVE 
MINUTES  TO  HALF  AN  HOUR.  ALL  THE  HOUSES  FILLED. 
PATRONS  SPEND  HOURS  COLLECTING  ON  REFUND  CHECKS  AT  BOX 
OFFICES.  MORE  SHOWS  MAY  BE  HIT.  EQUITY  ASSOCIATION 
EXPECTED  TO  ATTACK  VAUDEVILLE,  BURLESQUE,  AND  MOVIE 

HOUSES. 

WILSON  3  URGES  8o,OOO  RAILWAY  SHOPMEN  TO  RETURN  TO  WORK. 
WILSON  ASKS  HINES  *  TO  ACT.  SAYS  RAILROAD  DIRECTOR  HAS 
POWER  TO  PASS  ON  SHOPMEN'S  WAGES.  BUT  DEMANDS  STRIKE 
STOP.  ASSERTS  WORKERS  THEMSELVES  BLOCK  POSSIBILITY  OF 
SOLVING  HIGH  COST  OF  LIVING.  CUMMINS  5  FREES  PRESIDENT, 

1  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company. 

z  Mayor  of  Greater  New  York  including  Brooklyn. 

8  President  of  the  United  States. 

*  Director  General  United  States  Railroad  Administration. 

5  Chairman  Interstate  Commerce  Committee,  United   States   Senate. 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE          183 

INFORMS  EXECUTIVE  CONGRESS   HAS  ALREADY  GIVEN    HIM    FULL 
AUTHORITY  IN  RAILROAD  MATTERS. 

LAHEY  TO  CHECK  STRIKE   VIOLENCE.      DEPUTY   POLICE   COMMIS- 
SIONER    ASSUMES     CHARGE     AND     PROMISES     STERN     MEASURES. 
DISORDERS    HALT    SUDDENLY.       MOTOR    TRUCKS   READY   TO    QUELL 
RIOTS IOO  MANHATTAN  DETECTIVES  WILL  AID. 

SHOPMEN    STRIKE    ON    THE    NEW    HAVEN.       WALKOUT    OF    7OOO 

WORKERS    RESULTS    IN     CURTAILMENT    OF     PASSENGER     SERVICE. 

AFFECTS  WHOLE  SYSTEM.      CONTINUED  SPREAD  OF  STRIKE  IN  THE 

WEST    BRINGS   FREIGHT   EMBARGOES   ON    MANY    ROADS. 

The  daily  newspaper  may  properly  be  regarded  as  a  mirror 
of  current  events,  in  its  more  or  less  accurate  accounts  reflect- 
ing the  important  problems  in  the  life  of  the  American  people 
which  are  the  mainspring  of  their  thoughts  and  which  agitate 
them  to  action.  From  all  over  the  United  States  the  news  of 
these  events  is  carried  each  day  by  the  telegraph  wires  into 
the  office  of  the  newspaper  to  the  desk  of  the  news  editor 
whose  trained  mind  separates  out  the  more  important  events 
and  directs  their  display  on  the  front  page.  Thus  the  front 
page  of  the  newspaper  serves  as  a  barometer  for  measuring 
the  relative  importance  of  the  day's  happenings.  With  the 
front  page  given  up  to  strike  activities  and  their  issues  flowing 
out  of  the  high  cost  of  living  is  there  not  evidence  that  some- 
thing is  amiss  in  the  working  out  of  the  principles  of  democ- 
racy in  America? 

The  same  issue  of  "  The  New  York  Times  "  contained  news 
accounts  of  municipal  policemen  in  labor  unions  affiliating  with 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor ;  as  to  the  request  of  postal 
employes  of  the  United  States  Government  for  a  50  per  cent, 
increase  in  pay:  as  to  the  threat  of  white  labor  union  em- 
ployes in  the  Chicago  stock  yards  to  strike  if  special  police  and 
militia  on  guard  to  quell  further  race  riots  against  imported 
non-union  negroes  were  not  withdrawn ;  and  as  to  the  effects 
on  the  cost  of  living  of  surplus  products  in  storage  warehouses 
and  the  activities  of  city  and  State  officials  against  profiteers 
in  relation  thereto.  In  the  same  issue  the  leading  editorial 


184  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

discussed  the  proposal  of  the  organized  railway  employes  for 
the  nationalization  of  the  railroads  of  the  United  States  and 
the  attitude  of  the  president  of  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor  in  accepting  the  honorary  presidency  of  the  League  or- 
ganized to  further  the  nationalization  plan.  Another  editorial 
discussed  "  The  Police  in  the  Strike,"  and  still  another  "  Let 
No  Guilty  Profiteer  Escape."  On  the  editorial  page  was  also 
a  communication  from  a  correspondent  on  "  Railroad  Profit 
Sharing."  This  is  but  one  day's  summary  from  one  of  our 
leading  newspapers  of  the  news  events  that  have  to  do  with 
various  aspects  of  the  labor  problem  which  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living  had  made  most  acute. 

For  the  single  month  of  August,  1919,  these  news  events 
included  a  strike  in  the  silk  mills  of  Paterson,  New  Jersey ; 
in  machine  shops  at  Waterloo,  Iowa ;  among  the  men  who 
man  the  fishing  boats  that  daily  go  out  to  sea  from  the  harbor 
of  Boston ;  by  shopmen  of  the  New  York  Central  at  Depew, 
New  York,  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  at  Cumberland,  Mary- 
land, and  of  the  Chicago,  Burlington  and  Quincy  at  Havelock, 
Nebraska;  of  employes  of  the  Standard  Steel  Car  Company 
at  Hammond,  Indiana ;  motormen  and  conductors  of  the  New 
York,  Westchester  and  Boston  Railway,  a  subsidiary  company 
of  the  New  Haven  system ;  of  employes  of  the  Pittsburgh  Rail- 
ways Company  at  Pittsburgh,  Pennsylvania;  of  trainmen,  en- 
ginemen,  yardmen,  and  allied  crafts  in  shops  of  the  Southern 
Pacific,  the  Atchison,  Topeka  and  Santa  Fe  and  the  other  steam 
railroads  entering  Los  Angeles,  California;  of  employes  at 
Los  Angeles  of  the  Pacific  Electric,  an  interurban  railway  sys- 
tem of  southern  California,  and  of  the  Southern  Public  Util- 
ities Company  in  Charlotte,  North  Carolina.  In  New  York 
City  alone  in  the  month  of  August  there  were  strikes  of  con- 
ductors and  motormen  of  the  Interborough  Rapid  Transit'Com- 
pany  and  of  the  Brooklyn  Rapid  Transit  Company;  of  stage- 
hands, musicians,  actors  and  actresses;  of  employes  of  the 
Brooklyn  Union  Gas  Company;  of  waiters  in  lunch  rooms 


EFFECTS  OF  THE  VICIOUS  CYCLE  185 

and  small  restaurants  all  over  the  city;  of  employes  of  bak- 
eries ;  of  cigarmakers ;  of  workers  in  ladies'  tailoring  factories ; 
of  window  cleaners;  of  numerous  crafts  engaged  in  the  con- 
struction of  buildings,  and  so  on. 

At  the  same  time  these  and  other  strikes  were  in  progress, 
the  500,000  members  of  the  various  crafts  employed  in  the 
steam  railroad  shops  of  the  country  were  voting  in  favor  of  a 
strike  beginning  September  2  in  the  event  their  demands  for 
increased  wages  with  which  to  meet  the  increase  in  cost  of 
living  were  refused  by  the  Railroad  Administration  of  the 
Federal  Government.  A  strike  vote  was  also  being  taken  by 
the  maintenance  of  way  employes  on  the  American  railroads. 
Officials  of  other  railway  organizations  representing  more  than 
1,500,000  employes  were  submitting  to  the  Director  General 
of  the  Railroad  Administration  demands  for  wage  increases 
equal  at  least  to  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living.  A  nation- 
wide strike  of  the  workers  in  the  iron  and  steel  mills  of  the 
country  had  been  voted  to  become  effective  August  30,  and  it 
was  only  being  delayed  until  the  outcome  of  attempts  on  the 
part  of  union  leaders  to  secure  conferences  with  officials  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation.  Twenty-four  separate  or- 
ganizations of  steel  and  iron  mill  employes  were  involved  in 
this  movement  affecting  approximately  370,000  men. 

Among  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  other  workers  who  in 
August,  1919,  were  formulating  demands  with  the  possibility 
of  strikes  to  enforce  them  were  cigar  store  clerks  in  New 
York  City,  members  of  the  Order  of  Railroad  Telegraphers, 
involving  practically  every  railroad  in  the  United  States  and 
Canada ;  clerks  in  drug  stores  in  New  York  City ;  civil  service 
clerks  in  the  New  York  City  and  county  offices ;  postal  em- 
ployes of  the  United  States  Government  in  all  parts  of  the 
country;  policemen  in  the  National  Capital  and  other  cities. 

And  all  this,  too,  with  political  autocracy  as  represented  by 
the  Imperial  German  Government  prostrate  across  the  sea 
largely  in  consequence  of  America's  efforts  "  to  make  the 


186  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

world  safe  for  democracy"!  That  very  same  powerful  Gov- 
ernment had  failed  at  home  to  protect  its  wage  workers  from 
the  effects  of  the  "  Vicious  Cycle  " !  The  capitalist-producer 
and  seller  was  in  the  saddle  and  he  was  applying  the  spurs 
to  the  wage-worker  consumer. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  VICIOUS   CYCLE,   STRIKES,   AND  THE   CONSUMER 

IF  the  wage  workers  were  the  only  members  of  our  de- 
mocracy injuriously  affected  by  the  increase  in  the  cost  of 
living  and  by  the  inability,  or  at  least  the  failure,  of  the  Gov- 
ernment to  protect  and  safeguard  the  economic  welfare  of  its 
people,  the  situation  would  still  be  serious  but  not  so  much 
so  as  it  is  when  millions  of  other  consumers  are  also  similarly 
affected.  For  the  great  outstanding  fact  is  that  the  unprec- 
edented rise  in  the  cost  of  living  during  and  following  the  war 
and  the  strikes  of  the  wage  worker  to  protect  himself  against 
its  effects,  have  been  and  continue  to  be  a  grievous  burden  upon 
the  numerous  members  of  another  class  of  citizens  —  the  class 
that  is  solely  dependent  for  the  necessaries  of  life  upon  an- 
nual salaries  ranging  from  fifteen  hundred  to  ten  thousand 
dollars. 

In  only  exceptional  cases  have  these  citizens  been  able  to 
increase  their  salary  income  to  meet  the  increase  in  the  cost  of 
living.  They  have  had  to  draw  upon  their  insurance  and  other 
savings,  in  many  cases  the  wife  and  children  "  went  out  to 
work,"  educational  and  other  advantages  have  had  to  be  with- 
held from  the  children,  and  in  scores  of  like  sacrifices  the 
standard  of  living  has  been  lowered.  And  when  the  standard 
of  living  of  "  the  great  middle  class  "  is  thus  affected  there 
remains  no  longer  any  doubt  whatever  as  to  something  being 
amiss  in  the  working  out  in  the  United  States  of  the  principles 
of  democracy. 

Upon  the  citizens  comprising  this  middle  class  —  citizens 
who  are  neither  wage  workers  in  the  customary  use  of  that 
term  nor  capitalist-producers  —  has  fallen  virtually  the  entire 
economic  burden  of  the  costly  war.  Members  of  all  the  pro- 

"187 


i88  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

fessional  classes,  such  as  lawyers,  physicians,  dentists,  clergy- 
men, editors  and  reporters,  engineers,  school  teachers  and  col- 
lege and  university  professors ;  city,  county,  State,  and  Fed- 
eral employes,  and  other  innumerable  salaried  workers  of  all 
kinds  who  have  very  little  if  any  control  over  increasing  the 
amount  of  their  money  income,  have  found  each  month  the 
money  compensation  for  their  services  purchasing  less  and  less 
of  the  necessaries  of  life  as  the  prices  of  these  rose  higher  and 
ever  higher.  With  the  amount  of  their  money  salary  remain- 
ing stationary,  the  constantly  increasing  prices  as  constantly 
decreased  their  real  salary  as  measured  in  terms  of  food,  cloth- 
ing, and  shelter. 

Agitations  in  consequence  sprang  up  all  over  the  country 
for  increased  pay  to  policemen,  firemen,  public  school  teachers, 
and  other  Government  employes;  in  colleges  and  universities 
"  drives  "  were  inaugurated  to  secure  funds  with  which  to  in- 
crease the  salaries  of  professors;  religious  denominations 
started  movements  to  secure  "  endowment  funds  "  for  increas- 
ing the  salaries  of  ministers  of  the  gospel.  So  great  was  the 
economic  pressure  that  in  some  communities  school  teachers, 
and  also  college  professors,  organized  themselves  into  unions 
and  applied  for  charters  of  affiliation  with  the  American  Fed- 
eration of  Labor.  Congress  found  it  necessary  to  increase  to 
the  extent  of  a  bonus  of  $240  a  year  the  salaries  of  clerical  em- 
ployes in  the  District  of  Columbia  receiving  less  than  $2500  a 
year,  and  appointed  a  commission  to  adjust  the  classification 
and  pay  of  all  Federal  employes  in  the  District.  Congress  also 
voted  increases  in  pay  to  postal  and  other  Government  em- 
ployes. These  were  reflected  in  increased  taxes  which  in  turn 
increased  the  prices  of  commodities.  So  the  "  Vicious  Cycle  " 
kept  on  cycling. 

In  warding  off  the  attacks  of  increasing  prices  upon  their 
standard  of  living  policemen,  firemen^  letter  carriers  and  other 
postal  employes,  clerical  workers  of  all  kinds,  and  that  whole 
catagory.  of  citizens  in  the  service  of  city,  county,  State,  and 
National  governments  were  forced  to  complain.  Unorganized, 


STRIKES  AND  THE  CONSUMER  189 

at  first  they  were  helpless  and  their  appeals  and  protests  went 
unheeded;  some  formed  unions  and  applied  to  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  for  charters,  at  the  same  time  formulating 
demands  for  salary  increases  at  least  equal  to  the  increase  in 
the  cost  of  living.  In  the  National  Capital,  even  policemen 
organized  themselves  into  a  union  and  appealed  to  the  Ameri- 
can Federation  of  Labor  for  its  support  of  their  demands  for 
an  increase  in  their  pay.  The  District  of  Columbia  Commis- 
sioners ordered  the  policemen  who  were  members  of  the  union 
to  renounce  affiliation  with  the  Federation  on  pain  of  trial  for 
insubordination.  By  September,  1919,  policemen  in  as  many 
as  thirty  different  cities  scattered  over  the  country  had  simi- 
larly organized  into  labor  unions  and  had  become  affiliated  with 
the  Federation.  In  Boston  about  twelve  hundred  members 
of  the  Policemen's  Union  of  that  city  actually  went  out  on 
strike  on  September  9,  and  for  two  days  the  city  was  given 
over  to  rowdyism  and  rioting  until  State  militia  ordered  out 
by  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts  restored  order.  The  imme- 
diate cause  of  the  strike  was  the  disciplining  of  policemen  for 
joining  the  union  contrary  to  orders  of  the  Police  Commis- 
sioner, but  the  real  cause  was  protest  by  the  policemen  against 
the  delay  in  increasing  their  pay  to  meet  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living. 

Not  only  has  the  consumer  other  than  the  wage  worker  been 
affected  seriously  in  his  economic  interests  by  the  increase  in 
the  cost  of  living  which  affects  the  wage  worker,  but  the  con- 
sumers' economic  welfare  has  also  been  disadvantageously  in- 
jured by  the  efforts  the  wage  worker  has  been  compelled  to 
exert  by  means  of  the  strike  in  order  to  protect  his  wage  stand- 
ard. How  grievously  the  consumers'  economic  interest  suffers 
by  the  limitation  of  output  and  all  the  other  causes  of  price 
increases  resulting  from  these  suspensions  of  production  can 
be  indicated,  in  the  absence  of  more  complete  information, 
from  reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics.1  These  show 

1 "  Monthly  Labor  Review,"  Department  of  Labor,  United  States 
Government. 


190  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

the  number  of  strikes  and  lockouts,  their  duration,  the  number 
of  workers  involved,  the  industries  and  occupations  affected, 
the  specific  causes  which  brought  them  about,  and  the  States 
in  which  they  occurred. 

A  strike  is  where  several  or  more  employes  collectively  re- 
fuse to  continue  at  work  unless  the  employer  complies  with 
their  specific  demands.  A  lockout  is  where  the  employer  re- 
fuses to  allow  several  or  more  employes  to  continue  at  work 
except  under  specified  conditions  determined  by  the  employer. 
Neither  a  strike  nor  a  lockout  includes  those  innumerable  cases 
in  which  a  single  employe  without  cooperation  with  others 
voluntarily  ceases  work  or  is  refused  continued  employment 
and  in  which  there  is  dissatisfaction  on  one  side  or  the  other. 
These  instances,  while  they  involve  the  principles  of  a  strike 
or  lockout  in  that  there  is  disagreement  as  to  the  conditions  of 
employment  or  with  the  employes'  services,  and  to  this  extent 
may  be  looked  upon  as  an  "  individual  strike  '*  or  "  lockout," 
still  these  are  usually  considered  under  what  is  termed  in  in- 
dustry as  "labor  turnover." 

Here  is  the  summarized  record  as  to  the  number  of  strikes 
and  lockouts  each  year  for  the  past  four  years: 

FOUR  YEARS  OF  STRIKES  AND  LOCKOUTS 

Total 


No.  of 
Strikes 

No.  of 
Lockouts 

121  

1018 

1  212  . 

IQI7.  . 

.  4,^24  .  .  . 

,  .  .  .  .  126  

1016.  . 

.  ^.68  1  , 

,  108  . 

3,789 

The  duration  of  these  strikes  and  lockouts  in  1919  totaled 
as  many  as  60,070  days;  in  1918,  29,895  days;  in  1917,  26,981 
days  and  in  1916,  49,680  days.  As  a  general  statement,  lock- 
outs continue  on  the  average  a  longer  number  of  days  than 
strikes. 

These  statistics  are  not  in  the  slightest  degree  indicative  of 
the  amount  of  working  time  actually  lost  to  production,  as  they 


STRIKES  AND  THE  CONSUMER  191 

do  not  take  into  consideration  the  number  of  workers  involved. 
For  illustration,  on  this  latter  basis  in  New  York  State  alone 
in  1918  fifty-six  strikes  in  the  metal,  machines,  and  convey- 
ances trades,  involving  29,870  workers,  resulted  in  the  loss  to 
production  of  890,636  working  days.  Three  strikes  in  the 
shipbuilding  industry,  in  which  10,250  men  participated,  caused 
a  loss  of  720,950  days'  time.  A  strike  of  two  thousand  shoe 
cutters  at  Long  Island  City  before  it  was  terminated  totaled 
a  loss  in  working  time  of  100,000  days;  eight  strikes  in  the 
leather  and  rubber  goods  trades,  involving  4,167  workers,  re- 
sulted in  a  loss  of  159,433  days  of  working  time.  In  the  food, 
liquor,  and  tobacco  group  of  industries  twenty-seven  strikes 
affecting  directly  10,091  workers  caused  a  loss  of  147,088  days' 
time.  In  the  clothing  and  millinery  trades  alone  in  New  York 
the  loss  of  working  time  from  strikes  was  578,644  days  in  1917, 
the  huge  total  of  7,124,366  days  in  1916,  a  total  of  314,328  days 
in  1915,  and  152,812  days  in  1914.  In  addition  there  was  loss 
in  working  time  by  other  workers  indirectly  affected  by  these 
strikes. 

Complete  records  are  not  available  for  the  total  number  of 
workers  involved  in  all  these  strikes  and  lockouts.  In  74  per 
cent,  of  the  disturbances  in  1919  as  many  as  4,112,507  persons 
were  directly  affected ;  in  64  per  cent,  of  the  cases  in  1918 
workers  to  the  number  of  1,239,989  were  involved;  in  52  per 
cent,  of  the  strikes  and  lockouts  in  1917  a  total  of  1,227,254 
men  and  women  were  participants ;  and  in  70  per  cent,  of  the 
cases  in  1916  there  were  involved  1,599,917  workers.  If  the 
average  number  of  individuals  taking  a  direct  part  in  strikes 
and  lockouts  as  determined  by  these  statistics  holds  good,  and 
there  is  no  reason  why  this  assumption  is  not  plausible,  then 
in  1919  the  number  of  persons  involved  directly  exceeded 
5,000,000;  in  the  preceding  year  1,858,000;  in  1917,  2,120,000; 
and  in  1916  more  than  2,207,000. 

This  cessation  of  employment  through  strikes  and  lockouts 
of  millions  of  toilers  simply  means  an  interruption  to  con- 
tinuous production  which  results  in  an  appalling  limitation  on 


192  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

output,  and  this  in  turn  effects  a  continuance  of  high  prices  or 
an  increase  in  prices.  As  a  decrease  in  the  supply  of  com- 
modities in  relation  to  demand  has  an  important  influence  on 
prices,  other  economic  factors  remaining  the  same,  such  limita- 
tion of  supply  by  strikes  and  lockouts  is  extremely  injurious  to 
the  economic  interests  of  the  consumer  and,  as  the  wage  worker 
is  a  consumer,  ultimately  to  those  of  the  worker  himself.  The 
consumer  pays  the  bill  —  sooner  or  later  he  has  to  meet  all  this 
enormous  cost  of  these  industrial  disturbances.  This  cost  is 
so  great  as  to  be  beyond  computation  —  it  runs  up  each  year 
into  the  millions  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  millions  of  dol- 
lars. In  one  sense  of  the  word  the  effect  is  virtually  the  same 
as  it  would  be  if  an  amount  of  goods  equal  to  the  quantity  that 
would  have  been  produced  during  the  continuance  of  the  strike 
was  assembled  and  a  match  applied  resulting  in  its  complete 
destruction. 

The  economic  effects  of  these  strikes  and  lockouts  are  nation- 
wide, notwithstanding  the  larger  number  take  place  in  the 
eastern  industrial  centers.  This  is  true  for  the  simple  reason 
that  under  modern  conditions  of  distribution  commodities 
manufactured  in,  say,  Massachusetts  and  New  York,  are  con- 
sumed in,  say,  California  and  Oregon ;  goods  produced  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  are  consumed  on  the  Atlantic.  The  geographical 
concentration  of  strikes  and  lockouts  is  indicated  in  the  state- 
ment that  58  per  cent,  of  the  total  number  in  1919,  6p  per 
cent,  of  those  in  1918,  56  per  cent,  in  1917,  and  72  per  cent,  in 
1916  occurred  in  the  seven  States,  New  York,  Pennsylvania, 
New  Jersey,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Ohio,  and  Illinois. 

As  to  the  industries  affected,  the  largest  number  of  strikes 
and  lockouts  took  place  in  the  metal  trades,  in  mining,  in  the 
building  trades,  clothing  industries,  textile  industries,  and 
transportation,  these  six  groups  of  industries  comprising  more 
than  one-half  of  all  the  industrial  disturbances  in  each  of  the 
four  years  from  1916  to  1919.  Other  leading  industries 
seriously  affected  were  iron  and  steel,  lumber,  furniture,  meat 
cutting,  paper  manufacturing,  printing  and  publishing  ship- 


STRIKES  AND  THE  CONSUMER  193 

building,  stone-work,  and  tobacco.  Grouped  according  to  the 
occupation  of  the  workers  directly  involved,  as  measured  by  the 
number  of  men  affected,  the  strikes  were  principally  among  coal 
miners,  machinists,  molders,  teamsters,  carpenters,  longshore- 
men, bakers,  building  laborers,  freight  handlers,  painters, 
plumbers  and  steamfitters,  street  railway  employes,  and 
tailors. 

The  important  strikes  and  lockouts  in  1919  were  those  of 
the  435,000  bituminous  coal  miners,  the  367,000  iron  and  steel 
workers,  the  250,000  railroad  shop  employes,  the  125,000  build- 
ing trades'  workers  of  New  York  City,  the  lockout  of  the 
115,000  members  of  the  building  trades  of  Chicago,  the  100,000 
shipyard  workers  of  New  York  City  and  vicinity,  the  100,000 
longshoremen  at  the  Atlantic  Coast  ports,  the  65,000  employes 
of  the  Chicago  stockyards,  and  the  general  strike  in  Tacoma 
and  Seattle  in  sympathy  with  the  strike  of  the  60,000  members 
of  the  metal  trades  of  those  cities.  These  nine  strikes  alone 
involved  more  than  1,600,000  individuals. 

In  1918  the  more  important  strikes  were  those  of  the  tailors 
in  New  York  City;  employes  in  the  textile  industry  in  New 
Hampshire,  Rhode  Island,  and  Philadelphia;  among  the  gar- 
ment workers  in  Chicago ;  in  the  paper  mills  of  northern  New 
York ;  the  cigar  makers  of  New  York  City  and  St.  Louis ;  on 
the  trolley  systems  of  Buffalo,  Kansas  City,  and  St.  Louis ;  the 
molders  and  teamsters  of  Chicago;  the  retail  clerks  of  St. 
Louis;  the  separate  strikes  of  pressmen,  waiters,  and  subway 
laborers  in  New  York  City ;  the  strikes  at  the  General  Electric 
plants;  and  the  general  strike  in  Kansas  City.  In  1917 
the  important  strikes  were  in  the  oil  fields  of  Louisiana  and 
Texas;  on  the  telephone  systems  in  Arkansas  and  the  Pacific 
northwest ;  in  the  packing  houses  in  St.  Louis  and  Omaha ; 
among  the  sugar-cane  workers  in  Porto  Rico;  in  the  sugar 
refineries  in  New  York  and  Philadelphia;  among  the  potters 
in  Ohio  and  New  Jersey;  in  the  silk  mills  in  Hoboken,  New 
Jersey,  and  vicinity;  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry  in  Pitts- 
burgh ;  among  the  cigar  makers  in  Porto  Rico  and  New  York 


194  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

City;  hatters  in  Danbury,  Connecticut;  shoemakers  in  New 
York  City ;  in  the  various  clothing  industries  in  New  York  City, 
Philadelphia,  and  Chicago ;  in  the  lumber  industry  of  the  north- 
west; and  the  general  strikes  in  Minneapolis  and  St.  Paul. 

Considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  specific  causes  of 
these  strikes  and  lockouts  the  facts  disclose  that  by  far  the 
larger  number  were  the  result  of  demand  on  the  part  of 
the  workers  for  increases  in  wages,  which  demand  was  quite 
frequently  coupled  with  others  as  to  changes  or  improvements 
in  conditions  of  employment,  such  as  a  reduction  in  the  hours 
of  work.  For  the  four  years  under  review,  the  other  causes 
in  the  order  of  their  importance  as  measured  by  the  number 
of  strikes  and  lockouts,  were  "  recognition  of  the  union,"  dis- 
charge of  employes,  "  recognition  "  and  wages,  and  a  decrease 
of  hours  of  work.  Other  causes  were  the  employment  of 
non-union  men,  conditions  of  employment,  disputes  over  the 
terms  of  the  wage  agreement,  sympathetic  strikes,  trade  union 
jurisdictional  controversies  between  two  or  more  unions,  dis- 
charge of  foreman  demanded,  non-payment  of  wages,  decrease 
in  wages,  and  against  an  increase  in  the  hours  of  work. 

There  is  still  another  very  important  aspect  of  these  strikes 
and  lockouts  in  their  effects  upon  the  economic  interests  of  the 
consumer  besides  their  enormous  direct  and  indirect  loss  in 
production.  This  is  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  strike  of  the 
bituminous  coal  miners  in  November-December,  1919  It 
will  be  recalled  that  this  strike  was  ordered  at  the  beginning  of 
winter,  at  which  time  the  demand  for  fuel  is  greatest,  with 
virtually  no  mined  surplus  on  hand  because  of  the  war,  demands 
having  been  so  great  as  to  consume  the  coal  almost  as  fast  as 
it  could  be  mined.  In  consequence  of  this  situation,  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  strike,  with  production  less  than  50 
per  cent,  of  normal,  the  consumer  was  made  to  feel  the  effects 
of  this  cutting  off  of  the  fuel  supply. 

The  Fuel  Administration,  hastily  recalled  by  the  threatening 
conditions  to  the  exercise  of  its  far-reaching  war  powers,  put 
into  effect  over  the  entire  country  the  most  drastic  restrictions 


STRIKES  AND  THE  CONSUMER  195 

on  the  use  of  bituminous  coal  for  lighting  and  heating  pur- 
poses —  restrictions  that  were  even  more  severe  than  those 
imposed  by  it  in  the  unprecedentedly  cold  winter  of  1917-18. 
These  restrictions  prohibited  ornamental  lights,  "  white  way  " 
and  other  unnecessary  street  lights,  outline  lighting,  electric 
signs,  illuminated  billboards,  and  show  window  and  show  case 
lights.  Cabarets,  dance  halls,  pool  rooms,  and  bowling  alleys 
were  permitted  to  use  light  only  between  7  P.  M.  and  n  p.  M. 
All  stores,  excepting  those  selling  food,  and  warehouses  could 
not  use  other  than  safety  lights  except  for  six  hours  a  day, 
and  manufacturing  plants  only  during  the  time  prescribed  for 
the  use  of  power.  Drug  stores  and  restaurants  were  required 
to  reduce  lighting  one-half.  General  and  office  lights  had  to 
be  cut  off  not  later  than  4  P.  M.  in  office  buildings,  except  neces- 
sary Federal,  State,  and  municipal  offices  and  except  where 
office  operation  of  vital  industries  was  involved.  Only  enough 
heat  was  permitted  in  offices,  stores,  warehouses,  and  manu- 
facturing plants  to  keep  the  average  temperature  at  68  degrees 
Fahrenheit,  and  then  only  during  the  hours  for  which  light 
was  permitted.  During  other  hours  only  enough  heat  was  to 
be  used  to  prevent  the  freezing  of  water  pipes  or  sprinkler 
systems. 

A  coal  famine  in  many  communities  became  a  distressing 
reality.  The  Railroad  Administration  was  compelled  to  cur- 
tail passenger  service  on  steam  railroads  to  a  greater  extent 
than  was  ever  known  before,  it  being  estimated  that  200,000 
train  miles  a  day  were  eliminated ;  it  placed  embargoes  on  the 
movement  of  fuel  oil  out  of  the  West;  it  reduced  the  amount 
of  coal  permitted  to  go  to  coking  ovens;  it  confiscated  ship- 
ments of  coal  and  caused  their  distribution  at  points  of  greatest 
need.  Half  time  working  schedules  were  made  effective  in 
industries  generally;  retail  stores  in  the  large  cities  opened 
at  noon  and  closed  at  six  o'clock ;  hours  of  work  for  govern- 
ment employes  were  reduced ;  school  houses,  churches,  movies, 
theatres,  and  like  public  places  were  limited  in  the  amount  of 
coal  and  in  cases  were  closed  completely.  In  some  States,  such 


196  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

as  Missouri,  Oklahoma,  and  Kansas,  the  Governors  ordered  the 
seizure  of  coal  mines  by  the  State  and  volunteers  went  into  the 
mines  and  dug  coal  in  order  to  meet  the  necessities  of  hospitals 
and  like  pressing  public  needs. 

A  conference  of  Governors  of  seven  of  the  soft  coal  pro- 
ducing States  held  in  Chicago  November  30  appealed  to  the 
Federal  Government  for  an  equitable  distribution  of  the  coal 
supply  in  stock  "  among  the  forty-eight  States  on  the  basis  of 
their  needs  as  developed  during  the  war  regardless  of  the  State 
where  mined  " ;  also  for  the  immediate  establishing,  promul- 
gating, and  enforcing  of  "  rigid  and  uniform  rules  and  regula- 
tions for  the  greatest  conservation  of  coal  throughout  the 
Union." 

In  brief,  all  that  came  about  which  was  foreseen  in  the 
President's  statement  to  the  public  on  October  25  when  it  said, 
referring  to  the  refusal  of  the  miners'  leaders  to  call  off  the 
strike : 

"  This  is  one  of  the  gravest  steps  ever  proposed  in  this  coun- 
try affecting  the  economic  welfare  and  the  domestic  comfort 
and  health  of  the  people.  It  is  recognized  that  the  strike  would 
practically  shut  off  the  country's  supply  of  its  principal  fuel 
at  a  time  when  interference  with  that  supply  is  calculated  to 
create  a  disastrous  fuel  famine.  All  interests  would  be  af- 
fected alike  by  a  strike  of  this  character,  and  its  victims  would 
be  not  the  rich  only,  but  the  poor  and  needy  as  well,  those  least 
able  to  provide  in  advance  a  fuel  supply  for  domestic  use.  It 
would  involve  the  shutting  down  of  countless  industries  and  the 
throwing  out  of  employment  of  a  large  part  of  the  workers  of 
the  country.  It  would  involve  stopping  the  operation  of  rail- 
roads, electric  light  and  gas  plants,  street  railway  lines  and 
other  public  utilities,  and  the  shipping  to  and  from  this  country, 
thus  preventing  our  giving  aid  to  the  allied  countries  with  sup- 
plies which  they  so  seriously  need.  .  .  .  From  whatever  angle 
the  subject  may  be  viewed,  it  is  apparent  that  such  a  strike 
in  such  circumstances  would  be  the  most  far-reaching  plan 
ever  presented  in  this  country  to  limit  the  facilities  of  produc- 
tion and  distribution  of  a  necessity  of  life  and  thus  indirectly 
to  restrict  the  production  and  distribution  of  all  the  necessaries 
of  life." 


STRIKES  AND  THE  CONSUMER  197 

As  another  illustration  of  the  effects  of  strikes  on  the  con- 
sumer let  us  select  one  more  localized  in  its  immediate  conse- 
quences—  that  of  the  employes  of  the  Interborough  Rapid 
Transit  Company  of  New  York  City  on  its  elevated  and  sub- 
way systems  of  transportation  on  Manhattan  Island.  The 
charge  was  made  in  the  press  by  Mayor  Hylan  of  Greater 
New  York  that  this  strike  was  called  by  the  "  company  union  " 
in  collusion  with  officials  of  the  corporation  primarily  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  an  eight  cent  in  place  of  the  five  cent  fare.1 
The  City  of  New  York  owns  the  subway  lines  which  are  leased 
to  the  Interborough.  The  situation  was  complicated  by  a  con- 
test between  two  different  labor  organizations  for  jurisdiction 
over  the  employes.  The  strike  was  precipitated  August  16, 
1919,  and  the  demands  of  the  workers  were  for  a  50  per  cent, 
increase  in  wages,  a  forty-eight  hour  working  week,  and  time 
and  one-half  payment  for  over-time  work.  It  was  settled  by 
an  increase  of  25  per  cent,  in  wages  and  agreement  to  submit 
the  question  of  a  further  increase  and  the  other  demands  to 
arbitration. 

For  as  long  as  forty-eight  hours  the  operation  of  the  two 
subway  and  the  four  elevated  lines  were  at  a  complete  stand- 
still notwithstanding  efforts  to  settle  the  controversy  that  were 
put  forth  by  the  Mayor  of  the  city,  the  Public  Service  Com- 
mission, and  the  Governor  of  the  State.  Some  of  the  effects 

1  Following  the  settlement  of  the  strike  Mayor  Hylan  issued  a  state- 
ment to  the  public  in  which  he  said :  "  As  Mayor  of  the  City  of  New 
York  I  am  more  than  pleased  and  gratified  that  the  lockout  perpetrated 
by  the  Interborough  officials  and  their  unions  against  the  people  of 
the  city  has  been  settled.  ...  As  each  hour  of  the  lockout  against  the 
people  continued  it  became  »nore  apparent  to  the  general  public  that 
there  was  an  understanding  between  the  self -organized  heads  of  the 
Interborough's  unions  and  certain  officials  of  the  company.  I  trust  the 
District  Attorney  of  this  county  will  continue  his  probe  into  the  ques- 
tions leading  up  to  the  lockout,  so  that  in  the  future  the  traveling  public 
of  our  city  cannot  be  subjected  to  so  great  inconvenience  at  the  will  of 
a  transit  corporation  which  seeks  to  extort  and  whose  sole  purpose  is 
to  filch  from  the  pockets  of  the  public  an  increased  fare." — "  New  York 
Times,"  August  19,  1919. 


198  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

upon  the  consumer  are  indicated  in  the  "  New  York  Times' " 
account  of  the  occurrence.1 

"  Cessation  of  travel  in  the  Interborough  subways  and  on  the 
elevated  lines,  on  which  more  than  2,000,000  passengers  are 
carried  daily,  caused  a  congestion  of  vehicular  traffic  in  all  the 
streets  on  Manhattan  Island  yesterday  that  has  never  been 
matched  in  the  memory  of  the  Traffic  Division  of  the  Police 
Department.  This  unusual  condition,  caused  by  the  efforts  to 
carry  on  one  traffic  level  the  passengers  usually  carried  on  three 
levels,  continued  throughout  the  day.  Although  emergency 
measures  were  adopted  to  absorb  the  crowds,  the  street  cars 
and  buses  were  unable  to  convey  any  of  their  passengers  in 
comfort.  More  than  fifty  persons,  three  of  them  traffic  police- 
men, were  injured  in  jams  and  accidents  during  the  day  and 
one  unidentified  woman  was  killed. 

"  When  the  city's  2,000,000  travelers  who  generally  use  the 
subways  and  elevated  lines  awoke  with  the  problem  on  their 
minds  of  devising  some  new  way  of  reaching  offices  and  fac- 
tories, they  found  that  there  was  rainy  weather  to  add  to  the 
difficulties  of  their  travel.  Persons  who  had  expected  to  find 
a  new  means  of  travel  an  adventure  found  instead  that  the 
chill  and  rainy  weather  and  the  necessity  of  fighting  through 
enormous  throngs  made  travel  a  tremendous  hardship.  In  the 
crushes  at  the  main  traffic  points  throughout  the  city  hundreds 
of  persons  were  forced  to  abandon  their  efforts  to  reach  the 
lower  part  of  Manhattan  Island  so  that  they  could  work  a  few 
hours.  Banks  and  other  large  institutions,  employing  hun- 
dreds of  persons,  reported  last  night  that  the  journeys  of  many 
of  the  employes,  particularly  girls  and  women,  had  so  exhausted 
them  that  they  were  not  able  to  work.  Even  with  the  regular 
and  emergency  bus  lines,  steamboat  schedules,  and  all  the 
other  means  of  transportation  it  was  estimated  last  night  that 
not  more  than  one  half  of  the  usual  north  and  south  travel  was 
carried  during  the  day.  Many  factories  operated  with  de- 
pleted forces,  and  superintendents  last  night  declared  that  the 
efficiency  of  the  workers  who  did  reach  their  desks  or  machines 
was  lowered  by  battling  with  the  throngs  or  by  standing  up  in 
long  rides  for  more  than  an  hour. 

"  Exercising  the  utmost  ingenuity  in  choosing  means  of 
transit,  passengers  in  the  Dyckman,  Washington  Heights,  and 

JAug.  19,  1919. 


STRIKES  AND  THE  CONSUMER  199 

other  sections  at  the  north  of  the  island,  who  generally  travel 
to  Wall  Street  in  less  than  an  hour,  found  that  they  could  not 
make  the  trip  during  a  '  street  car  rush  hour '  in  less  than  two 
to  three  hours.  There  were  many  persons  who  reported  that 
it  hacl  taken  them  three  hours  to  reach  their  offices  in  the  un- 
usual conditions  of  traffic.  As  early  as  five  o'clock  in  the 
morning  throngs  were  waiting  at  One  Hundred  and  Forty- 
ninth  Street  and  Third  Avenue,  the  Bronx,  for  cars  to  convey 
them  to  their  work  in  Manhattan.  These  persons  thought  that 
they  would  get  up  early  and  get  to  their  offices  without  incon- 
venience by  avoiding  the  crowds.  They  were  mistaken  in 
their  judgment,  because  thousands  of  others  had  had  the  same 
thought  and  were  there  waiting  for  the  few  cars  that  were 
running  at  that  hour.  During  the  usual  rush  hour  hundreds 
fought  for  standing  room  in  the  street  cars  that  were  departing 
on  irregular  schedules  from  their  starting  point  at  One  Hun- 
dred and  Eighty-first  Street  and  Broadway.  A  pouring  rain 
drenched  those  who  had  neglected  to  bring  their  umbrellas  and 
a  brisk  wind  succeeded  in  depriving  many  who  had  brought 
them  of  that  means  of  protection  against  the  rain.  Long  waits 
for  cars,  the  heavy  rains,  and  the  crowding  affected  many 
tempers  both  in  the  morning  and  in  the  evening,  and  scores 
of  fist  fights  were  stopped  by  the  police  before  combatants  were 
able  to  injure  each  other.  At  virtually  every  one  of  these 
traffic  points,  notably  in  the  Bronx,  at  One  Hundred  and 
Twenty-fifth  Street,  and  in  the  financial  district  in  the  evening, 
the  throngs  were  almost  as  large  as  those  seen  in  Times  Square 
on  the  night  the  city  was  celebrating  on  the  false  report  that 
an  armistice  had  been  signed." 


CHAPTER  XIX 

DEMOCRACY   IN    INDUSTRY 

S'\T  7E  cannot  go  any  'farther  in  our  present  direction.  We 
»  *  have  already  gone  too  far.  We  cannot  live  our  right 
life  as  a  nation  or  achieve  our  proper  success  as  an  industrial 
community  if  capital  and  labor  are  to  continue  to  be  antag- 
onistic instead  of  being  partners ;  if  they  are  to  continue  to  dis- 
trust one  another  and  contrive  how  they  can  get  the  better  of 
one  another,  or,  what  perhaps  amounts  to  the  same  thing, 
calculate  by  what  form  and  degree  of  coercion  they  can  man- 
age to  extort  on  the  one  hand  work  enough  to  make  enterprise 
profitable,  and  on  the  other  justice  and  fair  treatment  enough 
to  make  life  tolerable.  That  bad  road  has  turned  out  a  blind 
alley.  It  is  no  thoroughfare  to  real  prosperity." 

This  quotation  is  from  President  Wilson's  message  to  the 
extraordinary  session  of  Congress  which  was  cabled  from 
Paris  under  date  of  May  20,  1919.  It  voiced  the  conclusion  to 
which  other  thoughtful  Americans  had  come.  Continuing,  the 
message  further  said  on  this  vital  question : 

"  We  must  find  another,  leading  in  another  direction  and  to 
a  very  different  destination.  It  must  lead  not  merely  to  ac- 
commodation, but  also  to  a  genuine  cooperation  and  partnership 
based  upon  a  real  community  of  interest  and  participation  in 
control.  There  is  now,  in  fact,  a  real  community  of  inter- 
est between  capital  and  labor,  but  it  has  never  been  made 
evident  in  action.  It  can  be  made  operative  and  manifest  only 
in  a  new  organization  of  industry.  The  genius  of  our  business 
men  and  the  sound  practical  sense  of  our  workers  can  certainly 
work  such  a  partnership  out  when  once  they  realize  exactly 
what  it  is  that  they  seek  and  sincerely  adopt  a  common  purpose 
with  regard  to  it." 

200 


DEMOCRACY  IX  INDUSTRY  201 

The  President  expressed  the  belief  that  the  new  spirit  and 
method  of  organization  which  must  be  effected  are  not  to  be 
brought  about  by  legislation  so  much  as  by  common  counsel 
and  voluntary  cooperation  of  capitalist,  manager,  and  work- 
man. The  organization  of  industry  is  a  matter  of  corporate 
and  individual  initiative  and  of  practical  business  arrangement, 
he  said,  and  those  who  really  desire  a  new  relationship  between 
capital  and  labor  can  readily  find  a  way  to  bring  it  about. 

"  The  object  of  all  reform  in  this  essential  matter,"  con- 
tinued the  President's  message,  "  must  be  the  genuine  democ- 
ratization of  industry,  based  upon  a  full  recognition  of  the 
right  of  those  who  work,  in  whatever  rank,  to  participate  in 
some  organic  way  in  every  decision  which  directly  affects  their 
welfare  or  the  part  they  are  to  play  in  industry.  Some  positive 
legislation  is  practicable.  The  Congress  has  already  shown  the 
way  to  one  reform  which  should  be  world-wide,  by  establish- 
mg  the  eight-hour  day  as  the  standard  day  in  every  field  of 
labor  over  which  it  can  exercise  control.  It  has  sought  to  find 
the  way  to  prevent  child  labor,  and  will,  I  hope  and  believe, 
presently  find  it.  It  has  served  the  whole  country  by  leading 
the  way  in  developing  the  means  of  preserving  and  safeguard- 
ing life  and  health  in  dangerous  industries.  It  can  now  help  in 
the  difficult  task  of  giving  a  new  form  and  spirit  to  industrial 
organization  by  coordinating  the  several  agencies  of  conciliation 
and  adjustment  which  have  been  brought  into  existence  by 
the  difficulties  and  mistaken  policies  of  the  present  management 
of  industry,  and  by  setting  up  and  developing  new  Federal 
agencies  of  advice  and  information  which  may  serve  as  a 
clearing  house  for  the  best  experiments  and  the  best  thought 
on  this  great  matter,  upon  which  every  thinking  man  must  be 
aware  that  the  future  development  of  society  directly  depends." 

This  question  of  labor,  said  the  President,  stands  at  the 
front  of  all  others  in  every  country  amidst  the  present  great 
awakening.  *  By  the  question  of  labor  I  do  not  mean  the 
question  of  efficient  industrial  production,  the  question  of  how 
labor  is  to  be  obtained  and  made  effective  in  the  great  process 


202  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

of  sustaining  populations  and  winning  success  amidst  com- 
mercial and  industrial  rivalries.  I  mean  that  much  greater 
and  more  vital  question,  How  are  the  men  and  women  who  do 
the  daily  labor  of  the  world  to  obtain  progressive  improvement 
in  the  conditions  of  their  labor,  to  be  made  happier,  and  to  be 
served  better  by  the  communities  and  the  industries  wjiich  their 
labor  sustains  and  advances  ?  How  are  they  to  be  given  their 
right  advantage  as  citizens  and  human  beings  ?  " 

It  was  with  the  object  of  formulating  a  plan  for  the  work- 
ing out  of  these  new  conditions  for  the  industrial  state  that 
President  Wilson  called  a  conference  for  October  6,  1919. 
In  a  Labor  Day  appeal  urging  the  people  to  continue  their 
support  of  the  Administration  in  its  efforts  to  reduce  the  cost 
of  living  the  President  stated  that  the  proposed  conference 
"  will  discuss  fundamental  means  of  bettering  the  whole  rela- 
tionship of  capital  and  labor  and  putting  the  whole  question  of 
wages  upon  another  footing."  Special  consideration  was  to 
be  given  by  the  conference  to  the  unsatisfactory  relations  be- 
tween employes  and  employers. 

The  conference  was  composed  of  forty-five  representatives 
divided  into  three  groups  of  fifteen  members  each,  representa- 
tives of  industry,  business,  finance,  and  agriculture  forming  one 
group,  representatives  of  organized  labor  another,  and  repre- 
sentatives of  the  public  a  third.  The  fifteen  representatives 
of  the  first  mentioned  group  were  selected  as  follows:  Five 
by  the  National  Industrial  Conference  Board,  five  by  the  United 
States  Chamber  of  Commerce,  two  by  the  Investment  Bankers' 
Association,  one  by  the  American  Society  of  Equity,  one  by 
the  National  Grange,  and  one  by  the  National  Farmers'  Union. 
The  fifteen  representatives  of  organized  labor  were  named  by 
the  president  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor.  President 
Wilson  was  to  name  the  fifteen  representatives  of  the  public 
but  the  selection  of  these  fell  into  other  hands  owing  to  his 
ill-health. 

This  indisposition  of  the  President  was  most  unfortunate 
from  every  point  of  view  in  its  disastrous  effects  upon  the  work 


DEMOCRACY  IX  INDUSTRY  203 

of  the  conference.  It  assembled  after  his  illness  began  and 
was  without  his  assistance  in  giving  direction  to  its  proceedings, 
was  without  a  program,  and  was  without  any  definite  policy. 
Its  sessions  were  too  public  and  at  the  very  outset  became  the 
football  of  group  antagonisms.  But  more  even  than  all  this, 
the  personnel  of  the  three  groups  as  they  were  finally  formed 
foretold,  at  the  very  outset  to  any  one  in  the  least  familiar 
with  the  practical  every-day  labor  problem,  that  no  good  could 
ever  come  out  of  such  an  assemblage  in  so  far  as  accomplish- 
ing anything  constructive  was  to  be  expected.  The  so-called 
public  group  very  inadequately  if  at  all  represented  the  real 
economic  interests  of  consumers,  and  if  they  did  not  distinctly 
represent  clearly  these  interests  there  was  no  reason  for  their 
selection.  They  were  high-minded,  public-spirited  citizens  but 
these  were  not  sufficient  qualifications.  One  of  these  represen- 
tatives of  the  public  was  a  prominent  manufacturer,  another 
was  the  executive  head  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corpor- 
ation, still  another  was  a  representative  of  the  Standard  Oil 
and  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Company ;  one  was  a  Socialist ; 
still  others  were  official  heads  of  national  labor  unions.  These 
representatives  of  the  public  represented  every  economic  inter- 
est in  the  industrial  trilogy  but  that  of  the  consumers.  This 
was  the  one  interest  unrepresented  that  most  emphatically  was 
entitled  to  representation.  The  details  of  the  sessions  of  the 
conference  are  merely  accounts  of  disagreements  rather  than  of 
agreements,  and  about  the  only  good  that  came  out  of  it  was  its 
failure. 

This  failure,  inevitable  at  the  outset,  finally  came  over  the 
question  of  joint  or  collective  bargaining.  Both  the  public  and 
the  labor  group  agreed  to  the  principle  as  thus  expressed: 
"  The  right  of  wage  earners  to  organize  in  trade  and  labor 
unions,  to  bargain  collectively,  to  be  represented  by  represen- 
tatives of  their  own  choosing  in  negotiations  and  adjustments 
with  employers  and  in  respect  to  wages,  hours  of  labor,  and 
relations  and  conditions  of  employment,  is  recognized.  This 
must  not  be  understood  as  limiting  the  right  of  any  wage  earner 


204  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

to  refrain  from  joining  any  organization,  or  to  deal  directly 
with  his  employer,  if  he  so  chooses."  To  this  formulation  of 
collective  bargaining  the  employers  group  refused  to  agree, 
although  its  members  were  divided  on  the  issue  in  the  separate 
conferences  among  themselves. 

There  was  no  disagreement  among  the  three  groups  as  to 
"  the  right  of  wage  earners  to  organize  or  not  to  organize  in 
trade  and  labor  unions,  or  some  form  of  shop  industrial 
councils."  There  was  no  disagreement  as  to  "  the  right  of 
employers  and  employes  to  bargain  collectively,  in  respect  to 
wages,  hours  of  labor,  and  rules  and  conditions  of  employ- 
ment." All  three  agreed  "  for  the  purpose  of  so  bargaining 
collectively  "  in  "  the  right  of  representation  of  wage  earners." 
There  was  also  agreement  by  all  three  groups  in  recognizing 
"  the  right  of  wage  earners  to  be  represented  by  representa- 
tives chosen  by  the  majority  of  their  own  number." 

But  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  place  an  interpretation  on 
the  practical  meaning  of  this  recognition  of  industrial  "  rights  " 
to  the  effect  that  "  this  must  not  be  understood  as  limiting  the 
right  of  any  wage  earner  to  refrain  from  joining  any  organiza- 
tion or  to  deal  directly  with  his  employer  if  he  so  chooses," 
the  representatives  of  the  employer  group  declined  to  agree. 
Instead,  they  submitted  the  following  declaration  of  principle: 
"  The  right  of  employer  and  employe  to  negotiate  individually 
in  respect  to  wages,  hours  of  labor,  and  rules  and  conditions  of 
employment  is  recognized." 

The  labor  group  submitted  their  formulation  of  the  principle 
of  collective  bargaining  as  follows :  "  The  right  of  wage  earn- 
ers to  organize  without  discrimination,  to  bargain  collectively, 
to  be  represented  by  representatives  of  their  own  choosing  in 
negotiations  and  adjustments  with  employers  in  respect  to 
wages,  hours  of  labor,  and  relations  and  conditions  of  employ- 
ment is  recognized."  This  was  approved  by  the  public  group 
but  approval  was  withheld  by  the  employer  group. 

Under  the  rules  adopted  for  the  guidance  of  the  conference 
unanimous  consent  was  required,  and  in  consequence  of  this 


DEMOCRACY  IX  INDUSTRY  205 

defeat  of  the  principle  of  collective  bargaining  as  proposed  by 
the  labor  group,  its  representatives  withdrew  from  further 
participation  in  the  conference.  President  Wilson  then  dis- 
missed the  employer  group  and  requested  the  public  group  to 
continue  in  conference  to  work  out  alone  an  industrial  pro- 
gram. This  group  finally  adjourned  October  24  without  ac- 
complishing results  other  than  to  recommend  the  calling  of 
another  conference  to  consist  of  only  fifteen  members  and  these 
representing  solely  the  public. 

The  conference  was  a  failure  primarily  because  a  powerful 
and  influential  group  of  employers  of  labor  had  previously  de- 
termined upon  a  policy  of  opposition  to  the  demands  of  the 
labor  unions  and  to  the  labor  policy  of  the  Wilson  Administra- 
tion during  the  war,  and  it  was  the  representatives  of  these 
employers  that  dominated  the  employer  group  in  the  confer- 
ence. They  had  decided  upon  a  test  of  strength  with  or- 
ganized labor  to  determine  what  principles  shall  govern  in  the 
industrial  state  —  they  have  in  the  most  literal  sense  thrown 
down  the  gauge  of  battle  to  the  organized  workers.  There 
were  indications  of  this  all  during  the  sessions  which  prevented 
any  understanding  being  arrived  at  between  the  three  groups 
as  to  the  formulation  of  industrial  principles  of  future  rela- 
tions. This  decision  of  the  employers  was  so  clearly  the  fact 
that  representatives  of  the  labor  group  very  early  in  the  ses- 
sions saw  ahead  of  them  nothing  less  than  a  protracted  period 
of  industrial  warfare  to  establish  their  principles.  This  was 
impressed  upon  them  in  the  attitude  taken  by  representatives  of 
this  dominant  group  in  the  strike  of  the  employes  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation  which  was  in  progress  while 
the  conference  was  in  session. 

So  unmistakenly  was  this  the  prospect  as  seen  by  the  labor 
leaders  that  upon  the  breaking  up  of  the  conference  represen- 
tatives of  all  the  national  unions  in  the  country  were  summoned 
to  Washington  by  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  and  the 
railway  brotherhoods.  These  drew  up  a  statement  to  the  pub- 
lic as  to  the  policy  organized  labor  was  to  pursue  in  the  bitter 


2o6  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

contest  the  leaders  saw  ahead  of  them.  The  statement  de- 
clared the  "  fundamental  principles "  upon  which  organized 
labor  would  combat  "  grave  dangers  affecting  the  very  founda- 
tion of  its  structure  "  in  order  ''  to  safeguard  and  promote 
the  rights,  interests,  and  freedom  of  the  wage  earners."  These 
principles  were  a  reiteration  of  those  contained  in  labor's  re- 
construction program  as  drawn  up  by  a  committee  of  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor  appointed  by  the  St.  Paul, 
Minnesota,  convention  in  June,  1918.  Says  this  program:  — 

"  The  world  war  has  forced  all  free  peoples  to  a  fuller  and 
deeper  realization  of  the  menace  to  civilization  contained  in 
autocratic  control  of  the  activities  and  destinies  of  mankind.  It 
has  caused  a  world-wide  determination  to  overthrow  and 
eradicate  all  autocratic  institutions,  so  that  a  full  measure  of 
freedom  and  justice  can  be  established  between  man  and  man 
and  nation  and  nation.  It  has  awakened  more  fully  the  con- 
sciousness that  the  principles  of  democracy  should  regulate  the 
relationship  of  men  in  all  their  activities.  It  has  opened  the 
doors  of  opportunity  through  which  more  sound  and  progres- 
sive policies  may  enter.  New  conceptions  of  human  liberty, 
justice  and  opportunity  are  to  be  applied.  The  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  the  one  organization  representing  Labor 
in  America,  conscious  that  its  responsibilities  are  now  greater 
than  before,  presents  a  program  for  the  guidance  of  Labor, 
based  upon  experience  and  formulated  with  a  full  conscious- 
ness of  the  principles  and  policies  which  have  successfully 
guided  American  trade  unionism  in  the  past." 

Under  the  title  "  Democracy  in  Industry  "  the  program  says : 

"  Two  codes  of  rules  and  regulations  affect  the  workers ; 
the  law  upon  the  statute  books,  and  the  rules  within  industry. 
The  first  determines  their  relationship  as  citizens  to  all  other 
citizens  and  to  property.  The  second  largely  determines  the 
relationship  of  employer  and  employe,  the  terms  of  employ- 
ment, the  conditions  of  labor,  and  the  rules  and  regulations 
affecting  the  workers  as  employes.  The  first  is  secured  through 
the  application  of  the  methods  of  democracy  in  the  enactment 
of  legislation,  and  is  based  upon  the  principle  that  the  laws 
which  govern  a  free  people  should  exist  only  with  their  con- 
sent. The  second,  except  where  effective  trade  unionism  ex- 


DEMOCRACY  IN  INDUSTRY  207 

ists,  is  established  by  the  arbitrary  or  autocratic  whim,  desire 
or  opinion  of  the  employer  and  is  based  upon  the  principle  that 
industry  and  commerce  cannot  be  successfully  conducted  unless 
the  employer  exercises  the  unquestioned  right  to  establish  such 
rules,  regulations  and  provisions  affecting  the  employes  as 
self-interest  prompts. 

"  Both  forms  of  law  vitally  affect  the  workers'  opportuni- 
ties in  life  and  determine  their  standard  of  living.  The  rules, 
regulations  and  conditions  within  industry  in  many  instances 
affect  them  more  than  legislative  enactments.  It  is,  there- 
fore, essential  that  the  workers  should  have  a  voice  in  deter- 
mining the  laws  within  industry  and  commerce  which  affect 
them,  equivalent  to  the  voice  which  they  have  as  citizens  in 
determining  the  legislative  enactments  which  shall  govern  them. 

"  It  is  as  inconceivable  that  the  workers  as  free  citizens 
should  remain  under  autocratically  made  law  within  industry 
and  commerce  as  it  is  that  the  nation  could  remain  a  democracy 
while  certain  individuals  or  groups  exercise  autocratic  powers. 
It  is,  therefore,  essential  that  the  workers  everywhere  should 
insist  upon  their  right  to  organize  into  trade  unions,  and  that 
effective  legislation  should  be  enacted  which  would  make  it  a 
criminal  offense  for  any  employer  to  interfere  with  or  hamper 
the  exercise  of  this  right  or  to  interfere  with  the  legitimate 
activities  of  trade  unions." 

The  field  of  endeavor  of  the  trade  union  and  the  objects  it 
aims  to  secure  are  discussed  in  detail  in  the  reconstruction  pro- 
gram under  such  headings  as  unemployment,  wages,  hours  of 
labor,  women  as  wage-earners,  child  labor,  status  of  public  em- 
ployes, cooperation,  the  people's  final  voice  in  legislation,  po- 
litical policy,  government  ownership,  water  ways  and  water 
power,  regulation  of  land  ownership,  federal  and  State  regula- 
tion of  corporations,  freedom  of  expression  and  association, 
workmen's  compensation,  immigration,  taxation,  education, 
private  employment  agencies,  housing,  and  militarism. 

Under  the  claim  of  industrial  democracy  the  railway  broth- 
erhoods launched  an  extensively  organized  campaign  in  1910 
against  the  return  of  the  railroads  by  the  Government  to  private 
operation.  The  Plumb  Plan  League  was  organized,  a  weekly 
newspaper,  "  Labor,"  published,  a  lecture  and  public  speakers' 


208  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

bureau  put  to  work  on  propaganda,  and  a  widespread  move- 
ment created  among  the  organized  wage  earners  in  favor  of  a 
so-called  tripartite  plan  of  railway  control  under  Government 
ownership  in  which  the  wage  earners  on  the  railroads  had 
representation  in  the  board  of  directors.  Briefly,  this  plan 
provides,  in  a  bill  introduced  in  Congress,  for  the  acquisition 
by  Government  bond  issues  of  complete  ownership  by  the  Fed- 
eral Government  through  the  National  Railways  Operating 
Corporation,  created  for  the  purpose,  of  all  railway  property  in 
the  United  States  under  compensation  to  be  determined  by  the 
Railways  Board  of  Appraisement  and  Extension,  also  created 
in  the  bill  for  this  particular  purpose.  The  Operating  Corpora- 
tion was  to  be  administered  by  a  board  of  directors  of  fifteen 
members  selected  in  the  following  manner:  "  Five  of  the  di- 
rectors shall  be  elected  by  the  classified  employes  of  the  railway 
lines  and  properties  of  the  United  States  and  its  possessions 
below  the  grade  of  appointed  officials ;  five  of  the  directors 
shall  be  elected  by  the  official  employes  of  said  lines  and  prop- 
erties ;  and  five,  of  whom  one  shall  be  designated  as  chairman, 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate ;  not  more  than 
three  of  said  appointees  shall  belong  to  one  political  party, 
That  the  members  of  each  group  of  five  directors  shall  be 
elected  and  appointed,  respectively,  for  terms  of  two,  four,  sixk 
eight,  and  ten  years  each,  their  terms  thereafter  overlapping 
and  for  ten  years  each.  The  elected  directors  shall  be  subject 
to  recall  by  their  electors  and  the  appointed  directors  to  re- 
moval by  the  President  for  inability  or  misconduct."  l 

The  territory  of  the  United  States  and  its  possessions  was  to 
be  divided  into  operating  districts  and  in  each  district  a  rail- 
way council  constituted  as  follows :  "  One-third  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  council  shall  be  elected  by  the  classified  employes 
within  their  district  below  the  grade  of  official  employes,  one- 
third  of  the  council  shall  be  elected  by  the  official  employes 
within  said  district,  and  one-third,  of  whom  one  shall  be  desig- 

1  Section  I,  Article  2,  of  the  so-called  Esch  bill. 


DEMOCRACY  IN  INDUSTRY  209 

nated  as  chairman,  shall  be  appointed  by  the  board  of  di- 
rectors." 1  The  board  "  may  delegate  to  any  district  railway 
council  such  of  their  powers  under  this  act  as  may  conven- 
iently be  exercised  locally,  and  the  district  railway  council  shall, 
upon  such  delegation,  have  and  exercise  within  its  district  all 
of  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  board  of  directors  as  may  be 
delegated  to  it."  1 

1  Section  3,  Article  2  of  the  Esch  bill. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  THREE   PARTIES  TO   PRODUCTION 

'  I  **HE  nature  of  the  conflict  between  the  wage  worker  and 
•*•  the  capitalist-producer  over  the  division  of  the  proceeds 
of  industry  as  viewed  by  leaders  of  the  workers  is  clearly  set 
forth  by  Mr.  Warren  S.  Stone,  grand  chief  of  the  Brother- 
hood of  Locomotive  Engineers,  in  testimony  before  the  Com- 
mittee on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,1  in  support  of  the  demand  of  the  railway 
brotherhoods  for  employe  representation  in  the  board  of  di- 
rectors of  the  railroad  corporation.  Mr.  Stone  explained  the 
fundamental  purpose  of  organized  workers  as  being  "  to  secure 
better  working  conditions  and  a  larger  measure  of  return  for 
their  labor."  But  in  their  efforts  to  attain  these  objects  "  the 
full  force  of  capitalistic  organizations  has  been  set  against  labor 
to  hold  and  to  keep  all  the  profits  of  industry.  The  strength 
of  the  labor  unions  has  been  exerted  to  wrest  from  capital 
some  share  of  the  profits  for  the  wage  earners. 

"  This  has  been  a  perpetual  struggle  by  the  workers  to  main- 
tain a  tolerable  standard  of  existence ;  on  the  part  of  capital, 
to  amass  greater  profits.  At  times,  both  sides  could  ignore  the 
needs  of  the  public.  But  now  the  very  growth  of  the  labor 
organizations  has  brought  into  their  ranks  a  great  mass  of 
the  consumers.  The  large  number  of  the  wage  earners  now 
constitute  a  large  percentage  of  the  people.  The  extension  of 
industry  has  changed  the  nature  of  the  previous  struggle.  For 
whatever  the  worker  receives  in  wages  he  must  spend  for  the 
necessaries  of  life.  In  addition,  he  is  always  compelled  to  pay 

1  Hearings  on  Return  of  the  Railroads  to  Private  Ownership,  Sixty- 
sixth  Congress,  First  Session,  H.  R.  4378,  August  20-27,  1919,  Plumb 
Plan  Testimony. 

210 


THE  THREE  PARTIES  TO  PRODUCTION      211 

to  the  employer  an  excessive  profit  on  his  own  wages.  The 
cost  of  his  living  is  determined  by  the  sum  he  earns,  plus  the 
profits  he  is  charged  on  his  own  labor.  And  as  a  group,  labor 
is  forever  prevented  from  bettering  its  lot  because  of  the  profits 
exacted  by  the  employer.  The  hope  of  a  finer  life  is  never 
realized.  So  long  as  consumers  are  forced  to  pay  extortionate 
profits  on  their  own  earnings  to  a  third  interest  there  is  no 
solution  of  the  industrial  problem. 

"  We  find  that  this  third  interest  absolutely  controls  and 
dominates  the  management  of  industry.  It  fixes  wages  and 
controls  working  conditions.  It  fixes  the  prices  of  commodities 
without  regard  to  the  needs  of  society,  or  the  necessities  of 
producers  and  consumers. 

"  We  have  a  democratic  form  of  government  but  an  auto- 
cratic control  of  industry.  We  exist  under  government,  but 
by  industry  we  live.  Under  such  a  system  the  majority  of  a 
democracy  can,  through  their  government,  enjoy  only  such 
rights  and  privileges  as  an  autocracy  in  industry  permits  them 
to  receive. 

"  This  country  was  peopled  by  a  race  who  sought  within 
its  boundaries  religious  freedom.  It  was  established  by  their 
descendants  through  revolution  as  a  land  of  political  freedom. 
We  now  demand  that  it  become  the  home  of  industrial  free- 
dom." Mr.  Stone  expressed  the  belief  that  this  could  "  only 
be  accomplished  by  extending  to  industry  the  same  right  of  in- 
dividual freedom  recognized  by  the  founders  of  our  Govern- 
ment in  establishing  this  democracy.  The  need  of  mankind 
for  the  products  of  industry  must  be  accepted  as  the  basic  in- 
terest in  all  industry.  The  right  of  the  worker  who  supplies 
that  need  demands  like  acceptance.  This  can  only  be  achieved 
by  permitting  producers  and  consumers  to  share  in  the  control 
of  the  management  of  their  means  of  existence." 

This  presentation  of  the  situation  by  the  leader  of  one  of 
the  most  powerful  and  at  the  same  time  conservative  labor 
organizations  of  the  country  is  deeply  significant.  It  reflects 
the  fact  that  the  more  advanced  representatives  of  organized 
labor  believe  that  further  increases  in  wages  without  control 
over  the  transfer  of  these  increases  to  the  prices  of  the  com- 
modities that  enter  into  the  daily  life  of  the  workers,  mean  no 
permanent  advance  to  the  wage  worker.  Therefore  organized 


212  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

labor  must  strike  out  for  a  greater  degree  of  control  over 
the  power  that  fixes  prices  just  as  by  past  endeavor  it  has  se- 
cured part  control  at  least  over  the  power  to  fix  wages.  The 
interest  of  the  worker  is  in  the  price  of  the  things  he 
buys  with  his  wages  as  much  as  it  is  in  those  wages. 
Heretofore  organized  labor  has  emphasized  increases  in 
wages  with  but  little  if  any  thought  of  what  those  wages 
would  exchange  for.  It  has  been  too  much  concerned 
with  money  wages  and  too  little  interested  in  real  wages — in 
the  food,  clothing,  shelter,  and  so  on  which  the  money  wages 
purchase.  And  after  all  the  real  progress  of  the  organized 
labor  movement  and  the  economic  welfare  of  its  individual 
members  is  measured  in  terms  of  real  and  not  money  wages. 

This  concept  of  the  economics  of  wages  and  of  the  labor 
movement  links  the  interest  and  welfare  of  the  wage  worker 
with  that  of  the  consumer.  It  recognizes  that  in  the  product 
of  every  industry,  whether  this  product  is  a  commodity  or  a 
service,  there  are  three  groups  in  society  that  have  a  vital, 
economic  interest  in  the  processes  of  production,  distribution, 
and  consumption.  These  three  groups  are  the  consumer  who 
pays  the  price  for  the  commodity  or  service,  the  capitalist  whose 
money  is  invested,  and  the  worker  who  supplies  the  labor. 

There  are  three  basic  interests  in  every  socialized  industry, 
says  Mr.  Glenn  E.  Plumb,  counsel  for  the  railway  brother- 
hoods, in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  Interstate  and 
Foreign  Commerce  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
Sixty-sixth  Congress.1  By  socialized  industries  Mr.  Plumb 
does  not  mean  ownership  or  control  by  the  Government  but 
those  that  are  based  on  either  a  grant  from  the  Government 
or  a  privilege  of  monopolistic  nature.  He  does  not  include  in- 
dustries carried  on  by  individuals  under  the  competitive  sys- 
tem without  the  aid  or  grant  of  privilege.  By  "  socialized  '" 
he  means  industries  which  require  great  aggregations  of  work- 
ers, each  performing  a  small  fraction  of  the  task  of  production 
and  in  which  the  finished  product  is  the  result  of  combined  co- 

1  Hearings,  First  Session,  on  H.  R.  4378,  August  20-27,  1919,  Part  5. 


THE  THREE  PARTIES  TO  PRODUCTION     213 

operative  productive  effort.  "  I  deem  that  an  industry  is  soc- 
ialized," he  says,  "  when  it  can  only  be  carried  on  by  a  grant 
of  society  and  by  organizations  which  eliminate  individual  ef- 
fort or  competition.  It  is  a  function  of  society  when  it  has 
reached  that  development,  regardless  of  its  ownership  of  man- 
agement, and  it  is  in  that  sense  and  that  sense  alone  that  I 
speak  of  '  socialized  '  industries." 
Says  Mr.  Plumb : 

"  The  first  interest  is  that  of  the  public,  which  I  define  as 
the  demand  of  the  public  for  the  products  of  that  industry.  It 
is  the  need  of  society  for  those  things  essential  to  its  exist- 
ence which  are  produced  alone  by  the  organized,  socialized,  pro- 
ductive efforts  of  those  engaged  in  meeting  this  demand. 
Without  the  existence  of  this  demand  of  society,  that  industry 
could  not  exist ;  without  this  demand  capital  would  have  no 
field  for  investment,  labor  would  have  no  opportunity  for  em- 
ployment. With  either  one  of  these  three  fundamental  inter- 
ests lacking  the  other  two  could  not  exist  within  that  field  of 
production. 

"  The  second  interest  is  the  interest  of  capital.  Capital  is 
nothing  but  the  unexpended  surplus  of  past  human  effort  which 
is  now  available  to  furnish  the  tools  for  present  human  effort. 
It  is  essential  to  every  organized  industry  in  that  it  furnishes 
the  tools  for  production  without  which  the  demand  of  society 
for  the  products  of  industry  could  not  be  satisfied  and  with- 
out which  labor  or  human  effort  could  not  find  employment. 

"  The  third  fundamental  interest  is  that  of  the  wage  earner 
or  producer.  It  includes  all  those  employed  in  productive  ef- 
forts in  those  industries  which  have  been  socialized.  That  in- 
cludes not  only  the  man  who  works  with  his  brawn,  but  the 
man  who  works  with  his  brain  —  all  productive  effort  in  that 
industry.  This  constitutes  the  third  interest  which  I  have 
termed  the  interest  of  the  wage  earner.  The  wage  earner  rep- 
resents the  human  effort  which  must  be  applied  to  these  means 
for  production,  without  which  capital  could  not  find  investment 
and  secure  its  returns  and  without  which  the  needs  of  society 
for  the  products  of  industry  could  not  be  satisfied. 

"  These  are  the  three  fundamental  interests  in  industry,  each 
as  essential  -to  the  existence  of  industry  as  the  other.  There- 
fore they  are  equal  and  must  have  equal  opportunity,  protec- 
tion, and  authority." 


2i4  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Viewed  from  the  welfare  of  each  of  these  economic  groups 
which  combined  comprise  all  members  of  society,  the  funda- 
mentals of  the  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  production  should 
be  a  fair  return  to  the  owners  of  capital,  a  fair  wage  to  the 
possessors  of  labor,  and  a  fair  price  to  the  consumers  of  the 
commodity  or  service.  Production  should  be  so  organized  that 
the  attainment  of  any  two  of  these  objects  automatically  pro- 
duces the  third.  That  is,  a  fair  interest  or  dividend  and  a  fair 
wage  should  of  themselves  in  combination  result  in  a  fair 
price ;  a  fair  interest  or  dividend  return  and  a  fair  price  should 
of  themselves  in  combination  result  in  a  fair  wage ;  and  a  fair 
price  and  a  fair  wage  should  of  themselves  in  combination 
result  in  a  fair  return  to  capital  in  interest  or  dividends.  Pro- 
duction organized  on  such  a  basis  would  secure  and  assure 
economic  justice  to  the  individual  citizens  in  all  three  groups. 

The  great  obstacle  to  the  attainment  of  this  much  to  be  de- 
sired end  is  the  widespread  violation  of  the  prime  essential  of 
honest  corporate  organization  and  financing  of  industries  en- 
gaged in  production.  This  essential  is  accurate  and  trust- 
worthy information  as  to  the  actual  true  capital  investment  of 
money  and  services.  Instead  of  the  finances  showing  this,  in 
all  too  many  cases  the  true  capital  investment  is  arbitrarily  in- 
creased by  paper  capitalization  and  hidden  or  concealed  by 
corporate  organization  and  similar  methods  to  such  an  extent 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  ascertain  what  is  a  fair  return  to  the 
capital  actually  invested  and  in  turn  to  any  one  of  the  other 
two  elements  to  production.  If,  for  example,  with  the  finances 
showing  a  capitalization  of,  say,  ten  million  dollars  where  only 
one  million  dollars  of  money  and  services  are  actually  invested 
and  with  a  dividend  or  interest  return  paid  on  the  ten  million, 
there  cannot  be  a  fair  return  on  capital,  a  fair  wage,  and  a 
fair  price  —  every  one  of  the  three  is  most  likely  to  be  unfair. 
If,  through  holding  and  subsidiary  companies,  the  bookkeeping 
entries  or  charges  are  manipulated  so  as  to  falsify  or  conceal 
the  actual  transactions,  there  can  be  no  basis  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  share  of  each  of  these  three  factors  in  productioa 


THE  THREE  PARTIES  TO  PRODUCTION      215 

So  at  the  very  outset  it  is  impossible,  for  any  industry  thus  cap- 
italized and  organized  to  supply  the  essential  elements  of  fair- 
ness. 

The  cost  of  management  in  salaries  to  executives,  superin- 
tendents, managers,  and  so  on,  which  might  be  considered  as  a 
fourth  factor  in  production  separate  and  distinct  from  either 
capital  or  labor  is  here  treated  as  a  part  of  labor ;  it  can  with 
equal  regard  for  the  facts  be  treated  as  a  part  of  capital  cost. 

Beginning  in  1910  the  four  railway  brotherhoods  whose 
members  are  engaged  in  the  operation  of  trains,  directed  con- 
certed movements  for  increases  in  wages  against  large  groups 
of  railroads  in  the  three  territorial  divisions,  that  is,  the  South- 
ern, Eastern,  and  Western  territories.  The  principal  line  of 
defense  of  the  transportation  corporations  in  opposition  to  the 
demands  of  their  employes  for  higher  wages  and  shorter  hours 
of  work  was  their  claim  of  "  inability  to  pay."  So  persistent 
was  this  claim  down  to  1913  without  specific  proof  of  the  asser- 
tion other  than  the  formal  presentation,  before  arbitration 
boards  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  of  their 
"  property  investment  "  and  "  capital  obligations  "  accounts  as 
taken  from  the  reports  of  the  companies  to  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  and  so  insidious  was  its  effect  upon  mem- 
bers of  the  board,  with  a  terrifying  and  confusing  array  of  sta- 
tistical tables  showing  alleged  fixed  charges  which  must  be  met 
if  bankruptcy  was  to  be  avoided,  that  two  of  the  railway  broth- 
erhoods determined  upon  an  ascertainment  of  the  facts  if  it 
were  possible  to  ascertain  those  facts. 

For  eight  months  a  most  exhaustive  investigation  was  made 
by  a  staff  of  experts.  The  so-called  "  property  investment " 
account  of  all  the  important  railway  systems  of  the  United 
States  was  analyzed.  Their  intercorporate  relations  through 
stock  ownership  were  also  established  and  the  effects  of  these 
relations  upon  the  finances  of  the  companies  shown.  Their 
so-called  "  capital  obligations "  account  was  gone  into  thor- 
oughly ;  also  the  interrelation  of  all  these  companies  with  each 
other  and  with  industrial  and  financial  corporations  and  supply 


216  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

companies  by  means  of  interlocking  directorates  and  stock  own- 
ership by  individual  railway  officials.  No  ascertainable  fact 
that  would  throw  light  on  the  confusing,  complex,  and  com- 
plicated situation  was  ignored.  And  when  in  1913  the  con- 
certed wage  movement  of  the  Order  of  Railway  Conductors 
and  Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Trainmen  against  the  leading 
railways  of  the  Eastern  Territory  came  before  the  board  of 
arbitration  appointed  by  President  Taft  to  settle  the  contro- 
versy, all  this  mass  of  data  was  presented  before  this  board 
in  statistical  tables,  charts,  text  explanations,  and  in  the  oral 
testimony  of  an  expert  witness.  The  Eastern  railroads  stated 
for  the  first  time  that  they  did  not  claim  "  inability  to  pay." 

The  sum  and  substance  of  this  investigation  is  to  condemn 
as  worthless,  the  so-called  "  property  investment "  account  as  it 
appears  today  on  the  books  of  these  transportation  corpora- 
tions. The  same  is  true  as  to  the  alleged  "  capital  obligations  " 
account  of  these  companies  —  it  is  worse  than  useless  as  a  fair 
measure  of  ascertaining  the  securities  that  have  a  just  claim 
upon  the  earnings  of  the  railroads ;  it  is  actually  misleading. 
These  statements  are  verified  by  numerous  rulings  and  find- 
ings of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

This,  then,  is  the  situation  today  with  regard  to  the  "  of- 
ficial "  statements  of  the  railroads  of  the  country  as  to  the 
basis  of  their  elaborate  financial  structure.  This  basis  is  un- 
just, unsound,  and  misleading,  not  to  apply  harsher  terms. 
Consequently  the  railway  employes  have  not  the  slightest  con- 
fidence in  the  financial  statements  of  railway  corporations  — 
the  employes  in  their  wage  demands  absolutely  refuse  to  take 
into  consideration  any  claims  of  the  officials  as  to  the  corpora- 
tions' finances.  This,  in  turn,  has  resulted  in  these  wage  earn- 
ers objecting  to  the  reports  as  in  any  honest  degree  reflecting 
the  actual  facts  and  declining  to  accept  them  as  a  basis  for 
determining  "  the  ability  to  pay  "  the  higher  wages  and  the  cost 
of  improved  conditions  of  employment  demanded  of  the  in- 
dustry. Such  accounts  make  it  next  to  impossible  for  arbitra- 
tion boards  to  render  intelligent  and  just  decisions  in  wage 


THE  THREE  PARTIES  TO  PRODUCTION      217 

cases.  Perhaps  this  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  arbitration 
through  the  intervention  of  the  National  Government  no  longer 
has  the  confidence  of  the  railway  employes.  From  the  side  of 
prices,  in  the  case  of  railroads  taking  the  form  of  transporta- 
tion rates  for  services,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
finds  such  accounts  so  unreliable  as  a  basis  for  the  determina- 
tion of  what  are  reasonable  rates  that  it  refuses  to  take  them 
into  consideration  in  this  connection. 

This  is  the  situation  that  exists  with  regard  to  the  finances 
of  our  railroads  whose  accounts,  many  of  which  are  still  in- 
accurate notwithstanding  they  are  now  kept  according  to  rules 
prescribed  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  are  regu- 
larly inspected  and  are  far  more  subject  to  governmental  au- 
thority than  the  accounts  of  other  corporations.  What  is  fairly 
to  be  expected  as  to  the  finances  and  practices  of  corporations 
that  are  absolutely  free  in  the  adoption  and  employment  of  such 
methods?  Some  concept  of  the  conditions  can  be  gained  from 
a  perusal  of  the  findings  of  the  Commission  in  the  notorious 
looting  of  the  New  Haven,  the  Rock  Island,  the  Pere  Marquette, 
the  Cincinnati,  Hamilton  and  Dayton,  the  Chicago  and  Alton, 
the  St.  Louis  and  San  Francisco,  and  other  roads  generally 
regarded  by  the  public  as  under  government  supervision  be- 
cause of  the  mistaken  idea  of  the  extent  of  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  These  findings  present 
a  most  disgraceful  record  of  practices  that  are  really  nothing 
less  than  the  robbery  and  theft  of  values  that  belong  to  the 
people.  The  fact  it  is  desired  to  make  plain  here  is  that  there 
is  such  widespread  misuse  of  the  legitimate  principles  of  cor- 
porate organization  and  finance  that  only  in  exceptional  cases 
of  large  industrial  enterprises  is  it  possible  to  ascertain  from 
their  accounts  the  essential  facts  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  just 
determination  of  a  fair  return  to  capital,  a  fair  wage  to  labor, 
and  a  fair  price  to  the  consumer. 

The  American  workingman,  then,  is  justifiably  suspicious  of 
the  financial  practices  of  industrial  corporations  as  to  their  in- 
vestments and  earnings.  He  will  never  be  content  with  any 


2i8  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

so-called  "  profit  sharing  "  plan  so  long  as  corporation  finances 
absorb  by  unjust  capitalization  methods  a  huge  proportion  of 
the  earnings  over  and  above  those  properly  due  to  the  capital 
invested.  Such  a  practice  verges  close  to  actual  fraud  and  ex- 
plains in  part  why  the  American  workingman  "has  received  so- 
called  profit  sharing  schemes  with  suspicion.  Until  a  financial 
and  corporate  organization  is  effected  in  American  industries 
that  will  represent  the  facts  of  investment  as  they  actually  exist, 
the  workers  will  continue  to  ignore  the  alleged  financial  state- 
ments of  these  industries.  One  of  the  very  first  reforms  neces- 
sary in  these  days  of  moral  awakening  as  to  rights  and  justice 
in  the  industrial  world  is  the  abandonment  of  past  and  present 
financial  and  corporate  methods,  based  on  forced  profits 
through  high  prices  over  and  above  a  legitimate  return  for  the 
service  performed,  and  the  substitution  of  others  that  show  the 
actual  facts  in  relation  to  production  for  social  service.  Then, 
and  then  only,  will  profit  sharing,  stock  ownership  by  employes, 
participation  in  management  by  the  workers,  and  like  economic 
appeals  possess  for  the  workers  the  attractions  inherent  in 
their  principles. 

But  the  situation  is  even  more  serious.  The  methods  and 
practices  of  industrial  autocracy  affect  not  alone  the  wage 
workers  but  all  consumers. 


INDUSTRIAL  autocracy  operates  through  the  corporation. 
If  we  are  to  understand  clearly  autocracy's  methods  and 
practices  that  are  injurious  to  the  economic  interests  of  the 
wage  worker  and  the  consumer  we  must  examine  the  operation 
of  the  corporation.  But  these  methods  and  practices  are  so 
general  throughout  the  industrial  state  and  they  are  manifested 
in  so  many  different  ways  that  it  is  not  possible,  within  the 
limited  space  at  our  disposal,  to  indicate  completely  their  nature 
and  characteristics.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to  present  very 
brief  summaries  from  official  government  reports.  For  this 
purpose  the  records  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
are  selected  and  those,  too,  of  only  a  single  corporation,  but  it 
is  not  to  be  inferred  that  these  practices  are  confined  to  this 
particular  transportation  company  or  solely  to  railway  cor- 
porations. From  the  Commission's  reports  on  the  financial  and 
other  transactions  of  the  New  York,  New  Haven  and  Hart- 
ford Railroad  Company,1  which  transactions  resulted  in  the 
financial  wrecking  of  that  great  transportation  system,  extracts 
will  suffice  to  give  a  general  idea  of  the  methods  employed  by 
the  autocracy  in  control  of  our  industrial  state.  Quotations 
are  the  exact  wording  of  the  Commission's  statements. 

Evidence  of  wrongdoing  such  as  was  disclosed  in  this  in- 
vestigation is  difficult  to  obtain.  Men  do  not  conduct  such 
transactions  in  the  open,  but  rather  in  secret  and  in  the  dark. 
Only  those  individuals  involved,  as  a  rule,  have  direct  informa- 

1 1.  C.  C. —  No.  6569  —  Financial  Transactions  of  the  New  York, 
New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Company.  Also  27  I.  C.  C.,  560, 
New  England  Investigation. 

219 


220  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

tion.  So  some  of  the  evidence,  of  necessity,  must  come 
through  participants.  And  in  securing  such  evidence  im- 
munity against  criminal  prosecution  has  to  be  extended  to  some 
of  those  incriminated.  Ordinarily,  too,  in  investigations  by 
the  Commission  evidence  is  easily  adduced  by  placing  witnesses 
upon  the  stand,  but  in  this  instance  the  witnesses,  other  than 
the  accountants  for  the  Commission,  were  in  the  main  hostile, 
and  with  few  exceptions  their  testimony  was  unwillingly  given. 
One  witness  to  whom  payments  of  many  thousands  of  dollars 
had  been  made  in  a  transaction  for  which  there  were  no  item- 
ized vouchers  "  left  for  Europe  after  this  investigation  was 
commenced,  and  his  evidence  could  not  be  secured." 

In  its  search  for  the  truth  not  only  did  the  Commission  have 
to  overcome  the  obstinacy  of  witnesses  who  declined  to  testify 
until  criminal  proceedings  were  begun  for  their  refusal  to 
answer  questions,  but  it  also  encountered  obstacles  purposely 
placed  in  its  way,  such  as  the  burning  of  records,  books,  let- 
ters, and  documents.  "  J.  L.  Billard  purposely  burned  his 
books  and  papers  so  as  to  get  them  out  of  the  way."  "  This 
transaction  (referring  to  the  purchase  by  the  New  Haven  of 
trolleys  from  the  Rhode  Island  Securities  Company)  seems  an 
extravagant  purchase  and  makes  it  a  matter  of  interest  just 
who  owned  the  securities  of  the  Rhode  Island  Securities  Com- 
pany. This  information  could  be  furnished  from  the  stock 
books  of  that  company,  but  during  the  progress  of  this  investi- 
gation it  was  learned  that  these  books  had  also  been  burned." 
There  was  additional  evidence  as  to  the  destruction  of  still 
other  records. 

The  New  Haven  system  had  more  than  three  hundred  sub- 
sidiary corporations  "  in  a  web  of  entangling  alliances  with 
each  other,  many  of  which  were  seemingly  planned,  created, 
and  manipulated  by  lawyers  expressly  retained  for  the  purpose 
of  concealment  or  deception." 

The  financial  operation  necessary  for  these  acquisitions  (re- 
ferring to  steamship  and  trolley  lines  acquired  by  the  New 
Haven)  and  the  losses  which  they  have  entailed,  have  been 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  CONSUMER     221 

skillfully  concealed  by  the  juggling  of  money  and  securities 
from  one  subsidiary  corporation  to  another. 

The  story  of  the  companies  through  which  the  property  of 
the  Metropolitan  Steamship  Company,  operating  between  New 
York  and  Boston,  passed  "  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Rob- 
bins,  the  general  counsel  for  the  New  York,  New  Haven  and 
Hartford  Railroad  Company,  is  indeed  a  remarkable  exhibi- 
tion of  corporate  legerdemain.  .  .  .  Witnesses  who  were  of- 
ficers of  some  of  these  companies  appeared  before  the  Com- 
mission and  testified  that  they  acted  as  '  dummies  '  under  the 
direction  of  Robbins  and  of  attorneys  selected  by  him.  Some 
of  them  handled,  without  any  knowledge  of  the  nature  or 
purpose  of  the  transactions,  checks  approximating  three  million 
dollars." 

"The  devious  methods  used,  the  tangled  web. of  corporate 
transactions  through  which  this  property  (the  Metropolitan 
Steamship  Company)  passed  and  the  use  of  '  dummies,'  who 
knew  nothing  of  the  purposes  for  which  they  were  being 
used,  all  clearly  indicate  that  the  purpose  of  these  circuitous 
methods  was  to  conceal  the  hand  of  the  New  Haven.  The 
names  of  the  men  who  vouched  for  the  '  dummy '  treasurer, 
Richards,  and  who  undoubtedly  furnished  the  money  which 
at  the  inception  of  this  transaction  he  was  blindly  using,  also 
seem  to  point  to  the  New  Haven."  Thus  in  the  acquisition  of 
the  numerous  steamship  lines  that  ply  between  several  of  the 
large  cities  served  by  the  New  Haven  system  "  dummy  com- 
panies and  dummy  officers  and  directors  were  used  in  financial 
maneuvering  that  resulted  in  the  New  Haven  controlling  those 
steamships." 

Increases  in  capital  stock  of  the  New  Haven  were  made  upon 
the  basis  of  transfers  of  assets  from  one  subsidiary  company  to 
another.  The  steamship  properties  of  this  system  at  one  time 
were  held  by  the  New  England  Navigation  Company,  approxi- 
mating a  cost  of  $11,500,000.  This  latter  company  transferred 
the  title  of  these  steamship  properties  to  another  subsidiary 
company,  the  Consolidated  Railway  Company,  at  a  value  of 


222  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

$20,000,000.  The  Consolidated  Company  thereupon  increased 
its  capital  stock  $20,000,000.  The  latter  company  was  then 
merged  with  the  New  Haven,  and  the  stock  of  the  New  Haven 
increased  $30,000,000,  $20,000,000  of  which  went  to  the  New 
England  Navigation  Company,  and  placing  in  its  treasury  by 
this  transaction  $20,000,000  Consolidated  Railway  stock,  which 
by  the  merger  became  New  Haven  stock,  with  a  market  value 
of  over  $30,000,000. 

Domination  of  the  Boston  and  Maine  Railway  was  secured 
with  apparent  ease  to  the  New  Haven  "  without  any  expendi- 
ture "  and  simply  "  by  inducing  an  exchange  of  the  Boston  and 
Maine  stock  owned  by  the  American  Express  Company  for 
New  Haven  stock."  Thus  by  a  mere  exchange  of  stock  those 
controlling  the  New  Haven  were  enabled  to  extend  their  domi- 
nation over  almost  the  entire  railroad  property  in  five  States. 
Those  who  at  first  were  merely  employed  as  fiscal  agents  of  the 
railroad  to  negotiate  its  securities  used  that  knowledge  in  the 
effort  to  become  the  masters  in  supreme  control  of  the  trans- 
portation of  the  country.  This  is  an  illustration  of  what  has 
been  a  most  dangerous  tendency  in  recent  years. 

Among  the  marked  features  and  significant  incidents  in  the 
"  loose,  extravagant,  and  improvident  administration  of  the 
finances  of  the  New  Haven  as  shown  in  this  investigation  " 
are  the  following : 

The  Boston  and  Maine  despoilment. 

The  iniquity  of  the  Westchester  acquisition. 

The  double  price  paid  for  the  Rhode  Island  trolleys. 

The  recklessness  in  the  purchase  of  Connecticut  and  Massa- 
chusetts trolleys  at  prices  exorbitantly  in  excess  of  their 
market  value. 

"  The  retention  by  John  L.  Billard  of  more  than  $2,700,000  in 
a  transaction  in  which  he  represented  the  New  Haven  and 
into  which  he  invested  not  a  dollar." 

"The  inability  of  Oakleigh  Thorne  to  account  for  $1,032,000 
of  the  funds  of  the  New  Haven  intrusted  to  him  in  carry- 
ing out  the  Westchester  proposition." 

The  Westchester  transaction  is  a  story  of  the  profligate  waste 
of  corporate  funds. 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  CONSUMER     223 

"  The  vote  appointing  this  committee  (directors  Morgan, 
Rockefeller,  and  Miller,  with  President  Mellen  as  chair- 
man) is  ambiguous  and  was  evidently  intended  to  con- 
ceal a  secret  purpose.  The  full  board  was  not  taken  into 
the  confidence  of  those  directors  who  wanted  these  securi- 
ties purchased." 

"  No  comment  is  necessary  to  make  clear  to  the  mind  the  cor- 
rupt and  unlawful  nature  of  this  transaction,  and  it  would 
seem  that  the  amount  illegally  expended  could  be  recov- 
ered from  Mr.  Mellen  and  the  directors  who  authorized 
it." 

"  It  appears  that  of  the  moneys  disbursed  by  Perry  and 
Thorne,  $1,423,000  remains  to  be  accounted  for  by 
them." 

"  The  blame  for  the  Westchester  (involving  the  squandering 
of  more  than  $36,000,000  of  the  moneys  of  the  New  Haven 
stockholders)  rests  squarely  upon  the  directors  of  the  New 
Haven  road.  Some  are  guilty  for  acts  permitted;  others, 
the  greater  number,  for  their  failure  to  act.  They  are 
alike  culpable  and  responsible  to  the  stockholders." 

The  result  of  the  transaction  with  regard  to  the  acquisition  of 
trolley  lines  was  to  enable  the  United  Gas  Improvement 
Company  to  realize  par  value  on  securities  amounting  to 
$19,899,000  of  debentures  which  represented  an  investment 
of  approximately  only  $6,000,000  and  based  merely  upon 
lively  expectation  of  future  possibilities,  thereby  immedi- 
ately placing  the  burden  of  watered  stock  upon  the  backs 
of  the  New  Haven  stockholders.  The  millions  that  were 
made  from  this  transaction  did  not  come  through  magic, 
but  were  brought  into  existence  at  the  expense  of  the  stock- 
holders of  the  New  Haven,  upon  whom  and  the  public  the 
yoke  of  giving  value  to  these  securities  ultimately  rests, 
and  the  New  Haven  stock  was  diluted  to  the  extent  of  the 
water  thus  added. 

Purchases  of  cars  and  coal  are  two  large  expenditures  that 
railroads  make.  "  The  New  Haven  purchased  cars  almost 
exclusively  from  James  B.  Brady  without  competition  and 
to  the  extent  of  some  $37,000,000.  Mr.  Brady,  as  a  wit- 
ness, made  no  secret  of  his  generosity  to  the  officials  with 
whom  he  had  business." 

Locomotives  were  purchased  from  the  company  in  which  a 
director  of  the  New  Haven  was  also  a  director. 

Many  supplies  obtained  by  the  New  Haven  were  from  com- 


224  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

panics  having  directors  who  were  also  directors  of  the  New- 
Haven. 

There  was  the  habitual  payment  of  unitemized  vouchers  with- 
out any  clear  specification  of  details. 

There  was  the  confusion  of  interrelation  of  the  principal  com- 
pany and  its  subsidiaries  and  the  consequent  complication 
of  accounts. 

Proper  accounting  demands  that  the  records  of  a  company 
should  reflect  accurately  the  transactions  relating  to  the 
matter  recorded,  and  where  accounts  fail  to  reveal  a  true 
history  of  the  transactions  it  can  be  due  to  but  one  of  two 
causes  —  carelessness  or  design.  Several  transactions  ap- 
pear of  record  "  which  show  that  by  no  stretch  of  imagina- 
tion can  the  irregularity  of  recording  be  classified  as  due 
to  carelessness." 

The  practice  of  financial  legerdemain  in  issuing  large  blocks  of 
New  Haven  stock  for  notes  of  the  New  England  Naviga- 
tion Company,  and  manipulating  these  securities  back  and 
forth. 

Fictitious  sales  of  New  Haven  stock  to  friendly  parties  with 
the  design  of  boosting  the  stock  and  unloading  on  the 
public  at  the  higher  "  market  price." 

The  unwarranted  increase  of  the  New  Haven's  liabilities  from 
$93,000,000  in  1903  to  $417,000,000  in  1913. 

The  increase  in  floating  notes  from  nothing  in  1903  to  approxi- 
mately $40,000,000  in  1913. 

The  loss  of  $2,748,700  growing  out  of  the  so-called  Billard 
transaction.  That  Billard  was  merely  a  tool  of  the  New 
Haven  in  transactions  where  he  was  involved  is  shown  by 
the  following  facts  which  stand  out  glaringly  in  the  rec- 
ord of  attempted  evasions  of  the  law  as  disclosed  by  the 
Commission's  report : 

1.  He  never  paid  a  dollar  of  his  own  for  the  stock  in  any  of 

these  transactions. 

2.  He  never  bought  a  share  of  Boston  and  Maine  stock 

where  the  New  Haven  did  not  furnish  him  the  money. 

3.  He  never  sold  a  share  of  the  Boston  and  Maine  stock 

except  as  the  New  Haven  dictated. 

4.  All  securities  nominally  held  by  the  Billard  Company  were 

kept  in  a  subdivision  of  the  vaults  of  the  New  Haven. 

5.  The  Billard  Company  was  organized  by  the  general  coun- 

sel of  the  New  Haven. 

6.  The  Navigation  Company  furnished  the  $2,000,000  for 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  CONSUMER     225 

which  the  Billard  Company  was  capitalized.  Billard 
testified  that  he  did  not  pay  any  of  his  own  money  for 
the  stock. 

7.  The  Billard  Company  bought  other  Boston  and  Maine 

stock  in  addition  to  the  109,948  shares. 

8.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Billard  Company  acted  for 

or  on  behalf  of  any  interest  other  than  the  New  Haven. 

9.  The  whole  capital  stock  of  the  Billard  Company  was  used 

as  his  own  by  Charles  S.  Mellen  (President  6f  the  New 
Haven)  as  collateral  security  for  his  own  personal  bor- 
rowing of  $375,000. 

10.  The  Billard  Company  paid  out  of  its  treasury  $375,000 

to  enable  John  L.  Billard  to  repossess  himself  of  the 
$2,000,000  capital  stock  of  that  company  after  the  same 
had  been  pledged  by  Mr.  Mellen. 

11.  J.  L.  Billard  purposely  burned  his  books  and  papers  so 

as  to  get  them  out  of  the  way. 

12.  The  Billard  Company  was  used  to  take  over  some  of  the 

questionable  assets  of  the  New  Haven  and  assets  which 
it  was  desirable  to  conceal. 

13.  The  minutes  of  the  board  of  directors  of  the  New  Haven 

show  that  Billard  was  to  receive  no  profit  out  of  this 
transaction  other  than  a  reasonable  compensation. 

14.  In  two  other  transactions  shown  in  this  case  Billard  and 

his  company  were  admittedly  used  to  accomplish  New 
Haven  purposes,  and  in  one  of  them,  which  resulted  in 
a  loss,  the  New  Haven  made  up  the  deficit  to  the  Billard 
Company. 

All  these  practices  and  many  more  of  record  represent 
transactions  within  the  industrial  state  proper,  but  industrial 
autocracy  does  not  confine  its  practices  to  the  industrial  state. 
It  reaches  out  its  malign  influence  and  endeavors  to  control 
also  the  educational  state  for  its  own  selfish  purposes.  The 
Commission's  investigation  disclosed  "  how  public  opinion  was 
distorted ;  how  officials  who  were  needed  and  who  could  be 
bought  were  bought ;  how  newspapers  that  could  be  subsidized 
were  subsidized ;  how  a  college  professor  and  publicist  secretly 
accepted  money  from  the  New  Haven  while  masking  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  a  great  American  university  and  as  the  guardian  of 
the  interests  of  the  people;  how  agencies  of  information  to 


226  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

the  public  were  prostituted  wherever  they  could  be  prosti- 
tuted in  order  to  carry  out  a  scheme  of  private  transportation 
monopoly  imperial  in  its  scope." 

Among  these  particular  incidents  in  "  the  loose,  extravagant, 
and  improvident  administration  of  the  New  Haven  "  were : 
The  unwarranted  expenditure  of  large  amounts  in  "  educating 
public  opinion " ;  the  disposition,  without  knowledge  of  the 
directors,  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  for  influencing 
public  sentiment ;  attempts  to  control  utterances  of  the  press 
by  subsidizing  reporters;  the  investment  of  $400,000  in  se- 
curities of  a  New  England  newspaper. 

Even  these  questionable  practices  are  not  all.  Not  con- 
tent with  its  malpractices  within  the  industrial  state  and  its 
attempts  to  control  the  educational  state,  the  New  Haven  in- 
dustrial autocracy  blatantly  attacked  the  instrumentalities  of  the 
sovereign  political  state  itself.  Not  only  did  the  Commis- 
sion's investigation  into  the  financial  workings  of  the  man- 
agement of  the  New  Haven  system  disclose  one  of  the  most 
glaring  instances  of  maladministration  revealed  in  all  the  his- 
tory of  American  railroading  but  it  also  uncovered  many  in- 
stances of  violation  of  the  laws  of  different  States. 

Briefly  summarized,  here  are  some  of  the  Commission's  in- 
dictments of  the  activities  of  the  New  Haven  industrial  autoc- 
racy in  its  efforts  to  dominate  for  its  own  purposes  the  po- 
litical institutions  of  the  free  people  of  New  England: 

The  unlawful  diversion  of  corporate  funds  to  political  or- 
ganizations. 

Payments  made  for  political  purposes  totaled  a  large  sum. 
For  instance,  in  1900,  $50,000  was  contributed  by  the  New 
Haven  for  campaign  purposes  through  J.  P.  Morgan  and  Com- 
pany. No  proper  and  complete  voucher  for  this  payment 
appears  on  the  books  of  the  New  Haven  Company.  In  1904 
a  payment  of  $50,000  was  made  through  Mr.  Mellen  for  polit- 
ical purposes.  This  was  secretly  done  and  not  reported  to  the 
directors  or  stockholders  or  in  any  manner  made  public. 

The  regular  employment  of  political  bosses  in  Rhode  Island 
and  other  States,  not  for  the  purpose  of  having  them  perform 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  CONSUMER     227 

any  service  but  to  prevent  them,  as  Mr.  Mellen  expressed  it, 
from  "  becoming  active  on  the  other  side." 

Payment  of  money  and  profligate  issue  of  free  passes  to 
legislators  and  their  friends. 

Extensive  use  of  a  paid  lobby  in  matters  as  to  which  the 
directors  claim  to  have  no  information. 

The  scattering  of  retainers  to  attorneys  of  five  States,  who 
rendered  no  itemized  bills  for  services  and  who  conducted  no 
litigation  to  which  the  railroad  was  a  party. 

The  story  of  Mr.  Mellen  as  to  the  distribution  of  $1,200,000 
for  corrupt  purposes  in  bringing  about  amendments  of  the 
Westchester  and  Port  Chester  franchises. 

In  connection  with  the  steamship  purchases  by  the  New 
Haven  it  was  necessary  to  have  piers.  The  record  shows 
money  payments  in  connection  with  pier  leases  which  were  un- 
mistakably improper,  and  these  payments  were  covered  up  by 
being  charged  on  the  books  of  other  companies  to  the  New 
Haven  under  such  headings  as  '*  repairs  on  steamers."  These 
pier  leases  in  the  city  of  New  York  are  controlled  by  public 
officials,  as  the  municipality  owns  the  piers,  and  arrangements 
for  the  leases  had  to  be  made  through  these  officials.  But  be- 
cause of  the  methods  employed  to  conceal  these  expenditures 
by  increases  of  capital  stock  and  otherwise,  it  has  been  impos- 
sible to  give  any  total  amount  of  these  payments. 

"  The  New  Haven  management  had  no  politics,"  comments 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  on  the  large  expenses 
incurred  out  of  the  treasury  of  the  corporation  in  litigation,  in 
procuring  legislation,  and  in  the  New  Haven's  attempts  to  stem 
the  tide  of  adverse  popular  opinion.  "  It  was  Democratic  in 
Democratic  States  and  Republican  in  Republican  States.  As 
Mr.  Mellen  testified,  its  effort  was  always  to  '  get  under  the  best 
umbrella/  No  public-service  corporation  may  rightfully  use 
corporate  funds  to  promote  a  political  cause  or  to  support  a  po- 
litical candidate  or  a  political  party.  A  corporation  as  such  has 
no  political  principles  to  maintain  and  no  political  candidates  to 
support.  The  revenues  of  a  public-service  corporation  are  for 
the  most  part  derived  from  the  exercise  of  the  right  delegated 
to  it  by  the  sovereign  power  to  tax  the  public  by  fixed  rates 
established  in  accordance  with  law.  Shippers  and  the  traveling 


2-8  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

public  may  be  presumed  to  be  divided  in  political  opinion. 
Corporate  revenue  derived  by  public  tax  from  men  of  one 
political  conviction  can  not  be  used  to  support  the  fortunes 
of  a  candidate  or  party  of  contrary  political  principles.  Re- 
gardless of  the  injustice  to  stockholders  and  travelers  belonging 
to  another  party  which  results  from  such  use  of  funds,  the 
withdrawal  from  corporate  use  and  the  diversion  to  political 
use  is  illegal  and  indefensible. 

"  Corporate  funds  may  not  be  used  for  other  than  corporate 
purposes.  That  there  was,  at  the  time  of  such  taking  and 
diversion  from  corporate  use,  no  express  statute  making  such 
acts  criminal,  in  no  degree  justifies  or  renders  lawful  such 
indefensible  use  of  corporate  funds.  It  was  always  dishonest. 
The  state  itself  may  not  use  public  funds  for  other  than  pur- 
poses prescribed  by  law.  No  creature  of  the  state  can  assert 
power  of  which  the  state  itself  is  devoid,  to  use  money  derived 
from  a  tax  on  shippers  and  travelers  to  promote  the  interests 
of  any  political  party.  Nor  is  the  '  education  '  of  the  public 
upon  economic  issues  any  part  of  the  province  of  a  corporation 
such  as  is  here  in  question.  Such  political  and  '  educational ' 
use  of  corporate  funds  is  a  gross  injustice  to  the  stockholders 
and  the  public." 

Among  the  characteristic  features  of  the  industrial  autocracy 
of  the  New  Haven  were  "  the  domination  of  all  the  affairs  of 
this  railroad  by  Mr.  Morgan  and  Mr.  Mellen  and  the  absolute 
subordination  of  other  members  of  the  board  of  directors  to 
the  will  of  these  two  " ;  "  the  indefensible  standard  of  business 
ethics  and  the  absence  of  financial  acumen  displayed  by  eminent 
financiers  in  directing  the  destinies  of  this  railroad  in  its  at- 
tempt to  establish  a  monopoly  of  the  transportation  of  New 
England  " ;  corporate  and  financial  practices  which  on  a  rea- 
sonable estimate  have  resulted  in  a  loss  to  the  New  Haven  of 
between  $60,000,000  and  $90,000,000 ;  "  an  unsound  and  mis- 
chievous "  monopoly  theory  to  effect  which  the  New  Haven 
attempted  to  circumvent  governmental  regulation  and  to  extend 
its  domination  beyond  the  limits  fixed  by  law.  "  To  achieve 


INDUSTRIAL  AUTOCRACY  AND  CONSUMER     229 

such  monopoly,"  says  the  Commission,  "  meant  the  reckless 
and  scandalous  expenditure  of  money;  it  meant  the  attempt 
to  control  public  opinion ;  corruption  of  government ;  the  at- 
tempt to  pervert  the  political  and  economic  instincts  of  the 
people  in  insolent  defiance  of  law.  Through  exposure  of  the 
methods  of  this  monopoly  the  invisible  government  which  has 
gone  far  in  its  efforts  to  dominate  New  England  has  been 
made  visible." 


INDUSTRIAL   AUTOCRACY    AND  THE    CORPORATION 

PRACTICES  and  methods  of  industrial  autocracy  similar 
to  those  described  as  having  financially  wrecked  the  New 
Haven  have  also  resulted,  in  their  operation  upon  the  rail- 
roads alone  since  1900,  in  the  looting  of  the  Boston  and  Maine, 
the  Chicago  and  Alton,  the  Rock  Island,  the  St.  Louis  and 
San  Francisco,  the  Pere  Marquette,  the  Cincinnati,  Hamilton 
and  Dayton,  and  other  corporations  engaged  in  the  production 
of  transportation  services  for  the  people.  In  most  instances 
these  railroads  had  previously  been  highly  prosperous  and 
thriving,  serving  efficiently  rich  and  growing  sections  of  the 
country,  and  conservatively  managed  in  the  interest  of  the 
public  welfare.  One  of  the  effects  of  this  reign  of  industrial 
autocracy  has  been  an  increase  in  the  number  of  and  additions 
to  already  existing  private  fortunes  of  "  undesirable  "  citizens 
and  in  consequence  an  increase  in,  or  what  might  have  been  a 
decrease  of,  the  cost  of  producing  transportation  to  these  cor- 
porations which  prevents  higher  wages  to  the  workers  and 
Tower  rates  to  the  consumers. 

As  has  been  said,  the  corporation  is  the  operating  instru- 
mentality by  means  of  which  industrial  autocracy  attains  its 
ends.  Let  us  admit  at  the  very  outset  that  the  production  of 
commodities  or  services  by  the  corporation  has  incalculable 
social  advantages.  An  entire  volume  could  be  written  detail- 
ing these  advantages  but  at  the  present  we  are  not  concerned 
with  this  aspect  of  the  industrial  state.  While  the  welfare  of 
society  demands  that  all  these  advantages  be  retained,  it  also 
just  as  imperatively  demands  that  the  evils  and  injurious  prac- 
tices of  the  corporate  control  of  wealth  production  and  dis- 

230 


THE  CORPORATION  231 

tribution  be  eradicated.  For  within  and  behind  the  corporation 
Special  Privilege,  which  has  been  driven  by  the  people  from 
their  religious,  their  educational,  and  to  a  large  extent  from 
their  political  state,  has  taken  refuge  and  is  today  entrenched 
in  the  industrial  state. 

The  corporation  is  a  creature  of  the  political  state  —  it  is 
brought  into  existence  by  means  of  a  charter  from  the  State 
and  all  the  powers  to  which  it  has  any  right  are  conferred  upon 
it  through  this  exercise  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  Pow- 
ers not  specifically  conferred  upon  it  by  its  charter  or  act  of 
incorporation  are  reserved  exclusively  to  all  the  people.  If 
its  operation  were  confined  to  the  exercise  of  its  specified  au- 
thority and  if  the  powers  granted  were  effectively  regulated 
by  the  political  state  the  workers  and  consumers  would  have  no 
cause  for  complaint.  But  the  corporation  has  assumed  rights 
and  appropriated  values  which  it  was  never  intended  it  should 
have.  The  political  state  has  been  neglectful  of  its  creature 
in  that  its  representatives  have  not  properly  regulated  the  op- 
eration of  the  corporation  in  the  interests  of  the  people. 

Now  the  corporation  of  and  by  itself  is  inoffensive;  it  is  an 
inanimate  thing,  and  itself  can  do  no  harm  to  the  people. 
Whether  it  is  beneficial  or  injurious  depends  upon  the  hands 
which  direct  its  operation  and  the  use  to  which  it  is  put.  It 
is  like  a  revolver  in  that  in  the  hands  of  a  thief  or  thieves  it 
can  be  made  the  instrument  of  robbery  while  in  the  hands  of 
well  intentioned  men  it  can  be  made  a  weapon  of  social  justice. 
There  are  many  corporations  honestly  managed  and  efficiently 
conducted  for  the  benefit  of  the  people.  There  can  be  no 
denying  and  there  should  be  no  attempt  to  deny  this  fact.  At 
the  same  time  it  is  also  equally  true  that  in  far  too  many 
cases  the  corporation  is  in  the  control  of  men  who  use  it  simply 
as  a  means  of  exploiting  the  people  either  through  low  wages 
or  high  prices  or  both. 

The  corporation  is  the  instrument  for  accomplishing  the 
purpose  of  the  owners  of  capital.  Now  capital  itself,  like  its 
agent  the  corporation,  is  neither  a  saint  nor  a  sinner ;  it  is  not, 


232  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

either  morally  or  economically,  a  law  unto  itself,  irrevocable, 
and  working  towards  an  end  regardless  of  human  welfare  or 
the  happiness  of  the  individual.  It  is  this  only  when  the 
owner  of  the  particular  capital  wills  it  to  be.  Capital  simply 
obeys  the  command  of  its  owner  or  of  whoever  may  be  in  con- 
trol of  it  for  the  time  being.  Capital  of  its  own  volition  did 
not  turn  itself  into  the  manufacture  of  guns  and  other  mu- 
nitions of  destruction  in  1914  at  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
war;  it  withdrew  from  peace  time  production  and  pursuits 
only  at  the  command  of  those  who  were  in  control  of  it.  It 
was  capital  in  the  hands  of  the  American  Red  Cross  that  per- 
formed the  healing  and  humane  tasks  on  the  battlefields  of 
Europe  just  as  it  was  capital  directed  by  the  Imperial  German 
Army  that  accomplished  its  destructive  and  inhuman  deviltry. 
Scores  of  similar  contrasts  of  the  use  and  misuse  of  capital 
will  readily  occur  to  the  reader. 

Thus  the  mission  or  purpose  of  capital  cannot  be  dissociated 
from  the  intent  of  its  possessor.  So  when  we  see  capital  pay- 
ing low  wages  and  find  wage  earning  citizens  living  in  anti- 
sociaj  conditions  of  disease  and  poverty  —  when  we  see  the  con- 
sumer exploited  through  high  prices  —  we  can  be  pretty  sure 
that  the  owner  of  this  particular  capital  employing  these 
workers  and  enforcing  these  prices  wills  these  conditions  to 
exist.  It  is  true  the  owner  of  the  particular  capital  may  not 
know  of  these  conditions  —  his  capital  may  have  been  bor- 
rowed by  some  one  else  who  puts  it  to  work  in  this  way.  But 
this  does  not  alter  the  fundamental  fact,  already  stated,  be- 
cause for  the  time  being  the  borrowed  capital  is  temporarily 
"  owned  "  by  the  user  thereof  who  wills  the  low  wages  and 
the  high  prices.  True  also  it  is  that  the  owner  may  have  his 
desire  centered  in  those  benefits  which  this  misuse  of  capital 
brings  to  him  rather  than  in  the  effect  its  misuse  has  on  the 
wage  worker  and  the  consumer.  If  owners  of  capital  were 
more  frequently  identified  personally  in  the  public  mind  with 
the  methods  and  practices  accompanying  the  use  to  which  it 
is  sometimes  put  in  production,  they  might  in  shame  and  dis- 


THE  CORPORATION  233 

grace  withdraw  their  capital  from  that  particular  employment. 

As  to  the  character  of  the  organization  of  the  corporation 
there  is  a  woeful  lack  of  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  public. 
Superficially,  the  corporation  gives  the  impression  that  it  is 
democratic  in  its  organization  in  that  the  exercise  of  the  au- 
thority conferred  by  its  charter  or  act  of  incorporation  is  vested 
in  its  stockholders.  The  fact  is  that  the  source  of  the  corpora- 
tions' authority  within  the  limitations  of  its  charter  rights  does 
not  lie  with  a  majority  of  the  number  of  its  stockholders  but 
with  a  majority  of  the  shares  of  stock  which  the  corporation 
issues.  Let  us  illustrate  this  point  in  the  case  of  the  New 
Haven. 

At  the  time  of  the  financial  wrecking  of  this  railroad  cor- 
poration, the  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company  of  New  York, 
another  corporate  creature  of  the  political  state,  owned  35,- 
640  shares  of  the  New  Haven's  stock.  With  each  share  rep- 
resenting one  vote,  this  amount  of  stock  in  the  stockholders' 
meetings  represented  that  many  votes.  The  American  Ex- 
press Company,  still  another  corporation,  owned  23,493  shares 
and  in  consequence  had  that  many  votes.  The  total  number  of 
stockholders  in  the  New  Haven  at  the  time  was  21,948,  so 
that  either  of  these  two  corporations  of  and  by  itself 
exercised  greater  voting  power  than  all  the  remaining 
stockholders  combined,  assuming  that  each  of  the  21,947 
owned  but  a  single  share  of  stock.  The  New  York 
Central  and  Hudson  River  Railroad  Company,  another 
and  competing  transportation  corporation,  also  a  creature 
of  the  political  state,  cast  11,148  votes  in  the  stock- 
holders' meetings  of  the  New  Haven;  Charles  Pratt  and  Com- 
pany was  credited  on  the  books  of  the  New  Haven  with  the 
ownership  of  stock  equal  to  10,463  votes.  Mr.  Lewis  Cass 
Ledyard,  a  single  individual  stockholder,  cast  20,542  votes ; 
another  individual  stockholder,  Mr.  C.  S.  Mellen,  the  president 
of  the  New  Haven,  had  8,780  votes;  Mr.  C.  M.  Pratt,  6,690 
votes ;  and  Mr.  J.  P.  Morgan,  a  member  of  the  board  of  di- 
rectors of  the  New  Haven,  5,077  votes. 


234  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

Thus  the  principle  of  voting  power  based  upon  the  amount 
of  stock  owned  and  not  upon  the  number  of  stockholders  gives 
to  a  single  corporation  such  as  the  Mutual  Life  Insurance 
Company  as  many  votes  as  would  be  cast  by  35,640  separate 
stockholders  each  owning  one  share  of  stock.  Such  had  been 
the  public  refutation  of  the  New  Haven  management  prior  to 
its  wrecking  that  thousands  of  citizens  of  New  England,  de- 
pendent widows  and  orphans,  and  savings  banks,  charitable 
societies,  and  executors  of  trust  funds  and  the  like,  regarding 
its  securities  as  a  safe  and  conservative  investment,  had  placed 
their  all  in  its  securities ;  and  yet  all  combined  these  thousands 
of  stockholders  representing  millions  of  dollars  of  hard-earned 
savings  and  in  thousands  of  cases  everything  of  money  value 
many  of  them  had  in  the  world,  did  not  possess  as  much  of  a 
say  in  the  stockholders'  meetings  as  did  a  single  corporation. 

The  seat  or  source  of  all  power  possessed  by  the  corporation 
within  the  limitations  of  its  charter  rights  lies  then,  not  with 
a  majority  of  the  number  of  stockholders,  as  is  generally  be- 
lieved, but  with  the  owner  or  owners  of  a  bare  majority  of  the 
amount  of  shares  of  stock  the  corporation  has  issued.  And 
this  majority  of  shares  may  be  and  frequently  is  possessed  and 
its  powers  exercised  by  a  single  corporation. 

Let  us  carry  the  analysis  a  step  further.  The  New  Haven 
corporation  itself,  through  its  ownership  of  stock  of  the  Cen- 
tral New  England  Railroad  Company,  cast  49,649  votes,  or 
98.7  per  cent,  of  the  total  voting  power,  in  all  stockholders' 
meetings  of  the  Central  New  England ;  it  cast  290,600  votes,  a 
bare  majority  of  the  total  number  of  votes  but  sufficient  to 
decide  all  questions  submitted,  in  all  stockholders'  meetings  of 
the  New  York,  Ontario  and  Western  Railroad  Company.  This 
voting  power  of  a  single  corporation  is  greater  than  the  com- 
bined voting  strength  of  the  remaining  3,501  stockholders. 
Through  ownership  of  90.7  per  cent,  of  the  stock  of  the  Boston 
Railroad  Holding  Company,  the  New  Haven,  although  not 
owning  a  single  share  of  stock  in  the  Boston  and  Maine  Rail- 
road Company,  nevertheless  controlled  53.6  per  cent,  of  the 


THE  CORPORATION  235 

voting  power  of  the  stockholders  of  the  Boston  and  Maine. 
Possession  of  a  little  over  one-half  or  a  bare  majority  of  the 
shares  usually  means  control  of  the  policy  of  a  corporation. 
This  voting  power  of  the  New  Haven  in  the  Boston  and  Maine 
is  greater  than  the  combined  voting  strength  of  the  remaining 
8,104  stockholders.  But  this  is  not  all.  Through  this  indirect 
but  none  the  less  effective  control  of  53.6  per  cent,  of  the  vot- 
ing power  of  the  Boston  and  Maine  stockholders,  the  New 
Haven,  without  the  ownership  of  a  single  share  of  the  stock 
of  the  Maine  Central  Railroad  Company,  controlled  50.5  per 
cent.,  or  more  than  a  majority,  of  the  voting  power  of  the 
Maine  Central  stockholders.  This  is  greater  voting  power  in 
the  Maine  Central  in  the  hands  of  a  single  corporation,  itself 
not  a  stockholder,  than  is  possessed  by  all  the  remaining  755 
stockholders. 

In  brief,  a  single  stockholder,  and  this,  too,  another  corpora- 
tion —  in  this  case  the  New  York,  New  Haven  and  Hartford 
Railroad  Company  —  on  the  basis  of  shares  of  stock  exercises 
greater  voting  power  in  the  meetings  of  stockholders  of  other 
corporations  than  does  99.9  per  cent,  of  the  total  number  of 
their  stockholders.  In  consequence  of  this  situation,  which 
is  nation-wide  in  its  scope  and  which  may  be  said  to  be  a  gen- 
eral practice  among  corporations,  the  meeting  of  the  stock- 
holders of  the  corporation  is  today  the  greatest  travesty  on  the 
principle  of  representative  government  of  which  it  is  possible 
to  conceive.  Such  meetings  have  the  form  of  democracy  but 
none  of  its  substance.  By  means  of  this  control  of  a  majority 
of  the  shares  of  stock,  and  through  the  utter  indifference  of 
most  stockholders  to  their  duties,  not  only  in  their  absence 
from  such  meetings  but  also  in  the  practice  of  signing  away 
their  responsibilities  through  blank  proxies,  the  proceedings  are 
usually  "  cut  and  dried  "  affairs  with  no  adequate  presentation 
or  discussion  of  the  vital  problems  of  the  industrial  state  that 
lie  within  the  jurisdiction  of  this  delegated  form  of  government. 
And  these  individual  stockholders,  as  a  rule,  are  consumers 
whose  interest  in  the  just  government  of  the  industrial  state 


236  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

is  as  vital,  if  not  more  so,  than  that  of  the  workers  employed 
by  the  corporation. 

It  is  at  the  meeting  of  the  stockholders  of  a  corporation  that 
the  board  of  directors  is  elected.  This  board  is  the  government 
of  the  corporation  to  which  the  stockholders  delegate  the  pow- 
ers they  have  received  from  the  State  —  it  is  the  machinery 
for  the  exercise  of  all  the  powers  vested  in  the  corporation. 
The  election  of  the  board  is  somewhat  analogous  in  the  indus- 
trial state  to  the  election  by  the  voters  of  the  political 
state  of  their  government  to  which  they  delegate  for  a 
stated  period  the  exercise  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  political 
state.  An  important  difference  is  that  the  government  of  the 
political  state  is  selected  on  the  principle  of  a  majoirty  of  those 
voting,  with  each  having  one  vote  equal  in  power  to  any  other 
single  vote,  while  the  board  of  directors  of  a  corporation,  pre- 
sumably elected  by  its  stockholders,  is  selected  by  the  owner 
or  owners  of  a  majority  of  shares  of  the  stock  of  the  corpora- 
tion. As  we  have  seen,  this  ownership  may  be  by  a  single 
individual  or  corporation ;  it  may  be  that  the  stock  is  not  even 
owned  directly  but  is  controlled  by  ownership  of  a  majority  of 
the  shares  of  an  entirely  different  corporation. 

Thus  it  has  come  about  in  the  development  of  the  institutions 
of  the  industrial  state  that  a  single  voter  in  the  stockholders' 
meeting  exercises  greater  voting  power  than  all  the  remaining 
stockholders  whose  interests  may  be  and  not  infrequently  are 
antagonistic.  In  testimony  before  the  House  Committee  on 
the  Judiciary  of  the  Sixty-third  Congress  *  Mr.  Samuel  Unter- 
meyer  expressed  the  opinon  that  the  oppression  of  minority 
stockholders  "  is  one  of  the  greatest  evils  of  the  present-day 
corporate  management  due  to  the  toleration  of  the  holding  com- 
pany. It  is  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception.  I  might  say 
that  it  is  almost  the  invariable  accompaniment  of  the  holding 
company.  The  idea  that  one  corporation  should  control  the 
policy  and  the  business  of  another  against  the  protest  of  an 
outstanding  minority  is  abhorrent  to  one's  sense  of  justice,  as 

1  Hearings  on  Bills  Relating  to  Trust  Legislation,  page  895. 


THE  CORPORATION  237 

is  also  the  exclusion  of  the  minority  from  all  representa- 
tion. .  .  .  There  is  no  more  important  subject  within  the  do- 
main of  corporate  reform,  for  it  is  a  crying  evil.  You  may 
have  bought  your  holdings  in  an  independently  conducted  com- 
pany and  wake  up  some  fine  day  to  find  yourself  a  victimized 
minority  holder,  with  the  majority  holdings  in  the  grip  of  a 
corporation  with  purposes  quite  alien  to  the  best  interests  of 
your  company  and  with  no  redress.  That  should  no  longer  be 
possible." 

The  injurious  effects  to  the  consumer  as  well  as  to  the 
worker,  which  latter  is  beginning  to  demand  though  faintly 
some  kind  of  representation  in  industry,  inevitably  flowing  out 
of  this  autocratic  organization  and  operation  of  the  corporation 
are  innumerable  and  widespread.  It  is  not  tfie  purpose  here, 
even  if  the  limitations  of  space  did  not  forbid,  to  enter  into 
any  analysis  of  the  many  practices  accompanying  this  control 
of  the  corporation  that  are  affecting  seriously  the  economic 
welfare  of  the  people.  But  there  is  one  aspect  of  the  situation 
that  must  be  touched  upon. 

All  the  innumerable  transactions  of  the  industrial  state  in- 
volving the  production  of  commodities  and  services,  such  as 
purchases,  sales,  leases,  rentals,  and  so  on,  are  covered  by  con- 
tracts legally  enforceable  in  the  courts.  Where  these  contracts 
are  between  corporations  their  terms  are  determined  in  the 
final  analysis  by  the  board  of  directors.  In  those  numerous 
instances  where  such  contracts  exist  between  corporations 
whose  boards  of  directors  are  elected  and  controlled  by  the 
same  individual  or  group  of  individuals,  the  effect  is  exactly  the 
same  as  it  would  be  if  the  individual  or  group  entered  into  a 
contract  with  himself  or  itself.1  The  records  of  the  looting  of 
the  New  Haven  and  other  corporations  abound  in  instances  of 
such  contracts.  No  court  of  law  in  the  land  would  enforce  a 

1  "  The  principal  directors  of  the  company  (the  Central  Pacific  Rail- 
road Company)  all  received  large  salaries  as  compensation  for  their 
various  services  as  president,  treasurer,  secretary,  or  manager  of  the 
company.  It  is  therefore  impossible  to  find  any  justification  for  the 


238  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

contract  an  individual  makes  with  himself,  and  yet  in  hun- 
dreds and  thousands  of  cases  where  a  contract  is  made  between 
two  or  more  corporations  controlled  by  the  same  individual  or 
group  such  contracts  receive  the  sanction  of  the  courts.  Thus 
merely  through  a  legal  fiction  a  contract  is  enforced  in  which 
an  individual  or  group  buys  from  or  sells  to  himself  or  itself. 
And  in  all  these  cases  in  the  industrial  state  today  private  for- 
tunes are  being  accumulated  by  the  individuals  concerned  at 
the  expense  of  the  worker  in  low  wages  and  of  the  consumer 
in  high  prices. 

The  records  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  are  re- 
plete with  instances  of  such  questionable  transactions.  In  its 
report  of  the  New  Haven  investigation,  to  which  references 
have  already  been  made,  the  Commission  says  of  the  lease  sys- 
tem under  which  the  New  Haven  has  secured  control  of  many 
of  its  three  hundred  and  more  subsidiary  companies :  "  It 
must  also  be  evident  that  under  a  system  of  this  kind  unjust 
charges  may  be  imposed  upon  the  public  without  yielding  un- 
due returns  to  the  operating  company,  provided  the  leases  are 
upon  too  high  a  basis.  It  by  no  means  follows,  because  the 
Boston  and  Maine  does  not  make  earnings  sufficient  to  pay  its 
fixed  charges,  that  its  rates  are  too  low  and  should  be  advanced. 
There  is  still  the  fundamental  inquiry,  Are  the  rentals  of  the 
Boston  and  Maine  too  high?  If  they  are,  it  may  be  necessary 
to  readjust  those  rentals  upon  some  new  basis  in  order  that 
justice  may  be  done  to  all  parties  interested.  It  would  be  a 
monstrous  proposition  that,  because  at  some  past  day  some 
board  of  directors  of  the  Boston  and  Maine  had  agreed  to  pay 
an  extravagant  price  for  the  use  of  the  lines  making  up  its 
system,  therefore  the  owners  of  these  properties  are  for  all 
time  entitled  to  obtain  this  undue  return  upon  their  invest- 
ment." 

transfer  to  themselves  of  the  entire  franchise  of  this  company,  repre- 
sented in  its  stock,  and  of  a  considerable  portion  of  its  assets,  obtained 
through  contracts  made  by  their  own  votes."—  Report  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States  of  the  Pacific  Railway  Commission. 


THE  CORPORATION  239 

Even  though  it  is  a  monstrous  proposition,  it  is  exactly  what 
is  actually  happening  all  over  the  country.  In  Philadelphia, 
for  instance,  the  people  are  suffering  for  the  lack  of  adequate 
street  car  facilities  because  the  Philadelphia  Rapid  Transit  Com- 
pany, burdened  with  such  leases  and  rentals  of  subsidiary  com- 
panies which  exact  exorbitant  and  extortionate  returns,  is  un- 
able to  finance  imperatively  needed  improvements,  betterments, 
and  extensions.  Private  fortunes  in  Philadelphia,  built  up 
through  such  contracts  and  by  the  manipulation  of  securities 
between  various  public  utility  corporations,  are  notorious  and 
these  private  fortunes  in  large  part  rest  today  upon  the  ability 
of  the  Philadelphia  Rapid  Transit  Company  to  extort  from  the 
passenger  a  fare  high  enough  to  meet  such  charges  for  rentals 
to  subsidiary  companies  of  leased  lines. 

Thus  the  present-day  complex,  intricate,  and  wholly  and  in- 
tentionally confusing  autocratic  industrial  system  has  its  ex- 
istence based  upon  the  legal  fiction  of  the  sanctity  of  contract. 
Now  no  one  can  have  greater  reverence  for  contractual  rela- 
tions than  has  the  writer  —  much  of  the  progress  of  that  which 
we  are  prone  to  call  civilization  rests  on  the  sacredness  of  these 
relations.  But  the  sacrilegious  practices  of  those  in  control  of 
our  corporations  with  regard  to  these  relations  should  receive 
from  the  public  neither  respect  nor  willing  obedience.  There 
should  be  no  more  sanctity  in  such  a  device  or  subterfuge  to 
escape  the  just  penalty  of  what  in  many  cases  is  actual  theft 
than  there  is  in  the  enforcement  of  a  contract  made  by  an 
individual  with  himself,  for  this  is  what  has  actually  been  done 
when  the  legal  fiction  is  stripped  away. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE  ORGANIZATION   OF  THE   CONSUMER 

f  I  AHE  European  war  has  forced  the  American  people  to  open 
•*•  their  eyes  to  a  number  of  manifestations  of  their  national 
life  with  regard  to  which  for  years  they  have  simply  been 
drifting  without  any  thoughtful  consideration  as  to  the  goal 
towards  which  this  drifting  was  carrying  them  and  their  form 
of  government.  Among  these  manifestations  are  the  nature 
and  characteristics  of  the  industrial  organization  that  has 
grown  up  for  the  production,  distribution,  and  consumption  of 
socially  produced  wealth. 

It  is  not  possible  here  to  refer  even  briefly  to  its  historical  de- 
velopment. Today  we  find  accompanying  the  autocratic  ex- 
ercise of  economic  sovereignty  by  a  single  corporation  within 
its  sphere  of  influence  in  the  industrial  state,  as  already  de- 
scribed, that  there  has  developed  also  a  centralization  or  con- 
centration of  economic  power  through  organized  relations  be- 
tween groups  of  corporations  by  means  of  intercorporate  stock 
ownership  and  interlocking  directorates.  These  systems  have 
been  described  fully  and  in  detail  in  evidence  from  official 
documents  presented  by  the  writer  before  wage  arbitration 
boards  appointed  by  Presidents  of  the  United  States  and  in  rate 
cases  before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and  State 
public  utilities  commissions.1 

1  Exhibits  Submitted  Before  the  Board  of  Arbitration,  Concerted 
Wage  Movement,  Eastern  Territory,  1913,  Order  of  Railway  Con- 
ductors and  Brotherhood  of  Railroad  Trainmen. 

Before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  Investigation  and 
Suspension  Docket  No.  333,  in  the  Matter  of  Rate  Increases  in  Official 
Classification  Territory,  known  as  the  Five  Per  Cent  Case,  1914. 

Before  the  Public  Utilities  Commission  of  Ohio  in  the  Matter  of  In- 

240 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONSUMER     241 

The  situation  at  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century  was 
that  the  American  people  were  permitting  the  unregulated  op- 
eration of  powerful  and  autocratic  national  trusts  or  corpora- 
tions each  in  monopoly  control  of  some  one  or  several  of  the 
necessities  of  life.  Steel,  copper,  oil,  coal,  meat  products, 
sugar,  tobacco,  and  scores  of  like  necessities  were  being  pro- 
duced in  mill  and  mine  and  plant  by  millions  of  workers  at  low 
wages  and  distributed  to  consumers  at  high  prices.  Partly 
to  keep  these  wages  low  aliens  were  imported  from  Europe  by 
the  shiploads  and  concentrated  in  the  industrial  centers  under 
the  most  deplorable  living  conditions ;  to  keep  prices  high  com- 
petition was  ruthlessly  suppressed  and  where  necessary  to  the 
purpose  of  the  corporation  recourse  was  had  even  to  control  of 
the  courts  and  Government  of  the  people. 

One  of  the  many  evil  consequences  of  this  was  the  springing 
up  over  night  like  mushrooms  of  millionaires  and  even  multi- 
millionaires by  the  hundreds  and  thousands,  reflecting  the  rapid 
accumulation  of  the  largest  number  of  separate  private  for- 
tunes ever  produced  before  in  any  similar  period  of  time  in 
the  history  of  the  world.  These  were  concealed  from  the  pub- 
lic in  greater  part  under  the  guise  of  the  corporation.  Thus 
"  legal  "  claim  to  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  wealth  of  the 
country  as  represented  in  its  natural  resources  became  concen- 
trated in  the  hands  of  a  relatively  insignificant  number  of  in- 
dividuals and  families  instead  of  this  wealth  being  widely  dif- 
fused among  all  the  people  in  fair  wages  to  the  workers  and 

crease  of  Intrastate  Rates  by  the  Hocking  Valley  Railway  Company. 

Before  the  Public  Service  Commission  of  Pennsylvania,  Pittsburgh 
Coal  Operators'  Association,  Complainant,  vs.  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
Company,  et  al,  1916. 

Before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  I.  and  S.  Docket  No. 
774,  Bituminous  Coal  to  Central  Freight  Association  Territory,  etc., 
1916. 

Before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  No.  5725,  Lake  Cargo 
Coal  Rates,  1916. 

See  also  "  Intercorporate  Railway  Stock  Ownership "  and  "  Inter- 
locking Directorates,"  published  by  the  author. 


242  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

fair  prices  to  the  consumers.  It  was  a  challenge  to  our  boasted 
democratic  society  and  its  republican  institutions  which  the 
Government  has  been  unable  or  at  least  unwilling  to  meet.  Be- 
cause of  this  failure  of  Government  the  American  working- 
man  has  been  compelled  to  revolt  against  his  low  wages  and 
for  years  has  been  struggling  to  organize  himself  in  labor 
unions  that  would  be  strong  enough  to  secure  to  him  for  his 
labor  a  living  wage.  On  this  issue  great  industrial  wars  or 
strikes  have  been  and  are  being  waged  between  the  union  and 
the  corporation.  This  was  the  situation  in  the  industrial  state 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war.  It  is  the  situation  today 
only  more  aggravated  by  the  experience  of  labor  during  the 
war. 

The  principal  object  of  industrial  autocracy  through  the 
corporation  is  monopoly  control  of  wages  and  prices  for  the 
personal  profit  of  those  who  dominate  by  means  of  stock  own- 
ership these  producing  corporations.1  In  consequence  there  is 
no  provision  in  the  present  organization  of  the  corporation  for 
representation  of  the  vital  interests  of  the  wage  worker,  one 
of  the  three  parties  to  production. 

No  one  fact  stands  out  more  conspicuously  in  a  survey  of 
our  industrial  state  than  that  the  present  system  of  autocratic 
organization  of  production  has  alienated  the  friendship  and 
loyalty  and  self-interest  of  the  great  mass  of  wage  earners. 

1  Referring  to  this  situation  as  reflected  in  the  railway  transporta- 
tion field  through  intercorporate  stock  ownership  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  says :  "  The  conclusion  is  indisputable  that  rail- 
way corporations  do  not  purchase  railway  stock  widely  for  purposes 
of  investment,  but  that  the  holdings  in  the  stock  of  other  railways 
are  rather  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  or  influencing  the  manage- 
ment of  corporations  whose  operations  are  of  real  concern  to  the 
holding  company.  ...  It  is  difficult  to  discover  any  economic  justifica- 
tion for  the  existence  of  these  holding  companies  and  for  their  enor- 
mous issues  of  securities.  The  only  rational  explanation,  as  already 
noted,  is  their  employment  as  a  medium  by  large  financial  interests  to 
concentrate  and  perpetuate  control." —  Special  Report  No.  i,  Inter- 
corporate Relationships  of  Railways,  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONSUMER     243 

The  mere  record  of  strikes  and  lockouts  supplies  complete 
proof  of  this  assertion. 

The  existence  of  hundreds  of  strong  and  powerful  national 
and  international  labor  unions  with  their  millions  of  members 
but  emphasizes  lost  opportunities  by  our  captains  of  industry 
in  the  organization  for  social  ends  of  our  system  of  produc- 
tion, distribution,  and  consumption  of  wealth.  The  economic 
welfare  of  the  worker  engaged  in  production,  much  more  so 
than  that  of  the  employer,  lies  fundamentally  in  the  direction  of 
securing  the  greatest  possible  output  with  the  minimum  ex- 
penditure of  capital  and  labor,  and  yet  the  employe  has  been 
prevented  from  following  this  economic  self-interest  by  the 
short-sighted  policy  of  the  employing  class  in  its  distribution  of 
the  proceeds  of  industry.  This  distribution  has  been  arbi- 
trarily and  autocratically  controlled  by  the  employing  group. 
It  has  granted  to  the  worker  only  that  amount  which  would 
barely  meet  his  mere  physical  necessities  for  food,  clothing, 
and  shelter  —  and  quite  frequently  not  enough  even  for  these 
imperative  needs  —  and  has  retained  for  itself  all  the  remain- 
ing proceeds  of  production.  In  this  policy  it  has  completely 
ignored  the  loyalty  and  friendship  and  cooperation  of  the 
worker  and  thereby  has  missed  the  development  of  a  veritable 
mine  of  potential  wealth.  In  place  of  these  the  employing 
class  has  developed  the  opposition  and  antagonism  of  the  wage 
earner.  The  inevitable  result  of  this  policy  has  been  the  steady 
growth  in  the  power  of  the  labor  union. 

There  is  no  provision  in  the  present  autocratic  organization 
of  the  industrial  state,  as  reflected  in  the  corporation,  for  repre- 
sentation of  the  vital  interests  of  the  consumer,  one  of  the  three 
parties  to  production. 

Is  the  short-sightedness  of  those  in  charge  of  the  manage- 
ment and  direction  of  our  capitalistic  system  of  production  to 
cause  history  to  repeat  itself?  Are  the  producers  to  lose  the 
friendship  and  loyalty  and  cooperation  of  the  consumers  as  they 
have  that  of  the  workers? 

There  is  abundant  evidence  on  all  sides  that  this  is  the  pres- 


244  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

ent  tendency.  Profiteering  and  exploitation  on  the  part  of 
producers,  which  has  been  a  conspicuous  manifestation  of  the 
activities  of  our  national  life  the  past  six  years,  will  just  as 
certainly  in  course  of  time  result  in  the  organization  of  the 
consumer  to  protect  himself  against  the  injustice  of  high  prices 
as  did  like  economic  forces  compel  the  wage  earner  to  organize 
against  low  wages.  Unfair  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of 
industry,  in  which  all  three  groups  in  society  are  vitally  in- 
terested, will  alienate  the  consumer  as  it  did  the  worker.  And 
this  organization  of  the  consumer  will  be  as  much  to  the  ulti- 
mate disadvantage  of  the  producer,  if  not  more  so,  than  is  the 
present  organization  of  the  worker.  Our  recent  war  expe- 
rience with  profiteers  shows  quite  clearly  how  easy  it  is  to 
cause  the  springing  up  of  housewives'  organizations  and  the 
like  in  opposition  to  high  prices.  The  producers'  best  friend  is 
the  consumer  only  it  is  to  be  feared  the  average  producer  of 
today  does  not  realize  this  fact. 

It  is  the  consuming  class  which  in  the  final  analysis  supplies 
the  capital  for  every  business,  meets  the  cost  of  fixed  charges, 
furnishes  the  current  assets,  and  balances  the  pay-roll.  In 
one  aspect  of  the  case  the  employer  is  merely  the  employe  of 
the  consumer  —  an  agent,  self  appointed  it  is  true,  for  sup- 
plying the  consumer  with  needed  commodities  and  services. 
It  is  commonly  believed  that  wages  and  like  expenses  of  pro- 
duction are  paid  by  and  out  of  capital  supplied  by  the  employer 
but  if  the  facts  are  analyzed  closely  enough  it  will  be  found 
that  in  the  final  analysis  wages  are  paid  by  the  consumer  out  of 
his  contribution  to  production  through  prices,  except  at  the 
initial  establishing  of  the  industry,  and  even  in  this  case,  if 
the  means  of  production  prove  successful,  these  wages  have 
merely  been  advanced  by  the  employer  while  their  cost  is  ul- 
timately met  by  the  consumer.  It  can  thus  be  seen  how  im- 
portant to  the  successful  conduct  of  industry  is  the  friendship 
of  the  consumer.  Its  cultivation  and  retention  should  be  a 
matter  of  concern  to  the  manager  of  industry.  If  the  con- 
sumer goes  on  strike  —  if  he  refuses  to  purchase  a  particular 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONSUMER     245 

commodity  —  if  he  exercises  his  individual  or  collective  power 
of  the  boycott  —  if  he  transfers  his  demand  to  a  substitute  ar- 
ticle—  if  he  in  brief  organizes  his  potential  power  to  redress 
the  injustice  of  high  prices,  the  producer  will  very  soon  be 
confronted  by  the  necessity  of  closing  down  his  plant  or  fac- 
tory just  as  effectively  as  is  often  the  case  in  a  successful  strike 
by  the  workers. 

Our  present  system  of  corporate  organization  of  production, 
involving  among  other  practices  the  issuance  of  a  tremendous 
amount  of  fictitious  "  investment  "  securities  in  the  process  of 
capitalizing  social  values  for  personal  or  class  profit,  is  of 
even  greater  concern  to  the  welfare  of  the  consumer  than  it 
has  been  indicated  to  be  to  that  of  the  wage  earner.  The  con- 
dition of  the  "  property  investment "  and  "  capital  obliga- 
tions "  accounts  of  the  railroads  previously  referred  to  is 
taken  merely  as  one  of  a  score  or  more  illustrations  of  prac- 
tices that  are  socially  injurious  as  well  as  unjust.  In  the  pres- 
ent dangerous  situation  as  regards  our  railroads  we  see  some 
of  these  injurious  results  of  widespread  corporation  practices. 
Because  of  these  the  investing  public  has  lost  all  confidence  in 
the  railroads  and  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  these  transporta- 
tion corporations  to  secure  from  investors  the  capital  of  which 
they  are  in  need. 

For  years  there  had  been  a  din  and  clamor  in  certain  influ- 
ential sections  of  the  public  for  a  so-called  valuation  of  our 
railroads.  Congress  finally  gave  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  authority  to  proceed  with  this  valuation.  One  of 
the  instructions  to  the  Commission  in  ascertaining  this  value 
was  to  report  the  original  investment.  The  Commission's  ex- 
perts claim  this  to  be  an  impossibility  and  the  railway  corpora- 
tions themselves  assert'that  they  do  not  possess  the  facts.  The 
issuance  of  securities  representing  alleged  values  has  had  no 
relation  whatever  to  the  amount  actually  invested  in  the  prop- 
erties plus  services  and  labor  performed  and  in  consequence 
not  millions  but  billions  of  paper  value  have  been  created  upon 
which  the  holders  wherever  possible  force  a  return  in  dividends 


246  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

or  interest.  Such  return  can  only  be  secured  by  means  of 
high  prices  to  the  consumer.  The  so-called  investment  market 
has  literally  been  flooded  with  securities  by  railroad  and  in- 
dustrial corporations  which  today  stand  as  "  legal  "  claims  not 
only  upon  the  earnings  of  these  properties  but  also  upon  the 
properties  themselves.  Many  of  these  securities  are  in  reality 
piratical  demands  or  tributes  which  are  exacted  every  six 
months  and  which  extort  from  the  consumer  a  price  over  and 
above  that  necessary  to  meet  the  legitimate  cost  of  production. 
This  paper  capitalization  of  values  that  do  not  exist  and  of 
social  values  which  properly  belong  to  the  public  is  an  unjust 
economic  burden  upon  the  consumer.  In  large  part  because 
of  it  a  fair  price  is  an  impossibility  and  an  excessive  return  to 
alleged  investment  is  the  product. 

The  effects  of  such  practices  are  in  the  nature  of  a  blanket 
mortgage  on  the  annual  increase  in  the  nation's  production  of 
wealth,  interest  on  which  is  the  payment  of  an  unjust  claim. 
This  increase  should  in  justice  be  partly  distributed  among  all 
the  people  in  lower  prices  and  higher  wages  but  instead  of 
this  process  it  is  being  taken  from  them  by  the  "  legalization  " 
of  fictitious  claims  to  capital  investment.  Much  of  it  has  been 
taken  in  the  past  through  low  wages  to  the  workers.  But  the 
forces  let  loose  by  the  European  war  have  released  this  Titan 
from  his  bonds  and  he  has  risen  to  full  stature  to  demand  his 
just  share  in  wealth  production.  And  he  demands  it  with 
greater  assurance  than  in  the  past  that  he  will  receive  his 
share.  He  is  very  likely  not  only  to  maintain  but  also  to  ad- 
vance this  claim  successfully,  which  means  that  the  burden  of 
a  continuance  of  corporation  practices  and  methods  of  produc- 
tion will  be  shifted  to  the  shoulders,  or  rather  to  the  pocket- 
books,  of  the  consumer  through  high  prices.  The  anthracite 
industry  of  Pennsylvania  offers  convincing  proof  of  such  a 
probability.  The  consumer,  being  at  present  unorganized,  will 
at  first  be  unable  to  resist  and  will  be  subjected  to  a  period  of 
high  prices  until  these  exactions  become  so  burdensome  as  to 
force  him  also  into  organization  for  self  protection.  Only 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONSUMER     247 

when  the  worker  and  the  consumer  are  sufficiently  organized, 
either  separately  or  in  combination,  and  cooperate  to  resist  the 
unjust  claims  of  organized  capital  will  our  democratic  society 
reach  that  point  where  justice  will  be  determined  as  between 
the  "  rights  "  of  the  capitalist,  the  worker,  and  the  consumer. 

The  grim  truth  of  the  whole  matter  at  present  is  that  our 
corporate  instrumentalities  of  production  are  not  organized  on 
a  basis  that  will  permit  the  determination  of  what  is  a  fair 
return  to  capital,  a  fair  wage  to  labor,  and  a  fair  price  to  the 
consumer.  The  basis  upon  which  they  are  organized  is  more 
frequently  a  high  return  to  the  capital  invested,  and  in  many 
cases  where  there  has  been  no  investment  of  capital,  a  low 
wage,  and  a  high  price. 

The  organization  of  the  consumer  as  an  economic  group  to 
define  and  insist  upon  his  rights  is  the  next  necessary  step 
before  there  can  be  socialization  of  industrial  production  for 
the  common  welfare.  This  is  preeminently  the  problem  for 
this  generation  to  work  out,  as  the  problem  of  the  last  gen- 
eration was  the  organization  of  the  worker.  He  who  claims 
to  be  able  to  supply  the  answer  as  to  how  this  is  to  be  done  is 
too  much  of  a  braggart  to  be  trusted.  The  forcible  taking 
over  by  the  government  of  the  industries  to  which  are  at- 
tached a  public  interest  and  their  "  nationalization  "  or  "  so- 
cialization "  so  as  to  wipe  out  these  false  values  and 
in  so  doing  restore  to  the  people  social  values  that 
have  been  appropriated,  thus  preventing  the  continuance  of 
extortionate  tributes  from  the  great  mass  of  consumers  in 
high  prices,  is  a  policy  that  is  being  insisted  upon  by  some. 
It  is  based  upon  the  final  and  ultimate  right  of  revolution 
against  injustice  which  is  inherent  in  every  society  and  the  de- 
nial of  which  would  deprive  the  social  organism  of  its  last 
weapon  or  instrument  of  regeneration.  But  revolution  is  the 
means  only  after  all  others  have  failed  and  we  should  first 
turn  to  the  application  of  our  best  thought  and  patriotism  to  the 
working  out  of  a  plan  for  a  peaceable  solution. 

Any  such  plan  must  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the 


248  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

determination  of  the  return  to  the  owner  of  capital  or  to  the 
possessor  of  labor  cannot  be  left  to  each  of  these  two  interested 
classes  or  groups.  If  it  is,  then  one  or  both  remaining  classes 
will  be  disadvantageously  affected.  If  the  capitalist  alone  de- 
termines the  return  on  his  money  or  investment  he  is  likely  to 
make  it  too  high ;  i  f  the  worker  alone  determines  the  wage  rate 
he  is  to  receive  it  also  will  likely  be  too  high.  Nor  can  the  de- 
termination be  left  solely  to  the  consumer.  If  the  latter  alone 
determines  the  price  of  the  commodity  or  service  this  is  likely 
to  be  too  low  to  permit  of  a  fair  wage  and  a  fair  return  to 
capital.  Neither  can  the  determination  of  what  is  a  fair  re- 
turn to  capital,  a  fair  wage,  or  a  fair  price  be  left  to  any  two 
of  the  three  parties  interested  in  production  because  of  the 
danger  of  a  possible  combination  of  class  self-interest.  Such 
determination  can  be  arrived  at  only  through  the  participation 
of  all  three  parties  in  interest. 

The  capitalist-producer  is  strongly  organized  in  virtually 
every  industry  and  in  associations  of  industries  for  the  pro- 
tection of  his  economic  interest  in  profits ;  the  worker-producer 
is  likewise  organized  in  powerful  local  unions  and  national 
federations  for  the  safeguarding  of  his  economic  interest  in 
wages.  There  are  not  wanting  instances  where  these  two 
economic  groups  have  even  formed  combinations  for  mutual 
exploitation  of  the  interest  of  the  consumer.  With  the  con- 
sumer unorganized  for,  the  protection  of  his  economic  interest 
in  prices,  he  is  relatively  weak  and  defenceless.  In  conse- 
quence, upon  him  today  rests  nearly  all  the  cost-burden  of 
production  and  distribution,  and  it  is  because  of  this  that  he 
suffers  from  under-consumption  of  the  wealth  that  our  indus- 
trial system  produces. 

Up  to  the  present  time  the  consumer  has  depended  and  to- 
day is  dependent  almost  entirely  upon  the  Government  to  pro- 
tect him  from  the  social  and  individual  evils  of  high  prices. 
He  has  allowed  himself  to  be  regarded  as  the  public.  That 
protection  the  consumer  has  not  secured.  That  this  is  true  is 
reflected  in  the  failure  of  the  efforts  of  the  Wilson  Adminis- 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONSUMER     249 

tration  through  the  Department  of  Justice  to  effect  in  the 
slightest  degree  a  reduction  in  the  high  cost  of  living.  It  is 
reflected  in  the  inactivity  of  Congress.  It  is  also  shown  in  the 
results  of  the  recent  bituminous  coal  miners'  strike  by  which 
the  increase  of  27  per  cent,  in  wages  granted  by  the 
Government  commission  was  taken  advantage  of  by  the 
organized  coal  operators  to  increase  the  price  of  coal  to  the 
consumer  even  beyond  the  amount  necessary  to  meet  the  in- 
crease in  wages,  assuming  that  this  should  be  borne  by  the 
consumer  and  not  out  of  the  excessive  profits  of  the  coal  op- 
erator. It  is  conclusively  demonstrated  in  the  exorbitant  earn- 
ings of  virtually  all  corporations  dealing  in  the  necessaries  (of 
life  as  disclosed  in  Senate  Document  Number  259,  which  latter 
is  a  report  by  the  Secretary  of  the  United  States  Treasury  on 
profiteering  during  the  war  as  shown  in  the  payment  of  in- 
come and  excess  profit  taxes. 

That  something  is  amiss  with  the  working  out  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  democracy  in  the  United  States  is  indicated  so  clearly 
in  the  daily  events  of  the  industrial  life  of  America  that  even 
he  who  runs  may  read  their  significance.  In  the  train  of  the 
ever-widening  circles  of  increasing  prices  have  followed  tend- 
encies which  have  in  them  possible  developments  of  far-reach- 
ing consequences  to  the  American  people.  One  of  these  should 
be  the  organization  of  the  consumer  to  protect  effectively  his 
economic  interests  in  the  production,  distribution,  and  con- 
sumption of  wealth. 

One  of  the  functions  of  the  organization  of  the  consumer 
is  to  join  hands  with  the  organized  wage  worker  and  together 
demand  and  enforce  the  return  to  the  people  of  the  benefits 
of  social  values  to  which  industrial  autocracy  lays  unjust  claim 
and  of  which  it  is  in  possession.  The  instrumentality  by 
means  of  which  these  values  were  appropriated  and  their 
benefits  are  retained  by  autocracy  is  the  corporation.  Like 
the  land  "  squatter,"  industrial  autocracy  has  for  so  long  a 
time  been  in  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  returns  on  these 
social  values  that  its  adherents  and  beneficiaries  now  insist 


250  THE  WORKERS  AT  WAR 

vehemently  upon  their  "  legal  "  ownership.  And  in  all  too  many 
cases  they  have  actually  succeeded  in  "  legalizing  "  their  squat- 
ter possession  of  these  social  values  by  issuing  securities 
against  them  upon  which  the  worker  and  the  consumer  are 
required  to  pay  semi-annual  and  annual  tribute  in  the  form  of 
interest  on  bonds  and  dividends  on  stocks.  The  interests  of 
the  wage  worker  and  of  the  consumer  not  having  been  given 
consideration  at  the  time  of  the  appropriation  of  these  values, 
industrial  autocracy  simply  continues  in  possession  and  ex- 
ploits both  groups  for  the  benefit  solely  of  its  own  members. 
These  and  other  values  can  be  restored  to  the  people  by  in- 
sistence upon  the  democratization  of  the  corporation  with  the 
object  of  securing  a  fair  profit,  a  fair  wage,  and  a  fair  price 
in  industry.  This  is  industrial  justice,  which  is  the  aim  of 
industrial  democracy,  and  to  secure  it  an  American  Federation 
of  Consumers  is  most  essential. 


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